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Three Essayson Mergers and Acquisitions 
Nabil El Meslmani, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2017 
 This thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, we examine the behavior of the 
implied volatility of both target and acquirer firms around merger and acquisition 
announcements
1
. We find that option implied volatility is related to the bidder firm’s 
announcement cumulative abnormal return (CAR-Bidder), the choice of the method of payment 
as well as the probability that the deal will be concluded successfully. Specifically, we show that 
target implied volatility not only drops at the announcement day but moves towards the acquirer 
implied volatility post acquisition announcement for stock or mixed deals. Moreover, we find 
that the method of payment is related to the post announcement target implied volatility, and we 
document that target implied volatilities are lower in cash deals. The probability of deal success 
is significantly negatively affected by the spread between the actual target’s implied volatility 
two days after the announcement and its theoretical value. The greater the difference between the 
target’s implied volatility and its theoretical value, the lower the probability of successful deal 
completion.  
 Next, we rely on the average of the implied volatility as a proxy for expected risk and the 
volatility of the implied volatility as a proxy for uncertainty about expected risk. We show that 
the CAR-Bidder decreases with an increase in both the expected risk and the uncertainty about 
expected risk of the bidder firm for stock or mixed deals. We also illustrate that the probability of 
a cash offer is decreasing in the expected risk and the uncertainty about expected risk of both 
bidder and target firms. We also find that the probability of deal success is decreasing in bidder’s 
expected risk. Our measures related to risk and uncertainty about risk contain information 
additional to common proxies for asymmetric information and uncertainty used in the literature 
such as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts and idiosyncratic volatility.  
 The second essay examines whether the puzzling negative relationship between 
idiosyncratic volatility and next month performance is affected by the intensity of merger and 
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acquisition (M&A) activity in the market
2
. Our results show that the idiosyncratic volatility 
puzzle is stronger in periods of high M&A activity than in periods of low M&A activity. Further 
analysis shows that the negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and next month 
performance is the strongest in the high M&A activity sub-period spanning from 1982-1989. In 
contrast, M&A activity does not explain the negative relationship between the common factor in 
idiosyncratic volatility (CIV) and the next month’s performance. M&A activity can in part 
explain the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, but it does not subsume the negative relationship 
between CIV exposure and firm returns. 
 The third essay investigates how investor sentiment affects mergers and acquisitions
3
. 
Our results show that periods of higher market sentiment are associated with a lower likelihood 
of observing a Cash-Only offer. We also find that for stock and mixed offers, periods of higher 
market sentiment are associated with lower bidder announcement returns, higher target 
bargaining power, and lower synergy. Our findings are consistent with Barker and Wu’s (2012) 
argument that associates periods of higher market sentiment with greater overpricing. These 
results are consistent with the argument that higher overpricing results in bidder firms opting for 
stock or mixed deals. However, this will also lead bidder investors to react more negatively to 
these non-cash offer announcements, target investors to bargain more if they are to be paid in 
stock (fully or partially), and the market to anticipate lower total synergy as the deal may be 
driven by the stock overpricing rather than the maximization of synergy. Next, we find that 
target firm runups are, on average, higher in periods of higher market sentiment. This 
relationship is not observed in the premium, which is unrelated to investor sentiment. The 
differing results of the runup and the premium is interesting as we expected to find a relationship 
between runup and premium similar to the markup pricing hypothesis of Schwert (1996). It 
appears that in periods of higher investor sentiment there is a higher runup potentially associated 
with the overreaction of optimistic investors. However, bidder firms’ management realize that 
this excessive runup is not an increase in the stand-alone value of the target firm and they price 
the deal accordingly. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
Mergers and acquisitions is a topic that attracts a lot of research. We contribute to this wide 
range of literature by reaching outside the scope of mergers and acquisitions to three different 
fields of finance. In the first essay, we reach out to the options market in analyzing different 
merger and acquisition characteristics. In the second essay, we link the intensity of mergers and 
acquisitions to one asset pricing anomaly: the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, and in the third 
essay, we investigate how investor sentiment affects different mergers and acquisitions features. 
 In the first essay (Chapter two of this thesis), we study the choice of the medium of 
exchange in mergers and acquisitions. This line of work dates back to the early 1980s where 
Travlos (1987) and Majluf (1984) argue that bidder firms prefer to issue stock if they are 
overvalued and cash if they are undervalued. Within the same context, Hansen (1987) also 
supports the hypothesis that overvalued bidders would prefer to offer stock or mixed offers. In 
general, the literature supports the hypothesis that overvalued bidders are more inclined to 
choose a stock or mixed method of payment over a pure cash offer. In this essay, we link the 
choice of the medium of exchange to uncertainty about both the target and the acquirer. We use 
the Implied Volatility (IV) from the options market and use the average implied volatility (AIV) 
and the volatility of the implied volatility (VIV) as two proxies for risk and uncertainty about 
risk. We hypothesize that the higher the AIV and the VIV, the higher the uncertainty about the 
firms’ prospects and the greater the chances that the bidder will choose a stock or mixed offer in 
an attempt to benefit from the possible overvaluation in its stock. Our main finding supports our 
hypothesis and indicates the higher the bidder firms’ AIV and VIV; the lower the chances of a 
cash-only offer.   
 In the same essay, we build on the work of Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) that 
analyzes the effect of idiosyncratic volatility on Bidder Announcement CAR but instead of using 
idiosyncratic volatility, we use the forward-looking options-based AIV and VIV measures. We 
show that the CAR-Bidder decreases with an increase in both AIV and VIV of the bidder firm 
for stock or mixed deals. 
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 We are not the first to use option-based data in a merger and acquisition context. For example, 
Borochin (2014) uses option prices to analyze the deal value, Barone-Adesi, Brown, and Harlow 
(1994) and Subrahmanian (2004) use option data to estimate the probability of deal success. 
Also, Chan, Ge, and Lin (2012) and Ordu and Schweizer (2015) show that option implied 
measures of volatility are related to acquiring firm stock returns. In our work, we estimate AIV 
and VIV over the runup period. The runup period spans 42 days to 2 days before the 
announcement of an offer. We focus on the runup period because it is associated with an increase 
in the target stock price that is often attributed to news about the deal leaking to the market. We 
also find that the probability of deal success is decreasing with bidder AIV. 
 In addition to the analysis mentioned above, we uncover the existence of a trend in the 
implied volatility of the target firms that starts with the announcement of the deal, and we show 
that this trend differs between stock (mixed) offers or cash-only offers. In particular, we show 
that the target IV approaches the acquirer IV around the announcement day for stock or mixed 
offers and drops to lower levels for cash-only offers. This result is not surprising as the target 
investors will receive zero risk cash (if the deal is successful) that in the case of cash-only offers 
but they will assume the bidder firm risk in case of stock or mixed offers. The post-
announcement behavior of implied volatilities adds to the literature on the time series behavior of 
implied volatilities (for examples, see: Bester, Martinez, Rosu (2013) and Tassel (2014)). 
 
 In the second essay (Chapter three) we analyze the effect of mergers and acquisitions on 
one major anomaly in the empirical asset pricing literature: the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. 
Ang et Al. (2006) show that stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility exhibit lower next month 
return. This is puzzling as idiosyncratic volatility should not be priced as it can be diversified 
away. Even if idiosyncratic volatility is capturing stocks’ exposure to a missing risk factor, it is 
expected to exhibit a positive relationship rather than a negative one. As such, this puzzling 
negative relationship has been widely researched in the empirical asset pricing literature. For 
example, Chen and Petkova (2012) show that the puzzle can be attributed to a missing risk factor 
that is related to the aggregate market variance; Fu (2009) and Huang, Liu, Rhee, and Zhang 
(2009) attribute the puzzle to return reversal. Spiegel and Wang (2007) link higher idiosyncratic 
volatility to lower stock liquidity. In that chapter, we shed new light on the puzzle from a merger 
and acquisition perspective. We argue that firms involved in a merger and acquisition would 
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have much higher uncertainty about their future. This uncertainty is firm-specific and not 
market-wide, as such it would not be captured by an asset pricing model and would be reflected 
in the idiosyncratic volatility. Since mergers and acquisitions cluster in periods of high level of 
overpricing (see: Shleifer and Vishney (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)), we 
link merger and acquisition activities to the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle and hypothesize that 
the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is stronger in periods of higher mergers and acquisitions 
activities. Our tests support this hypothesis. 
In the third essay (Chapter four), we examine the relationship between investor sentiment and 
mergers and acquisitions. A relatively new literature has been developed linking market behavior 
to psychology. The most relevant literature for our purposes includes Baker and Wurgler (2006; 
2007) who show that periods of higher market sentiments are usually associated with higher 
market valuation especially for hard to arbitrage stocks. Hwand (2011) shows that Closed End 
Fund (CEF) discount is affected by investors' sentiment and Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) 
analyze the sentiment effect on different market anomalies. Our work follows this literature, and 
we investigate how investor sentiment affects different merger and acquisition characteristics. 
First, we show that stock or mixed offers are more likely in periods of higher market sentiment. 
Also, periods of higher market sentiment are associated with lower bidder announcement returns 
and higher target bargaining power in the case of stock or mixed offers, but higher synergy in the 
case of cash-only offers. These results can be interpreted within the context of Baker and Wu 
(2012) linking periods of higher market sentiment to higher levels of overpricing. Bidder firms 
will try to benefit from possible stock overvaluation in periods of higher market sentiment and 
opt for a stock or mixed acquisition. However, investors will react negatively to the bidder’s 
choice of stock as a medium of exchange resulting in lower bidder announcement returns. Also, 
since target investors will probably receive overpriced stock they demand a higher price leading 
to higher bargaining power in case of stock or mixed acquisition. Within the same context, 
bidders who choose to offer cash are purchasing a possibly overvalued target stock. When 
bidders do pay with cash in high sentiment periods then they should be anticipating superior 
return on their investment. Consequntly, we expect to see higher synergy for cash offers in high 
sentiment periods than in low sentiment periods.  
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In the same essay, we then analyze whether the target runup is different between high and low 
sentiment periods and whether such a difference will affect the premium paid. The literature 
documents an increase in the target stock price around two months before the merger and 
acquisition's announcement. This runup can be attributed to either information leakage/insider 
trading or an increase in the stand-alone value of the target. In both cases, the increase is caused 
by positive news about the target. We argue that this positive news would cause optimistic target 
investors to overreact in higher sentiment periods leading to a higher runup in those periods. Our 
results support this hypothesis. Schwert (1996) shows that the runup is a cost to the bidder: an 
increase in the runup leads to an increase in the premium paid. He termed this relationship the 
markup pricing hypothesis. Our results show that periods of higher market sentiment are not 
associated with higher premiums although they are associated with a higher runup. This is at 
odds with the markup pricing hypothesis of Schwert (1996). It appears that bidder firm 
management infers that the higher runup in periods of higher market sentiment is more likely due 
to investor overreaction to news than to changes in the standalone value of the target and they 




2 CHAPTER TWO 
 
Expected Risk and Uncertainty about Expected Risk in Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this paper, we test whether information extracted from option pricing plays a significant role 
in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We consider option traders, sophisticated and well 
informed; thus we conjecture that their superior knowledge would be partially captured by the 
implied volatility extracted from option prices. We study implied volatility as a proxy for risk. 
We analyze the trends exhibited by the implied volatilities of both bidder and target firms and 
link these patterns to the probability of deal success. In addition, we use the Average of the 
Implied Volatility (AIV) as a proxy for the firm’s expected risk and the Volatility of Implied 
Volatility (VIV) as a proxy for the uncertainty about the expected risk. We consider AIV as a 
measure of uncertainty and VIV as a measure of resolution of uncertainty. Our results support 
our main assumption that information extracted from option prices is valuable when tested on 
merger and acquisition deals. Specifically, we find that options implied volatility trends affect 
the probability of deal success. Both our risk measures are significantly linked to the bidder 
firm’s Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), to the chances of having a cash-only offer, and to 
the probability of deal success. We show how the significance of this link varies when 
accounting for different proxies for asymmetric information and uncertainty.  
 There is extensive empirical literature analyzing the relation between bidder Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) around the announcement period and the choice and implication of the 
medium of exchange in mergers and acquisitions deals. The literature presents different 
hypotheses explaining such relations ranging from information asymmetry, to tax advantages, to 
co-insurance effect, to corporate controls to investment opportunity. We build our work around 
the signaling hypothesis and assume that our risk and uncertainty about risk measures proxy for 
different forms of uncertainty. At any time prior to the effective day, there is always the chance 
that the deal may not be completed successfully. The reasons for deal failure may include rival 
bids, disagreement regarding the value of the target and/or the package of securities being 
offered, or government intervention due to anti-trust, and etc. We examine the relationship 
between our risk and uncertainty about risk measures and the probability of deal success.  
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 To present an overview of the literature analyzing the choice of the medium of exchange 
and the bidder cumulative abnormal return (CAR), we begin with the work of Carelton, Guilkey, 
Harris, and Stewart (1983) that highlights the importance of distinguishing between cash and 
non-cash takeovers in analyzing mergers and discuss the importance of cash offer in getting 
target management on board. Travlos (1987) explains three hypothesis that affect the medium of 
exchange in a merger. The author relies on Myers and Majluf (1984) framework to argue that in 
a context of asymmetric information bidders will prefer to issue stock if their firm is overvalued 
and to issue cash if their firm is undervalued. Travlos (1987) also highlights the different tax 
implication of cash offers versus stock offers; cash offers generate direct tax obligations to target 
shareholders leading the bidder to pay a higher premium in order to offset the tax paid by target 
shareholders. The third hypothesis that Travlos (1987) presents is the co-insurance effect: when 
the cash flows of two firms are not perfectly correlated combining them in a merger will 
decrease the default risk of the merged entity leading to higher debt capacity benefiting debt 
holders at the expense of stockholders resulting in lower stock prices. Fishman (1989) discusses 
how a cash offer would pre-empt competing bidders as it signals higher valuation in case of both 
target and bidder being asymmetrically informed. As such, he concludes that bidders will tend to 
move to cash offers when they want to increase the chances that the target will accept the offer or 
to deter other competing bidder or when the cost of gathering information about the target and 
the deal was high. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) link medium of exchange in a merger to 
corporate control. They argue that when insiders prefer to keep control of the firm they tend to 
go for cash or debt mergers in order to avoid issuing new stocks that will dilute their control. As 
such, the more materialistic the managerial ownership in the target company the more the 
likelihood that a cash offer would be selected over a stock offer. Brown and Ryngaert (1991) 
show that in spite of their negative signaling connotation, stock offers may still be chosen by 
bidders due to their tax advantages over cash offers while Martin (1996) shows that the higher 
the bidder and target investment opportunities the higher the chances of stock financing in a 
merger. Hansen (1987) argues that bidders would prefer to issue stocks when they are 
overvalued and cash when they are undervalued. Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) study 
the effect of the mix of cash and securities offers on the bidders abnormal returns and show that 
the cash percentage tend to increase for higher valued acquisition.   
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 Within the empirical context of measuring uncertainty and information asymmetry and 
studying their effect on the bidder’s firm cumulative abnormal return as well as the medium of 
exchange, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) use idiosyncratic volatility, standard 
deviation of analyst forecasts, the breadth of blockowners ownership and the change in the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for different measures of uncertainty and asymmetric 
information. They showed that the bidders’ abnormal returns fall as the idiosyncratic volatility 
increases in stock mergers. The idiosyncratic volatility effect dominates the diversity of opinion 
proxy when added to the same regression. They also show that bidders’ abnormal return 
increases with an increase in idiosyncratic volatility in the case of cash deals and that change in 
the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts affects stock and cash acquisition differently. Cemmanur, 
Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) on their side use the number of analysts following the firm, the 
standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts and the absolute value of the difference in the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and the actual realized earning to proxy for information asymmetry 
about the firm. Their empirical results support the idea that bidders prefer cash offers when target 
information asymmetry increases. Dionne, Haye, and Bergeres (2015) use blockholders’ 
ownership as a proxy for asymmetric information. They revealed a negative relationship between 
bidders being blockholders and the premium. 
 Our work is based on the assumption that the option markets contain valuable 
complementary information to stock markets. We create two measures relying on both targets 
and acquirers’ implied volatility: the Average Implied Volatility (AIV) and the Volatility of 
Implied Volatility (VIV). Both our AIV and VIV are estimated during the runup period (days -
42, -2). We posit that option implied volatility is a proxy for future expected risk. As such, we 
consider AIV to be a proxy for the firm expected risk and VIV to be a proxy for the uncertainty 
about its expected risk. Extensive research has shown that during the runup period target firms’ 
stocks exhibit a significant cumulative abnormal return
4
. Option investors, considered as 
sophisticated and well informed, would be among the first to detect such a signal and trade upon 
it. As such, their aggregate beliefs should be embedded in option prices and updated 
consecutively as the private deal negotiation proceeds. AIV would enable us to measure their 
(option investors) expected level of risk during the deal negotiation period and the VIV would 
give us a rough estimate of the fluctuations in these expectations.  
                                                          
4
 Jarell and Poulsen (1989), King and Padalko (2005), Meulbroek (1992), Schwert (1996) and others 
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 The use of option information is not new in the mergers and acquisitions context. 
Borochin (2014) relies on option prices to analyze the value generated by a merger. Cao, Chen 
and Griffin (2005) compare stock and call volume imbalances and discover that during the runup 
period call volume imbalance is significantly related to next day stock returns. Bester, Martinez, 
and Rosu (2013) find that the at-the-money (ATM) implied volatility of target companies’ drops 
around the announcement date but rises after, if the deal fails. Barone-Adesi, Brown, and Harlow 
(1994) rely on target option implied volatilities to predict the probability of deal success for cash 
offers. Barraclough, Robinson, Smith, and Whaley (2012) expand use call option prices and 
stock prices to show that the gain is not limited to the target, as perceived in previous literature, 
but also spans to the bidder. Subramanian (2004) concludes that the probability of deal success is 
present in stock and option prices before it becomes a public news. Geppert and Kamerschen 
(2008)
5
 use the sum of option implied volatility of the target and acquirer as a proxy for the 
volatility of the merged firm. Their results reveal that the market believes the new firm is riskier 
than a combined portfolio of both bidder and target through 18 months after the deal completion. 
Spyros, Tsekrekos, and Siougle (2010) show that there is an increase in option’s trading volume 
prior to the announcement day in the UK equity markets. Chan, Ge, and Lin (2012) show that 
bidder cumulative abnormal return (CAR) increases with higher implied volatility (IV) spreads 
and decreases with higher implied volatility skew. Their IV spread measure is calculated as the 
difference of implied volatilities between call and put options on the same security with the same 
strike price and the same maturity
6
 whereas their implied volatility skew is estimated as the 
difference in implied volatilities of the out-of-the-money (OTM) put and the ATM call. Tassel 
(2014) shows that for cash deals there is a decline in the target implied volatility at the 
announcement. For stock deals, he finds that target implied volatility drops at the announcement 
if the acquirer is less volatile than the target and increase if the acquirer is more volatile. Ordu 
and Schweizer (2015) show that acquiring firm options’ volumes increases before the 
announcement of a stock merger and that the options’ trade direction is related to future stock 
returns. In a more recent work, Luypaert and Caneghem (2017) use the average implied volatility 
estimated during the pre-runup period as a proxy for firm’s uncertainty in mergers and 
acquisitions. 
                                                          
5
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising up this point 
6
 This is the same IV spread measure used in Bali and Hovakimian (2009) and Driessen, Lin, and Lu (2012) 
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 This relatively new literature exploring the use of option implied information in mergers 
and acquisitions is not unique.  Jayaraman, Mandelker, and Shastri (1991) use the target firms’ 
implied variance to show that markets foresee acquisitions before the announcement day. Levy 
and Yoder (1993) show that target firms’ implied volatility increases significantly before to the 
announcement day.  
 When it comes to volatility of implied volatility, Baltussen, Van Bekkum and Van Der 
Grient (2014)
7
 show that the uncertainty about risk as measured by the volatility of implied 
volatility (similar to our VIV) is an important stock characteristics; stock with higher uncertainty 
about risk underperform those with lower uncertainty about risk. Huang and Shaliastovish (2014) 
showed that the volatility of volatility index (VVIX) is a significant risk factor and investors 
dislike increases in the VVIX. Agarwal, Arisoy, and Naik (2015) found that the volatility of 
aggregate volatility (VOV) is an important factor when estimating hedge funds risk exposure. 
More recently, Borochin and Zhao (2015) reveal a significant relationship between standard 
deviation of implied volatility and subsequent stock returns. 
 As we studied the effect of AIV and VIV on our deal characteristics, we analyzed the 
pattern exhibited by target and bidder implied volatility as we moved through the deal 
negotiation. Our findings confirm the following: for stock or mixed deals, the average target 
implied volatility moves towards the average acquirer implied volatility during the 
announcement period and hovers around it for the next 50 trading days or so. Since the targets’ 
implied volatility is usually higher than the acquirers’, this would indicate a decline in the target-
implied volatility; a decline that is well documented in the existing literature. In cash-only deals, 
the decline in target implied volatility is more dramatic: we find a larger decline in target implied 
volatility with the target implied volatility dropping below the acquirer implied volatility. This 
result is not surprising as the target shareholders are replacing their risky stock investment with 
riskless cash. An observation that is not distant from that highlighted by Tassel (2014).  
Building on the above findings, we create an Implied Volatility Spread measure that is 
constructed as the target implied volatility estimated two days after the announcement minus the 
acquirer implied Volatility estimated two days after the announcement for stock or mixed deals 
                                                          
7
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising up this point 
 
 10 
and as the target implied volatility estimated two days after the announcement minus zero for 
cash-only deals. We show that the higher this spread the lower the probability of deal success; 
we interpret the result as the further the target implied volatility from its theoretical value the 
lower the chances that the deal will finish successfully. Simply put, if investors believe that the 
deal has a good chance of succeeding two days after the announcement day, the target implied 
volatility would approach the acquirer implied volatility for stock or mixed deal and zero for 
cash deal.  
 We highlight the importance of AIV and VIV in a merger and acquisition framework. We 
postulate that the higher the AIV, the higher the expected risk about the firm undergoing a 
merger negotiation and consequently the higher uncertainty both parties are facing.  We interpret 
the VIV in two ways. First, the VIV can be used as a proxy for resolution of uncertainty: the 
higher the VIV, the higher the uncertainty and the lower the resolution of uncertainty.  
Consequently, we associate a higher VIV with a lower CAR
8
. Second, we see VIV capturing the 
uncertainty in option investors’ perception about the risk level of a firm undergoing a deal 
negotiation process. The higher this uncertainty, the harder it will be to assess the risk level of 
the firm, and the harder and costlier it will be to price the firm.  
 Our main results related to AIV and VIV can be summarized as follows. We find that 
both the average implied volatility and the volatility of implied volatility of the acquirer firm 
(AIV-Acquirer and VIV-Acquirer) estimated during the runup period (days -42, -2) are 
negatively related to the bidder cumulative abnormal returns (CAR-Bidder) estimated during the 
announcement period (days -1,1) for stock or mixed (Non-Cash-Only) acquisition and non-
significant (VIV) or positive but marginally significant (AIV)s for cash-only acquisitions. The 
results can be interpreted as follows: when bidder risk and uncertainty about risk increases, 
                                                          
8
 What distinguishes our measure from the resolution of uncertainty measure analyzed by Moeller et al. (2007) is 
that their measure of resolution uncertainty is related to the “uncertainty about the firm’s expected growth 
potentials” whereas ours is related to the “uncertainty about the firm’s expected risk exposure”. The different nature 
of the two components (growth potentials and risk exposure) leads us to formulate different expectations regarding 
the VIV. Where Moeller et al. (2007) assume that a lower uncertainty about the firms’ growth potential should be 
associated with lower bidder CAR (backed by the work of Pastor and Veronesi ‘2006’ and Johnson ‘2004’), we 
assume that a higher uncertainty about the firms’ risk exposure should be associated with lower bidder CAR. Our 
assumption can be justified if we look at the Gordon growth model P/E = 1/(r-g). As explained in Pastor and 
Veronesi (2006), this function is convex in ‘g’ leading to a positive relationship between uncertainty about ‘g’ and 
the firm value. However, this same function is concave in ‘r’ and we postulate that the risk associated with a 
company should be captured in ‘r’ leading to a negative relationship between uncertainty about ‘r’ and the firm 
value. 
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ambiguity about bidder stock price increases. If it opts for a Non-Cash-Only offer, this signals to 
the market that the bidder stock is overvalued and lower bidder CAR is observed.  
When AIV and VIV are tested together in the same model on bidder CAR, the AIV-Bidder 
overshadowed the VIV-Bidder for Non-Cash-Only deals (VIV-Bidder becomes insignificant) 
highlighting the importance of the level of risk over the uncertainty about the risk. For Cash-
Only acquisitions including both the AIV and VIV in the same model leads to results consistent 
to those of Moeller et al. (2007); CAR-Bidder increases as AIV-Bidder increases and VIV-
Bidder decreases. As bidder firm increases, opting for a cash-only offer signals that its own stock 
is undervalued, which is reflected in the market by higher relative abnormal returns around the 
announcement of the deal. The negative relationship between VIV-Bidder and the CAR-Bidder 
can be explained in the resolution of uncertainty context: the higher the uncertainty about the 
bidder risk (the less the resolution of uncertainty related to the firm’s risk) the lower the firm 
value. The VIV-CAR relationship is also consistent with the findings of Baltussen, Van Bekkum 
and Van Der Grient (2014) who show that higher VIV stocks underperform their lower VIV 
peers.  
 Next we analyze the relationship between the medium of exchange and AIV and VIV. 
We find that the probability of cash-only offer is decreasing in the Average Implied Volatility 
and Volatility of Implied Volatility of both Target and Bidder firms. In the context of our 
interpretation of AIV and VIV, we conclude that as the target risk increases, bidder firms prefer 
non-cash-only offers as the risk involved would be shared by both acquirer and bidder firms. 
When it comes to increase in the bidder risk, the bidder still prefers non-cash only deals (in our 
sample at least) – either to share its own risk with the target shareholders or because it may 
benefit from a possible overvaluation in its own stock (opposite to the pre-emptive setting). A 
similar argument can be applied to our proxy for risk uncertainty; as VIV increases, the firm is 
faced with higher risk uncertainty. This makes it harder to properly quantify the risk of the firm 
(target or acquirer) should the deal go through and as such, a non-cash only acquisition would be 
preferred as the possible risk misspecification is shared by both target and acquirer.  
 What is interesting in our findings is that when both AIV and VIV are included in the 
same model, the probability of a cash-offer decreases with an increase in the Average Implied 
Volatility (consistent with the previous results) but increases with an increase in the Volatility of 
 12 
Implied Volatility (opposite to the previous results). Thus we conjecture that the expected firm 
risk level (AIV) affects the choice of the medium of exchange as well as the way in which other 
variables (like uncertainty about risk ‘VIV’) affect the choice of the medium of exchange.   
 Our final test examines the relationship between the AIV (VIV) and the probability of the 
deal success. Our tests indicate that there is a negative relationship between the average implied 
volatility (AIV) of the bidder and the probability of the deal success: the higher the bidder risk 
the lower the chances that the deal will end successfully.  
 Next we test the robustness of our finding against different proxies for asymmetric 
information and uncertainty like analysts’ divergence of opinion and idiosyncratic volatility. We 
estimate analysts’ divergence of opinion as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecast and the 
idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation of the market model residuals.  Our results show 
that the effect of the divergence of opinion on CAR-Bidder, the chances of facing a cash-only 
offer and the probability of deal success depends on the time over which analysts’ forecasts are 
captured. The divergence of opinion did not affect our main results.  
We show that the idiosyncratic volatility plays a significant role in determining the chances of 
facing a cash-only offer as well as the probability of deal success in addition to the effect of 
idiosyncratic volatility on Bidder-CAR previously reported by Moeller et al (2007). We also 
highlight the importance of the choice of the estimation period for idiosyncratic volatility when 
this latter is used as a proxy for uncertainty in a merger and acquisition context. Controlling for 
idiosyncratic volatility in our AIV and VIV models mitigates our findings related to VIV but not 
to AIV.  As such, idiosyncratic volatility does not seem to contain all information present in our 
option implied measures (AIV and VIV). 
 The main contribution of our work is highlighting the trend followed by the implied 
volatilities of both bidder and target firms when both counterparties possess options traded on 
them and how this trend can be used to predict the chances of deal success. We also use average 
implied volatility as proxy for expected risk and the volatility of implied volatility as a proxy for 
uncertainty about risk and show that both measures possess predictive power over the CAR-
Bidder, choice of medium of exchange and the probability of deal success. The rest of the paper 
is organized as follows: Section II presents our research hypotheses and expectations; Section III 
discusses our sample construction and summarizes the sample characteristics; Section IV 
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presents our main results; Section V presents our different robustness checks; and Section VI 
concludes.   
2.2 Research Hypothesis and Expectations 
In this paper, we analyze the option implied volatility (IV) trends around mergers’ and 
acquisitions announcements. We also study the effect of the average implied volatility (AIV) and 
the volatility of implied volatility (VIV) of both acquirer and target firms on the acquirer 
performances, the choice of the medium of exchange and probability of the deal success.  
 In cash deals, target shareholders will ultimately receive cash in return for their shares.  
They will end up having no equity ownership in the merged firm and the risk of their investment 
will converge to zero once they have received the cash payment. For stock deals, the target 
shareholders will ultimately be joining the acquirer shareholders and share the acquirer risk 
(merged firm risk). Consequently, in stock deals, we expect to observe the acquirer and target 
implied volatilities approaching each other as the deal effective date approaches.  For cash deals, 
we expect target volatility to approach zero as the deal effective date approaches whereas the 
acquirer volatility would move toward the perceived IV of the new entity.  This leads us to our 
first hypothesis in its two forms: 
H1-a: As we move through time during the runup and post announcement periods, we expect the 
target-implied volatility to approach the acquirer implied volatility for Non-Cash-Only bids and 
to decline more for Cash-Only bids.  
H1-b: The further away the target-implied volatility from the acquirer-implied volatility for 
Stock or Mixed offers and from zero for Cash-Only offers, the lower the chances that the deal 
will finish successfully. This effect should be clearer after the announcement day.  
We focus on the runup period in the analysis and construction of the AIV and VIV variables as 
the literature
9
 documents an increase in the average target stock prices starting approximately 42 
trading days before the announcement date. One possible explanation for this observation is the 
possibility that information about the deal (negotiation process) may be leaking to the public 
before the announcement day. As we proceed through the M&A negotiation process, both 
acquirer and target option investors update (change) their beliefs regarding the likelihood that an 
                                                          
9
 Jarell and Poulsen (1989), King and Padalko (2005), Meulbroek (1992), Schwert (1996) and others.  
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offer appears and is successful, the riskiness of their own firm and the riskiness of the possible 
combined company. This revision of uncertainly is expected to be revealed in the implied 
volatilities of both target and acquirer as we progress in time through the runup period. The more 
investors revise their beliefs about the future uncertainty of the firms, the greater the fluctuations 
in the IVs; hence, the higher our VIV measure. The average of the IV estimated during the runup 
period proxies for the expected risk of the firm. 
 We construct a set of AIV and VIV measures: the Average Implied Volatility of the 
acquirers, the Average Implied Volatility of the Targets, the Volatility of Implied Volatility of 
the acquirers and the Volatility of Implied Volatility of the targets.  
 We associate a higher AIV with a higher level of the firm’s expected risk and 
consequently a higher associated uncertainty. Moeller et al. (2007) test the effect of idiosyncratic 
volatility on bidder abnormal returns in mergers and acquisitions. Instead of using idiosyncratic 
volatility, we use average implied volatility estimated during the runup period. We believe that 
implied volatility serves as a good proxy for expected uncertainty due to its dynamic forward-
looking characteristics. Hence, we anticipate the higher the target AIV (AIV-Target), the lower 
the bidder announcement cumulative abnormal return (CAR-Bidder) as a result of bigger risk 
faced by the bidder company. This effect is expected to be significant mainly for the cash offers 
as both bidder and target firms share the target risk when it comes to stock or mixed offers. We 
also anticipate the higher the bidder AIV (AIV-Bidder), the lower the CAR-Bidder in case of 
stock and mixed (Non-Cash-Only) offers and the higher the CAR-Bidder in case of Cash-Only 
offers. This prediction is related to the signaling hypothesis: the bidder will tend to offer cash if 
its stock is undervalued and offer stock (mixed) if its stock is overvalued. Based on the above 
arguments, we develop the following hypotheses:  
H2: The higher the AIV-Target, the lower the CAR-Bidder in Cash-Only Offers 
H3: The AIV-Target should not significantly affect the CAR-Bidder in Stock or Mixed (Non-
Cash-Only) offers 
H4: The higher the AIV-Bidder, the lower the CAR-Bidder in Stock or Mixed (Non-Cash-Only) 
offers 
H5: The higher the AIV-Bidder, the higher the CAR-Bidder in Cash-Only offers 
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 In the development of our VIV related hypothesis, we interpret the VIV in two different 
ways. In the first interpretation, the VIV can be used as a proxy for resolution of uncertainty: the 
higher the VIV, the higher the uncertainty and the lower the resolution of uncertainty. As such, 
we expect that the higher the uncertainty about the bidder risk (VIV-Bidder) the lower the CAR-
Bidder – a result that should be observed for both Stock (Mixed) offers and Cash-Only offers. In 
the second interpretation, the VIV captures the uncertainty in option investors’ perception about 
the risk level of a firm undergoing a deal negotiation process. The higher this uncertainty, the 
harder it will be to assign the appropriate risk level for the firm, the harder it will be to price it. 
As such, a higher VIV-Target would be associated with lower CAR-Bidder, reflecting the 
difficulties faced by the bidding firm in pricing the target. This observation should be valid only 
for Cash-Only deals and not for Stock (Mixed) deals as the target risk uncertainty is shared with 
the target investors in the case of a Stock (Mixed) offer and not completely absorbed by 
Acquirer’s Investors. Our hypotheses related to VIV and CAR-Bidder are:  
H6: The higher the VIV-Target, the lower the CAR-Bidder in Cash-Only Offers 
H7: The VIV-Target should not significantly affect the CAR-Bidder in Stock or Mixed (Non-
Cash-Only) offers 
H8: The higher the VIV-Bidder, the lower the CAR-Bidder. A result that should be observed for 
both types of offers (Cash-Only and Stock ‘Mixed’ Offers) 
 Next, we analyze how the Average Implied Volatility (AIV) and Volatility of Implied 
Volatility (VIV) of both target and acquirer affect the choice of the medium of exchange. We 
conjecture that the higher the AIV-Target, the higher the target risk and the lower the chance that 
the bidder offers a Cash-Only deal because a Stock or Mixed offer will allow the bidder to share 
the target risk with the target shareholders. Regarding acquirer AIV, we expect the higher the 
AIV-Bidder, the more the uncertainty associated with the bidder firm, the greater the likelihood 
that the bidder offers cash if its objective is to pre-empt competing bids (pre-emptive bidding 
context). For the VIV analysis we expect the higher the VIV-Bidder the greater the uncertainty 
about the risk of the bidder, which makes it harder for external investors to value the bidder firm 
properly. This increases the chances that the bidder will go for a Cash-Only offer because it 
reduces the risk uncertainty absorbed by target shareholders and pre-empt competing bids. For 
the VIV-Target, the more the uncertainty about the risk of the target, the harder it would be for 
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the bidder to gather information about the target firm, and the more costly it would be to for the 
bidder to properly price the target. As such, and in a pre-emptive setting, the bidder will prefer to 
go for Cash-Only bids in order to avoid the possibility of losing the high costs already invested 
for a competing bidder. Our hypotheses related to AIV, VIV and medium of exchange are:  
H9: The higher the AIV-Target, the lower the chances of a Cash-Only offer  
H10: The higher the AIV-Bidder, the higher the chances of a Cash-Only offer 
H11: The higher the VIV-Target, the higher the chances of a Cash-Only offer 
H12: The higher the VIV-Bidder, the higher the chances of a Cash-Only offer 
Lastly we analyze how AIV (VIV) affects the probability of the deal success. Looking at AIV 
and VIV as measures of expected risk and uncertainty about risk respectively, we link an 
increase in these measures for both target and acquirer to a lower probability that the deal will 
finish successfully. Our hypothesis related to AIV (VIV) and deal completion is:  
H13: The higher the AIV (VIV) of both Bidder and Target, the lower the chances that the deal 
will finish successfully 
Table 2.1 summarizes our predictions.  < Please insert Table 2.1 here > 
 
2.3 Data and Sample Construction 
2.3.1 Data Collection 
This paper joins two important fields of research: M&A and option implied information. In line 
with the extant literature, we rely on five databases to create our sample: SDC, CRSP, 
Compustat, Optionmetrics, and IBES.  
 We use Thompson Financial SDC database to obtain our M&A sample and limit our 
sample to US public target firms whereby the transactions form is classified as M (Merger) or 
AM (acquisition of majority interest). Our sample is limited to the period from January 1996 to 
December 2013 (as Optionmetrics starts from January 1996). From the initial bid announcements 
in SDC, we identify control bids as those in which bidders own less than 50% of the target shares 
prior to the bid and seek to own at least 50% of the target shares after completion of the deal, we 
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remove bid announcements where the target is a utility company or is a financial institution
10
 and 
cases where the Target Primary SIC code is not provided by SDC
11
.   
 As in Betton and Eckbo (2009; 2014) we arrange successive bids for the same target into 
takeover contests. A contest could have a single control bid, multiple bids by a single bidder, or 
multiple bidders. In our definition, control bidders initiate the contest if there are no other control 
bidders for the same target over the preceding six months. All subsequent control bids within six 
months of a previous bid relate to the same contest. A contest ends when there are no additional 
control bids for the same target over the following six-month period. This initial SDC sample 
contains 15,119 control bids with deal value reported on SDC.  
 In order to obtain the daily return data for the target and acquirer firms, we merge our 
SDC M&A sample with CRSP daily stock data. Firm accounting and financial information are 
gathered from Compustat and options extracted implied volatilities are taken from 
Optionmetrics.  
 We delete any bid that does not have 42 days of CRSP daily returns data before the 
announcement day; this is needed for runup period estimations. We have also removed any deal 
where there is no CRSP returns data within 3 days after the announcement day in order to avoid 
the possibility of associating wrong returns with the announcement period. We obtain the 
standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts from IBES database.  
Our final sample comprises 572 control bids. 
2.3.2 Filtering the Option Implied Volatilities 
The implied volatilities for our options are taken from the volatility surface file available on 
Optionmetrics. This file contains implied volatilities with the following maturities: 30, 60, 91, 
182, 365, and 547 days. The data is provided for different ranges of strike prices covering a wide 




                                                          
10
 This involved deleting targets whose primary first two-digit SIC codes range from 40 to 49 (Transportation and 
Public Utilities) and 60 to 67 (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate). 
11
 304 control bids have missing target primary SIC code. 
12
 This wide range of maturities and moneyness provided by Optionmetrics in the implied volatilities surface file are 
obtained by interpolating actual option implied volatilities across maturities and moneyness levels. The interpolation 
used is cubic interpolation based on a kernel smoothing algorithm. Optionmetrics estimates the implied volatility of 
the American Options relying on the Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) binomial tree model which is the case for 
most of our acquirer and target options. 
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We follow Barraclough et al. (2012) and use 30-day ATM implied volatilities as a proxy for the 
stock expected volatility. This leads to two main sets of Implied Volatility variables: 30-day at 
the money puts and 30-day at the money calls. Preliminary testing revealed similar results for 
both ATM puts and calls and consequently, we consider the average of the 30-day ATM puts and 
the 30-day ATM calls implied volatility as the proxy for our implied volatility. Driessen et al. 
(2009) deploy options delta to identify OTM options needed in their analysis. We follow their 
footsteps and use the ATM Implied Volatilities corresponding to an option having a delta equal 
to 0.5 for Call options and -0.5 for Put options.  
2.3.3 Variable Definitions  
We create the following control dummy variables relying on SDC data: whether the deal is 
hostile or friendly (hostile), whether it begins as a rumor or not (rumor), whether it is Cash-Only 
or Non-Cash-Only (Cash-Only), whether it is a tender offer or not (Tender), whether it contains a 
collar or not (Collar), whether the target is listed on NYSE/AMEX or not (NYSE/AMEX) and 
whether it is completed or not (Complete). 
 We form a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the 
same contest (Multiple Bids). If the target and acquirer have the same four digit Standard 
Industry Classification codes (obtained from CRSP), we give a value of 1 for the dummy 
variable (Horizontal). If the bidder company owns more than 5% of the target company before 
the announcement day, we associate a value of 1 to the (Toehold) dummy variable.  
 We estimate the Target (Bidder) Size as the logarithm of target (bidder) market value of 
equity, which is estimated by multiplying the number of target (bidder) shares outstanding by the 
target (bidder) stock price at event day -42. We estimate the target (bidder) Turnover as the ratio 
of target (bidder) volume to shares outstanding on day -42. We also estimate the Target (Bidder) 
B/M as the target (bidder) book value per share for the corresponding announcement day divided 
by the target (bidder) market value per share at day -42. We establish the runup variable as [(P-2/ 
P-42) – 1] where Pi is the price adjusted for dividend and splits ‘i’ days before the announcement 
day. We measure the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) over the announcement period as the 
sum of Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period (days -1,+1) where 
ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is company ‘i’ return on day ‘t’ in excess of the 
risk free rate. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free 
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rate. The model components (𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 +
𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the (days -256; -43) event day window
13
.  
Variables used in this paper are summarized in Table 2.2.  
<Please insert Table 2.2 here> 
 
In constructing our risk variables, we calculate the Average Implied Volatility (AIV) as the mean 
of the daily Implied Volatility spanning the runup period (days -42, -2) and the Volatility of 
Implied Volatility (VIV) as the standard deviation of the daily Implied Volatility spanning the 
runup period (days -42, -2). To draw our graphs (figures 2.1 to 2.6), we rely on the average of the 
IV-Acquirer and the average of the IV-Target. The IV-Spread used in the graphs is equal to the 
difference between the average of the IV-Target and the average of the IV-Bidder. The IV-
Spread@t used in testing our first hypothesis in its second form is constructed as the difference 
between the target implied volatility and the acquirer implied volatility in case of a stock (mixed) 
offer and the target implied volatility and zero in case of a cash offer. The IV-Spread-Ratio is 
equal to the ratio of the IV-Spread@2 divided by the IV-Spread-@-42. For the dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts measure, we rely on standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts estimated on 
month -12, month -2, and month +1. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard 
deviation of the market model residuals over the indicated period.  
2.3.4 Sample Characteristics 
Table 2.3 presents the descriptive statistics for our final sample. Not surprising, the 572 control 
bids (deals) remaining in our final sample have larger deal values than the deals in our initial 
SDC sample as both target and acquirer are public companies and have options traded on their 
stocks. In our control bids, 146 are tender offers, 63 belong to a multiple bidder contest, 20 are 
hostile, 288 are Cash-Only, 41 are preceded by a rumor, 34 have a collar, 145 are horizontal, 13 
involve a bidder having a toehold, 204 involve a target listed on NYSE/AMEX, and 485 were 
completed successfully. We have also constructed year and target industry dummies. We rely on 
the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code to create our industry dummy.  
                                                          
13
 We have also estimated the Abnormal Returns (AR) as the excess stock return above the CRSP value weighted 
index. We obtained similar results to those reported in table 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10. We do not report these results here 
for space limitation.  
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< Please insert Table 2.3 here > 
 
2.4 Empirical Tests and Results 
2.4.1 Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests Results 
Table 2.4 presents the descriptive statistics (Mean, Median) for the main variables in our sample 
as well as the results of our univariate tests.  
<Please insert Table 2.4 here> 
Our target firms are on average smaller than their acquirers, have higher turnover, and higher 
B/M. Bidder firms are usually bigger when it comes to a Cash-Only offer and have lower 
Turnover. Bidder firms achieve a negative CAR around the announcement period when the 
whole sample is considered. However, looking at Cash-Only versus Non-Cash-Only control bids, 
we can observe a positive bidder CAR for Cash-Only bids and a negative bidder CAR for Non-
Cash-Only bids. The difference between both CARs is statistically significant: in Cash-Only 
deals, the bidder realizes a higher announcement performance relative to their Non-Cash-Only 
counterparts.  
 We find no significant difference between target characteristics (size, turnover and B/M) 
when it comes to Cash-Only bids versus Non-Cash-Only bids. We also find that the target runup 
during Cash-Only offers is significantly higher than that of Non-Cash-Only offers, a result that 
can be restated for the target markup but with lower significance.  
 We find that on average, targets’ and bidders’ implied volatility is bigger in case of Stock 
and Mixed offers relative to Cash-Only offers. The results are observed for implied volatility 
obtained 42 days before the announcement, 2 days before the announcement as well as the 
average implied volatility (AIV) estimated over the announcement period (days -42, -2). We 
observe riskier firms (target and acquirer) in Non-Cash-Only offers. Our univariate tests seem to 
support the inclination that the higher the target firm’s risk (AIV-Target), the more the chances 
that it would be included in a Stock and Mixed offer – in accordance with our 9th hypothesis and 
supporting the notion that as the target risk increases, the bidder will tend to go for a Stock 
(mixed) offer to share the target risk with the target investors. The results also convey that the 
higher the bidder firm risk (AIV-Bidder), the more likely it would fall in the Stock (Mixed) 
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category – opposite to our 10th hypothesis built around the pre-emptive bidding setting.  When it 
comes to a bidder’s risk, it seems that the pre-emptive bidding scenario does not work for our 
sample: bidder firms with higher risk will tend to go for a stock or mixed offer as they may build 
on this higher risk and try to benefit from possible price ambiguity when exchanging their stocks 
for the target’s stocks. It could also be that the riskier the bidder firm the more it would be 
inclined to opt for a stock or mixed offer in an attempt to share its own risk with the target 
shareholders.  
 The target volatility of implied volatility (VIV-Target) does not differ significantly 
between Cash-Only deals and Non-Cash-Only deals (in contradiction with our 11
th
 hypothesis) 
whereas the bidder volatility of implied volatility (VIV-Bidder) is significantly larger for stock 
and mixed deals than for Cash-Only deals. This supports the intuition that the higher the VIV-
Bidder the lower the chances that we would observe a Cash-Only deal (in contradiction with our 
12
th
 hypothesis). It seems that bidder firms with higher risk uncertainty do not prefer to go for 
Cash-Only offers in an attempt to reduce the uncertainty level taken by target shareholders (pre-
emptive bidding setting). On the other hand, they prefer stock offers where they can either share 
their risk uncertainty with the target investors or benefit from this risk uncertainty (which 
probably leads to price uncertainty) in pricing the offer.  
 In relation to IBES measures, our sample statistics show that on average, the standard 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts for target firms involved in a Stock or Mixed offer is higher than 
those involved in a Cash-Only offer. However, these differences are not significant. Bidders’ 
divergence of opinion measures are not significantly different between Cash-only offers and 
Non-Cash-Only offers.  
 When it comes to idiosyncratic volatility, we notice that the target idiosyncratic volatility 
seems to be larger than the acquirer idiosyncratic volatility. In addition, the idiosyncratic 
volatility of both target and acquirer firms for stock (mixed) deals are larger than their 
counterparts for cash-only deals.  
2.4.2 Behavior of Average Implied Volatilities around the Announcement Day 
Figures 2.1 to 2.6 present the average implied volatility of our firms as we move through time 
around the announcement day. Figure 2.1 spans from 65 days before the deal announcement till 
65 days after the deal announcement. It helps us observe what happens to the average target and 
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acquirer implied volatilities as we proceed during the merger negotiation process. Figure 2.2 
spans only 3 days around the announcement; it is included in order for us to see exactly when the 
target implied volatility starts to change. Both Figures 2.1 and 2.2 cover all our deals. We can 
clearly observe from Figure 2.1 and 2.2 that the average target implied volatility starts dropping 
towards the acquirer implied volatility one day before the announcement day and the drop is 
almost complete one day after the announcement day. For Non-Cash-Only deals, the target-
implied volatility approaches the acquirer-implied volatility and stay near it. For Cash-Only 
deals, the target-implied volatility drops much more and stays at these lower levels for a while. 
We can observe for Cash-Only deals that the target implied volatility starts increasing after 
almost 55 days from the announcement. This may be due to the fact that as the deal negotiation 
process time increases, investors start associating lower probability for the successful 
accomplishment of the deal, leading to an increase in the target-implied volatility.  
 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 and figures 2.5 and 2.6 are limited to complete deals and incomplete 
deals respectively. We observe high similarities in the target and acquirer implied volatility 
trends between complete and incomplete deals 3 days around the announcement period. For the 
larger periods, we observe an increase in the target and acquirer implied volatility starting around 
10 days after the announcement days for incomplete deals. Whether this increasing trend is 
because the deals were rejected and announced to the public or whether this is a market 
anticipation of the deal failure we do not know at this stage, and it has been kept for future 
research. The figures generally support our first hypothesis that the target implied volatility does 
not simply drop but it also moves towards the acquirer implied volatility for Non-Cash-Only 
deals and drops further away for Cash-Only deals adding some clarifications to Tassel (2014) 
findings.    
2.4.3 Model used in the Multivariate Tests 
In order to test the average implied volatility (AIV) effect on Bidder CAR, we rely on Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) estimation of Model 1 below. (Model 1 covers hypotheses H2 through H5).  
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𝐶𝐴𝑅 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐴𝐼𝑉𝑖  + 𝛾1𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖  + 𝛾2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛾3𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑁𝑌𝑆𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾4 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝐵/𝑀𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖
+ 𝛾6𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾8𝑇𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾9𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛾10𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾11𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝛾12𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾13𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛾14𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾15𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾16s𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖  
+ 𝛾17s𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 (𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟏) 
In order to test the volatility of implied volatility (VIV) effect on Bidder CAR, we rely on 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation of Model 2 below. (Model 2 covers hypotheses H6 
through H8). 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑉𝐼𝑉𝑖  + 𝛾1𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖  + 𝛾2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛾3𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑁𝑌𝑆𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾4 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝐵/𝑀𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖
+ 𝛾6𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾8𝑇𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾9𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛾10𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾11𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝛾12𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾13𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛾14𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾15𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾16s𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖  
+ 𝛾17s𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 (𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟐) 
For model 1 and 2, estimations are done for all our 572 bids, the 284 Non-Cash-Only bids and 
the 288 Cash-Only bids. Each estimation is performed twice: one using VIV-Target and another 
using VIV-Acquirer; ‘i’ corresponds to the control bid (deal) in our sample.   
 We test AIV and VIV effect on the choice of the medium of exchange using the logistic 




1 − 𝑃(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = 1)
)
𝑖
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖  + 𝛾1𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛾3𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑁𝑌𝑆𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾4 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝐵/𝑀𝑖 +  𝛾5𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛾6𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾7𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑁𝑌𝑆𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾8 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝐵/𝑀𝑖
+ 𝛾9𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾10𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾11𝑇𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 +  𝛾12𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖
+  𝛾13𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾14𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾15𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾16𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑖
+  𝜀𝑖 (𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟑) 
 Model 3 is estimated four times in which the Risk_Measure independent variable takes 
the following values respectively: AIV-Target, VIV-Target, AIV-Bidder, and VIV-Bidder. The 
dependent variable is the Cash dummy. ‘i’ corresponds to the control bid (deal) in our sample.   
 Model 4 seen below is a logistic estimation for testing the AIV and VIV effect on the 
chances that the deal will finish successfully (Model 4 covers hypothesis H13).  
Log (
𝑃(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒 = 1)
1 − 𝑃(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒 = 1)
)
𝑖
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖  + 𝛾1𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖  + 𝛾2𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛾3𝛾3,𝑖𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑁𝑌𝑆𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾4 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝐵/𝑀𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖
+ 𝛾6𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾8𝑇𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾9𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛾10𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾11𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝛾12𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾13𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛾14𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 (𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝟒) 
 Model 3 and Model 4 have similar estimation procedures.     
 
2.4.4 Multivariate Tests Results 
Table 2.5 summarises the findings of multivariate testing.  
<Please insert table 2.5 here> 
2.4.4.1 The effect of our control variables 
Table 2.8, Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 present the results for the tests related to the effect of AIV 
and VIV on CAR-Bidder. We observe that the bidder announcement CAR decreases with the 
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target size, target turnover, target markup, and for hostile takeover. On the other hand, it 
increases for cash deals, for multi-bid deals and for completed deals. The target B/M, target 
being listed on NYSE/Amex, the target runup or the deal containing a collar, a toehold or being 
horizontal, a tender offer or preceded by a rumor do not affect the CAR-Bidder significantly.  
 Table 2.11 presents the results of the tests related to the effect of AIV and VIV on the 
choice of the medium of exchange. From table 2.11 we can conclude that the chance that the deal 
will be a Cash-Offer increases with the B/M-Bidder, the deal being a tender offer, and when 
multiple bidders are competing for the same deal and decreases in the presence of a collar and in 
horizontal bids. The other control variables play no significant role in the choice of the medium 
of exchange. 
 Table 2.12 presents the results of the tests related to the effect of AIV and VIV on the 
chances that the deal will finish successfully. Table 2.12 reveals that the probability of the deal 
success increases with the deal being a tender offer and decreases for hostile deals, multi-bid 
deals, deals having a Toehold, with the target size and if the target is listed on NYSE/AMEX. 
Other control variables play no significant role in the probability of the deal being successfully 
completed. 
2.4.4.2 The effect of the implied volatility spread on the probability of deal success 
The results provided in table 2.6 and 2.7 present strong evidence in support of our first 
hypothesis in its second form: the further away is the target implied volatility from its theoretical 
value (acquirer implied volatility in case of stock ‘mixed’ deals or zero in case of cash deals), the 
lower the chances that the deal will finish successfully.  
<Please Inset Tables 2.6 and 2.7 here> 
We can notice that while the IV-Spread@+2 is negative and significant, the square of the spread 
when put in the same model with the IV-Spread@+2 is positive and significant. This observation 
leads us to conclude that the probability of deal success decreases as the IV-Spread@+2 
increases but this relationship is not constant and is decreasing in strength. The IV-Spread@-42 
plays no significant role in the determination of the probability of deal success as predicted by 
our hypothesis as the trends taken by the target implied volatilities are still in their very early 
stages. The IV-Spread-Ratio does not add additional explanatory power over the IV-Spread@+2. 
This ratio was designed to capture whether the relative spread between the target implied 
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volatility and its theoretical level before and after the announcement is important when it comes 
to assessing the probability of deal success. The results shows it is not.  
2.4.4.3 The effect of the risk (AIV) and uncertainty about the risk (VIV) on CAR-Bidder 
Related to hypothesis H3 through H8, Tables 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 present the detailed results for 
testing the effect of the average implied volatility (AIV) and the volatility of implied volatility 
(VIV) of both target and acquirer firms on the CAR-Bidder.  
<Please Inset Tables 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 here> 
We find out that when tested on Stock and Mixed offers, AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder negatively 
affect the CAR-Bidder; a 1% increase in the bidder’s expected uncertainty (AIV-Bidder) is 
associated with 1.5% decrease in the bidder CAR whereas a 1% increase in bidder’s uncertainty 
about risk (VIV-Bidder) leads to 0.5% decrease in bidder CAR
14
. However, VIV-Bidder plays no 
significant role when the sample is limited to Cash-Only offers and the AIV-Bidder effect 
becomes positive but not significant. In addition, when AIV and VIV are included together in the 
same regression, the AIV-Bidder overshadowed the VIV-Bidder for Stocks and Mixed offers 
(VIV-Bidder becomes insignificant) and the AIV-Bidder effect becomes positive and significant 
and the VIV-Bidder effect becomes negative and significant for Cash-Only offers.  
 The results related to AIV-Bidder on CAR-Bidder are in line with our predictions: they 
support the notion that the higher the bidder firm uncertainty (AIV) the more the perception of its 
stock being undervalued if it opts for Cash-Only deals and overvalued if it opts for Stock or 
Mixed (Non-Cash-Only) deals. The market will react accordingly: Bidder CAR will increase as a 
Bidder AIV increase for Cash-Only offers (in line with H5) and Bidder CAR will decrease as 
Bidder AIV increase for Stock and Mixed offers (in line with H4).    
 The results related to the VIV-Bidder reveals that VIV-Bidder negatively affect the CAR-
Bidder in case of Stock (Mixed) offers when tested alone in the model. However, when we add 
the AIV-Bidder to the regression, the significance of the VIV-Bidder disappears. For Cash-Only 
offers, the situation is reversed: VIV-Bidder effect is significant and negative only in the 
presence of AIV-Bidder in the same regression but it is not significant when the AIV-Bidder is 
not included as explanatory variable in the model.  Our eighth hypothesis (H8) related to 
associating a higher VIV-Bidder with lower CAR-Bidder passes but not in all settings. When the 
                                                          
14
 The 1.4% and 0.4% are the AIV and VIV respective elasticities in the OLS models used to estimate CAR-Bidder 
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related results deviate from our prediction it is not because of a counter significance but it is 
because of a lack of significance. The negative relationship between VIV-Bidder and CAR-
Bidder seems to hold but is not very strong. This maybe a result of our 572-deal sample size 
limitation.  
 When it comes to AIV (VIV)-Target, it seems that target risk and uncertainty about risk 
do not affect the CAR-Bidder in case of both Cash offer and Stock or Mixed Offer. This 
contradicts what we have expected in H2 and H6 and in accordance with what we have expected 
in H3 and H7, respectively.  
2.4.4.4 The effect of risk (AIV) and uncertainty about risk (VIV) on the Choice of the Medium of 
Exchange 
Related to hypothesis H9 through H12, table 2.11 presents the detailed results for testing the 
effect of risk and uncertainty about risk of both target and bidder firms on the choice of the 
medium of exchange.  
<Please Inset Table 2.11 here> 
Our results show that an increase in any of our risk measures (AIV-Target and AIV-Bidder) and 
uncertainty about risk measures (VIV-Target and VIV-Bidder) leads to a decrease in the 
probability that we observe in a Cash-Only offer. It seems that as the risk of the bidder (AIV-
Bidder) and the target (AIV-Target) both increases, the bidder will prefer to go for a Stock 
(Mixed) offer in order to share the target risk (supporting what we have expected – H9) and also 
to share its own risk with the target (not supporting the pre-emptive setting that we have 
expected – H10). When it comes to target risk uncertainty, it seems that as VIV-Target increases, 
the uncertainty about the target risk increases making it harder for the bidder to properly price it. 
In such case, it appears that bidder firms prefer a stock or mixed deal over a fixed cash one 
because it will be sharing the target risk uncertainty with target investors (in contradiction to 
H11). When it comes to bidder risk uncertainty; it seems that as VIV-Bidder increases, the 
uncertainty about the bidder risk increases and consequently the uncertainty about its price. This 
leads the bidder firm to prefer a stock or mixed deal with the possibility of benefiting from the 
ambiguity about their stock value while paying the target shareholder (in contradiction to H12). 
The pre-emptive bidding setting we have expected to occur when considering both bidder and 
target uncertainty about risk is not happening for our sample refuting both hypothesis 11 and 12, 
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respectively.  
 A point worth mentioning; when both AIV and VIV are used together in in the same 
regression in order to predict the probability of a Cash offer, the VIV effect of both target and 
bidder firms reverse signs: it now significantly positively affects the chance of being faced with a 
Cash-Only offer. It seems that the expected firm risk level (AIV) affects the choice of the 
medium of exchange as well as the way in which other variables (like uncertainty about risk 
‘VIV’) affect the choice of the medium of exchange.   
2.4.4.5 The effect of risk (AIV) and uncertainty about risk (VIV) on the chances that the deal 
will finish successfully 
Related to hypothesis H13, table 2.12 presents the detailed results for testing the effect of risk 
and uncertainty about risk of both target and bidder firms on the probability that the deal will 
finish successfully. 
<Please inset Table 2.12 here> 
Although we expect a negative relation between AIV and VIV of both Target and Acquirer and 
the probability of deal success (H13), only the bidder level of risk (Bidder-AIV) seems to 
negatively affect the chances of the deal success. The higher the level of the bidder risk, the 
lower the possibility that the merger will be completed successfully. This may be due to conflict 
of interests between target and acquirer firms: the target would like to receive a cash offer or a 
higher premium to compensate its investors for the riskier bidder stock in case of a stock or 
mixed deal and the bidder will either prefer stock and/or disagree on the proper premium to pay 
(exchange ratio). The higher the bidder risk, the harder the negotiation would be in a merger and 
acquisition setting. Thus it would be more likely that these negotiations would fail.  
2.5 Robustness Checks 
2.5.1 A. The effect of the estimation period on our AIV and VIV related results 
In order to check whether the results we have obtained are driven by information generated 
during the deal negotiation process or by firm specific features that existed way before target and 
bidder companies considered the merger, we estimate the average implied volatility (AIV) and 
the volatility of implied volatility (VIV) over a pre-runup period (days, -84, -43). This pre-runup 
estimation window is close to the one used by Luypaert and Caneghem (2017). We expect the 
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measures estimated during the runup period to be different in effect and significance than those 
estimated during the pre-runup period if they are found to capture deal related information rather 
than firm specific information. Table 2.13 presents a summary of the results performed on the 
pre-runup measures.  
<Please insert Table 2.13 here> 
 The detailed results of our tests are presented in Appendix A. Our findings show that the 
results obtained by the tests performed during the pre-runup period are similar to those obtained 
during the runup period with a decrease in significance. Specifically, the VIV-Bidder no longer 
affects our CAR-Bidder significantly. We also lose the effect of the AIV-Bidder on the 
probability of the deal success when both AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder are included in the same 
regression. All other results are similar to those obtained in our original tests. These findings 
reveal that although the runup measures capture information from the deal negotiation process, 
they still keep some of the original target and firm characteristics that existed before the deal 
negotiation intensified.  
2.5.2 B. The effect of controlling for the divergence of opinion measures on our AIV and VIV 
related results 
The literature uses different measure to proxy for information asymmetry. Among the most 
widely used ones are the number of analysts’ forecasts and the standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts (usually referred to as diversity of opinion measures) – both measures are usually 
obtained from the IBES database. Following the same trend, we rely on the standard deviation of 
analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for diversity of opinion. We use the one-year analysts’ forecasts as 
our base. However, the main challenge we face is what month relative to the announcement 
month to tally the analysts’ forecasts related measures. As presented in figure 6, we can notice an 
increasing trend in the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts for both bidder and target firms 
as we go through the deal negotiation process.  
<Please insert figure 6 here> 
 Analysts seem to update their beliefs about both target and acquirer firms progressively. 
The more we go through the deal, the higher their level of disagreement (higher standard 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts). As such we have picked three time-periods: 12 months before 
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the announcement month, 2 months before the announcement months, and 1 month after the 
announcement month. Next, we have checked the effect of IBES divergence of opinion on our 
CAR-Bidder, choice of medium of exchange and the chances that the deal will go through 
successfully. The rational for the choice of period is the following: 12 months represents one 
year before the announcement and we are relying on 1-year analysts’ forecasts as our base, 2 
months before the announcement month represents the start of our runup period and 1 month 
after the announcement period is selected to check how analysts react to the announcement after 
it occurs. The objective of our tests is to check whether the asymmetric information measure 
extracted from analysts’ diversity of option would react on our sample as predicted in the 
literature. Table 2.14 summarizes the results of these tests and Appendix B presents the details 
tests results.  
<Please insert Table 2.14 here> 
 Whereas previous work (Moeller et al. 2007 among others) predicts a negative 
relationship between diversity of opinion of the bidder and CAR-Bidder for Stock (Mixed) deals 
and no effect of diversity of opinion on Cash deals, our results show that diversity of opinion 
about the bidder plays no significant role in the CAR- Bidder for our sample except for the 
measure estimated one month after the announcement and for non-cash-only deals. It seems to 
play no role in the choice of medium of exchange as well. However, as the bidder diversity of 
opinion increases the chances that the deal finishes successfully increases. These results are 
limited to the measure estimated 2 months before the announcement months. It seems that for 
our deals, the analysts following the deal will update their beliefs about the firms’ prospects 
when they are confident that the deal will go through – which in turn leads to this significant 
positive relationship between the chances that the deal will go through and the diversity of 
opinion measure. This phenomenon does not happen a year before the announcement nor a 
month after the announcement. When it comes to diversity of opinion related to the target firm, 
our sample reveals that the higher the target diversity of opinion the higher the CAR-Bidder in 
case of a Stock (Mixed) deal and the lower the CAR-Bidder in case of a Cash deal. It seems that 
the more the analysts disagree about the target firm, the more the uncertainty about the firm, thus 
the Bidder-CAR will react positively in case of Stock (Mixed) deal as this uncertainty is shared 
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with the target shareholders. Moreover, it will react negatively in case of a Cash deal as this 
uncertainty is absorbed solely by bidder shareholders.  
 Since the measures estimated two months before the announcement month are the most 
significant ones when it comes to the probability of deal success prediction, we use them as 
control variables in the subsequent tests. In order to test whether our AIV and VIV measures are 
capturing additional information above the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts, we repeat 
the same tests for AIV and VIV while including both Target and Bidder measures of diversity of 
opinion as control variables. Table 2.15 summarises our main findings and Appendix C presents 
the detailed results.  
<Please insert Table 2.15 here> 
 Our findings show that the results originally obtained for AIV and VIV are robust and 
most of the significant relations are maintained. One effect is worth mentioning though: for 
Cash-Only deals, once we control for the bidder firms’ analysts’ diversity of opinion, the effect 
of AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder on CAR-Bidder becomes insignificant when put together in the 
same regression.  
2.5.3 The effect of controlling for the idiosyncratic volatility on our AIV and VIV related 
results 
2.5.3.1 Idiosyncratic volatility as an independent variable 
A proxy for uncertainty that is used in the literature and used by Moeller et al., (2007) and 
Luypaert and Caneghem (2017) is idiosyncratic volatility. Following their work, we estimate the 
idiosyncratic volatility of both bidder and target firms relying on the standard deviation of the 
market model residuals. The main challenge we face is: over what interval do we estimate our 
idiosyncratic volatility? Driven by the literature about the run-up period and that information 
about the deal starts leaking around 42 days before the announcement day, we decided to 
estimate our idiosyncratic volatility measures over three periods: one spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement and ending two trading days before the announcements [-256, -2], a 
second starting 256 trading days before the announcement and ending 43 trading days before the 
announcement day [-256, -43], and a third starting 43 trading days before the announcement day 
and ending two trading days before the announcement day [-43, -2]. The last interval covers the 
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same period over which our AIV (VIV) are estimated, the first interval is more in line with 
Moeller et al.’s (2007) estimation period that spanned from 205 days before the announcement to 
six days before the announcement and the middle interval was intended to catch the idiosyncratic 
volatility effect before the runup period in order to avoid any overlap with our AIV (VIV) 
estimation period.   
 The work of Moeller et al. 2007 predicts a negative relationship between the idiosyncratic 
volatility of the bidder and the CAR-Bidder for Stock-Only deals and a positive effect for Cash-
Only deals. Table 2.16 summarizes the results of the idiosyncratic volatility effect on the CAR-
Bidder, and the chances of facing a cash-only offer and the probability of the deal’s success. The 
detailed tests’ results are presented in Appendix D.  
<Please insert Table 2.16 here> 
 The findings show that the acquirer’s idiosyncratic volatility is negatively related to 
bidder CAR in case of stock or mixed deals (in line with the work of Moeller), and not 
significant or positively related to bidder CAR (significance is only observed for the 
idiosyncratic volatility estimated over the ‘-43,-2’ interval) for a Cash-Only offer. The weak 
positive relationship between acquirer idiosyncratic volatility and bidder CAR in case of a Cash-
only offer might be attributed to the different sample periods considered in both studies. Where 
Moeller et al.’s (2007) sample period spans from 1980 to 2002, our sample spans from 1996 till 
2013. Adding to the CAR-Bidder related tests, we show that the higher the idiosyncratic 
volatility of either acquirer or target, the lower the chances of facing a cash-only offer, and the 
higher the acquirer idiosyncratic volatility, the lower the probability of deal success (only when 
idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval ‘-43, -2’). Relying on our idiosyncratic 
volatility related tests we have two main conclusions: the first is that the idiosyncratic volatility 
behavior is in line with the results we have obtained for AIV and VIV when it comes to their 
effect on the CAR-bidder (also in line with the results of Moeller et. Al ‘2007). In addition, they 
conform to the results obtained by AIV and VIV when explaining the chances of facing a cash 
deal or on the probability of the deal’s success. The second conclusion we observe is that the 
estimation period plays an important role in shaping the relationship between the idiosyncratic 
volatility and Acquirer-CAR, chances of facing a Cash-Only offer and the probability of the 
deal’s success. Where the three measures behave similarly when it comes to determining the 
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chances of facing a Cash-Only offer, the idiosyncratic volatility estimated over the run-up period 
[-43,-2] seems to possess superior predictive power when it comes to its effect on the CAR-
Bidder and the probability of the deal’s success. For this reason and because it is estimated over 
the same period as our AIV and VIV measure, we rely on the idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
over the runup period [-43,-2] as a control variable in testing the robustness of our AIV and VIV 
findings
15
.   
2.5.3.2 The significance of AIV (VIV) on the CAR-Bidder while controlling for idiosyncratic 
volatility  
Next we analyze how the results discovered for AIV and VIV are affected by the corresponding 
idiosyncratic volatility. Table 2.17 reports a summary of the results obtained by testing AIV and 
VIV effect on Bidder-CAR while controlling for the idiosyncratic volatility, and the chances of 
the deal being a cash-only offer and of the deal succeeding. Appendix E presents the detailed 
results.  
<Please insert Table 2.17 here> 
 Our results show that the target AIV is still insignificant after controlling for the 
idiosyncratic volatility. When it comes to the effect of acquirer AIV on the CAR-bidder, a 
negative relationship was established earlier for Stock or Mixed deals. This relationship persists 
after controlling for the idiosyncratic volatility. The previously established relationship between 
VIV and CAR-Bidder becomes insignificant after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility.  
 
2.5.3.3 The significance of AIV (VIV) on the chances of facing a cash-only offer while 
controlling for idiosyncratic volatility  
When it comes to determining the probability of facing a Cash-only offer, the target and acquirer 
AIV seem to preserve their negative relationship after controlling for the idiosyncratic volatility, 
the VIV effect is neutralized.  
 
                                                          
15
 We have checked how AIV and VIV behaves while controlling for the idiosyncratic volatility estimated over the 
[-256,-2] and the [-256,-43] windows. The results reveal that the effect of AIV and VIV is stronger than those 
discussed here. Appendix K and Appendix L show the results of AIV and VIV performed while controlling for these 
two extra measures respectively.  
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2.5.3.4 The significance of AIV (VIV) on the probability of deal success while controlling for 
idiosyncratic volatility  
Controlling for idiosyncratic volatility render the previously established relationship between the 
bidder AIV and the probability of deal success insignificant.  
 
2.5.3.5 Main points related to the significance of AIV (VIV) after controlling for idiosyncratic 
volatility  
The results presented here show that AIV (VIV) and idiosyncratic volatility appear to share some 
common information. However, the idiosyncratic volatility does not capture all the information 
included in our AIV measure. Because our results may be driven by high correlations between 
AIV and idiosyncratic volatility (as shown in Table 2.18 below), we orthogonalized our AIV and 
VIV measures to the idiosyncratic volatility by regressing AIV (VIV) to the corresponding 
idiosyncratic volatility and using the residuals as our new AIV (VIV) variables. A summary of 
the new results is presented in Table 2.19 below and the entire results are presented in Appendix 
F. The findings obtained after orthogonizing our AIV and VIV lead to the same conclusions 
about AIV and VIV as the above
16
.   
<Please insert Table 2.18 and Table 2.19 here> 
 
2.5.3.6 Expanding our Sample 
Next, we expand our sample by relaxing the requirement that both bidder and target firm need to 
have options traded on them into only having the option requirement limited to the bidder firms 
when testing a bidder related hypothesis (no option requirement on the target side) or the target 
firms when testing target related hypothesis (no option requirement on the bidder side).  
2.5.3.6.1 Our main AIV and VIV hypothesis tested on the expanded sample 
Table 2.20 presents a summary of the results found when testing Bidder and Target AIV and 
VIV on the expanded sample. The results of the tests performed on the larger sample are very 
similar to the ones obtained for the original 572 deals’ sample except for the bidder VIV: the 
                                                          
16
 Appendix M and N presents the results related to AIV and VIV being orthogonized against the idiosyncratic 
volatilities estimated over the interval [-256, -2] and [-256, -43] 
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relationship between VIV-Bidder and chances of observing a cash-only offer is no more 
significant. The details of the tests performed on the expanded sample are presented in Appendix 
G.  
<Please insert Table 2.20 here> 
2.5.3.6.2 The effect of the idiosyncratic volatility in the expanded sample 
The similarity of the expanded sample results to those obtained from the original sample is also 
observed for the idiosyncratic volatility as seen in Table 2.21 below, with the main addition that 
the acquirer idiosyncratic volatility estimated over the three intervals [‘-256, -2’, ‘-256, -43’, ‘-
43, -2’] negatively affects the probability of the deal’s success. The details of the related tests are 
presented in Appendix H.    
<Please insert Table 2.21 here> 
2.5.3.6.3 The significance of AIV (VIV) after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility in the 
expanded sample 
When it comes to the robustness of our AIV and VIV findings after controlling for the 
idiosyncratic volatility effect, we notice from Table 2.22 below that in the expanded sample the 




<Please insert Table 2.22 here> 
When it comes to assessing the effect of AIV and VIV on the chances of facing a cash-only offer 
in the expanded sample, we see that target AIV and VIV exhibit similar behavior as in the 
original sample; target AIV negatively affects the chances of facing a cash-only offer even after 
controlling for idiosyncratic volatility whereas target VIV is not significant. For the Acquirer 
AIV, it is still negatively affecting the chances of facing a cash-only offer while controlling for 
the idiosyncratic volatility and the VIV (which was insignificant in the original sample 
robustness check) is now positive and significant.  The shift in the sign of the VIV was also 
observed when VIV and AIV were put together in the same regression, so it was not a surprise.  
                                                          
17
 Appendix O and Appendix P present the results related to AIV and VIV being while controlling for the 
idiosyncratic volatilities estimated over the interval [-256, -2] and [-256, -43] in the expanded sample respectively 
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After controlling for idiosyncratic volatility, none of our AIV or VIV measures affect the 
probability of the deal’s success. 
  
2.5.3.6.4 Main points for AIV (VIV) after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility in the 
expanded sample 
Following the same procedure performed for our original sample, we estimate the correlation 
matrix among our main independent variables (Table 2.23 below) and we orthogonalize our AIV 
and VIV measures against the idiosyncratic volatility. As shown in Table 2.24, similar results are 
obtained. The details of the results are presented in Appendix J
18
.  
<Please insert Table 2.23 and 2.24 here> 
In conclusion, accounting for idiosyncratic volatility neutralizes the effect of our option-implied 
measures on the probability of the deal’s success and weaken the effect of VIV19 on both CAR-
Bidder and the chances of facing a cash-only offer but does not capture all the information 
related to AIV and its relationship with Bidder-CAR and the chances of facing a cash-only offer.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we study the behavior of future expected uncertainty (proxied by the implied 
volatility) of the bidder and target firms during the runup period. We show that for our sample of 
572 M&A deals in which both target and acquirer possess traded options, the target’s implied 
volatility (IV) approaches the acquirer’s implied volatility (IV) for stock and mixed (Non-Cash-
Only) deals and drops to lower levels for Cash-Only deals. Building on these findings, we 
hypothesize that the target implied volatility should ultimately approach a theoretical level: the 
acquirer-implied volatility in case of stock (mixed) deals and zero in case of cash deals. 
Consequently, the further away the implied volatility from this theoretical level, the lower the 
probability of the deal’s success.  
                                                          
18
 Appendix Q and Appendix R present the results related to AIV and VIV while orthogonalizing against the 
idiosyncratic volatilities estimated over the interval [-256, -2] and [-256, -43] in the expanded sample respectively 
19
 We note that the VIV effect on the CAR-Bidder was negative and significant for the cash-only offer while 
controlling for the idiosyncratic volatilities estimated over the interval [-256, -2] and [-256, -43] in the expanded 
sample.  
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 We rely on the average implied volatility (AIV) as a proxy for average expected risk and 
the volatility of implied volatility (VIV) as a proxy for the uncertainty about the expected risk. 
We show that the average of the implied volatility of the acquirer company (AIV-Bidder) 
estimated over the runup period (days -42; -2) negatively affects the CAR-Bidder for Stock 
(Mixed) offers and positively affects the CAR-Bidder for Cash offers. The results can be 
interpreted as follows: when uncertainty about the bidder is high, a Cash offer will be perceived 
as a sign that the bidder stock is undervalued and a Stock (Mixed) offer will be perceived as a 
sign that the bidder stock is overvalued.  
 On the other hand, the bidder volatility of implied volatility (VIV-Bidder) negatively 
affects the CAR-bidder for Stock (Mixed) offers and negatively affects the CAR-bidder when 
tested in conjunction with AIV-Bidder for Cash deals. As uncertainty about the risk of the bidder 
firm increases, the CAR-Bidder tends to decrease (to varying extents) for both Cash and Stock 
(Mixed) offers. This result supports the hypothesis that VIV (Volatility of Implied Volatility) 
would serve as a good proxy for resolution of uncertainty of the firm’s risk and that higher VIV 
implies lower resolution of uncertainty.  
 We also study the relation between risk and uncertainty about risk and the choice of the 
medium of exchange. Our results show that the probability of Cash deals decreases as both risk 
and uncertainty about the risk increases – results apply for both target and bidder firms. As target 
risk (AIV-Target) increases the bidder firm will opt for a Stock (Mixed) deal to share this 
increase risk with target investors. When target uncertainty about the risk (VIV-Target) 
increases, bidder investors would also be inclined to part any possible target risk misspecification 
with the target’s investors. When the bidder risk uncertainty increases (VIV-Bidder), the bidder 
firm will prefer a Stock (Mixed) offer in order to possibly benefit from the prevailing ambiguity 
about its risk and consequently its stock price. A similar argument applies when it comes to 
interpreting the bidder risk.  
 We also show that the probability that the deal will be successfully completed decreases 
as the risk of the bidder increases. This may be a direct translation of the harder negotiation taken 
place between bidder and target when the bidder risk level is high (making it harder for the target 
investors to evaluate the offer). 
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 Additional tests reveal that AIV, VIV, and idiosyncratic volatility behave as proxy for 
different forms of uncertainty. We present evidence showing that the idiosyncratic volatility 
affects the chances of facing a Cash-only offer as well as the probability of the deal’s success, in 
addition to the effect of idiosyncratic volatility on Bidder-CAR pioneered by Moeller et al. 
(2007). When controlling for idiosyncratic volatility, the role that our AIV measure plays in 
determining the probability of deal success becomes insignificant. However, the relationship of 
our AIV with the bidder CAR and the chances of facing a Cash-only offer is not absorbed by the 
idiosyncratic volatility.  
 In this study, we convey that risk (AIV) and uncertainty about risk (VIV) both contain 
valuable information that play a predicting role over of the bidder cumulative abnormal return, 
the choice of the medium of exchange, and the possibility that the deal will pass through 
successfully. Our results open new doors to several interesting questions. Our Implied Volatility 
graphs show a slight difference between complete and incomplete deals post the announcement 
period. It would be interesting to check whether this behavior anticipates the effective 
(withdrawal) day. We have limited our analysis to the bidder performances around the 
announcement day. It would be worthwhile to check whether our AIV (VIV) measures 
(estimated during the runup period or after the announcement period) can predict the acquisition 
perceived synergy and consequently the long-term performance of the emerging company. In 
this study, we rely on Implied Volatilities extracted from the money (ATM) options. We pick 
ATM implied volatilities because they serve as a proxy for the stock expected volatility. 
However, deep out of the money (OTM) option prices would catch buying (selling) pressure. As 
such, we expect that OTM implied volatility based measures to behave differently than our ATM 
implied volatility based measures, an expectation supported by research analyzing the effect of 
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Figure 2-1   Average Implied Volatility Graphs 
The figures below presents the average implied volatility for our bidder and target firms through the deal negotiation process. We use the average of 
put and call Implied Volatility for 30 day ATM option as our proxy for Implied Volatility. The implied volatility spread corresponds to the difference 
between target and acquirer Implied Volatility.  
  
 
Panel A: Average Volatility as we move through time for All Control Bids in our Sample  
 
 
Panel B: Average Volatility as we move through time for ‘Non-Cash-Only (Stock and Mixed)’ Control Bids in our Sample  
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Figure 2-2   Average Implied Volatility Graphs around the Announcement Day 
The figures below presents the average implied volatility for our bidder and target firms around the announcement day. We use the 
average of put and call Implied Volatility for 30 day ATM option as our proxy for Implied Volatility. The implied volatility Spread 
corresponds to the difference between the target and acquirer Implied Volatility.  
  
 
Panel A: Average Volatility as we move through time for All Control Bids in our Sample  
 
 
Panel B: Average Volatility as we move through time for ‘Non-Cash-Only (Stock and Mixed)’ Control Bids in our Sample  
 
 












-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4







-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4










-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Implied Acquirer Volatility Implied Target Volatility Implied Volatility Spread
 44 
Figure 2-3   Average Implied Volatility Graphs for Complete Deals Only 
The figures below presents the average implied volatility for our bidder and target firms, for complete deals only, through the deal 
negotiation process. We use the average of put and call Implied Volatility for 30 day ATM option as our proxy for Implied 
Volatility. The implied volatility Spread corresponds to the difference between the target and acquirer Implied Volatility. 
  
 
Panel A: Average Volatility as we move through time for Complete Control Bids in our Sample  
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Figure 2-4   Average Implied Volatility Graphs for Complete Deals Only around the Announcement Day 
The figures below present the average implied volatility for our bidder and target firms, for complete deals only, around the 
announcement day. We use the average of put and call Implied Volatility for 30 day ATM option as our proxy for Implied 
Volatility. The implied volatility Spread corresponds to the difference between the target and acquirer Implied Volatility.  
 
Panel A: Average Volatility as we move through time for Complete Control Bids in our Sample  
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Figure 2-5   Average Implied Volatility Graphs for Incomplete Deals Only 
The figures below presents the average implied volatility for our bidder and target firms, for incomplete deals only, through the 
deal negotiation process. We use the average of put and call Implied Volatility for 30 days ATM option as our proxy for Implied 
Volatility. The implied volatility Spread corresponds to the difference between the target and acquirer Implied Volatility.  
  
 
Panel A: Average Volatility as we move through time for Incomplete Control Bids in our Sample  
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Figure 2-6   Average Implied Volatility Graphs for Incomplete Deals Only around the Announcement Day 
The figures below presents the average implied volatility for our bidder and target firms, for incomplete deals only, around the 
announcement day. We use the average of put and call Implied Volatility for a 30-day ATM option as our proxy for Implied 
Volatility. The implied volatility Spread corresponds to the difference between the target and acquirer Implied Volatility.  
  
 
Panel A: Average Volatility as we move through time for Incomplete Control Bids in our Sample  
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Figure 2-7   Analysts Divergence of Opinion around the Announcement Month 
 
Figure 2.7a: Divergence of opinion about the Target firm around the announcement month (0) measured as the standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts as reported by IBES. 
 
Figure 2.7b. Divergence of opinion about the Bidder firm around the announcement month (0) measured as the standard deviation of 
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Table 2-1   Model Predictions 
Synopsis of the main predictions highlighted in our hypothesis related to Risk (AIV) and Uncertainty about Risk (VIV) of 
both target and bidder firms.  
 
 Acquirer Abnormal Returns 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease Increase 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Decrease Decrease 
 
Increase in: Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Increase 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  Increase 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 
Increase in: Probability of Deal Success 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  Decrease 





Table 2-2   Summary of variables used in the cross-sectional analysis 
Description of the main variables used in our work and the brief description of their construction. 
 
Variable Definition and Estimation 
Adjusted_Price CRSP Price Adjusted for Dividend and Split 
Premium (Initial_Offfer_Price/ P-42) – 1 
Runup (P-2/ P-42) – 1 
CAR Announcement  Announcement CAR is equal to the sum of Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the 
announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is company ‘i' 
return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted 
Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s components 
(𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43] 
event day window.   
Target Size Logarithm of target market value of equity 
Target market value of equity Number of target shares outstanding multiplies by the target stock price at event day -42 
Target Share Turnover The ratio of target volume to shares outstanding on day -42. 
NYSE/AMEX A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the target stock is listed on NYSE/ AMEX 
Target Book/Market ratio The target Book Value per share for the corresponding announcement day divided by the 
Target Market Value Per Share at day -42. 
Acquirer Size Logarithm of Acquirer market value of equity 
Acquirer market value of equity Number of Acquirer shares outstanding multiplies by the Acquirer stock price at event day -
42 
Acquirer Share Turnover The ratio of Acquirer volume to shares outstanding on day -42. 
Acquirer Book/Market ratio The Acquirer Book Value per share for the corresponding announcement day divided by the 
Acquirer Market Value Per Share at day -42.  
Collar A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the target has a collar 
Toehold A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder has more than 5% ownership prior to 
the announcement 
Horizontal A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if bidder and target has the same 4 digits SIC 
(Standard Industrial Classification) code 
Tender Offer A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the Bid is a Tender Offer 
Cash A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the offer is in cash-only  
Hostile A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bid is hostile 
Multiple Bids A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there are multiple bidders within the same contest 
(a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder bid) 
Rumor A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the deal started with a rumor - We relied on SDC 
for our rumor source 
Complete A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the deal was completed 
IV-Bidder (@t) The average of a 30-Day ATM Put and Call Option Implied Volatility estimated ‘t’ days 
from the announcement day for the Bidder Company 
IV-Target (@t) The average of a 30-Day ATM Put and Call Option Implied Volatility estimated ‘t’ days 
from the announcement day for the Target Company 
IV-Spread-Target-Bidder-(@t) IV-Target (@t) - IV-Bidder (@t) 
IV-Spread(@t) IV-Target (@t) - IV-Bidder (@t) in case of a stock (mixed) offer and IV-Target (@t) - 0 in 
case of a cash offer 
AIV-Bidder (Target) The Average of the Bidder (Target) Implied Volatility Estimated over the runup period (from 
day -42 till day -2) 
VIV-Bidder (Target) The Volatility of the Bidder (Target) Implied Volatility Estimated over the runup period 
(from day -42 till day -2) 
AIV-Bidder (Target) Pre-Runup The Average of the Bidder (Target) Implied Volatility Estimated over the pre-runup period 
(from day -84 till day -43) 
VIV-Bidder (Target) Pre-Runup The Volatility of the Bidder (Target) Implied Volatility Estimated over the runup period 
(from day -84 till day -43) 
Diversity of Opinion (@t) Standard Deviation of the analysts forecast obtained from IBES and estimated ‘t’ months 
before the announcement month 






Table 2-3   Sample Description 
The data spans from January 1996 till December 2013. The sample is based on US target firms’ with the deal form ‘M’ (merger) or ‘AM’ 
(acquisition of majority interest) obtained from the SDC Merger and Acquisition database. The control bids is defined as the bidder owning 
less than 50% of the target shares prior to the bid and seeking at least 50% of the target shares. 
 
 Initial Sample Final Sample 








All contests 15119 479.04 39.00 572 3208.45 1450.68 
       
1996-2008 3198 473.41170137 39.402 394 3338.29 1468.24 
2009-2013 11921 500.02334303 37.483 178 2921.04 1342.53 
       
Merger Bid 13934 452.856 32 426 3563.04 1458.93 
Tender Offer 1185 786.841 221.312 146 2173.79 1345.77 
       
Acquirer Private  4261 384.49 50.692 0 0 0 
Acquirer Public 10858 516.145 35.706 572 3208.45 1450.68 
Target Private 9395 135.326 18 0 0 0 
Target Public 5724 1043.191 149.414 572 3208.45 1450.68 




13985 238.55 30.875 368 1907.72 928.32 
Target Listed on 
NYSE/AMEX 
1134 3444.862 1080.45 204 5554.86 2634.59 
       
Single Bidders 14324 438.204 35.759 209 3216.21 1399.99 
Multi-Bidder 795 1214.826 136.706 63 3145.70 1702.61 
       
Friendly 15000 457.10 38.1525 552 3095.02 1405.24 
Hostile 119 3244.608 606.82 20 6339.03 1898.79 
       
Non-Cash-Only 9634 459.023 23.39 284 4097.85 1480.22 
Cash-Only 5485 514.199 87 288 2331.39 1401.61 
       
       
No Rumor 14880 406.82 37 531 2868.09 1353.55 
Rumor 239 4975.45 1499.47 41 7616.39 3901.32 
       
       
Non Completed 2597 453.54 17.174 87 3686.57 1454.76 
Completed 12522 484.33 44.909 485 3122.68 1436.28 
       
No Collar 14838 464.34 37 538 3249.51 1395.11 
Collar 281 1255.09 282.521 34 2558.58 2065.27 
       
No Toehold  14439 483.747 38.4 559 3235.29 1454.76 
Toehold 680 379.104 53.37 13 2053.69 701.57 
       
Not Horizontal 10745 442.76 38 427 3057.82 1362 
Horizontal 4375 568.16 41.84 145 3651.99 1660.72 
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Table 2-4   Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests of the differences in means and medians between Cash-Only and Non-Cash-Only deals 
IV-Bidder (Target) (@-t) is the Option Extracted Implied Volatility obtained ‘t’ days before the deal announcement day. IV-Spread-Target-Bidder (@-t) is the difference between the IV of the Target and the IV of the Bidder estimated ‘t’ 
days before the deal announcement day. AIV-Bidder (Target) is the Average of the Implied Volatility of the Bidder (Target) firm estimated during the runup period (days -42, -2). VIV-Bidder (Target) is the Volatility of the Implied Volatility 
of the Bidder (Target) firm estimated during the runup period (days -42, -2). AIV-Bidder (Target) Pre-runup is the Average of the Implied Volatility of the Bidder (Target) firm estimated during the Pre-runup period (days -84, -43). VIV-
Bidder (Target) Pre-runup is the Volatility of the Implied Volatility of the Bidder (Target) firm estimated during the Pre-runup period (days -84, -43). AIV (VIV) Spread are the difference between the AIV (VIV) of the Target and the AIV 
(VIV) of the bidder estimated during the runup and Pre-runup period correspondingly. Target (Bidder) Size is the logarithm of the market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and Target (Bidder) turnover is ratio of target 
volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (Bidder) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest stock book value before the announcement day divided by the stock price 42 days before the 
announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price 
divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +
 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The models’ components (𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖) are obtained 
by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43] event day window. Divergence of Opinion @t is the standard deviation of the analysts forecast obtained from IBES and estimated ‘t’ months before the announcement 
month. The Target (Acquirer) Idiosyncratic Volatility is the standard deviation of the market model adjusted residuals estimated over the corresponding interval. The sample consists of 572 control bids divided into 288 Cash-Only Bids and 
284 Non-Cash Only Bids. The sample is based on US targets firms with deal form ‘M’ (merger) or ‘AM’ (acquisition of majority interest) obtained from the SDC Merger and Acquisition database. The control bids is defined as the bidder 
owning less than 50% of the target shares prior to the bid and seeking to own at least 50% of the target shares. We request that both bidder and target have options traded on them. The results of t-tests for the difference in means and 
Wilcoxon tests for the difference in medians are reported in parentheses. The *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1% respectively.  
Panel A – Target and Bidder Characteristics 


















Difference in means between 
the two subgroups (Non-Cash-
Only minus Cash-Only) 
Difference in medians between 
the two subgroups (Non-Cash-
Only minus Cash-Only) 
Target Size 13.7355 13.6760 13.7999 13.6773 13.6720 13.6679 0.1279 (1.28) 0.0094 (0.847) 
Target Turnover 15.1403 8.9337 15.8807 9.4969 14.4101 8.4822 1.4706 (0.49) 1.0147 (0.44) 
Target B/M 0.4420 0.3810 0.4412 0.3839 0.4427 0.3787 -0.0015 (-0.05) 0.0052 (-0.48) 
Target Runup 0.0852 0.0625 0.0627 0.0496 0.1075 0.0768 -0.0448 (-2.39)** -0.0272 (-2.36)** 
Target Markup 0.3065 0.2632 0.2979 0.2493 0.3150 0.2789 -0.0171 (-0.69) -0.0296 (-1.83)* 
         
Bidder Size 15.8919 15.7202 15.3236 15.1109 16.4523 16.4657 -1.1287 (-8.39)*** -1.3548 (-8.29)*** 
Bidder Turnover 10.9381 6.9625 13.1012 7.6755 8.8050 6.7278 4.2962 (3.60)*** 0.9477 (2.37)** 
Bidder B/M 0.3581 0.3036 0.3634 0.3163 0.3529 0.2993 0.0105 (0.52) 0.017 (0.11) 
Bidder CAR  -0.0209 -0.0106 -0.0429 -0.0424 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0435  (-7.01)*** -0.0431 (-6.96)*** 
         
Panel B – Implied Volatility Related Measures 
IV-Bidder (@-42) 0.3919 0.3415 0.4699 0.4108 0.3149 0.2899 0.155 (10.23)*** 0.1209 (10.32)*** 
IV-Bidder (@-2) 0.3912 0.3481 0.4671 0.4084 0.3164 0.2936 0.1507 (10.34)*** 0.1148 (10.49)*** 
IV-Target (@-42) 0.5423 0.4826 0.5872 0.5235 0.4979 0.4408 0.0893 (4.44)*** 0.0827 (4.46)*** 
IV-Target (@-2) 0.5645 0.4980 0.6219 0.5435 0.5078 0.4536 0.1141 (5.05)*** 0.0899 (5.04)*** 
IV-Spread-(Target-Bidder) - (@-42) 0.1504 0.1083 0.1173 0.0768 0.1831 0.1435 -0.0658 (-3.95)*** -0.0667 (-4.75)*** 
IV-Spread-(Target-Bidder) - (@-2) 0.1733 0.1280 0.1549 0.0942 0.1914 0.1556 -0.0365 (-1.89)* -0.0614 (-3.24)*** 
         
AIV-Bidder 0.3909 0.3505 0.4669 0.4130 0.3160 0.2931 0.1509 (10.61)*** 0.1199 (10.65)*** 
AIV-Target  0.5473 0.4884 0.5968 0.5336 0.4985 0.4474 0.0983 (5.02)*** 0.0862 (4.77)*** 
AIV-Spread (Target-Bidder) 0.15638 0.1174 0.1299 0.0848 0.1914 0.1411 -0.0526 (-3.27)*** -0.0563 (-4.40)*** 
AIV-Bidder Pre-runup 0.4001 0.3524 0.4798 0.4313 0.3216 0.2995 0.1582 (10.73)*** 0.1318 (10.66)*** 
AIV-Target Pre-runup 0.5546 0.4897 0.6035 0.5497 0.5064 0.4445 0.0971 (4.79)*** 0.1052 (5.01)*** 
AIV-Spread (Target-Bidder) Pre-runup 0.15450 0.1131 0.1237 0.0786 0.1831 0.1402 -0.0611 (-3.61***) -0.0615 (-4.47)*** 
         
VIV-Bidder 0.0382 0.0309 0.0433 0.0349 0.0331 0.0286 0.0102 (4.21)*** 0.0063 (3.99)*** 
VIV-Target  0.0670 0.0495 0.0680 0.0514 0.0660 0.0485 0.002 (0.39) 0.0029 (1.07) 
VIV-Spread (Target-Bidder) 0.02878 0.0153 0.0247 0.0110 0.1825 0.0188 -0.0082 (-1.63) -0.0078 (-2.42)** 
VIV-Bidder Pre-runup 0.0409 0.0313 0.0476 0.0333 0.0343 0.0281 0.0133 (4.62)*** 0.0052 (3.79)*** 
VIV-Target Pre-runup 0.0651 0.0470 0.0682 0.0496 0.0621 0.0449 0.0061 (1.06) 0.0047 (0.77) 




Panel C – IBES Divergence of Opinion Related Measures 


















Difference in means between 
the two subgroups (Non-Cash-
Only minus Cash-Only) 
Difference in medians between 
the two subgroups (Non-Cash-
Only minus Cash-Only) 
Divergence of Opinion – Target (@-12) 0.1249 0.04 0.1754 0.04 0.0743 0.04 0.1011 (1.36) 0.00 (0.17) 
Divergence of Opinion – Bidder (@-12) 0.0848 0.03 0.0912 0.03 0.0785 0.04 0.0127 (1.04) -0.01 (0.63) 
Divergence of Opinion – Target (@-2) 0.1023 0.04 0.1278 0.05 0.0770 0.04 0.0507 (2.57)** 0.01 (1.58) 
Divergence of Opinion – Bidder (@-2) 0.0999 0.04 0.0936 0.04 0.1062 0.04 -0.0127 (-0.81) 0.00 (-0.69) 
Divergence of Opinion – Target (@1) 0.1104 0.045 0.1095 0.04 0.1112 0.05 -0.0016 (-0.06) -0.01 (0.30) 
Divergence of Opinion – Bidder (@1) 0.1157 0.04 0.1099 0.04 0.1215 0.04 -0.0116 (-0.58) 0.00 (0.28) 
         
Target Idiosyncratic Volatility [-256,-2] 0.0305 0.0265 0.0336 0.0300 0.0274 0.0237 0.0063 (5.02)*** 0.01 (5.48)*** 
Target Idiosyncratic Volatility [-256,-43] 0.0303 0.0265 0.0339 0.0299 0.0267 0.0234 0.0072 (5.84)*** 0.01 (5.79)*** 
Target Idiosyncratic Volatility [-43,-2] 0.0289 0.0233 0.0308 0.0257 0.0271 0.0215 0.0038 (2.19)** 0.00 (4.54)*** 
Acquirer Idiosyncratic Volatility [-256,-2] 0.0213 0.0186 0.0265 0.0223 0.0163 0.0144 0.0102 (11.07)*** 0.01 (11.22)*** 
Acquirer Idiosyncratic Volatility [-256,-43] 0.0215 0.0184 0.0266 0.0226 0.0164 0.0146 0.0103 (10.88)*** 0.01 (10.99)*** 







Table 2-5   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results 
Summary of the results for the main explanatory variables (AIV and VIV) when estimated over the runup period. 
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease Increase (No effect) 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease Increase 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect Decrease 
  
Panel B – Probability of Cash-Only Offer 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Decrease 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) Increase 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 
Panel B – Probability of Deal Success 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease  
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
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Table 2-6   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on the Implied 
Volatility Spread (IV-Spread) 
IV-Spread@+2 is constructed as the Target’s Implied Volatility estimated two days after the announcement minus the Acquirer’s Implied Volatility estimated two days after the 
announcement for Stock or Mixed Deals and the Target’s Implied Volatility estimated two days after the announcement minus zero for Cash-Only Deals. IV-Spread@-42 is 
constructed as the Target’s Implied Volatility estimated 42 days before the announcement minus the Acquirer’s Implied Volatility estimated 42 days before the announcement for 
Stock or Mixed Deals and as the Target’s Implied Volatility estimated 42 days before the announcement minus zero for Cash-Only Deals. The IV-Spread-Ratio is equal to the ratio 
of the IV-Spread@+2 divided by IV-Spread@-42. Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is 
the ratio of target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value 
divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price two days before the announcement divided by 
the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price two days 
before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the 
value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a 
rumor, and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if 
there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneathand are the MLE p-values *, **, *** 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 
Constant -0.623 
-0.057 -0.6104 0.5245 
(p-value) (0.7473) 
(0.9767) (0.7536) (0.7877) 
IV-Spread@+2  -0.8855*  -4.1239*** 
(p-value)  (0.0755)  (0.0018) 
( IV-Spread@+2 )^2   -0.0259 2.824** 
(p-value)   
  (0.9488) (0.0211) 
Target Size 0.2464* 
0.2031 0.2455* 0.1566 
(p-value) (0.0774) 
(0.15) (0.0801) (0.2652) 
Target Turnover -0.00032 
-0.0003 -0.00032 -0.00089 
(p-value) (0.9246) 
(0.933) (0.9262) (0.8284) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.551* 
-0.5721* -0.5512* -0.6377* 
(p-value) (0.0876) 
(0.0761) (0.0874) (0.0506) 
Target B/M -0.7347** 
-0.6772* -0.7326** -0.7468** 
(p-value) (0.0416) 
(0.0609) (0.043) (0.0353) 
Target Runup 0.8015 
0.7755 0.8025 0.5937 
(p-value) (0.2035) 
(0.2205) (0.2032) (0.343) 
Target Markup -0.4282 
-0.4296 -0.4284 -0.3886 
(p-value) (0.3369) 
(0.3355) (0.3367) (0.3798) 
Collar 0.7531 
0.6611 0.7525 0.4428 
(p-value) (0.2431) 
(0.3062) (0.2436) (0.4894) 
Toehold Exist -1.4348** 
-1.4139** -1.4365** -1.1639* 
(p-value) (0.0392) 
(0.0402) (0.0391) (0.0873) 
Horizontal -0.1016 
-0.0588 -0.0998 -0.1217 
(p-value) (0.749) 
(0.8546) (0.7544) (0.7049) 
Tender Offer 1.3744*** 
1.4123*** 1.3768*** 1.2638*** 
(p-value) (0.001) 
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0033) 
Cash Bid 0.1456 
0.35 0.1457 1.0692*** 
(p-value) (0.6251) 
(0.272) (0.6248) (0.0097) 
Hostile -3.634*** 
-3.5659*** -3.6347*** -3.2629*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.7525*** 
-2.7726*** -2.7533*** -2.7801*** 
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(p-value) (<.0001) 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.4967 
0.5559 0.4976 0.6898 
(p-value) (0.4354) 
(0.3907) (0.4348) (0.3038) 
Pseudo-R2 0.1985 
0.2024 0.1985 0.2136 
Year Dummies No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No 





Table 2-7   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be completed successfully on the Implied Volatility 
Spread (IV-Spread) 
IV-Spread@+2 is constructed as the Target’s Implied Volatility estimated two days after the announcement minus the Acquirer’s Implied Volatility estimated two days after the 
announcement for Stock or Mixed Deals and the Target’s Implied Volatility estimated two days after the announcement minus zero for Cash-Only Deals. IV-Spread@-42 is 
constructed as the Target’s Implied Volatility estimated 42 days before the announcement minus the Acquirer’s Implied Volatility estimated 42 days before the announcement for 
Stock or Mixed Deals and as the Target’s Implied Volatility estimated 42 days before the announcement minus zero for Cash-Only Deals. The IV-Spread-Ratio is equal to the ratio of 
the IV-Spread@+2 divided by IV-Spread@-42. Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the 
ratio of target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided 
by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the 
announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the 
Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is 
completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.8015 -0.6298 -0.8637 -0.4701 -0.6525 -0.6229 
(p-value) (0.6859) (0.7459) (0.6698) (0.8084) (0.7369) (0.75) 
IV-Spread@-42 0.3688   0.5102       
(p-value) (0.6168)  (0.676)    
( IV-Spread@-42 )^2  0.1843 -0.1385    
(p-value)   
(0.7525) (0.8841) 
      
IV-Spread-Ratio    -0.0592*  -0.0728** 
(p-value)    (0.0623)  (0.025) 
( IV-Spread-Ratio )^2     -0.00173 -0.00145 
(p-value)       
  (0.448) (0.2128) 
Target Size 0.2585* 0.2476* 0.2622* 0.2411* 0.2507* 0.2537* 
(p-value) (0.0696) (0.077) (0.07) (0.0849) (0.0733) (0.0726) 
Target Turnover -0.00058 -0.00047 -0.00058 -0.00043 -0.00038 -0.0005 
(p-value) (0.8636) (0.8905) (0.8656) (0.9023) (0.9105) (0.8856) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5358* -0.5348 -0.5421* -0.5843* -0.5592* -0.6058* 
(p-value) (0.0979) (0.1012) (0.097) (0.0724) (0.0835) (0.0641) 
Target B/M -0.7553** -0.7687** -0.7382* -0.7632** -0.7258 -0.7322** 
(p-value) (0.0425) (0.0443) (0.0575) (0.0339) (0.0449) (0.0428) 
Target Runup 0.772 0.8021 0.7606 0.8258 0.8398 0.8866 
(p-value) (0.2246) (0.2054) (0.2339) (0.1924) (0.1848) (0.1639) 
Target Markup -0.4564 -0.4384 -0.4596 -0.4684 -0.4312 -0.4694 
(p-value) (0.3115) (0.3281) (0.3083) (0.2909) (0.3362) (0.2919) 
Collar 0.724 0.7436 0.7199 0.5507 0.7827 0.6908 
(p-value) (0.2645) (0.2497) (0.2679) (0.3764) (0.2385) (0.2891) 
Toehold Exist -1.4629** -1.4465** -1.465** -1.6762** -1.4065** -1.5273** 
(p-value) (0.0369) (0.038) (0.0369) (0.0148) (0.0498) (0.0308) 
Horizontal -0.102 -0.1 -0.1031 -0.0753 -0.0805 -0.0155 
(p-value) (0.7484) (0.753) (0.7456) (0.8127) (0.8009) (0.9617) 
Tender Offer 1.3281*** 1.3429*** 1.3336*** 1.357*** 1.3687*** 1.3481*** 
(p-value) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Cash Bid 0.00669 0.1046 -0.0161 0.1471 0.1059 0.1024 
(p-value) (0.9869) (0.747) (0.9706) (0.6248) (0.7264) (0.7352) 
Hostile -3.6195*** -3.6147*** -3.6281*** -3.5555*** -3.6075*** -3.5834*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.7403*** -2.7511*** -2.7368*** -2.7683*** -2.7397*** -2.738*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.4771 0.4906 0.4741 0.482 0.4803 0.4484 
(p-value) (0.4549) (0.4413) (0.4581) (0.4518) (0.4511) (0.485) 
Pseudo -R2 0.1989 0.1987 0.1989 0.2033 0.1996 0.2057 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 








Table 2-8   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Target and VIV-Target 
Cross-sectional regressions of the Bidder Announcement CAR on the Target Average Implied Volatility (AIV-Target) and the Target Volatility of Implied Volatility (VIV-Target).  
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43].  The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Target firms estimated over the runup period [-42,-2]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and 
target turnover is the ratio of target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book 
value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target 
price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price 
/ P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on 
NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed 
successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold 
dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same 
contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-
values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 








Constant 0.13238** 0.08494 0.1029* 0.1017** 0.0344 0.12271** 
(p-value) (0.0176) (0.348) (0.0728) (0.0457) (0.6612) (0.025) 
AIV-Target -0.02638 -0.03868 0.01672       
(p-value) (0.1401) (0.1382) (0.4101)    
VIV-Target    -0.03586 -0.06068 -0.00499 
(p-value)    (0.4189) (0.4175) (0.919) 
Target Size -0.0105*** -0.01141** -0.00558 -0.0091*** -0.00955** -0.00681** 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0214) (0.1206) (0.0021) (0.0458) (0.0448) 
Target Turnover -0.0001356*** -0.0001452** -2.52E-05 -0.0001528*** -0.0001654*** 1.45E-06 
(p-value) (0.0078) (0.0145) (0.6915) (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.9812) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00374 -0.0006764 -0.0001118 0.00502 0.00207 -0.0008239 
(p-value) (0.6189) (0.959) (0.9892) (0.5027) (0.8739) (0.92) 
Target B/M -0.00751 -0.02086 -0.00548 -0.00722 -0.0201 -0.00488 
(p-value) (0.3642) (0.1837) (0.4923) (0.3709) (0.2003) (0.5393) 
Target Runup 0.0028 0.01315 -0.00667 0.00395 0.01424 -0.00578 
(p-value) (0.86) (0.6252) (0.6165) (0.8054) (0.5998) (0.6822) 
Target Markup -0.03284*** -0.02708 -0.0384*** -0.03417*** -0.02902* -0.03616*** 
(p-value) (0.0058) (0.1) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0745) (0.004) 
Collar -0.02831* -0.03744** 0.02249 -0.02744* -0.0361** 0.02321 
(p-value) (0.0553) (0.0242) (0.3366) (0.0645) (0.0302) (0.3276) 
Toehold Exist 0.01311 0.05221* 0.00363 0.01309 0.0542* 0.0025 
(p-value) (0.4412) (0.0758) (0.8811) (0.4463) (0.0651) (0.9192) 
Horizontal 0.00618 -0.00291 0.0124 0.00589 -0.00402 0.01191 
(p-value) (0.3854) (0.7985) (0.11) (0.4096) (0.7239) (0.121) 
Tender Offer 0.00267 0.01931 -0.00234 0.00205 0.02003 -0.0014 
(p-value) (0.6817) (0.2407) (0.7277) (0.7511) (0.2339) (0.8338) 
Cash Bid 0.02932***   0.03037***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.0106 0.0177 -0.03454* -0.0106 0.01912 -0.03359* 
(p-value) (0.5889) (0.6124) (0.0785) (0.5916) (0.59) (0.09) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00947 0.03102 -0.01442 0.01132 0.03365 -0.01428 
(p-value) (0.379) (0.1276) (0.2356) (0.2999) (0.1045) (0.2428) 
Rumor 0.00657 0.01048 -0.00776 0.00495 0.00732 -0.00691 
(p-value) (0.5176) (0.544) (0.5363) (0.6205) (0.6745) (0.5751) 
Complete 0.03037*** 0.0439*** 0.00957 0.03098*** 0.04467*** 0.01051 
(p-value) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.4656) (0.0048) (0.0043) (0.4257) 
Adj-R2 0.207 0.1603 0.0711 0.2046 0.1553 0.0693 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-9   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder 
Cross-sectional regressions of the Bidder Announcement CAR on the Bidder Average Implied Volatility (AIV-Bidder) and the Bidder Volatility of Implied Volatility (VIV-Bidder). 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Bidder Companies estimated over the runup period [-42,-2]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement 
and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock 
book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the 
target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement 
[(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed 
on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed 
successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold 
dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same 
contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-
values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 








Constant 0.15464*** 0.13454* 0.08832 0.10791** 0.03314 0.12943** 
(p-value) (0.0033) (0.0799) (0.1495) (0.0269) (0.6478) (0.0193) 
AIV-Bidder -0.08892*** -0.1388*** 0.05421       
(p-value) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.1865)    
VIV-Bidder    -0.35715** -0.50362** -0.10739 
(p-value)    (0.0103) (0.011) (0.4967) 
Target Size -0.01018*** -0.01143** -0.00568* -0.00858*** -0.00755* -0.00706** 
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0148) (0.0983) (0.0021) (0.0931) (0.0369) 
Target Turnover -0.0001219** -0.0001038 3.85E-06 -0.0001376*** -0.0001328* -9.20E-07 
(p-value) (0.018) (0.19) (0.9466) (0.005) (0.0524) (0.9879) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00286 -0.00677 -0.0014 0.00303 -0.00429 -0.0008191 
(p-value) (0.7008) (0.6024) (0.8629) (0.6812) (0.7352) (0.9205) 
Target B/M -0.00646 -0.02271 -0.00655 -0.00657 -0.02023 -0.00426 
(p-value) (0.417) (0.1409) (0.4038) (0.4147) (0.1911) (0.5936) 
Target Runup 0.00118 0.01315 -0.0042 0.00328 0.01399 -0.00586 
(p-value) (0.9391) (0.6083) (0.7553) (0.8327) (0.5931) (0.6637) 
Target Markup -0.03359*** -0.0266* -0.03585*** -0.03363*** -0.0288* -0.03561*** 
(p-value) (0.0035) (0.0852) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0679) (0.0034) 
Collar -0.03233** -0.0424*** 0.01978 -0.02822** -0.03329** 0.0232 
(p-value) (0.0224) (0.005) (0.3736) (0.0441) (0.0346) (0.3265) 
Toehold Exist 0.00769 0.04387 0.00213 0.0091 0.0486* 0.00226 
(p-value) (0.652) (0.1378) (0.936) (0.5921) (0.0956) (0.9247) 
Horizontal 0.00927 0.00306 0.01068 0.00893 0.00133 0.01244 
(p-value) (0.1925) (0.7817) (0.1634) (0.2042) (0.9069) (0.1079) 
Tender Offer 0.0007335 0.01117 -0.00194 0.0009684 0.01831 -0.00164 
(p-value) (0.9088) (0.5021) (0.7691) (0.8786) (0.2551) (0.8058) 
Cash Bid 0.02235***   0.02732***   
(p-value) (0.0014)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00776 0.02382 -0.03782* -0.01048 0.01389 -0.03174 
(p-value) (0.6839) (0.4619) (0.0577) (0.592) (0.7029) (0.1123) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01271 0.03535* -0.0169 0.01078 0.03342 -0.0143 
(p-value) (0.2542) (0.0928) (0.1565) (0.3225) (0.1117) (0.2425) 
Rumor 0.00358 -0.0001633 -0.008 0.00433 0.00596 -0.00626 
(p-value) (0.7178) (0.9923) (0.5078) (0.6627) (0.7147) (0.6079) 
Complete 0.02741** 0.03737** 0.01001 0.03072*** 0.04388*** 0.01095 
(p-value) (0.0121) (0.0191) (0.4336) (0.0047) (0.0055) (0.406) 
Adj-R2 0.228 0.2194 0.0776 0.2186 0.1825 0.0706 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 572 284 288 572 284 288 
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Table 2-10   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder 
Cross-sectional regressions of the Bidder Announcement CAR on the Bidder Average Implied Volatility (AIV-Bidder) and the Bidder Volatility of Implied Volatility (VIV-Bidder). 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The models’ 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43].  The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Bidder Companies estimated over the runup period [-42,-2]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement 
and target turnover is the ratio of target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book 
value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target 
price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price 
/ P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on 
NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed 
successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold 
dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same 
contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-
values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.14938*** 0.13078* 0.08658 
(p-value) (0.0042) (0.0895) (0.158) 
AIV-Bidder -0.07364** -0.13283*** 0.09827** 
(p-value) (0.0377) (0.0057) (0.0473) 
VIV-Bidder -0.13098 -0.05293 -0.38344* 
(p-value) (0.4551) (0.8341) (0.0554) 
Target Size -0.00989*** -0.01117** -0.0058* 
(p-value) (0.0006) (0.0183) (0.0868) 
Target Turnover -0.0001208** -0.0001025 2.09E-06 
(p-value) (0.0206) (0.1994) (0.9706) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00249 -0.00705 -0.00203 
(p-value) (0.7368) (0.5836) (0.805) 
Target B/M -0.00625 -0.02251 -0.0053 
(p-value) (0.4321) (0.1427) (0.4928) 
Target Runup 0.00155 0.01312 -0.00169 
(p-value) (0.9199) (0.6088) (0.9004) 
Target Markup -0.03354*** -0.02674* -0.03268*** 
(p-value) (0.0036) (0.0835) (0.0067) 
Collar -0.03187** -0.04181*** 0.01704 
(p-value) (0.022) (0.0059) (0.427) 
Toehold Exist 0.00723 0.04383 0.0003644 
(p-value) (0.6713) (0.138) (0.9887) 
Horizontal 0.0098 0.00334 0.0115 
(p-value) (0.164) (0.7602) (0.1278) 
Tender Offer 0.000625 0.0115 -0.00323 
(p-value) (0.922) (0.4864) (0.6219) 
Cash Bid 0.02252***   
(p-value) (0.0012)   
Hostile -0.00818 0.023 -0.03416* 
(p-value) (0.6691) (0.4826) (0.0851) 
Multiple Bidders 0.0124 0.03527* -0.01831 
(p-value) (0.264) (0.0925) (0.1141) 
Rumor 0.00359 -2.779E-05 -0.00663 
(p-value) (0.7175) (0.9987) (0.5803) 
Complete 0.02796*** 0.03759** 0.01182 
(p-value) (0.0097) (0.0173) (0.3465) 
Adj-R2 0.2277 0.216 0.0851 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-11   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-
cash-only offer 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target 
(acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by 
the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, 
Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target (Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is 
a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of 
target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). 
The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 2.2361 2.2373 1.6222 4.836 1.4451 5.8315 
(p-value) (0.8157) (0.7977) (0.8681) (0.5861) (0.8676) (0.5123) 
AIV-Variable -5.1206***  -5.654*** -7.9795***  -9.3065*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
VIV-Variable  -3.1006* 3.137*  -11.978*** 11.5761** 
(p-value)  (0.0571) (0.0912)  (0.0066) (0.0319) 
Target Size -0.7274 0.0832 -0.781 -0.2103 0.0656 -0.1858 
(p-value) (0.2751) (0.8886) (0.2501) (0.7275) (0.9116) (0.7581) 
Target Turnover 0.00201 -0.00057 0.002 0.000284 -0.00072 0.000335 
(p-value) (0.4426) (0.8527) (0.445) (0.9276) (0.8193) (0.9141) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.2984 -0.1324 -0.2941 -0.1252 -0.175 -0.0715 
(p-value) (0.2559) (0.5919) (0.2615) (0.6345) (0.4808) (0.788) 
Target B/M 0.3926 0.055 0.3334 0.4222 0.0776 0.4125 
(p-value) (0.26) (0.859) (0.3519) (0.2056) (0.7997) (0.2266) 
Acquirer Size 0.6518 0.145 0.7006 0.1894 0.1739 0.1428 
(p-value) (0.2644) (0.7818) (0.2392) (0.7222) (0.7385) (0.789) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00908 -0.0154* -0.00927 0.0133 -0.0106 0.0129 
(p-value) (0.4116) (0.0956) (0.4077) (0.2428) (0.2753) (0.2395) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.2519 -0.014 -0.2653 -0.2593 -0.0554 -0.2629 
(p-value) (0.2754) (0.948) (0.2514) (0.2616) (0.7971) (0.2572) 
Acquirer B/M 0.9154* 0.9883** 0.8593* 0.5744 1.0256** 0.4283 
(p-value) (0.0603) (0.03) (0.0804) (0.2589) (0.0253) (0.4084) 
Relative Size -0.346 -6.6311 0.4531 -2.9401 -5.7376 -3.5099 
(p-value) (0.974) (0.4897) (0.9666) (0.7625) (0.5478) (0.718) 
Collar -2.4928*** -2.4632*** -2.488*** -2.533*** -2.4474*** -2.5183*** 
(p-value) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Toehold Exist -0.6262 -0.7448 -0.6577 -0.6459 -0.8407 -0.5926 
(p-value) (0.3973) (0.3227) (0.3799) (0.3674) (0.256) (0.4118) 
Horizontal -0.5996** -0.6956*** -0.5855** -0.5494** -0.6414*** -0.5529** 
(p-value) (0.0195) (0.004) (0.0228) (0.0343) (0.0083) (0.034) 
Tender Offer 1.7639*** 1.5112*** 1.7685*** 1.6474*** 1.467*** 1.6862*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.2225 -0.4459 -0.18 -0.0401 -0.397 0.00143 
(p-value) (0.6983) (0.4333) (0.7542) (0.9467) (0.4799) (0.9981) 
Multiple Bidders 0.7593** 0.9959*** 0.711** 0.9925*** 0.9052*** 1.0198*** 
(p-value) (0.0321) (0.0044) (0.0469) (0.0063) (0.0097) (0.0051) 
Rumor 0.5168 0.3474 0.5293 0.2133 0.3703 0.1699 
(p-value) (0.2231) (0.3903) (0.2139) (0.6066) (0.3631) (0.681) 
Adj-R2 0.3536 0.2726 0.3568 0.3647 0.2784 0.3703 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 




Table 2-12   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) 
Target and VIV- (Bidder) Target 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share 
outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 
days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before 
the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. 
NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the 
deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the 
bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month 
period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.4534 -1.0295 0.1545 0.3574 -0.4327 0.3819 
(p-value) (0.8325) (0.6119) (0.9433) (0.859) (0.8237) (0.8501) 
AIV-Variable -0.7369  -1.0075 -1.4645*  -1.6132* 
(p-value) (0.2688)  (0.1523) (0.0649)  (0.0924) 
VIV-Variable  1.7825 3.0568  -3.6861 1.6673 
(p-value)  (0.4932) (0.2843)  (0.4476) (0.7844) 
Target Size 0.1986 0.2685* 0.2188 0.2244 0.2436* 0.2225 
(p-value) (0.1694) (0.062) (0.1359) (0.111) (0.0799) (0.1152) 
Target Turnover 0.000484 -0.00054 0.000375 0.000113 -0.00024 0.000113 
(p-value) (0.8997) (0.8735) (0.9223) (0.9755) (0.9444) (0.9756) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.6276* -0.5361* -0.6334* -0.6673** -0.588* -0.6601** 
(p-value) (0.0575) (0.0985) (0.0573) (0.0433) (0.0719) (0.0462) 
Target B/M -0.6849* -0.7667** -0.7165** -0.6569* -0.7063* -0.6618* 
(p-value) (0.0522) (0.0353) (0.0424) (0.0711) (0.051) (0.0696) 
Target Runup 0.7718 0.7567 0.679 0.7531 0.7896 0.7526 
(p-value) (0.2146) (0.2333) (0.2785) (0.2185) (0.2052) (0.22) 
Target Markup -0.379 -0.4183 -0.3456 -0.389 -0.4315 -0.3847 
(p-value) (0.393) (0.3492) (0.4368) (0.3798) (0.3329) (0.3851) 
Collar 0.7467 0.769 0.7708 0.7066 0.7522 0.7009 
(p-value) (0.2482) (0.2327) (0.2323) (0.2776) (0.244) (0.2823) 
Toehold Exist -1.4222** -1.471** -1.4744** -1.5252** -1.4807** -1.5131** 
(p-value) (0.0405) (0.035) (0.034) (0.0299) (0.0342) (0.0316) 
Horizontal -0.0878 -0.1002 -0.082 -0.0157 -0.0752 -0.022 
(p-value) (0.7824) (0.7528) (0.7971) (0.9611) (0.8139) (0.9455) 
Tender Offer 1.491*** 1.3496*** 1.4855*** 1.4279*** 1.3911*** 1.4253*** 
(p-value) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Cash Bid 0.0503 0.1557 0.032 -0.0836 0.1224 -0.0946 
(p-value) (0.8722) (0.6022) (0.9191) (0.7986) (0.6829) (0.7745) 
Hostile -3.7021*** -3.6316*** -3.7195*** -3.6597*** -3.6527*** -3.6524*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.8072*** -2.7781*** -2.8679*** -2.734*** -2.7659*** -2.7266*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.5356 0.4835 0.5312 0.4529 0.5017 0.4466 
(p-value) (0.403) (0.4472) (0.4066) (0.4776) (0.4309) (0.484) 
Adj-R2 0.2002 0.1992 0.2020 0.2030 0.1993 0.2031 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-13   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results – Pre-runup Period 
Summary of the results for the main explanatory variables (AIV and VIV) when estimated over the pre-runup period. 
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect  
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect No effect 
 
Panel B - Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Decrease 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) Increase 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 
Panel C - Probability of Deal Success 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) No effect 




Table 2-14   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results for the IBES Divergence of Opinion Measures 
Summary of the results for IBES divergence of opinion measure when used as explanatory variable. 
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
When the divergence of opinion is estimated 12 months before the announcement month 
Divergence of Opinion - Target  Increase Decrease 
Divergence of Opinion - Bidder No effect No effect 
When the divergence of opinion is estimated 2 months before the announcement month 
Divergence of Opinion - Target  Increase No effect 
Divergence of Opinion - Bidder No effect No effect 
When the divergence of opinion is estimated 1 month after the announcement month 
Divergence of Opinion - Target  No effect No effect 
Divergence of Opinion - Bidder Decrease No effect 
 
Panel B - Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
When the divergence of opinion is estimated 12 months before the announcement month 
Divergence of Opinion - Target  No effect 
Divergence of Opinion - Bidder No effect 
When the divergence of opinion is estimated 2 months before the announcement month 
Divergence of Opinion - Target  Decrease (No effect) 
Divergence of Opinion - Bidder No effect 
When the divergence of opinion is estimated 1 month after the announcement month 
Divergence of Opinion - Target  No effect 
Divergence of Opinion - Bidder No effect 
 
Panel C - Probability of Deal Success 
When the divergence of opinion is estimated 12 months before the announcement month 
Divergence of Opinion - Target  No effect 
Divergence of Opinion - Bidder No effect 
When the divergence of opinion is estimated 2 months before the announcement month 
Divergence of Opinion - Target  No effect 
Divergence of Opinion - Bidder Increase 
When the divergence of opinion is estimated 1 month after the announcement month 
Divergence of Opinion - Target  No effect 





Table 2-15   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results – with IBES Control 
Summary of the results for the main explanatory variables (AIV and VIV) when controlling for IBES divergence of opinion measure. 
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect No effect 
 
Panel B - Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  Decrease (no effect) 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Decrease 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) Increase 
Bidder Uncertainty (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 
Panel C - Probability of Deal Success 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
















Table 2-16   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results for the Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Summary of the results for idiosyncratic volatility when used as explanatory variable. 
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect No effect 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease No effect 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -43) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect No effect 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease No effect 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-43, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect No effect 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease Increase 
 
Panel B - Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  Decrease 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -43) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  Decrease 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-43, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  Decrease 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease 
 
Panel C - Probability of Deal Success 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder No effect 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -43) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder No effect 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-43, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect 














Table 2-17   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results – with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control 
Summary of the results for the main explanatory variables (AIV and VIV) when controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility.  
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect Decrease 
 
Panel B - Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) Increase 
Bidder Uncertainty (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 
Panel C - Probability of Deal Success 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) No effect 








Table 2-18   Correlation Matrix between our Main Independent Variables for our 572 Firm Sample 
The correlation coefficient between our AIV and VIV measures for both target and acquirer firms and the corresponding firms’ idiosyncratic volatility estimated over different intervals.  






𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝐴𝑐𝑞(−256, −2) 1.00          
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝐴𝑐𝑞(−256, −43) 0.99 1.00         
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝐴𝑐𝑞(−43, −2) 0.85 0.80 1.00        
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝑇𝑎𝑟(−256, −2) 0.59 0.58 0.53 1.00       
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝑇𝑎𝑟(−256, −43) 0.62 0.61 0.53 0.97 1.00      
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝑇𝑎𝑟(−43, −2) 0.38 0.36 0.44 0.78 0.61 1.00     
VIV-Tar 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.25 0.20 0.32 1.00    
VIV-Acq 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.31 1.00   
AIV-Tar 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.83 0.80 0.70 0.47 0.42 1.00  
AIV-Acq 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.60 0.60 0.45 0.17 0.62 0.61 1.00 
 69 
 
Table 2-19   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results – with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control and orthogonizing AIV 
and VIV against the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility 
Summary of the results for the main explanatory variables (AIV and VIV) when controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility and  
orthogonizing AIV and VIV against the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect Decrease 
 
Panel B - Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) Increase 
Bidder Uncertainty (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 
Panel C - Probability of Deal Success 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) No effect 







Table 2-20   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results for the Expanded Sample 
Summary of the results for the main explanatory variables (AIV and VIV) when estimated over the expanded. 
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Decrease Decrease 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect No effect 
 
Panel B - Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) Increase 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 
Panel C - Probability of Deal Success 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) No effect 

















Table 2-21   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results for the Idiosyncratic Volatility performed on the Expanded Sample 
Summary of the results for idiosyncratic volatility when used as explanatory variable on the expanded sample. 
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect No effect 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease No effect 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -43) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect No effect 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease No effect 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-43, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect No effect 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease Increase 
 
Panel B - Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  Decrease 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -43) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  Decrease 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-43, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  Decrease 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease 
 
Panel C - Probability of Deal Success 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-256, -43) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Bidder Decrease 
When the idiosyncratic volatility is estimated over the interval (-43, -2) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility - Target  No effect 















Table 2-22   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results – with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control on the Expanded Sample 
Summary of the results for the main explanatory variables (AIV and VIV) when controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility in the Expanded Sample. 
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect No Effect 
 
Panel B - Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) Increase 
Bidder Uncertainty (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 
Panel C - Probability of Deal Success 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) No effect 
















Table 2-23   Correlation Matrix between our Main Independent Variables for our Expanded Sample 
The table below present the correlation coefficient between our AIV and VIV measures for both target and  
acquirer firms and the corresponding firms’ idiosyncratic volatility estimated over different intervals. 
Panel A – Options are required for the Bidder firms 
𝝆 VIV-Acq AIV-Acq 𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝐴𝑐𝑞(−256, −2) 𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝐴𝑐𝑞(−256, −43) 𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝐴𝑐𝑞(−43, −2) 
VIV-Acq 1.000     
AIV-Acq 0.573 1.000    
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝐴𝑐𝑞(−256, −2) 0.433 0.908 1.000   
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝐴𝑐𝑞(−256, −43) 0.412 0.885 0.993 1.000  
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝐴𝑐𝑞(−43, −2) 0.441 0.863 0.856 0.794 1.000 
Panel B – Options are required for the Target firms 
𝝆 VIV-Tar AIV-Tar 𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝑇𝑎𝑟(−256, −2) 𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝑇𝑎𝑟(−256, −43) 𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝑇𝑎𝑟(−43, −2) 
VIV-Tar 1.00     
AIV-tar 0.48 1.00    
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝑇𝑎𝑟(−256, −2) 0.28 0.83 1.00   
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝑇𝑎𝑟(−256, −43) 0.20 0.79 0.95 1.00  
𝜎𝑒𝑖−𝑇𝑎𝑟(−43, −2) 0.37 0.69 0.78 0.57 1.00 
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Table 2-24   Summary of Multivariate Tests’ Results – with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control on the Expanded Sample and 
orthogonizing AIV and VIV against the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility 
Summary of the results for the main explanatory variables (AIV and VIV) when controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility in the Expanded Sample 
Panel A - Acquirer Abnormal Returns (CAR-Bidder) 
Increase in: Stock and Mixed Offers Cash-Only Offers 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect No Effect 
 
Panel B - Probability of a Cash-Only offer 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  Decrease 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) Decrease 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) Increase 
Bidder Uncertainty (AIV-Bidder) Decrease 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) Increase 
 
Panel C - Probability of Deal Success 
Target Risk (AIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target)  No effect 
Bidder Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Bidder) No effect 
 When both AIV and VIV are included together in the same regression 
Target Risk (AIV-Target) No effect 
Target Uncertainty about Risk (VIV-Target) No effect 
Bidder Risk (AIV-Bidder) No effect 




2.8 Appendix A – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV estimated in the Pre-runup Period 
Table 2-25   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Target and VIV-
Target estimated over the Pre-runup period 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43].The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Target firms estimated during the pre-runup period [-84,-43]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement 
and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock 
book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the 
target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement 
[(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed 
on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed 
successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold 
dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same 
contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-
values are given underneath and are the White Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 








Constant 0.11171** 0.2385*** 0.10989* 0.10039* 0.20115*** 0.12106** 
(p-value) (0.0404) (0.0037) (0.0671) (0.052) (0.0075) (0.0263) 
AIV-Target -0.01211 -0.02148 0.00775       
(p-value) (0.4949) (0.4517) (0.6491)    
VIV-Target    0.01094 0.04651 0.0135 
(p-value)    (0.7895) (0.4891) (0.7555) 
Target Size -0.00951*** -0.01024** -0.00621* -0.00866*** -0.0083* -0.00665* 
(p-value) (0.0017) (0.0401) (0.0813) (0.0027) (0.0807) (0.0501) 
Target Turnover -0.0001444*** -0.0001543*** -1.17E-05 -0.000159*** -0.0001836*** -2.01E-06 
(p-value) (0.0024) (0.0074) (0.8517) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.9737) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00451 0.00135 -0.0004386 0.00514 0.00226 -0.0005829 
(p-value) (0.5514) (0.9194) (0.9578) (0.4941) (0.8633) (0.9437) 
Target B/M -0.0075 -0.01982 -0.00537 -0.008 -0.01991 -0.00517 
(p-value) (0.3634) (0.2008) (0.5083) (0.3236) (0.1998) (0.5155) 
Target Runup 0.00324 0.01765 -0.00659 0.00314 0.01859 -0.00675 
(p-value) (0.8389) (0.5113) (0.6204) (0.8443) (0.4941) (0.6201) 
Target Markup -0.03368*** -0.02791* -0.03696*** -0.03414*** -0.02802* -0.03682*** 
(p-value) (0.0042) (0.0749) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.075) (0.003) 
Collar -0.02741* -0.03641** 0.02304 -0.02679* -0.03634*** 0.02319 
(p-value) (0.0643) (0.0276) (0.3273) (0.0719) (0.0287) (0.3263) 
Toehold Exist 0.01283 0.05572* 0.00397 0.01197 0.05018* 0.00279 
(p-value) (0.458) (0.0637) (0.8686) (0.4704) (0.0844) (0.9096) 
Horizontal 0.00615 -0.00457 0.01226 0.0055 -0.00717 0.01202 
(p-value) (0.3898) (0.6914) (0.1158) (0.4448) (0.5398) (0.1187) 
Tender Offer 0.0021 0.01668 -0.00177 0.00141 0.01277 -0.00154 
(p-value) (0.7456) (0.2996) (0.7917) (0.8294) (0.4352) (0.8187) 
Cash Bid 0.03012***   0.03103***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.01046 0.00598 -0.03425* -0.01056 0.00761 -0.03398* 
(p-value) (0.596) (0.8588) (0.0822) (0.5936) (0.8244) (0.0862) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01049 0.03644* -0.01456 0.01081 0.03739* -0.01457 
(p-value) (0.3312) (0.0757) (0.233) (0.319) (0.0746) (0.2326) 
Rumor 0.00507 0.00602 -0.00697 0.00498 0.00706 -0.00695 
(p-value) (0.6116) (0.7309) (0.5741) (0.6183) (0.6928) (0.5739) 
Complete 0.03058*** 0.04959*** 0.01033 0.03085*** 0.05093*** 0.01016 
(p-value) (0.0055) (0.0019) (0.432) (0.0051) (0.0017) (0.4394) 
Adj-R2 0.2045 0.1636 0.0698 0.2024 0.1647 0.0695 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-26   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder estimated over the Pre-
runup period. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Bidder Companies estimated during the pre-runup period [-84,-43]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the 
nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the 
announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days 
before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value 
of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the 
deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. 
The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders 
within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement 
year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values. The The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 








Constant 0.14372*** 0.2621*** 0.09043 0.10145* 0.20894*** 0.10607** 
(p-value) (0.0076) (0.0009) (0.1265) (0.0522) (0.0053) (0.0438) 
AIV-Bidder -0.06009** -0.08976** 0.05856    
(p-value) (0.0329) (0.0179) (0.1183)    
VIV-Bidder    0.01243 -0.0223 0.27331 
(p-value)    (0.9212) (0.8886) (0.104) 
Target Size -0.01023*** -0.01178** -0.0056 -0.00873*** -0.00882* -0.00588* 
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0126) (0.1052) (0.0023) (0.0595) (0.0779) 
Target Turnover -0.0001335*** -0.0001271* 5.01E-06 -0.0001577*** -0.000173*** 5.33E-06 
(p-value) (0.0054) (0.064) (0.9316) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.9301) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00384 -0.00257 -0.00149 0.00512 0.00221 -0.00117 
(p-value) (0.6096) (0.85) (0.8536) (0.4915) (0.8651) (0.8862) 
Target B/M -0.00651 -0.02026 -0.00671 -0.0079 -0.01937 -0.00455 
(p-value) (0.413) (0.1876) (0.3911) (0.3277) (0.2136) (0.5486) 
Target Runup 0.00274 0.0165 -0.00669 0.00324 0.01835 -0.00684 
(p-value) (0.8604) (0.5277) (0.6233) (0.839) (0.495) (0.6214) 
Target Markup -0.03499*** -0.02989** -0.03581*** -0.03417*** -0.02803* -0.03852*** 
(p-value) (0.0024) (0.0492) (0.003) (0.0037) (0.0733) (0.0017) 
Collar -0.031** -0.04074*** 0.02253 -0.02685* -0.03627** 0.02748 
(p-value) (0.0329) (0.0099) (0.3078) (0.0714) (0.0294) (0.2527) 
Toehold Exist 0.00795 0.04577 0.00392 0.01242 0.05623* 0.00286 
(p-value) (0.6498) (0.1329) (0.8799) (0.4602) (0.0722) (0.9098) 
Horizontal 0.00897 0.0005057 0.00919 0.00556 -0.00561 0.0102 
(p-value) (0.2131) (0.9636) (0.25) (0.4381) (0.6149) (0.1703) 
Tender Offer 0.0008099 0.01115 -0.00154 0.00164 0.01618 -0.00117 
(p-value) (0.8998) (0.4997) (0.8164) (0.7975) (0.3104) (0.8598) 
Cash Bid 0.02442***   0.03096***   
(p-value) (0.0006)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.0079 0.01355 -0.03791* -0.01065 0.0055 -0.03418* 
(p-value) (0.6835) (0.6759) (0.0557) (0.5907) (0.8712) (0.0846) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01177 0.03743* -0.01705 0.01067 0.0376* -0.01617 
(p-value) (0.2869) (0.0772) (0.1475) (0.3278) (0.0789) (0.1826) 
Rumor 0.00323 0.000951 -0.00666 0.00503 0.00563 -0.00688 
(p-value) (0.745) (0.956) (0.5841) (0.6151) (0.7521) (0.5798) 
Complete 0.0285*** 0.04389*** 0.00988 0.03084*** 0.04987*** 0.00949 
(p-value) (0.0093) (0.0068) (0.4413) (0.005) (0.0018) (0.4601) 
Adj-R2 0.2152 0.1892 0.0803 0.2023 0.1636 0.0788 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-27   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder estimated over the Pre-
runup period. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Bidder Companies estimated during the pre-runup period [-84,-43]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the 
nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the 
announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days 
before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value 
of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the 
deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. 
The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders 
within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement 
year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.15*** 0.26768*** 0.09147 
(p-value) (0.0063) (0.0006) (0.122) 
AIV-Bidder -0.09222*** -0.1283*** 0.04057 
(p-value) (0.0077) (0.004) (0.4548) 
VIV-Bidder 0.24418 0.28384 0.14773 
(p-value) (0.1106) (0.1432) (0.5556) 
Target Size -0.01023*** -0.01241*** -0.00548 
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0082) (0.1083) 
Target Turnover -0.0001322*** -0.0001265* 6.27E-06 
(p-value) (0.0078) (0.072) (0.9154) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00406 -0.00181 -0.00148 
(p-value) (0.5863) (0.8913) (0.855) 
Target B/M -0.00589 -0.02104 -0.00594 
(p-value) (0.4625) (0.1728) (0.4384) 
Target Runup 0.00209 0.01439 -0.0069 
(p-value) (0.8936) (0.582) (0.6164) 
Target Markup -0.03666*** -0.03173** -0.03714*** 
(p-value) (0.0016) (0.04) (0.0039) 
Collar -0.03035** -0.04241*** 0.02505 
(p-value) (0.0358) (0.006) (0.2695) 
Toehold Exist 0.000843 0.02856 0.00365 
(p-value) (0.9591) (0.3672) (0.888) 
Horizontal 0.00876 0.000389 0.0091 
(p-value) (0.2282) (0.9715) (0.2497) 
Tender Offer -0.0003554 0.00523 -0.00137 
(p-value) (0.9559) (0.7534) (0.8361) 
Cash Bid 0.02447***   
(p-value) (0.0006)   
Hostile -0.00567 0.01959 -0.03688* 
(p-value) (0.7728) (0.5411) (0.0695) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01127 0.03362 -0.01718 
(p-value) (0.3121) (0.1286) (0.1463) 
Rumor 0.00355 0.0028 -0.00672 
(p-value) (0.7211) (0.868) (0.584) 
Complete 0.02848*** 0.04297*** 0.00955 
(p-value) (0.0087) (0.0075) (0.4565) 
Adj-R2 0.2187 0.1977 0.0779 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 








Table 2-28   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the Deal Will be a Cash-Only offer versus Being a Non-Cash-Only 
Offer using AIV (VIV) as Explanatory Variables Estimated over the Pre-runup period. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated during the pre-runup period 
[-84,-43]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of target 
(acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by 
the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, 
Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target (Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is 
a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of 
target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). 
The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 2.2361 2.2373 1.6222 4.836 1.4451 5.8315 
(p-value) (0.8157) (0.7977) (0.8681) (0.5861) (0.8676) (0.5123) 
AIV-Variable -5.1206***  -5.654*** -7.9795***  -9.3065*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
VIV-Variable  -3.1006* 3.137*  -11.978*** 11.5761** 
(p-value)  (0.0571) (0.0912)  (0.0066) (0.0319) 
Target Size -0.7274 0.0832 -0.781 -0.2103 0.0656 -0.1858 
(p-value) (0.2751) (0.8886) (0.2501) (0.7275) (0.9116) (0.7581) 
Target Turnover 0.00201 -0.00057 0.002 0.000284 -0.00072 0.000335 
(p-value) (0.4426) (0.8527) (0.445) (0.9276) (0.8193) (0.9141) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.2984 -0.1324 -0.2941 -0.1252 -0.175 -0.0715 
(p-value) (0.2559) (0.5919) (0.2615) (0.6345) (0.4808) (0.788) 
Target B/M 0.3926 0.055 0.3334 0.4222 0.0776 0.4125 
(p-value) (0.26) (0.859) (0.3519) (0.2056) (0.7997) (0.2266) 
Acquirer Size 0.6518 0.145 0.7006 0.1894 0.1739 0.1428 
(p-value) (0.2644) (0.7818) (0.2392) (0.7222) (0.7385) (0.789) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00908 -0.0154* -0.00927 0.0133 -0.0106 0.0129 
(p-value) (0.4116) (0.0956) (0.4077) (0.2428) (0.2753) (0.2395) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.2519 -0.014 -0.2653 -0.2593 -0.0554 -0.2629 
(p-value) (0.2754) (0.948) (0.2514) (0.2616) (0.7971) (0.2572) 
Acquirer B/M 0.9154* 0.9883** 0.8593* 0.5744 1.0256** 0.4283 
(p-value) (0.0603) (0.03) (0.0804) (0.2589) (0.0253) (0.4084) 
Relative Size -0.346 -6.6311 0.4531 -2.9401 -5.7376 -3.5099 
(p-value) (0.974) (0.4897) (0.9666) (0.7625) (0.5478) (0.718) 
Collar -2.4928*** -2.4632*** -2.488*** -2.533*** -2.4474*** -2.5183*** 
(p-value) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Toehold Exist -0.6262 -0.7448 -0.6577 -0.6459 -0.8407 -0.5926 
(p-value) (0.3973) (0.3227) (0.3799) (0.3674) (0.256) (0.4118) 
Horizontal -0.5996** -0.6956*** -0.5855** -0.5494** -0.6414*** -0.5529** 
(p-value) (0.0195) (0.004) (0.0228) (0.0343) (0.0083) (0.034) 
Tender Offer 1.7639*** 1.5112*** 1.7685*** 1.6474*** 1.467*** 1.6862*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.2225 -0.4459 -0.18 -0.0401 -0.397 0.00143 
(p-value) (0.6983) (0.4333) (0.7542) (0.9467) (0.4799) (0.9981) 
Multiple Bidders 0.7593** 0.9959*** 0.711** 0.9925*** 0.9052*** 1.0198*** 
(p-value) (0.0321) (0.0044) (0.0469) (0.0063) (0.0097) (0.0051) 
Rumor 0.5168 0.3474 0.5293 0.2133 0.3703 0.1699 
(p-value) (0.2231) (0.3903) (0.2139) (0.6066) (0.3631) (0.681) 
Adj-R2 0.3536 0.2726 0.3568 0.3647 0.2784 0.3703 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 






Table 2-29   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the Deal Will be Completed Successfully on AIV-Target and VIV-
Target when AIV (VIV) are estimated over the Pre-runup period. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated during the pre-runup period 
[-84,-43]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of target volume to share 
outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 
days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before 
the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. 
NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the 
deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the 
bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month 
period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.0485 -0.4858 0.0199 0.3319 -0.3666 0.2856 
(p-value) (0.9816) (0.8055) (0.9925) (0.8706) (0.8529) (0.8886) 
AIV-Variable -0.4924  -0.4361 -1.2445  -1.3568 
(p-value) (0.4386)  (0.5248) (0.1072)  (0.1472) 
VIV  -0.9424 -0.4348  -2.7612 0.8035 
(p-value)  (0.6347) (0.8408)  (0.4575) (0.8533) 
Target Size 0.2171 0.2399* 0.2183 0.2192 0.2358* 0.2229 
(p-value) (0.1306) (0.0886) (0.1297) (0.1213) (0.0937) (0.1161) 
Target Turnover 0.000392 -0.00015 0.000404 0.000119 -0.0002 0.000161 
(p-value) (0.919) (0.9663) (0.9162) (0.974) (0.9534) (0.965) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.6071* -0.5687* -0.6079* -0.6444** -0.5745* -0.644** 
(p-value) (0.0668) (0.0801) (0.0665) (0.0498) (0.0764) (0.0498) 
Target B/M -0.6828* -0.7158** -0.6779* -0.6502* -0.7065* -0.6409* 
(p-value) (0.0562) (0.0474) (0.0584) (0.0764) (0.0531) (0.0811) 
Target Runup 0.7966 0.8117 0.8011 0.7813 0.7596 0.7888 
(p-value) (0.2006) (0.197) (0.1985) (0.2042) (0.2259) (0.2015) 
Target Markup -0.4006 -0.419 -0.3975 -0.4087 -0.4076 -0.4076 
(p-value) (0.3685) (0.3469) (0.3721) (0.3585) (0.364) (0.3595) 
Collar 0.7557 0.74 0.7505 0.7059 0.7248 0.7147 
(p-value) (0.2427) (0.2522) (0.2466) (0.2787) (0.262) (0.2735) 
Toehold Exist -1.4252** -1.3682* -1.3938** -1.5328** -1.377** -1.5557** 
(p-value) (0.0398) (0.0533) (0.049) (0.0289) (0.0533) (0.029) 
Horizontal -0.0851 -0.0862 -0.0784 -0.00972 -0.0793 -0.00351 
(p-value) (0.7891) (0.787) (0.8059) (0.976) (0.8034) (0.9913) 
Tender Offer 1.45*** 1.4031*** 1.4545*** 1.4192*** 1.3909*** 1.4186*** 
(p-value) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Cash Bid 0.0834 0.1355 0.0876 -0.0633 0.1087 -0.0654 
(p-value) (0.7875) (0.6507) (0.7772) (0.8473) (0.7197) (0.8427) 
Hostile -3.6689*** -3.6534*** -3.674*** -3.6306*** -3.648*** -3.6265*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.7731*** -2.7641*** -2.7751*** -2.7468*** -2.7433*** -2.7461*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.4926 0.505 0.4964 0.4565 0.4926 0.453 
(p-value) (0.439) (0.4287) (0.436) (0.4744) (0.4396) (0.4777) 
Adj-R2 0.1993 0.1989 0.1995 0.2020 1994 02022 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 






2.9 Appendix B – Tests Performed with IBES Divergence of Opinion Measures being the Main 
Explanatory Variable 
Table 2-30    Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on Target and Bidder Divergence of Opinion Measures. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The divergence of opinion measures are extracted from IBES as the standard 
deviation of the analysts’ forecasts estimated 12 months before the announcement month. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the 
nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the 
announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days 
before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value 
of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and 
the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple 
Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the 
announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
   Estimated 12 months before the announcement months 
 Target Divergence of Opinion Bidder Divergence of Opinion 








Constant -0.01571 0.02151 0.13577** -0.0062 0.0265 0.14653** 
(p-value) (0.7488) (0.7471) (0.0308) (0.8991) (0.6956) (0.0168) 
Divergence of Opinion 0.00752*** 0.008*** -0.06284* 0.00738 -0.00691 -0.00884 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0055) (0.0815) (0.7669) (0.8806) (0.7384) 
Target Size -0.007** -0.003 -0.00838** -0.00751** -0.00342 -0.00871** 
(p-value) (0.0249) (0.5327) (0.0314) (0.0161) (0.483) (0.0221) 
Target Turnover -0.000116 -0.0001253 8.257E-07 -0.000124 -0.0001265 -1.975E-05 
(p-value) (0.2264) (0.7474) (0.9896) (0.201) (0.7508) (0.7418) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00493 -0.00518 0.00127 0.00498 -0.00353 0.00234 
(p-value) (0.5396) (0.7052) (0.8895) (0.5425) (0.7994) (0.8105) 
Target B/M -0.01214 -0.01896 -0.00248 -0.01134 -0.01513 -0.00454 
(p-value) (0.1617) (0.2559) (0.7636) (0.188) (0.3635) (0.5896) 
Target Runup 0.01849 0.03743 -0.00882 0.01742 0.03666 -0.0087 
(p-value) (0.2866) (0.2115) (0.521) (0.3141) (0.2179) (0.539) 
Target Markup -0.03789*** -0.03515** -0.03813*** -0.03734*** -0.0336** -0.03766*** 
(p-value) (0.0015) (0.0194) (0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0271) (0.004) 
Collar -0.02235* -0.03299** 0.02336 -0.02242* -0.03142** 0.02167 
(p-value) (0.0946) (0.0288) (0.2977) (0.0952) (0.0393) (0.361) 
Toehold Exist 0.00126 0.03563 -0.00294 0.0137 0.06025** 0.0003048 
(p-value) (0.938) (0.2538) (0.9047) (0.4286) (0.0487) (0.9898) 
Horizontal 0.00705 0.00181 0.01423 0.00573 -0.0006508 0.01117 
(p-value) (0.3422) (0.8742) (0.1023) (0.4455) (0.9545) (0.1815) 
Tender Offer 0.0007857 0.01904 -0.0035 0.0006203 0.01953 -0.00355 
(p-value) (0.9124) (0.3052) (0.6377) (0.9309) (0.2839) (0.6406) 
Cash Bid 0.04002***   0.03976***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01392 0.05281* -0.01141 0.01214 0.05123* -0.01363 
(p-value) (0.4317) (0.0884) (0.5628) (0.4996) (0.0918) (0.4761) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01078 0.02762 -0.01249 0.0102 0.02839 -0.01254 
(p-value) (0.3463) (0.1994) (0.3475) (0.3725) (0.1913) (0.3308) 
Rumor 0.00396 0.00622 -0.00675 0.00511 0.00576 -0.00598 
(p-value) (0.7054) (0.7384) (0.5886) (0.6256) (0.7608) (0.6361) 
Complete 0.02242* 0.03506** 0.00881 0.02047* 0.03346** 0.00682 
(p-value) (0.0539) (0.0395) (0.5307) (0.0775) (0.0491) (0.6244) 
Adj-R2 0.2535 0.2247 0.1054 0.2476 0.2151 0.0952 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-31   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on Target and Bidder Divergence of Opinion Measures 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The divergence of opinion measures are extracted from IBES as the standard 
deviation of the analysts’ forecasts estimated 2 months before the announcement month. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of target the volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the 
nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the 
announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days 
before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value 
of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and 
the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple 
Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the 
announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Estimated 2 months before the announcement months 
 Target Divergence of Opinion Bidder Divergence of Opinion 








Constant 0.09499* 0.14732* 0.141** 0.09341* 0.15133* 0.14638** 
(p-value) (0.0562) (0.0719) (0.0189) (0.0623) (0.0656) (0.014) 
Divergence of 
Opinion 
0.03097** 0.04028* -0.03485 0.00799 0.00318 0.0072 
(p-value) (0.0353) (0.0651) (0.1801) (0.5402) (0.9353) (0.5257) 
Target Size -0.00783*** -0.00578 -0.00727* -0.0077** -0.00557 -0.00788** 
(p-value) (0.0078) (0.2261) (0.0519) (0.0104) (0.25) (0.0327) 
Target Turnover -0.0001519*** -0.000168*** 9.88E-06 -0.0001427*** -0.0001555*** -2.247E-05 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0022) (0.8807) (0.0026) (0.0067) (0.7048) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00668 -0.0004853 -0.0001076 0.00621 0.00194 0.0009825 
(p-value) (0.4131) (0.9717) (0.99) (0.4449) (0.889) (0.9115) 
Target B/M -0.01948** -0.033** -0.00581 -0.01663* -0.02754* -0.00844 
(p-value) (0.0195) (0.045) (0.5091) (0.0504) (0.0893) (0.2994) 
Target Runup 0.01057 0.02263 -0.01188 0.00866 0.02226 -0.00921 
(p-value) (0.5353) (0.4418) (0.4114) (0.61) (0.4502) (0.5232) 
Target Markup -0.04358*** -0.03817** -0.04558*** -0.04489*** -0.03991*** -0.04409*** 
(p-value) (0.0002) (0.0126) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0098) (0.0008) 
Collar -0.01477 -0.02443 0.02424 -0.01448 -0.02212 0.02319 
(p-value) (0.2687) (0.1235) (0.3092) (0.2786) (0.1641) (0.3345) 
Toehold Exist 0.00489 0.02412 0.00153 0.01607 0.05335* 0.0041 
(p-value) (0.7407) (0.448) (0.9537) (0.3332) (0.0733) (0.8704) 
Horizontal 0.00401 -0.0005371 0.0102 0.00354 -0.00356 0.00872 
(p-value) (0.5861) (0.9632) (0.1947) (0.6328***) (0.7548) (0.2695) 
Tender Offer 0.000851 0.01292 -0.0006875 0.00166 0.01534 -0.0009049 
(p-value) (0.8991) (0.4521) (0.9201) (0.8042) (0.3681) (0.8986) 
Cash Bid 0.03988***   0.03929***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.01462 0.01442 -0.03688* -0.01418 0.01834 -0.03841** 
(p-value) (0.4654) (0.7114) (0.0598) (0.4723) (0.6264) (0.0458) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00666 0.0331 -0.01595 0.00521 0.03007 -0.01452 
(p-value) (0.5355) (0.1297) (0.2097) (0.6277) (0.1795) (0.2437) 
Rumor 0.00225 0.01035 -0.01016 0.00355 0.01049 -0.01018 
(p-value) (0.8263) (0.5939) (0.4098) (0.7266) (0.5954) (0.4143) 
Complete 0.0238** 0.04042** 0.01223 0.02172** 0.03651** 0.01167 
(p-value) (0.0319) (0.0171) (0.3575) (0.0494) (0.0281) (0.3722) 
Adj-R2 0.25 0.1955 0.1074 0.2449 0.1852 0.1036 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-32   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on Target and Bidder Divergence of Opinion Measures 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The divergence of opinion measures are extracted from IBES as the standard 
deviation of the analysts’ forecasts estimated 1 months after the announcement month. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and the target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the 
nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the 
announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days 
before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value 
of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and 
the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple 
Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digitsSIC codes and to the 
announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Estimated 1 month after the announcement months 
 Target Divergence of Opinion Bidder Divergence of Opinion 








Constant 0.10925** 0.17248* 0.14956** 0.1041** 0.17021* 0.15065** 
(p-value) (0.0346) (0.0738) (0.034) (0.044) (0.0639) (0.0331) 
Divergence of 
Opinion 
0.01067 0.03463 -0.00548 -0.0112 -0.05817* 0.00101 
(p-value) (0.1574) (0.4829) (0.4108) (0.3598) (0.078) (0.918) 
Target Size -0.00853*** -0.00598 -0.00927** -0.00819*** -0.00512 -0.0093** 
(p-value) (0.0066) (0.2558) (0.0201) (0.0094) (0.3273) (0.0204) 
Target Turnover -0.000143*** -0.0001625*** 5.78E-06 -0.0001345*** -0.0001491** -8.15E-06 
(p-value) (0.0032) (0.006) (0.9344) (0.0098) (0.0197) (0.9043) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00758 0.0009736 0.00298 0.00755 0.0003413 0.00307 
(p-value) (0.3664) (0.9463) (0.7434) (0.3682) (0.981) (0.7385) 
Target B/M -0.02233** -0.03654* -0.00482 -0.01788** -0.03328* -0.00809 
(p-value) (0.0277) (0.0502) (0.6514) (0.0499) (0.0685) (0.3311) 
Target Runup 0.0071 0.02114 -0.01542 0.00582 0.02255 -0.01371 
(p-value) (0.6955) (0.5062) (0.3104) (0.7452) (0.4694) (0.3474) 
Target Markup -0.04271*** -0.03723*** -0.04568*** -0.04467*** -0.0409*** -0.04415*** 
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0155) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0054) (0.001) 
Collar -0.01395 -0.02267 0.02336 -0.01374 -0.02238 0.02194 
(p-value) (0.326) (0.1718) (0.3284) (0.3369) (0.1793) (0.3521) 
Toehold Exist 0.00714 0.0456 -0.00749 0.00652 0.05079* -0.00379 
(p-value) (0.6713) (0.142) (0.8228) (0.7015) (0.095) (0.9059) 
Horizontal 0.00232 -0.00719 0.01198 0.0026 -0.00611 0.01169 
(p-value) (0.7651) (0.5614) (0.1257) (0.7371) (0.6151) (0.1357) 
Tender Offer 0.00224 0.02046 -0.0029 0.00281 0.0196 -0.00301 
(p-value) (0.7513) (0.2711) (0.682) (0.6895) (0.2836) (0.6797) 
Cash Bid 0.03984***   0.04097***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.01507 0.01888 -0.03569* -0.01307 0.04792 -0.03659* 
(p-value) (0.4731) (0.6211) (0.0792) (0.5296) (0.1707) (0.0674) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00901 0.03976* -0.01626 0.00864 0.04047* -0.01578 
(p-value) (0.4423) (0.0656) (0.2229) (0.4593) (0.0614) (0.2352) 
Rumor 0.00402 0.00705 -0.00935 0.00376 0.00926 -0.00906 
(p-value) (0.6972) (0.7395) (0.4558) (0.7173) (0.636) (0.4725) 
Complete 0.02308** 0.043** 0.01342 0.02325** 0.0413** 0.01286 
(p-value) (0.0492) (0.0139) (0.3315) (0.0472) (0.0144) (0.3454) 
Adj-R2 0.2373 0.183 0.1025 0.2367 0.1901 0.1012 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-33   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the Deal will be a Cash-Only Offer Versus a Being a Non-Cash-
Only Offer 
The divergence of opinion measures are extracted from IBES as the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts estimated 12 months and 2 months before the announcement day and 1 
month after the announcement month. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target (acquirer) 
turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest 
target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by the acquirer size (in log terms). 
NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target (Acquirer) is listed on 
NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed 
successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold 
dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same 
contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. 
 Estimated 12 Months before Announcement Estimated 2 Months before Announcement Estimated 1 Months After Announcement 
Independent Variable Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target Acquirer 
Constant 4.6813 3.9956 1.372 4.3852 2.5114 5.6563 
(p-value) (0.679) (0.7243) (0.8813) (0.6347) (0.794) (0.5525) 
Divergence of Opinion -0.865 -0.0835 -1.2978* 0.7306 0.2143 0.7318 
(p-value) (0.2885) (0.9183) (0.1) (0.2327) (0.5924) (0.1362) 
Target Size 0.3256 0.2849 0.0959 0.2311 0.0795 0.2949 
(p-value) (0.672) (0.7117) (0.877) (0.7076) (0.9015) (0.6408) 
Target Turnover 0.00665 0.00598 -0.00012 -0.00107 -0.00165 -0.00155 
(p-value) (0.3622) (0.4022) (0.9684) (0.7345) (0.6529) (0.6598) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.2166 -0.2301 -0.2242 -0.2223 -0.3169 -0.3323 
(p-value) (0.4083) (0.3865) (0.3893) (0.3937) (0.2294) (0.2077) 
Target B/M 0.0931 0.0414 0.1272 0.00519 -0.1656 -0.0645 
(p-value) (0.772) (0.8971) (0.6918) (0.9869) (0.6522) (0.8448) 
Acquirer Size -0.0468 -0.00562 0.1548 0.00515 0.1329 -0.056 
(p-value) (0.9447) (0.9934) (0.7775) (0.9925) (0.8159) (0.9208) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.0158 -0.0154 -0.016 -0.0171* -0.0176* -0.0189* 
(p-value) (0.1008) (0.1131) (0.1004) (0.0719) (0.07) (0.0569) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex 0.0658 0.0625 0.0568 0.0398 0.0896 0.1083 
(p-value) (0.7721) (0.7831) (0.7994) (0.8577) (0.6942) (0.6347) 
Acquirer B/M 1.0586** 1.0391** 1.0138** 0.8486* 0.9118* 0.7909 
(p-value) (0.0312) (0.0359) (0.0344) (0.0805) (0.0546) (0.1006) 
Relative Size -10.1232 -9.4613 -6.2064 -9.0943 -6.7207 -10.3439 
(p-value) (0.4218) (0.4536) (0.5383) (0.3672) (0.5224) (0.3191) 
Collar -2.4199*** -2.413*** -2.5462*** -2.4948*** -2.352*** -2.3266*** 
(p-value) (0.0002) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Toehold Exist -0.5901 -0.7865 -0.5384 -0.7964 -0.7321 -0.7242 
(p-value) (0.4754) (0.31) (0.5226) (0.3096) (0.3707) (0.3774) 
Horizontal -0.5912** -0.6392** -0.7142*** -0.7491*** -0.6654** -0.6729*** 
(p-value) (0.0244) (0.0134) (0.0049) (0.003) (0.0101) (0.0091) 
Tender Offer 1.4517*** 1.4591*** 1.5262*** 1.4832*** 1.4089*** 1.4056*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.784 -0.756 -0.4866 -0.4471 -0.3021 -0.3225 
(p-value) (0.2082) (0.2235) (0.394) (0.4254) (0.593) (0.5672) 
Multiple Bidders 0.9387** 0.9112** 1.1355*** 1.1606*** 0.9826*** 1.0253*** 
(p-value) (0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0078) (0.0058) 
Rumor 0.3421 0.3542 0.3725 0.4344 0.4354 0.4566 
(p-value) (0.4026) (0.3894) (0.3586) (0.2923) (0.2897) (0.2682) 
Adj-R2 0.2782 0.2759 0.2891 0.2865 0.2763 0.2791 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 




Table 2-34   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the Deal Will be completed successfully on Target and Bidder 
Divergence of Opinion 
The divergence of opinion measures are extracted from IBES as the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts estimated 12 months and 2 months before the announcement day and 1 
month after the announcement month.  Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of 
the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by 
the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the 
announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the 
Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is 
completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of the target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders 
within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Estimated 12 Months before Announcement Estimated 2 Months before Announcement Estimated 1 Months After Announcement 
Deal-Type Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target Acquirer 
Constant -0.5995 -0.7289 -0.2265 0.0502 0.3778 0.1337 
(p-value) (0.774) (0.7252) (0.9115) (0.9804) (0.8611) (0.9498) 
Divergence of Opinion -0.2981 1.0922 -0.2743 3.0387* 0.4997 0.9555 
(p-value) (0.6281) (0.3181) (0.583) (0.0613) (0.4619) (0.2805) 
Target Size 0.2417 0.2459* 0.2181 0.1806 0.1812 0.1925 
(p-value) (0.1036) (0.0957) (0.1344) (0.2179) (0.2373) (0.2034) 
Target Turnover -0.00133 -0.00232 0.000172 -0.00097 -0.00012 0.000147 
(p-value) (0.7898) (0.6486) (0.9629) (0.7897) (0.9762) (0.9721) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5341 -0.6028* -0.5607 -0.6107* -0.6377* -0.6726* 
(p-value) (0.1183) (0.08) (0.1011) (0.073) (0.0674) (0.0541) 
Target B/M -0.667* -0.7563** -0.6715* -0.7805** -0.9263** -0.7857** 
(p-value) (0.0748) (0.0425) (0.0747) (0.0355) (0.0358) (0.0432) 
Target Runup 0.9494 1.0469 0.9798 0.9815 0.8747 0.7901 
(p-value) (0.159) (0.1184) (0.1456) (0.1409) (0.2101) (0.2512) 
Target Markup -0.3092 -0.2432 -0.4289 -0.2898 -0.2375 -0.2687 
(p-value) (0.5346) (0.6268) (0.3715) (0.5511) (0.647) (0.5963) 
Collar 0.6954 0.7568 0.9743 1.0273 0.6052 0.6114 
(p-value) (0.2878) (0.2491) (0.1813) (0.1508) (0.3924) (0.3819) 
Toehold Exist -1.1401 -1.3722** -1.3468* -1.423** -1.4* -1.4284* 
(p-value) (0.135) (0.05) (0.0644) (0.0365) (0.0768) (0.0714) 
Horizontal -0.1154 -0.1567 -0.0951 -0.1126 -0.2415 -0.2581 
(p-value) (0.731) (0.6397) (0.7724) (0.7335) (0.4778) (0.4483) 
Tender Offer 1.4622*** 1.4636*** 1.3093*** 1.3375*** 1.2467*** 1.2786*** 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.002) (0.0018) (0.0048) (0.0038) 
Cash Bid -0.00064 0.0399 0.0854 0.1275 0.0509 0.0656 
(p-value) (0.9984) (0.8999) (0.7866) (0.6888) (0.8744) (0.8392) 
Hostile -3.5133*** -3.5394*** -3.6537*** -3.7294*** -3.9094*** -4.0306*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.7739*** -2.7701*** -2.8234*** -2.8228*** -2.8047*** -2.7897*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.6073 0.6549 0.5463 0.5923 0.5833 0.5964 
(p-value) (0.358) (0.3236) (0.3968) (0.3582) (0.3655) (0.3545) 
Adj-R2 0.2003 0.2001 0.2119 0.2185 0.2177 0.2185 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 




2.10 Appendix C – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with IBES 
Divergence of Opinion as Control 
Table 2-35   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Target and VIV-Target with Divergence of 
Opinion used as Control Variable. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43].  The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Target firms estimated over the runup period [-42,-2]. The divergence of opinion measures are extracted from IBES as the standard deviation of the analysts’ 
forecasts estimated 2 months before the announcement month. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is 
the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by 
the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days 
before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. 
NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the 
deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the 
bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month 
period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and 
are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 








Constant 0.01419 0.11867 0.11379* 0.00611 0.08872 0.13599** 
(p-value) (0.7931) (0.1361) (0.061) (0.8975) (0.1861) (0.0164) 
AIV-Target -0.00829 -0.01689 0.01693    
(p-value) 
(0.6595) (0.5525) (0.4477)    
VIV-Target    -0.01908 0.00765 -0.00494 
(p-value)    (0.685) (0.9241) (0.9197) 
Divergence of 
Opinion - Target 0.03063** 0.03946* -0.03478 0.03058** 0.03985* -0.03109 
(p-value) (0.0387) (0.0758) (0.1891) (0.0392) (0.0703) (0.2336) 
Target Size -0.00848*** -0.00667 -0.00515 -0.00811*** -0.00551 -0.00652* 
(p-value) (0.0092) (0.1913) (0.1926) (0.0075) (0.2597) (0.0788) 
Target Turnover -0.0001497*** -0.0001561*** -4.246E-05 -0.0001539*** -0.0001687*** -1.839E-05 
(p-value) (0.0009) (0.0055) (0.5359) (0.0005) (0.0017) (0.7861) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00619 -0.00188 0.0006521 0.00659 -0.00124 5.551E-05 
(p-value) (0.4464) (0.8899) (0.9397) (0.4146) (0.9278) (0.9948) 
Target B/M -0.01966** -0.03278** -0.00478 -0.01951** -0.0334** -0.00424 
(p-value) (0.0207) (0.0473) (0.5886) (0.0207) (0.0413) (0.6375) 
Target Runup 0.00933 0.01987 -0.01013 0.00998 0.02078 -0.00944 
(p-value) (0.5832) (0.493) (0.4861) (0.5567) (0.4728) (0.537) 
Target Markup -0.04551*** -0.03824** -0.04706*** -0.04588*** -0.03819** -0.04455*** 
(p-value) (0.0001) (0.0137) (0.0004) (<.0001) (0.0142) (0.0011) 
Collar -0.01542 -0.0253 0.0243 -0.0151 -0.02425 0.02491 
(p-value) (0.2543) (0.1109) (0.3066) (0.2601) (0.1238) (0.3008) 
Toehold Exist 0.0046 0.02416 0.00186 0.00473 0.02392 0.00112 
(p-value) (0.7542) (0.4524) (0.9433) (0.7472) (0.4499) (0.9664) 
Horizontal 0.005 0.0005879 0.01182 0.00492 -3.519E-05 0.01131 
(p-value) (0.4995) (0.9597) (0.1532) (0.5066) (0.9976) (0.1647) 
Tender Offer 0.0007923 0.0132 -0.00273 0.0006933 0.01237 -0.00181 
(p-value) (0.9079) (0.4507) (0.6951) (0.9192) (0.4961) (0.7923) 
Cash Bid 0.03909***   0.03935***   
(p-value) 
(<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00915 0.01994 -0.03664* -0.0091 0.0209 -0.03585* 
(p-value) (0.6397) (0.5707) (0.0576) (0.6424) (0.5563) (0.0683) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00464 0.03128 -0.01665 0.00541 0.03264 -0.01642 
(p-value) (0.6605) (0.1411) (0.1941) (0.6149) (0.134) (0.2034) 
Rumor 0.00253 0.00909 -0.01406 0.00208 0.00829 -0.01299 
(p-value) (0.8064) (0.6415) (0.2481) (0.839) (0.6706) (0.2771) 
Complete 0.02243** 0.03964** 0.01285 0.02263** 0.03995** 0.01362 
(p-value) (0.0422) (0.0186) (0.3491) (0.0405) (0.0186) (0.3242) 
Adj-R2 0.2469 0.1955 0.1076 0.2468 0.1943 0.106 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-36   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder with Divergence of 
Opinion used as Control Variable. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43].  The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Bidder Companies estimated over the runup period [-42,-2]. The divergence of opinion measures are extracted from IBES as the standard deviation of the 
analysts’ forecasts estimated 2 months before the announcement month. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target 
turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value 
divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 
days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 
1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, 
the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the 
bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month 
period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and 
are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 








Constant 0.07812 0.1837* 0.11766* 0.02469 0.10621 0.1446** 
(p-value) (0.1332) (0.0157) (0.0548) (0.5989) (0.1087) (0.0111) 
AIV-Bidder -0.08186*** -0.1261*** 0.04381    
(p-value) 
(0.0048) (0.0019) (0.2837)    
VIV-Bidder    -0.31978** -0.464** -0.04936 
(p-value)    (0.0226) (0.0481) (0.757) 
Divergence of Opinion - 
Bidder 0.00935 0.02449 0.00772 0.00711 0.00741 0.00684 
(p-value) (0.4864) (0.5458) (0.5191) (0.5888) (0.8504) (0.5637) 
Target Size -0.00966*** -0.00865* -0.00621* -0.00804*** -0.00509 -0.00718* 
(p-value) (0.002) (0.084) (0.0952) (0.008) (0.2884) (0.0511) 
Target Turnover -0.0001163** -9.921E-05 -4.483E-05 -0.0001299*** -0.0001226* -4.842E-05 
(p-value) (0.0259) (0.2143) (0.4592) (0.0089) (0.0816) (0.4182) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00421 -0.00639 0.0003727 0.0049 -0.00176 0.00103 
(p-value) (0.6012) (0.6448) (0.9659) (0.5408) (0.897) (0.9055) 
Target B/M -0.01587* -0.02983* -0.00782 -0.01617* -0.02804* -0.00634 
(p-value) (0.0561) (0.0573) (0.3365) (0.059) (0.079) (0.4491) 
Target Runup 0.00684 0.01986 -0.0064 0.0094 0.02281 -0.00718 
(p-value) (0.6796) (0.4797) (0.6611) (0.5712) (0.4182) (0.6228) 
Target Markup -0.04656*** -0.03677** -0.04221*** -0.04604*** -0.03862** -0.04315*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0149) (0.0016) (<.0001) (0.0111) (0.0011) 
Collar -0.02283* -0.03169** 0.02148 -0.01879 -0.02471 0.02388 
(p-value) (0.0904) (0.0373) (0.3478) (0.1685) (0.1233) (0.3232) 
Toehold Exist 0.01085 0.04417 0.00354 0.01243 0.0481 0.00338 
(p-value) (0.512) (0.1349) (0.8953) (0.4514) (0.1038) (0.8925) 
Horizontal 0.00697 0.00206 0.00917 0.00626 -0.0003122 0.01033 
(p-value) (0.349) (0.8534) (0.256) (0.4009) (0.9782) (0.209) 
Tender Offer -0.0002995 0.00964 -0.0024 0.0009235 0.01678 -0.00212 
(p-value) (0.9644) (0.5823) (0.7349) (0.8897) (0.3268) (0.7667) 
Cash Bid 0.03082***   0.036***   
(p-value) 
(<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00687 0.02398 -0.04059** -0.00868 0.01962 -0.03641* 
(p-value) (0.7139) (0.4706) (0.0373) (0.6518) (0.5787) (0.0623) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00522 0.0287 -0.01722 0.00268 0.02482 -0.01532 
(p-value) (0.6314) (0.1945) (0.1639) (0.795) (0.2392) (0.2252) 
Rumor 0.00165 -0.0005227 -0.01309 0.00323 0.00809 -0.01261 
(p-value) (0.8695) (0.9787) (0.2731) (0.747) (0.6669) (0.2899) 
Complete 0.01735 0.02755* 0.01271 0.02018* 0.03333** 0.0132 
(p-value) (0.1121) (0.0995) (0.3374) (0.063) (0.0446) (0.3315) 
Adj-R2 0.2606 0.2327 0.1084 0.2512 0.2026 0.1033 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-37   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder with Divergence of 
Opinion used as Control Variable. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Bidder Companies estimated over the runup period [-42,-2].  The divergence of opinion measures are extracted from IBES as the standard deviation of the 
analysts’ forecasts estimated 2 months before the announcement month. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target 
turnover is the ratio of target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value 
divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 
days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 
1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, 
the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the 
bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month 
period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and 
are the White Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.07525 0.18285** 0.11879* 
(p-value) (0.1504) (0.0161) (0.0518) 
AIV-Bidder -0.0723** -0.12449** 0.07382 
(p-value) (0.0459) (0.0155) (0.1462) 
VIV-Bidder -0.09081 -0.01599 -0.26063 
(p-value) (0.6056) (0.9562) (0.2142) 
Divergence of Opinion - 
Bidder 0.00903 0.02442 0.00668 
(p-value) (0.5025) (0.547) (0.5771) 
Target Size -0.00951*** -0.0086* -0.00627* 
(p-value) (0.0023) (0.086) (0.0899) 
Target Turnover -0.000115** -9.881E-05 -4.709E-05 
(p-value) (0.0287) (0.2177) (0.4373) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00408 -0.0064 -0.0002241 
(p-value) (0.6115) (0.6438) (0.9797) 
Target B/M -0.01577* -0.02982* -0.00634 
(p-value) (0.0583) (0.057) (0.437) 
Target Runup 0.00741 0.01995 -0.0046 
(p-value) (0.6521) (0.4763) (0.7543) 
Target Markup -0.04631*** -0.03676** -0.03968*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0149) (0.0029) 
Collar -0.02308* -0.03166** 0.01958 
(p-value) (0.0888) (0.0383) (0.3778) 
Toehold Exist 0.01051 0.04411 0.0024 
(p-value) (0.5265) (0.1359) (0.9279) 
Horizontal 0.0072 0.00209 0.01043 
(p-value) (0.3324) (0.8505) (0.1873) 
Tender Offer -0.0002155 0.00977 -0.00341 
(p-value) (0.9743) (0.5742) (0.6301) 
Cash Bid 0.03091***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00705 0.02382 -0.03781* 
(p-value) (0.708) (0.4761) (0.0518) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00477 0.02854 -0.01848 
(p-value) (0.6542) (0.1858) (0.1261) 
Rumor 0.00181 -0.0004255 -0.01195 
(p-value) (0.8567) (0.9828) (0.3097) 
Complete 0.01762 0.02757* 0.01394 
(p-value) (0.1048) (0.0987) (0.2904) 
Adj-R2 0.2596 0.2289 0.1094 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-38   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer with Divergence of Opinion used as Control Variable. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The divergence of opinion measures are extracted from IBES as the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts estimated two months before the announcement month. Target 
(Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) 
volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target 
stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, 
Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target (Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender 
offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target 
before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The 
p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.5471 2.0838 -0.5891 7.0566 4.6829 7.8939 
(p-value) (0.9562) (0.82) (0.9539) (0.4928) (0.6126) (0.4472) 
AIV-Variable -4.9182***  -5.6065*** -7.3832***  -9.1393*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
VIV-Variable  -2.8008 4.0127**  -10.9129** 14.8542** 
(p-value)  (0.1048) (0.0474)  (0.0165) (0.0178) 
Divergence of Opinion - 
Target -0.7048 -1.3524* -0.6464    
(p-value) (0.3282) (0.0938) (0.3662)    
Divergence of Opinion - 
Bidder    1.037 0.6465 1.228* 
(p-value)    (0.146) (0.2897) (0.0957) 
Target Size -0.8335 0.0782 -0.9313 -0.1196 0.2118 -0.1243 
(p-value) (0.2239) (0.899) (0.1846) (0.8623) (0.7317) (0.858) 
Target Turnover 0.00207 0.000195 0.002 -0.00005 -0.00087 -0.00007 
(p-value) (0.4341) (0.9481) (0.4505) (0.9871) (0.7849) (0.9814) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.3152 -0.2262 -0.3253 -0.1668 -0.2671 -0.1086 
(p-value) (0.2578) (0.386) (0.2431) (0.5507) (0.3092) (0.7004) 
Target B/M 0.4112 0.1826 0.3359 0.3384 0.0691 0.3309 
(p-value) (0.2601) (0.5714) (0.3721) (0.3239) (0.8264) (0.3484) 
Acquirer Size 0.7412 0.1509 0.8267 0.089 0.014 0.0558 
(p-value) (0.2189) (0.7819) (0.1809) (0.8841) (0.9796) (0.9278) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00995 -0.0149 -0.0108 0.00745 -0.0121 0.00736 
(p-value) (0.3896 (0.1257) (0.361) (0.5267) (0.2277) (0.5146) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.246 0.0543 -0.2775 -0.309 -0.00655 -0.3222 
(p-value) (0.3093) (0.8087) (0.2535) (0.2023) (0.9768) (0.186) 
Acquirer B/M 0.8972* 1.0494** 0.8443 0.4726 0.9612* 0.2253 
(p-value) (0.0794) (0.0287) (0.1034) (0.39) (0.0509) (0.691) 
Relative Size 1.5972 -6.527 3.087 -5.1884 -8.9156 -5.299 
(p-value) (0.884) (0.5155) (0.7832) (0.6463) (0.3777) (0.6417) 
Collar -2.5479*** -2.5593*** -2.5453*** -2.572*** -2.4995*** -2.5503*** 
(p-value) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Toehold Exist -0.3669 -0.5042 -0.4284 -0.6775 -0.8419 -0.606 
(p-value) (0.6475) (0.5478) (0.5993) (0.3564) (0.2722) (0.4143) 
Horizontal -0.696*** -0.7164*** -0.6927** -0.6823** -0.7168*** -0.6786** 
(p-value) (0.0096) (0.0048) (0.0102) (0.0117) (0.0047) (0.0128) 
Tender Offer 1.7962*** 1.5519*** 1.7946*** 1.6043*** 1.4795*** 1.6173*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.3066 -0.5046 -0.2596 -0.1256 -0.4439 -0.0445 
(p-value) (0.5919) (0.3794) (0.6499) (0.8299) (0.4256) (0.9403) 
Multiple Bidders 0.8616** 1.1782*** 0.7952** 1.1197*** 1.0995*** 1.1899*** 
(p-value) (0.0186) (0.0012) (0.0319) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0021) 
Rumor 0.515 0.3807 0.5291 0.2698 0.4554 0.2199 
(p-value) (0.2255) (0.3484) (0.2157) (0.5224) (0.2736) (0.6006) 
Adj-R2 0.3644 0.2925 0.3691 0.3723 0.2949 0.3799 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-39   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Divergence of Opinion used as Control Variable. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The divergence of opinion measures are extracted from IBES as the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts estimated two months before the announcement month. Target 
Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 
42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the 
announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement 
[(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, 
Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, 
the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more 
than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first 
bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.8656 -0.4731 0.6534 1.4056 0.3308 1.4105 
(p-value) (0.6988) (0.8237) (0.7724) (0.5143) (0.872) (0.5136) 
AIV-Variable -0.7648  -1.0103 -1.6943**  -1.7166* 
(p-value) (0.26)  (0.1657) (0.0349)  (0.07) 
VIV-Variable  1.1523 2.6042  -5.226 0.2806 
(p-value)  (0.6712) (0.393)  (0.2979) (0.9646) 
Divergence of Opinion - 
Target -0.2328 -0.2758 -0.2211    
(p-value) (0.6361) (0.5831) (0.6549)    
Divergence of Opinion - 
Bidder    3.2883** 3.0572* 3.2892** 
(p-value)    (0.0428) (0.0585) (0.0428) 
Target Size 0.1703 0.2318 0.1861 0.1418 0.176 0.1414 
(p-value) (0.2577) (0.1216) (0.2223) (0.3403) (0.228) (0.3429) 
Target Turnover 0.00107 0.00001 0.000953 -0.00075 -0.00088 -0.00075 
(p-value) (0.797) (0.9977) (0.8184) (0.8452) (0.8099) (0.8446) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.6252* -0.556 -0.638* -0.7292** -0.6572* -0.7278** 
(p-value) (0.0713) (0.1051) (0.068) (0.0357) (0.0565) (0.0368) 
Target B/M -0.6222* -0.6906* -0.6481* -0.7246* -0.7503** -0.7254* 
(p-value) (0.0923) (0.0691) (0.0803) (0.0513) (0.0431) (0.0514) 
Target Runup 0.9759 0.9411 0.8852 0.9788 0.9852 0.9784 
(p-value) (0.1417) (0.1665) (0.1875) (0.129) (0.1331) (0.1294) 
Target Markup -0.3905 -0.4276 -0.3757 -0.2764 -0.282 -0.2771 
(p-value) (0.4086) (0.3735) (0.4258) (0.5607) (0.5627) (0.5597) 
Collar 0.9452 0.9851 0.9621 0.9571 1.0148 0.9568 
(p-value) (0.1955) (0.1762) (0.1865) (0.1873) (0.1587) (0.1874) 
Toehold Exist -1.3508* -1.3753* -1.4117* -1.5398** -1.4794** -1.5384** 
(p-value) (0.0626) (0.0597) (0.0517) (0.0246) (0.0303) (0.0249) 
Horizontal -0.087 -0.0959 -0.0868 -0.0545 -0.0855 -0.0557 
(p-value) (0.7913) (0.7708) (0.7923) (0.8699) (0.7962) (0.8675) 
Tender Offer 1.4328*** 1.2938*** 1.4347*** 1.3807*** 1.366*** 1.3795*** 
(p-value) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Cash Bid -0.00971 0.087 -0.0364 -0.1463 0.1024 -0.1483 
(p-value) (0.9765) (0.7828) (0.9127) (0.6768) (0.7486) (0.6751) 
Hostile -3.7301*** -3.6555*** -3.7571*** -3.7591*** -3.7633*** -3.7573*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.8945*** -2.8382*** -2.9492*** -2.8244*** -2.8593*** -2.8225*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.5709 0.5385 0.5644 0.5512 0.6062 0.5499 
(p-value) (0.3787) (0.4031) (0.384) (0.3966) (0.3476) (0.3982) 
Adj-R2 0.2137 0.2122 0.2149 0.2245 0.2199 0.2245 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 







2.11 Appendix D – Tests Performed with Idiosyncratic Volatility being the Main Explanatory 
Variable 
 
Table 2-40   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on Target and Bidder Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
   The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
 Target Idiosyncratic Volatility Bidder Idiosyncratic Volatility 








Constant 0.12144** 0.04989 0.15096** 0.168*** 0.12792* 0.09857 
(p-value) (0.0266) (0.5388) (0.0157) (0.0025) (0.093) (0.1373) 
Idio_Vol -0.34094 -0.38618 -0.36382 -1.43079*** -1.94841*** 0.60559 
(p-value) (0.2672) (0.4319) (0.2327) (0.0038) (0.0018) (0.4316) 
Target Size -0.00972*** -0.01027** -0.00795** -0.01048*** -0.01192*** -0.00607* 
(p-value) (0.0011) (0.0312) (0.0294) (0.0003) (0.0099) (0.0894) 
Target Turnover -0.0001357*** -0.0001513*** 3.157E-05 -0.0001082** -8.73E-05 -4.11E-07 
(p-value) (0.0069) (0.0079) (0.6375) (0.0315) (0.2466) (0.9944) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00348 -0.000494 -0.00192 0.00229 -0.00646 -0.0009847 
(p-value) (0.6463) (0.9709) (0.8115) (0.7564) (0.6191) (0.904) 
Target B/M -0.00787 -0.02321 -0.00453 -0.00623 -0.02241 -0.0063 
(p-value) (0.339) (0.1358) (0.5723) (0.4282) (0.1494) (0.4289) 
Target Runup 0.00455 0.01579 -0.00356 0.0008297 0.0102 -0.00556 
(p-value) (0.7737) (0.5561) (0.7966) (0.957) (0.6949) (0.6785) 
Target Markup -0.03344*** -0.02774* -0.03481*** -0.03729*** -0.03313** -0.03514*** 
(p-value) (0.0047) (0.0882) (0.0045) (0.0012) (0.0312) (0.0046) 
Collar -0.02729* -0.03625** 0.02409 -0.03093** -0.03854** 0.02215 
(p-value) (0.0646) (0.0313) (0.2988) (0.027) (0.0123) (0.3354) 
Toehold Exist 0.01349 0.05569* -0.0009537 0.00612 0.04412 0.004 
(p-value) (0.437) (0.0555) (0.9706) (0.7215) (0.1177) (0.8762) 
Horizontal 0.00632 -0.00337 0.01152 0.00885 0.00214 0.01099 
(p-value) (0.3764) (0.769) (0.1314) (0.2115) (0.8484) (0.1638) 
Tender Offer 0.00196 0.01729 -0.0004246 -0.000518 0.00837 -0.00131 
(p-value) (0.7599) (0.2856) (0.9486) (0.9348) (0.6058) (0.8447) 
Cash Bid 0.03007***   0.02215***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (0.0016)   
Hostile -0.01062 0.02071 -0.03244* -0.00749 0.02165 -0.03714* 
(p-value) (0.5876) (0.5575) (0.0962) (0.6854) (0.5174) (0.0725) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01098 0.03317 -0.01354 0.0135 0.0368* -0.01643 
(p-value) (0.3104) (0.1054) (0.2654) (0.2241) (0.0762) (0.1724) 
Rumor 0.00665 0.00969 -0.0051 0.00151 0.0003123 -0.00628 
(p-value) (0.5103) (0.5738) (0.6763) (0.8798) (0.9857) (0.6092) 
Complete 0.03072*** 0.0447*** 0.01117 0.02709** 0.03843** 0.01069 
(p-value) (0.0053) (0.0047) (0.3959) (0.0122) (0.0134) (0.4108) 
Adj-R2 0.2058 0.1559 0.0731 0.2286 0.2052 0.0729 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-41   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on Target and Bidder Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
   The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
 Target Idiosyncratic Volatility Bidder Idiosyncratic Volatility 








Constant 0.12266** 0.04787 0.16416** 0.16574*** 0.12028 0.10436 
(p-value) (0.0242) (0.5476) (0.0116) (0.0031) (0.1093) (0.1133) 
Idio_Vol -0.35098 -0.36283 -0.45367 -1.31265*** -1.79567*** 0.4558 
(p-value) (0.2532) (0.4347) (0.1407) (0.0072) (0.0036) (0.5401) 
Target Size -0.00982*** -0.01023** -0.00844** -0.01049*** -0.01209*** -0.00626* 
(p-value) (0.0009) (0.0309) (0.0229) (0.0003) (0.0091) (0.079) 
Target Turnover -0.0001353*** -0.0001516*** 0.0000351 -0.0001079** -8.78E-05 -9.48E-07 
(p-value) (0.0067) (0.0073) (0.6021) (0.0329) (0.2389) (0.9873) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00328 -0.0005023 -0.00249 0.00255 -0.0058 -0.0009572 
(p-value) (0.667) (0.9704) (0.7576) (0.7298) (0.6569) (0.9069) 
Target B/M -0.00817 -0.02336 -0.00486 -0.00619 -0.02227 -0.00602 
(p-value) (0.3162) (0.133) (0.5415) (0.4317) (0.1507) (0.4526) 
Target Runup 0.00406 0.01576 -0.00441 0.0006728 0.00934 -0.00588 
(p-value) (0.7972) (0.5572) (0.7458) (0.9652) (0.7214) (0.6614) 
Target Markup -0.03361*** -0.02801* -0.03494*** -0.03734*** -0.03364** -0.03557*** 
(p-value) (0.0045) (0.0835) (0.0045) (0.0013) (0.0302) (0.004) 
Collar -0.02719* -0.03613** 0.02484 -0.03046** -0.03808** 0.02266 
(p-value) (0.0655) (0.0322) (0.2844) (0.0296) (0.0136) (0.3292) 
Toehold Exist 0.01324 0.05497* -0.0008661 0.00657 0.04518 0.00388 
(p-value) (0.4418) (0.0565) (0.9729) (0.7037) (0.1112) (0.878) 
Horizontal 0.00646 -0.0035 0.01173 0.00858 0.00167 0.01116 
(p-value) (0.3667) (0.7605) (0.1229) (0.2259) (0.8821) (0.1611) 
Tender Offer 0.00172 0.0172 -0.0005048 -0.0005584 0.00892 -0.00123 
(p-value) (0.7872) (0.2875) (0.9387) (0.9299) (0.5822) (0.855) 
Cash Bid 0.0299***   0.02284***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (0.0012)   
Hostile -0.01023 0.02058 -0.03128 -0.00769 0.02205 -0.03619* 
(p-value) (0.6005) (0.56) (0.1088) (0.6785) (0.5128) (0.0794) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01035 0.03301 -0.01477 0.01347 0.03668* -0.01599 
(p-value) (0.3379) (0.1075) (0.2248) (0.2254) (0.078) (0.1852) 
Rumor 0.00676 0.00965 -0.00426 0.00144 0.0004951 -0.00632 
(p-value) (0.5036) (0.5749) (0.7281) (0.8846) (0.9774) (0.6085) 
Complete 0.03078*** 0.04476*** 0.011 0.02744** 0.03949** 0.01078 
(p-value) (0.0052) (0.0046) (0.4007) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.41) 
Adj-R2 0.2059 0.1558 0.0745 0.226 0.1997 0.0716 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 572 284 288 572 284 288 
  
 92 
Table 2-42   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on Target and Bidder Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
   The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
 Target Idiosyncratic Volatility Bidder Idiosyncratic Volatility 








Constant 0.10457* 0.05151 0.12292** 0.13768*** 0.11233 0.09219 
(p-value) (0.0415) (0.5419) (0.0254) (0.0067) (0.1733) (0.1064) 
Idio_Vol -0.14716 -0.3821 -0.05033 -1.24018*** -1.88335*** 0.88318* 
(p-value) (0.4328) (0.3688) (0.7493) (0.0023) (0.0002) (0.0784) 
Target Size -0.00902*** -0.01006** -0.00685** -0.00931*** -0.00949** -0.00571* 
(p-value) (0.0018) (0.0353) (0.044) (0.0012) (0.0397) (0.0917) 
Target Turnover -0.0001474*** -0.0001546*** 6.96E-06 -0.0001374*** -1.30E-04* 4.27E-06 
(p-value) (0.0018) (0.0074) (0.9126) (0.0044) (0.0646) (0.9411) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00468 0.0003518 -0.0008171 0.00283 -0.0047 -0.0007736 
(p-value) (0.5327) (0.9788) (0.9202) (0.6985) (0.7105) (0.9239) 
Target B/M -0.00744 -0.02232 -0.00478 -0.00578 -0.02262 -0.0081 
(p-value) (0.3663) (0.1534) (0.5467) (0.4885) (0.1576) (0.3061) 
Target Runup 0.00452 0.01622 -0.00535 0.00275 0.01876 -0.0023 
(p-value) (0.7774) (0.5454) (0.6955) (0.859) (0.4629) (0.8649) 
Target Markup -0.03328*** -0.0263 -0.03593*** -0.03453*** -0.02618* -0.03389*** 
(p-value) (0.0046) (0.1117) (0.0034) (0.002) (0.0821) (0.0051) 
Collar -0.02734* -0.03721** 0.0233 -0.03018** -0.03891** 0.01853 
(p-value) (0.0652) (0.0264) (0.3235) (0.0348) (0.0132) (0.4033) 
Toehold Exist 0.01347 0.05795* 0.00177 0.00874 0.04708* 0.00225 
(p-value) (0.4386) (0.0562) (0.943) (0.5996) (0.0928) (0.9326) 
Horizontal 0.00586 -0.00319 0.01173 0.00867 0.0012 0.01083 
(p-value) (0.4124) (0.7782) (0.1277) (0.2237) (0.9141) (0.1532) 
Tender Offer 0.00228 0.01836 -0.00112 0.0009444 0.01069 -0.00217 
(p-value) (0.7254) (0.2665) (0.8672) (0.882) (0.5125) (0.7432) 
Cash Bid 0.0307***   0.02453***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (0.0004)   
Hostile -0.01115 0.0212 -0.03393* -0.00812 0.01953 -0.03945** 
(p-value) (0.5731) (0.5487) (0.0865) (0.6687) (0.5543) (0.0473) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01166 0.03404* -0.01381 0.01233 0.0366* -0.01662 
(p-value) (0.2901) (0.0978) (0.2676) (0.264) (0.08) (0.1643) 
Rumor 0.00582 0.01005 -0.00678 0.00353 0.0011 -0.00721 
(p-value) (0.564) (0.5641) (0.5818) (0.7264) (0.9494) (0.5535) 
Complete 0.03051*** 0.04393*** 0.01062 0.02771*** 0.0371** 0.00925 
(p-value) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.4219) (0.0095) (0.0146) (0.4694) 
Adj-R2 0.2047 0.1565 0.0696 0.2255 0.2104 0.0795 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-43   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the Deal will be a Cash-Only Offer Versus a Being a Non-Cash-
Only Offer using Idiosyncratic Volatility 
The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) 
market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the 
announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size 
is the ratio of the target size divided by the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target (Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, 
the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value 
of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Estimated over [-256,-2] Interval Estimated over [-256,-43] Interval Estimated over [-43,-2] Interval 
Independent Variable Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target Acquirer 
Constant -2.6937 5.3212 -3.3727 5.2806 0.5642 2.6699 
(p-value) 0.7866 (0.5541) (0.7396) (0.5578) (0.9493) (0.7606) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -68.846*** -123*** -77.1284*** -115.3*** -27.0137*** -94.3296*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size -0.7536 -0.1625 -0.8722 -0.1484 -0.1534 -0.0997 
(p-value) (0.2775) (0.7899) (0.2184) (0.8079) (0.8008) (0.8665) 
Target Turnover 0.00248 0.00194 0.00312 0.00214 0.000409 -0.00051 
(p-value) (0.3527) (0.5271) (0.2504) (0.4822) (0.8833) (0.8695) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.3797 -0.1449 -0.4184 -0.1445 -0.1867 -0.1458 
(p-value) (0.1462) (0.5819) (0.112) (0.5812) (0.4569) (0.5729) 
Target B/M 0.3663 0.3987 0.3309 0.4016 0.267 0.3317 
(p-value) (0.2826) (0.2354) (0.3268) (0.234) (0.4047) (0.2998) 
Acquirer Size 0.7828 0.1228 0.8621 0.1181 0.3427 0.1849 
(p-value) (0.1984) (0.8194) (0.1651) (0.8265) (0.5224) (0.7244) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00805 0.00438 -0.00744 0.00366 -0.0132 -0.00085 
(p-value) (0.4333) (0.6817) (0.4711) (0.7315) (0.1817) (0.932) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.2009 -0.2009 -0.1941 -0.204 -0.123 -0.1166 
(p-value) (0.3742) (0.3801) (0.3931) (0.3709) (0.5728) (0.6026) 
Acquirer B/M 0.8088* 0.2064 0.7362 0.2073 0.8731 0.5166 
(p-value) (0.0942) (0.6879) (0.1315) (0.685) (0.0602) (0.2884) 
Relative Size 2.5643 -3.4112 4.0763 -3.6412 -4.0259 -3.3661 
(p-value) (0.8166) (0.7292) (0.7181) (0.7121) (0.6802) (0.7257) 
Collar -2.2275*** -2.3491*** -2.2123*** -2.3623*** -2.3923 -2.303*** 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Toehold Exist -0.3382 -0.8568 -0.7832 -0.8875 -0.3574 -0.6643 
(p-value) (0.6568) (0.2583) (0.3374) (0.2479) (0.6317) (0.352) 
Horizontal -0.5894** -0.5155** -0.5323** -0.5245** -0.6992 -0.5337** 
(p-value) (0.0211) (0.0457) (0.0386) (0.0413) (0.0046) (0.036) 
Tender Offer 1.6148*** 1.5982*** 1.6314*** 1.5716*** 1.5667 1.6045*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.3615 0.0201 -0.245 0.0327 -0.4897 -0.231 
(p-value) (0.5487) (0.9747) (0.6862) (0.9586) (0.3953) (0.6982) 
Multiple Bidders 1.1164*** 1.1317*** 0.9469*** 1.1276*** 1.1827 1.0587*** 
(p-value) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0095) (0.0021) (0.0008) (0.0031) 
Rumor 0.4708 0.0622 0.4889 0.0669 0.3934 0.1913 
(p-value) (0.2587) (0.8819) (0.2437) (0.8732) (0.3302) (0.6415) 
Adj-R2 0.3385 0.3629 0.3475 0.3582 0.2954 0.3380 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-44   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the Deal Will be completed successfully using Target and Bidder 
Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns.  Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value 
of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M 
is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P -2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the 
offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath 
and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Estimated over [-256,-2] Interval Estimated over [-256,-43] Interval Estimated over [-43,-2] Interval 
Deal-Type Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target Acquirer 
Constant -0.3711 0.1952 -0.5862 0.1469 -0.223 -0.1019 
(p-value) (0.8579) (0.9227) (0.7806) (0.9419) (0.9089) (0.9585) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility  -3.4002 -20.1813 -0.4961 -18.2215 -6.4328 -19.4344* 
(p-value) (0.742) (0.1001) (0.9646) (0.131) (0.3236) (0.0926) 
Target Size 0.2359 0.2266 0.2449* 0.2262 0.2296 0.2431* 
(p-value) (0.0982) (0.108) (0.0879) (0.1089) (0.0989) (0.0821) 
Target Turnover -0.00007 0.000208 -0.00029 0.000219 0.000196 -0.00021 
(p-value) (0.9849) (0.9543) (0.9349) (0.9518) (0.9571) (0.9534) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5784 -0.6577** -0.555* -0.6457 -0.5982 -0.653** 
(p-value) (0.0827) (0.0466) (0.0974) (0.0503) (0.066) (0.0474) 
Target B/M -0.723 -0.6636* -0.7334** -0.6674 -0.6908 -0.6604* 
(p-value) (0.0439) (0.0681) (0.0424) (0.067) (0.0496) (0.0641) 
Target Runup 0.8161 0.7599 0.8012 0.7626 0.8806 0.7621 
(p-value) (0.1941) (0.2163) (0.2032) (0.2158) (0.1633) (0.215) 
Target Markup -0.4219 -0.4422 -0.4272 -0.4443 -0.4082 -0.4127 
(p-value) (0.3426) (0.319) (0.3383) (0.3172) (0.3564) (0.3515) 
Collar 0.7525 0.7303 0.7537 0.7343 0.7286 0.7276 
(p-value) (0.243) (0.2599) (0.2428) (0.2571) (0.2574) (0.2605) 
Toehold Exist -1.4165 -1.5399** -1.4347** -1.5285 -1.3398 -1.5221** 
(p-value) (0.0425) (0.0285) (0.0391) (0.0297) (0.0601) (0.0293) 
Horizontal -0.0969 -0.0417 -0.1005 -0.0469 -0.1093 -0.0516 
(p-value) (0.7604) (0.8961) (0.7522) (0.8831) (0.7303) (0.8713) 
Tender Offer 1.3969 1.4098*** 1.3773*** 1.4036 1.4476 1.4277*** 
(p-value) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Cash Bid 0.119 -0.0714 0.1413 -0.0511 0.1102 -0.0418 
(p-value) (0.7004) (0.829) (0.6519) (0.8766) (0.714) (0.897) 
Hostile -3.6474 -3.6656*** -3.6359*** -3.6588 -3.6738 -3.6817*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.7511 -2.7172*** -2.7533*** -2.7184 -2.7127 -2.7245*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.5036 0.4409 0.4982 0.4434 0.5116 0.4549 
(p-value) (0.429) (0.4905) (0.4347) (0.4879) (0.4222) (0.4767) 
Adj-R2 0.1987 0.2021 0.1985 0.1469 0.1999 0.2022 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 




2.12 Appendix E – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with 
idiosyncratic volatility as Control 
Table 2-45   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.133** 0.08489 0.08676 0.10896** 0.0559 0.12303** 
(p-value) (0.0167) (0.3483) (0.1421) (0.0391) (0.5088) (0.0253) 
AIV-Variable -0.02937 -0.04062 0.03328    
(p-value) (0.1884) (0.2302) (0.1891)    
VIV-Variable    -0.02803 -0.04422 -0.00115 
(p-value)       (0.5177) (0.5407) (0.9816) 
Idio_Vol 0.05077 0.04268 -0.21017 -0.12164 -0.3329 -0.04947 
(p-value) (0.8274) (0.9386) (0.2891) (0.5125) (0.4301) (0.7594) 
Target Size -0.01059*** -0.01142** -0.00472 -0.00928*** -0.01031** -0.00686** 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0214) (0.2027) (0.0019) (0.0342) (0.0441) 
Target Turnover -0.0001366*** -0.0001458*** -2.30E-05 -0.0001456*** -0.0001518*** 0.0000071 
(p-value) (0.0072) (0.0144) (0.7168) (0.0022) (0.0088) (0.9116) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00372 -0.0006353 0.0004186 0.00472 0.0007064 -0.0008256 
(p-value) (0.6209) (0.9616) (0.9598) (0.5289) (0.9576) (0.9198) 
Target B/M -0.00759 -0.02075 -0.00518 -0.00708 -0.02105 -0.00476 
(p-value) (0.3551) (0.1903) (0.5183) (0.3891) (0.1796) (0.5508) 
Target Runup 0.00231 0.01292 -0.00397 0.00485 0.0155 -0.00528 
(p-value) (0.8867) (0.6376) (0.7751) (0.7621) (0.5638) (0.709) 
Target Markup -0.03294*** -0.02723 -0.03854*** -0.03359*** -0.02721 -0.03589*** 
(p-value) (0.0058) (0.1047) (0.0018) (0.0042) (0.1057) (0.0044) 
Collar -0.02833* -0.0374** 0.02225 -0.02764* -0.03692** 0.0233 
(p-value) (0.0549) (0.0242) (0.327) (0.0629) (0.0262) (0.3236) 
Toehold Exist 0.01289 0.05159* 0.00102 0.01364 0.0584* 0.00176 
(p-value) (0.4426) (0.0877) (0.9681) (0.4344) (0.0558) (0.9437) 
Horizontal 0.00623 -0.00297 0.01205 0.00585 -0.00306 0.01173 
(p-value) (0.3823) (0.7934) (0.1196) (0.4128) (0.7871) (0.1284) 
Tender Offer 0.00259 0.01933 -0.00212 0.00243 0.01987 -0.00112 
(p-value) (0.6917) (0.239) (0.7528) (0.7093) (0.242) (0.8664) 
Cash Bid 0.02919***   0.03036***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.01044 0.01745 -0.03634* -0.01098 0.02034 -0.0339* 
(p-value) (0.5954) (0.6174) (0.0648) (0.5792) (0.5645) (0.0884) 
Multiple Bidders 0.009 0.03084 -0.01165 0.01198 0.03412* -0.01378 
(p-value) (0.4182) (0.1426) (0.3459) (0.279) (0.0965) (0.2675) 
Rumor 0.00645 0.01037 -0.00812 0.00565 0.00928 -0.00678 
(p-value) (0.5259) (0.5511) (0.5172) (0.5754) (0.5962) (0.581) 
Complete 0.03042*** 0.04395*** 0.00988 0.0307*** 0.04399*** 0.01065 
(p-value) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.4497) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.4206) 
Adj-R2 0.2055 0.1565 0.0698 0.2035 0.1534 0.0654 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 515 258 257 515 258 257 
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Table 2-46   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P -2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.15388*** 0.13707* 0.08554 0.13585*** 0.10367 0.09899* 
(p-value) (0.0034) (0.0783) (0.1622) (0.007) (0.2011) (0.0818) 
AIV-Variable -0.05947 -0.0991** 0.02415    
(p-value) (0.1233) (0.0492) (0.6589)    
VIV-Variable    -0.19278 -0.19016 -0.29049 
(p-value)       (0.2361) (0.419) (0.1026) 
Idio_Vol -0.54767 -0.72679 0.63484 -0.97193** -1.62218*** 1.25859** 
(p-value) (0.3365) (0.2991) (0.3212) (0.0423) (0.0082) (0.0251) 
Target Size -0.00996*** -0.01092** -0.00552 -0.00911*** -0.00887* -0.00603* 
(p-value) (0.0006) (0.019) (0.107) (0.0013) (0.0519) (0.0723) 
Target Turnover -0.0001248** -0.0001071 4.72E-06 -0.0001311*** -0.0001211 2.44E-06 
(p-value) (0.0149) (0.1747) (0.9344) (0.0089) (0.1045) (0.9659) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00261 -0.00683 -0.00105 0.00222 -0.00611 -0.0008628 
(p-value) (0.7239) (0.5962) (0.8966) (0.7608) (0.6256) (0.9161) 
Target B/M -0.00602 -0.02278 -0.00792 -0.00557 -0.02193 -0.00751 
(p-value) (0.4578) (0.1443) (0.3174) (0.502) (0.1675) (0.3323) 
Target Runup 0.00165 0.01513 -0.00252 0.00288 0.01785 3.772E-05 
(p-value) (0.9145) (0.5474) (0.8521) (0.8515) (0.4821) (0.9978) 
Target Markup -0.03397*** -0.02629* -0.03435*** -0.03425*** -0.02672* -0.03076*** 
(p-value) (0.0029) (0.0829) (0.0042) (0.0025) (0.076) (0.0107) 
Collar -0.03197** -0.04165*** 0.01832 -0.03016** -0.03739** 0.01657 
(p-value) (0.0239) (0.0061) (0.4045) (0.0307) (0.0154) (0.4472) 
Toehold Exist 0.0076 0.04423 0.00214 0.00766 0.04632 0.00106 
(p-value) (0.6523) (0.126) (0.9368) (0.6476) (0.1006) (0.967) 
Horizontal 0.00938 0.00309 0.01058 0.00971 0.00259 0.01175 
(p-value) (0.1873) (0.779) (0.1679) (0.1672) (0.8139) (0.124) 
Tender Offer 0.0007164 0.01031 -0.00219 0.0007024 0.01185 -0.00314 
(p-value) (0.9106) (0.5335) (0.74) (0.9119) (0.466) (0.6328) 
Cash Bid 0.02238***   0.024***   
(p-value) (0.0014)   (0.0005)   
Hostile -0.00759 0.02253 -0.03967** -0.00855 0.01726 -0.03659* 
(p-value) (0.6886) (0.4871) (0.0459) (0.6537) (0.6085) (0.0674) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01277 0.03603* -0.0171 0.01202 0.03616* -0.0171 
(p-value) (0.2512) (0.0857) (0.1499) (0.2747) (0.082) (0.1449) 
Rumor 0.00341 -0.000493 -0.00761 0.00349 0.00128 -0.00562 
(p-value) (0.7329) (0.9768) (0.5281) (0.7276) (0.9396) (0.6419) 
Complete 0.02717** 0.03653*** 0.00941 0.02834*** 0.03784** 0.01037 
(p-value) (0.012) (0.0202) (0.4605) (0.0077) (0.013) (0.4121) 
Adj-R2 0.228 0.2189 0.0762 0.2273 0.2097 0.0833 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-47   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.14877*** 0.13393* 0.08337 
(p-value) (0.0041) (0.0866) (0.174) 
AIV-Bidder -0.04516 -0.09453* 0.06568 
(p-value) (0.2776) (0.0872) (0.2699) 
VIV-Bidder -0.12768 -0.04374 -0.3967** 
(p-value) (0.4692) (0.8641) (0.0486) 
Idio_Vol -0.5366 -0.72004 0.72047 
(p-value) (0.3514) (0.3088) (0.2627) 
Target Size -0.00968*** -0.01071** -0.00563* 
(p-value) (0.0007) (0.0219) (0.0963) 
Target Turnover -0.0001237** -0.0001061 3.02E-06 
(p-value) (0.0173) (0.1822) (0.9573) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00226 -0.00706 -0.00165 
(p-value) (0.7591) (0.5798) (0.8399) 
Target B/M -0.00582 -0.02261 -0.00681 
(p-value) (0.4731) (0.1458) (0.3788) 
Target Runup 0.002 0.01509 0.0003003 
(p-value) (0.896) (0.5483) (0.9825) 
Target Markup -0.03392*** -0.02641* -0.03088** 
(p-value) (0.003) (0.0816) (0.0102) 
Collar -0.03153** -0.04118*** 0.01529 
(p-value) (0.0233) (0.0068) (0.4709) 
Toehold Exist 0.00716 0.04419 0.0003084 
(p-value) (0.6715) (0.1263) (0.9906) 
Horizontal 0.00989 0.00332 0.01142 
(p-value) (0.1597) (0.7604) (0.1315) 
Tender Offer 0.0006109 0.0106 -0.00356 
(p-value) (0.9236) (0.5196) (0.5853) 
Cash Bid 0.02254***   
(p-value) (0.0012)   
Hostile -0.008 0.02187 -0.03613* 
(p-value) (0.6741) (0.5042) (0.0677) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01246 0.03595* -0.01858 
(p-value) (0.2605) (0.0852) (0.1069) 
Rumor 0.00341 -0.0003779 -0.00614 
(p-value) (0.7322) (0.9822) (0.6079) 
Complete 0.02771*** 0.03673** 0.0112 
(p-value) (0.0096) (0.0185) (0.3698) 
Adj-R2 0.2277 0.2154 0.0844 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-48   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for idiosyncratic volatility 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is 
constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by 
the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target 
(Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal 
is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 2.9585 0.9923 2.4955 4.5831 2.7647 5.6867 
(p-value) (0.7601) (0.9107) (0.8011) (0.6058) (0.7526) (0.5227) 
AIV-Variable -5.7043***  -6.4589*** -6.9595***  -8.2771*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
VIV-Variable  -1.7358 3.5327*  1.2925 11.7156** 
(p-value)   (0.2995) (0.064)   (0.7769) (0.0327) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 9.2219 -25.9565*** 11.7525 -19.83 -95.8608*** -20.3058 
(p-value) (0.3095) (<.0001) (0.2158) (0.3261) (<.0001) (0.318) 
Target Size -0.7023 -0.16 -0.7549 -0.2216 -0.0928 -0.1924 
(p-value) (0.2949) (0.7913) (0.2709) (0.7134) (0.8759) (0.7496) 
Target Turnover 0.00195 0.000513 1.90E-03 0.000222 -0.00052 0.000268 
(p-value) (0.4596) (0.8541) (0.4696) (0.9434) (0.8675) (0.9311) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.3002 -0.1918 -0.291 -0.1241 -0.1402 -0.0686 
(p-value) (0.2531) (0.4446) (0.2664) (0.638) (0.5888) (0.7965) 
Target B/M 0.3653 0.2938 0.2934 0.4307 0.3282 0.419 
(p-value) (0.2915) (0.3583) (0.4129) (0.1892) (0.3053) (0.2105) 
Acquirer Size 0.6175 0.3362 0.6622 0.1989 0.178 0.147 
(p-value) (0.2938) (0.5285) (0.271) (0.7088) (0.7347) (0.7828) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00916 -0.0129 -0.00927 0.0124 -0.00122 0.0119 
(p-value) (0.4082) (0.1942) (0.4085) (0.2732) (0.9035) (0.2744) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.2491 -0.123 -0.2639 -0.247 -0.1143 -0.2489 
(p-value) (0.2815) (0.5738) (0.2546) (0.2855) (0.6102) (0.284) 
Acquirer B/M 0.9254* 0.9048* 0.871* 0.5417 0.502 0.3961 
(p-value) (0.058) (0.0519) (0.0772) (0.2879) (0.305) (0.4455) 
Relative Size -0.8628 -4.2279 -0.1507 -2.6634 -3.4728 -3.3337 
(p-value) (0.9357) (0.6637) (0.989) (0.7842) (0.7178) (0.7315) 
Collar -2.5363*** -2.4032*** -2.5477*** -2.4917*** -2.2961*** -2.4726*** 
(p-value) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Toehold Exist -0.7168   -0.6352   
(p-value) (0.3512)   (0.3755)   
Horizontal -0.5821** -0.7055*** -0.5621** -0.5368** -0.5346** -0.5418** 
(p-value) (0.0236) (0.0043) (0.0292) (0.0391) (0.0357) (0.0381) 
Tender Offer 1.7746*** 1.5746*** 1.7866*** 1.6636*** 1.6078*** 1.7031*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.1873 -0.4997 -0.1387 -0.0539 -0.2305 -0.0115 
(p-value) (0.7444) (0.3867) (0.8097) (0.9289) (0.6992) (0.985) 
Multiple Bidders 0.6696* 1.1949*** 0.5963 1.0173* 1.0621*** 1.0436*** 
(p-value) (0.0675) (0.0007) (0.1077) (0.0052) (0.003) (0.0043) 
Rumor 0.5082 0.3973 0.5186 0.1988 0.1856 0.1543 
(p-value) (0.2323) (0.3257) (0.2253) (0.6313) (0.6517) (0.7091) 
Adj-R2 0.3549 0.2967 0.3587 0.3658 0.3381 0.3714 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 




Table 2-49   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2].  Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before 
the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is 
preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value of 1 if 
there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.3288 -0.667 0.0642 0.2928 -0.0999 0.3174 
(p-value) (0.8792) (0.742) (0.9766) (0.8852) (0.9593) (0.8761) 
AIV-Variable -0.5234  -0.8323 -1.1565  -1.3077 
(p-value) (0.5594)  (0.3746) (0.433)  (0.4066) 
VIV-Variable  2.3648 3.0311  -0.1035 1.6524 
(p-value)   (0.3915) (0.2919)   (0.9854) (0.7867) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -3.074 -7.528 -2.454 -5.3666 -19.3246 -5.2974 
(p-value) (0.7214) (0.2601) (0.7772) (0.8038) (0.138) (0.8064) 
Target Size 0.2047 0.254* 0.2229 0.2283 0.2431* 0.2265 
(p-value) (0.1587) (0.0755) (0.1299) (0.1068) (0.0821) (0.111) 
Target Turnover 0.000511 -0.00003 3.95E-04 0.000055 -0.00021 0.000054 
(p-value) (0.8941) (0.9944) (0.9182) (0.9882) (0.9539) (0.9883) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.6291* -0.5842* -0.6331* -0.6717** -0.6535** -0.6645** 
(p-value) (0.0568) (0.0738) (0.0573) (0.0422) (0.0483) (0.0451) 
Target B/M -0.6773* -0.7234** -0.7099** -0.6528* -0.66* -0.6579* 
(p-value) (0.0541) (0.041) (0.0442) (0.0714) (0.0648) (0.0699) 
Target Runup 0.8185 0.8356 0.7191 0.7541 0.7621 0.7537 
(p-value) (0.1983) (0.1883) (0.2634) (0.2174) (0.2149) (0.2189) 
Target Markup -0.3839 -0.395 -0.3511 -0.3927 -0.4128 -0.3884 
(p-value) (0.3866) (0.3725) (0.4294) (0.3755) (0.3514) (0.3808) 
Collar 0.737 0.7445 0.7625 0.7092 0.7278 0.7035 
(p-value) (0.2537) (0.2459) (0.237) (0.2753) (0.2604) (0.28) 
Toehold Exist -1.3798* -1.3701* -1.44** -1.5303** -1.5229** -1.5182** 
(p-value) (0.0519) (0.0551) (0.0425) (0.0292) (0.0296) (0.0309) 
Horizontal -0.0952 -0.108 -0.0872 -0.0195 -0.051 -0.0258 
(p-value) (0.7649) (0.734) (0.7848) (0.9517) (0.8735) (0.9363) 
Tender Offer 1.492*** 1.4271*** 1.4867*** 1.4311*** 1.4278*** 1.4286*** 
(p-value) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Cash Bid 0.0611   -0.0876   
(p-value) (0.8457)   (0.7897)   
Hostile -3.7017*** -3.675*** -3.7184*** -3.6674*** -3.682*** -3.6599*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.7726*** -2.7378*** -2.8394*** -2.7302*** -2.7249*** -2.7231*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.5308 0.4997 0.5276 0.4499 0.4552 0.4439 
(p-value) (0.4069) (0.4323) (0.4095) (0.4809) (0.4765) (0.487) 
Adj-R2 0.2003 0.2010 0.2021 0.2031 0.2022 0.2032 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





2.13 Appendix F – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables while being 
orthogonalizedd for the idiosyncratic volatility – Original Sample 
 
Table 2-50   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. The 
AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility.  Target Size is the logarithm of the 
target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. 
Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of 
the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price 
divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy 
variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is 
hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes 
a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-
digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.12386** 0.07605 0.09824* 0.10786** 0.05438 0.12298** 
(p-value) (0.02) (0.3882) (0.0804) (0.0392) (0.5182) (0.0252) 
AIV-Variable -0.02937 -0.04062 0.03328    
(p-value) (0.1884) (0.2302) (0.1891)    
VIV-Variable    -0.02803 -0.04422 -0.00115 
(p-value)       (0.5177) (0.5407) (0.9816) 
Idio_Vol -0.18878 -0.45726 -0.02115 -0.14859 -0.38122 -0.05051 
(p-value) (0.3226) (0.285) (0.896) (0.4287) (0.3701) (0.7489) 
Target Size -0.01059*** -0.01142** -0.00472 -0.00928*** -0.01031** -0.00686** 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0214) (0.2027) (0.0019) (0.0342) (0.0441) 
Target Turnover -0.0001366*** -0.0001458** -2.296E-05 -0.0001456*** -0.0001518*** 0.0000071 
(p-value) (0.0072) (0.0144) (0.7168) (0.0022) (0.0088) (0.9116) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00372 -0.0006353 0.0004186 0.00472 0.0007064 -0.0008256 
(p-value) (0.6209) (0.9616) (0.9598) (0.5289) (0.9576) (0.9198) 
Target B/M -0.00759 -0.02075 -0.00518 -0.00708 -0.02105 -0.00476 
(p-value) (0.3551) (0.1903) (0.5183) (0.3891) (0.1796) (0.5508) 
Target Runup 0.00231 0.01292 -0.00397 0.00485 0.0155 -0.00528 
(p-value) (0.8867) (0.6376) (0.7751) (0.7621) (0.5638) (0.709) 
Target Markup -0.03294*** -0.02723 -0.03854*** -0.03359*** -0.02721 -0.03589*** 
(p-value) (0.0058) (0.1047) (0.0018) (0.0042) (0.1057) (0.0044) 
Collar -0.02833* -0.0374** 0.02225 -0.02764* -0.03692** 0.0233 
(p-value) (0.0549) (0.0242) (0.327) (0.0629) (0.0262) (0.3236) 
Toehold Exist 0.01289 0.05159* 0.00102 0.01364 0.0584* 0.00176 
(p-value) (0.4426) (0.0877) (0.9681) (0.4344) (0.0558) (0.9437) 
Horizontal 0.00623 -0.00297 0.01205 0.00585 -0.00306 0.01173 
(p-value) (0.3823) (0.7934) (0.1196) (0.4128) (0.7871) (0.1284) 
Tender Offer 0.00259 0.01933 -0.00212 0.00243 0.01987 -0.00112 
(p-value) (0.6917) (0.239) (0.7528) (0.7093) (0.242) (0.8664) 
Cash Bid 0.02919***   0.03036***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.01044 0.01745 -0.03634* -0.01098 0.02034 -0.0339* 
(p-value) (0.5954) (0.6174) (0.0648) (0.5792) (0.5645) (0.0884) 
Multiple Bidders 0.009 0.03084 -0.01165 0.01198 0.03412* -0.01378 
(p-value) (0.4182) (0.1426) (0.3459) (0.279) (0.0965) (0.2675) 
Rumor 0.00645 0.01037 -0.00812 0.00565 0.00928 -0.00678 
(p-value) (0.5259) (0.5511) (0.5172) (0.5754) (0.5962) (0.581) 
Complete 0.03042*** 0.04395*** 0.00988 0.0307*** 0.04399*** 0.01065 
(p-value) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.4497) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.4206) 
Adj-R2 0.2055 0.1565 0.0698 0.2035 0.1534 0.0654 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 515 258 257 515 258 257 
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Table 2-51   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. The 
AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility.  Target Size is the logarithm of the 
target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. 
Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of 
the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price 
divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy 
variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is 
hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes 
a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-
digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.14618*** 0.1221 0.08874 0.13331*** 0.10159 0.09468* 
(p-value) (0.0044) (0.1156) (0.1314) (0.008) (0.2118) (0.0968) 
AIV-Variable -0.05947 -0.0991** 0.02415    
(p-value) (0.1233) (0.0492) (0.6589)    
VIV-Variable    -0.19278 -0.19016 -0.29049 
(p-value)       (0.2361) (0.419) (0.1026) 
Idio_Vol -1.34058*** -2.01706*** 0.93008* -1.21793*** -1.87584*** 0.90417* 
(p-value) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0864) (0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0693) 
Target Size -0.00996*** -0.01092** -0.00552 -0.00911*** -0.00887* -0.00603* 
(p-value) (0.0006) (0.019) (0.107) (0.0013) (0.0519) (0.0723) 
Target Turnover -0.0001248** -0.0001071 4.72E-06 -0.0001311*** -0.0001211 2.44E-06 
(p-value) (0.0149) (0.1747) (0.9344) (0.0089) (0.1045) (0.9659) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00261 -0.00683 -0.00105 0.00222 -0.00611 -0.0008628 
(p-value) (0.7239) (0.5962) (0.8966) (0.7608) (0.6256) (0.9161) 
Target B/M -0.00602 -0.02278 -0.00792 -0.00557 -0.02193 -0.00751 
(p-value) (0.4578) (0.1443) (0.3174) (0.502) (0.1675) (0.3323) 
Target Runup 0.00165 0.01513 -0.00252 0.00288 0.01785 3.772E-05 
(p-value) (0.9145) (0.5474) (0.8521) (0.8515) (0.4821) (0.9978) 
Target Markup -0.03397*** -0.02629* -0.03435*** -0.03425*** -0.02672* -0.03076** 
(p-value) (0.0029) (0.0829) (0.0042) (0.0025) (0.076) (0.0107) 
Collar -0.03197** -0.04165*** 0.01832 -0.03016** -0.03739** 0.01657 
(p-value) (0.0239) (0.0061) (0.4045) (0.0307) (0.0154) (0.4472) 
Toehold Exist 0.0076 0.04423 0.00214 0.00766 0.04632 0.00106 
(p-value) (0.6523) (0.126) (0.9368) (0.6476) (0.1006) (0.967) 
Horizontal 0.00938 0.00309 0.01058 0.00971 0.00259 0.01175 
(p-value) (0.1873) (0.779) (0.1679) (0.1672) (0.8139) (0.124) 
Tender Offer 0.0007164 0.01031 -0.00219 0.0007024 0.01185 -0.00314 
(p-value) (0.9106) (0.5335) (0.74) (0.9119) (0.466) (0.6328) 
Cash Bid 0.02238***   0.024***   
(p-value) (0.0014)   (0.0005)   
Hostile -0.00759 0.02253 -0.03967** -0.00855 0.01726 -0.03659* 
(p-value) (0.6886) (0.4871) (0.0459) (0.6537) (0.6085) (0.0674) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01277 0.03603* -0.0171 0.01202 0.03616* -0.0171 
(p-value) (0.2512) (0.0857) (0.1499) (0.2747) (0.082) (0.1449) 
Rumor 0.00341 -0.000493 -0.00761 0.00349 0.00128 -0.00562 
(p-value) (0.7329) (0.9768) (0.5281) (0.7276) (0.9396) (0.6419) 
Complete 0.02717** 0.03653** 0.00941 0.02834*** 0.03784*** 0.01037 
(p-value) (0.012) (0.0202) (0.4605) (0.0077) (0.013) (0.4121) 
Adj-R2 0.228 0.2189 0.0762 0.2273 0.2097 0.0833 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-52   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. The 
AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility.  Target Size is the logarithm of the 
target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. 
Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of 
the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price 
divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy 
variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is 
hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes 
a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-
digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.14124*** 0.11918 0.08618 
(p-value) (0.0055) (0.126) (0.1453) 
AIV-Bidder -0.04516 -0.09453* 0.06568 
(p-value) (0.2776) (0.0872) (0.2699) 
VIV-Bidder (-0.12768) -0.04374 -0.3967** 
(p-value) (0.4692) (0.8641) (0.0486) 
Idio_Vol -1.30169*** -2.00917*** 1.03937* 
(p-value) (0.0025) (0.0002) (0.0577) 
Target Size -0.00968*** -0.01071** -0.00563* 
(p-value) (0.0007) (0.0219) (0.0963) 
Target Turnover -0.0001237** -0.0001061 3.02E-06 
(p-value) (0.0173) (0.1822) (0.9573) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00226 -0.00706 -0.00165 
(p-value) (0.7591) (0.5798) (0.8399) 
Target B/M -0.00582 -0.02261 -0.00681 
(p-value) (0.4731) (0.1458) (0.3788) 
Target Runup 0.002 0.01509 0.0003003 
(p-value) (0.896) (0.5483) (0.9825) 
Target Markup -0.03392*** -0.02641* -0.03088** 
(p-value) (0.003) (0.0816) (0.0102) 
Collar -0.03153** -0.04118*** 0.01529 
(p-value) (0.0233) (0.0068) (0.4709) 
Toehold Exist 0.00716 0.04419 0.0003084 
(p-value) (0.6715) (0.1263) (0.9906) 
Horizontal 0.00989 0.00332 0.01142 
(p-value) (0.1597) (0.7604) (0.1315) 
Tender Offer 0.0006109 0.0106 -0.00356 
(p-value) (0.9236) (0.5196) (0.5853) 
Cash Bid 0.02254***   
(p-value) (0.0012)   
Hostile -0.008 0.02187 -0.03613* 
(p-value) (0.6741) (0.5042) (0.0677) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01246 0.03595* -0.01858 
(p-value) (0.2605) (0.0852) (0.1069) 
Rumor 0.00341 -0.0003779 -0.00614 
(p-value) (0.7322) (0.9822) (0.6079) 
Complete 0.02771*** 0.03673** 0.0112 
(p-value) (0.0096) (0.0185) (0.3698) 
Adj-R2 0.2277 0.2154 0.0844 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-53   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for idiosyncratic volatility 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. The AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) 
on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target 
(acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the 
nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by the acquirer size (in log terms). 
NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target (Acquirer) is listed on 
NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed 
successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold 
dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same 
contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 1.4957 1.0363 1.0171 3.7988 2.8821 4.812 
(p-value) (0.8782) (0.907) (0.9189) (0.6691) (0.743) (0.5889) 
AIV-Variable -5.7522***   -6.5606*** -7.0012***   -8.3265*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
VIV-Variable  -1.7029 3.7205*  1.2961 11.8127** 
(p-value)   (0.3095) (0.0526)   (0.7762) (0.0316) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -37.9519*** -27.8418*** -38.3624*** -113.3*** -94.3393*** -116.6*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size -0.7008 -0.1564 -0.755 -0.2232 -0.0929 -0.1995 
(p-value) (0.2995) (0.7967) (0.2752) (0.7118) (0.876) (0.7412) 
Target Turnover 0.002 0.000527 0.00197 0.000194 -0.00055 0.000242 
(p-value) (0.4476) (0.8501) (0.4541) (0.9511) (0.8616) (0.9385) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.3192 -0.202 -0.3126 -0.1432 -0.1521 -0.0891 
(p-value) (0.2261) (0.4224) (0.2341) (0.589) (0.5591) (0.7389) 
Target B/M 0.3417 0.2825 0.2608 0.4169 0.3145 0.4037 
(p-value) (0.3237) (0.3787) (0.4664) (0.2013) (0.3266) (0.2246) 
Acquirer Size 0.6229 0.34 0.6691 0.2072 0.1832 0.1604 
(p-value) (0.2929) (0.5252) (0.2701) (0.6977) (0.7277) (0.7641) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00887 -0.0128 -0.00885 0.0128 -0.00107 0.0123 
(p-value) (0.4254) (0.1985) (0.4324) (0.2584) (0.9151) (0.2585) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.2434 -0.1192 -0.2578 -0.2401 -0.1098 -0.242 
(p-value) (0.2934) (0.5858) (0.2665) (0.2997) (0.6245) (0.2982) 
Acquirer B/M 0.9257* 0.9025* 0.8688* 0.5442 0.5012 0.3958 
(p-value) (0.0583) (0.0524) (0.0786) (0.2863) (0.3059) (0.4466) 
Relative Size -0.9808 -4.2789 -0.2924 -2.6286 -3.4691 -3.2018 
(p-value) (0.9275) (0.6611) (0.9789) (0.7872) (0.7186) (0.7421) 
Collar -2.4836*** -2.3758*** -2.4809*** -2.4557*** -2.2778*** -2.4331*** 
(p-value) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Toehold Exist -0.7689 -0.3786 -0.8055 -0.6702 -0.6876 -0.6135 
(p-value) (0.3186) (0.6113) (0.3047) (0.3503) (0.3369) (0.3964) 
Horizontal -0.589** -0.7087*** -0.5691** -0.5398** -0.5395** -0.544** 
(p-value) (0.0225) (0.0042) (0.0277) (0.0383) (0.0344) (0.0376) 
Tender Offer 1.808*** 1.5914*** 1.8258*** 1.6929*** 1.6251*** 1.7339*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.3691 -0.6051 -0.347 -0.1915 -0.3348 -0.1528 
(p-value) (0.5405) (0.3181) (0.565) (0.761) (0.5911) (0.8101) 
Multiple Bidders 0.5372 1.1182*** 0.434 0.9041** 0.9829** 0.9263** 
(p-value) (0.17) (0.003) (0.2755) (0.0207) (0.0101) (0.0178) 
Rumor 0.5197 0.4013 0.5331 0.2127 0.194 0.1686 
(p-value) (0.2242) (0.3217) (0.2153) (0.6091) (0.6382) (0.6849) 
Complete -0.3252 -0.1847 -0.3835 -0.2694 -0.1963 -0.2833 
(p-value) (0.3441) (0.573) (0.2704) (0.4365) (0.5615) (0.4148) 
Adj-R2 0.3559 0.2971 0.36 0.3665 0.3385 0.3722 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 




Table 2-54   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2].  The AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) 
on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility. Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the 
ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value 
divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the 
target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the 
announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the 
Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is 
completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are mult iple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.1659 -0.5744 -0.0762 0.143 -0.1013 0.1698 
(p-value) (0.9357) (0.7744) (0.9708) (0.9427) (0.9587) (0.9322) 
AIV-Variable -0.5234   -0.8323 -1.1565   -1.3077 
(p-value) (0.5594)  (0.3746) (0.433)  (0.4066) 
VIV-Variable  2.3648 3.0311  -0.1035 1.6524 
(p-value)   (0.3915) (0.2919)   (0.9854) (0.7867) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -7.3427 -5.2546 -6.3279 -20.7863* -19.4567* -20.6235* 
(p-value) (0.2662) (0.4319) (0.3407) (0.0756) (0.094) (0.0787) 
Target Size 0.2047 0.254* 0.2229 0.2283 0.2431* 0.2265 
(p-value) (0.1587) (0.0755) (0.1299) (0.1068) (0.0821) (0.111) 
Target Turnover 0.000511 -0.00003 0.000395 0.000055 -0.00021 0.000054 
(p-value) (0.8941) (0.9944) (0.9182) (0.9882) (0.9539) (0.9883) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.6291* -0.5842* -0.6331* -0.6717** -0.6535** -0.6645** 
(p-value) (0.0568) (0.0738) (0.0573) (0.0422) (0.0483) (0.0451) 
Target B/M -0.6773* -0.7234** -0.7099** -0.6528* -0.66* -0.6579* 
(p-value) (0.0541) (0.041) (0.0442) (0.0714) (0.0648) (0.0699) 
Target Runup 0.8185 0.8356 0.7191 0.7541 0.7621 0.7537 
(p-value) (0.1983) (0.1883) (0.2634) (0.2174) (0.2149) (0.2189) 
Target Markup -0.3839 -0.395 -0.3511 -0.3927 -0.4128 -0.3884 
(p-value) (0.3866) (0.3725) (0.4294) (0.3755) (0.3514) (0.3808) 
Collar 0.737 0.7445 0.7625 0.7092 0.7278 0.7035 
(p-value) (0.2537) (0.2459) (0.237) (0.2753) (0.2604) (0.28) 
Toehold Exist -1.3798* -1.3701* -1.44** -1.5303** -1.5229** -1.5182** 
(p-value) (0.0519) (0.0551) (0.0425) (0.0292) (0.0296) (0.0309) 
Horizontal -0.0952 -0.108 -0.0872 -0.0195 -0.051 -0.0258 
(p-value) (0.7649) (0.734) (0.7848) (0.9517) (0.8735) (0.9363) 
Tender Offer 1.492*** 1.4271*** 1.4867*** 1.4311*** 1.4278*** 1.4286*** 
(p-value) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Cash Bid 0.0611 0.1175 0.0411 -0.0876 -0.0415 -0.0982 
(p-value) (0.8457) (0.6967) (0.8965) (0.7897) (0.8978) (0.7664) 
Hostile -3.7017*** -3.675*** -3.7184*** -3.6674*** -3.682*** -3.6599*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.7726*** -2.7378*** -2.8394*** -2.7302*** -2.7249*** -2.7231*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.5308 0.4997 0.5276 0.4499 0.4552 0.4439 
(p-value) (0.4069) (0.4323) (0.4095) (0.4809) (0.4765) (0.487) 
Adj-R2 0.2003 0.201 0.2021 0.2031 0.2022 0.2032 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 







2.14 Appendix G – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables in the 
Expanded Sample 
 
Table 2-55   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) 
(Expanded Sample) 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days 
before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the 
announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days 
before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value 
of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and 
the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple 
Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the 
announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
  
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.10549 0.06523 0.14995* 0.06456 0.05178 0.13563* 
(p-value) (0.2696) (0.6336) (0.0899) (0.4367) (0.6751) (0.0551) 
AIV-Variable -0.01876 -0.00891 -0.00392    
(p-value) (0.3994) (0.7697) (0.8482)    
VIV-Variable    -0.00715 -0.02507 0.01296 
(p-value)       (0.9152) (0.8133) (0.7946) 
Target Size -0.0096** -0.00833 -0.0068* -0.00818** -0.00789 -0.00626* 
(p-value) (0.0185) (0.1654) (0.0637) (0.0288) (0.1618) (0.0506) 
Target Turnover -0.0002885 -0.0002814 -6.78E-05 -0.00037 -0.000327 -8.69E-05 
(p-value) (0.3207) (0.5221) (0.8372) (0.1707) (0.4167) (0.778) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00625 0.00881 -0.00266 0.00727 0.00933 -0.0026 
(p-value) (0.4815) (0.5956) (0.7107) (0.4165) (0.5717) (0.716) 
Target B/M -0.01268*** -0.01362*** -0.0061 -0.01282*** -0.01376*** -0.00617 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5138) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5073) 
Target Runup -0.0091 0.0009137 -0.00572 -0.00985 0.000753 -0.00704 
(p-value) (0.606) (0.97) (0.6552) (0.585) (0.9752) (0.6026) 
Target Markup -0.03178** -0.04016 -0.02229** -0.03339** -0.04072 -0.02322** 
(p-value) (0.0446) (0.1276) (0.0307) (0.0282) (0.1159) (0.0212) 
Collar 0.02067 0.02221 0.01433 0.02196 0.02254 0.01444 
(p-value) (0.2413) (0.2945) (0.4842) (0.2053) (0.2795) (0.478) 
Toehold Exist 0.02464* 0.05391* 0.02341 0.02395* 0.05503* 0.0235 
(p-value) (0.0755) (0.052) (0.1186) (0.0821) (0.0508) (0.1208) 
Horizontal 0.0006698 -0.01541 0.01784** 0.0005347 -0.01561 0.01804** 
(p-value) (0.9369) (0.2179) (0.0193) (0.949) (0.2086) (0.0176) 
Tender Offer 0.00913 0.03056* -5.78E-05 0.009 0.03158** -0.0002657 
(p-value) (0.1662) (0.0508) (0.9928) (0.1713) (0.0493) (0.9662) 
Cash Bid 0.02729***   0.02861***   
(p-value) (0.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00973 0.0026 -0.042*** -0.00905 0.00319 -0.04255*** 
(p-value) (0.51) (0.9331) (0.0019) (0.5436) (0.9178) (0.0017) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00527 0.01594 -0.01529* 0.00542 0.01635 -0.0156* 
(p-value) (0.6541) (0.4782) (0.0668) (0.644) (0.4671) (0.0547) 
Rumor 0.02192 0.05193* -0.00804 0.02077 0.05183* -0.00845 
(p-value) (0.1183) (0.0714) (0.4783) (0.1335) (0.0698) (0.4503) 
Complete 0.02969** 0.03779* 0.00342 0.02994** 0.03757* 0.00312 
(p-value) (0.0211) (0.0575) (0.7535) (0.0201) (0.0551) (0.7737) 
Adj-R2 0.1568 0.1058 0.1445 0.1558 0.1058 0.1446 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-56   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) 
(Expanded Sample) 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days 
before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the 
announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days 
before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value 
of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and 
the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple 
Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the 
announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
  
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.13551*** 0.21302*** 0.0486 0.0732** 0.11802** 0.04 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.1841) (0.0119) (0.0198) (0.246) 
AIV-Variable -0.08579*** -0.10741*** -0.02236    
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2638)    
VIV-Variable    -0.17192*** -0.22454** -0.1001* 
(p-value)    (0.0032) (0.0289) (0.0723) 
Target Size -0.00808*** -0.01242*** -0.00208 -0.00622*** -0.00963*** -0.00202 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2281) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2471) 
Target Turnover -0.0001317 -2.956E-05 -2.10E-04 -0.0003762 -0.0004135 -2.44E-04 
(p-value) (0.5555) (0.9304) (0.3466) (0.1027) (0.2341) (0.2871) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.000729 0.01037 -0.01067** 0.00296 0.01382* -0.01065** 
(p-value) (0.877) (0.1651) (0.0422) (0.5293) (0.0651) (0.0427) 
Target B/M 0.00306 -0.0005705 0.00487* 0.00174 -0.00345 0.00456* 
(p-value) (0.3) (0.9401) (0.0733) (0.5708) (0.666) (0.0899) 
Target Runup 0.0061 0.00734 0.00724 0.0076 0.01004 0.00713 
(p-value) (0.1852) (0.2506) (0.2156) (0.1316) (0.1608) (0.229) 
Target Markup -0.01482** -0.02079 -0.00678 -0.01402** -0.02355* -0.00589 
(p-value) (0.0165) (0.1004) (0.2274) (0.0247) (0.0673) (0.291) 
Collar -0.00216 -0.00379 -0.01354 -0.00172 -0.00311 -0.01746 
(p-value) (0.7746) (0.6465) (0.4291) (0.8233) (0.713) (0.3302) 
Toehold Exist 0.01629* 0.03892*** 0.01041 0.02116** 0.04699*** 0.01112 
(p-value) (0.0571) (0.0055) (0.3535) (0.0157) (0.0008) (0.3307) 
Horizontal 0.00642 -0.0009243 0.01232** 0.00332 -0.00542 0.01185** 
(p-value) (0.1699) (0.8919) (0.0322) (0.4714) (0.4212) (0.0378) 
Tender Offer 0.00308 -0.00271 3.50E-03 0.0031 0.00171 0.00302 
(p-value) (0.4869) (0.8173) (0.443) (0.4881) (0.885) (0.5112) 
Cash Bid 0.02055***   0.02737***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01197 0.05063** -0.0247** 0.01427 0.05468** -0.02499** 
(p-value) (0.3257) (0.0383) (0.0384) (0.2583) (0.03) (0.0346) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00551 0.01574 -0.01133* 0.00499 0.01384 -0.01117* 
(p-value) (0.326) (0.1194) (0.0544) (0.3713) (0.1609) (0.056) 
Rumor 0.01639 0.03614* -0.00523 0.0178 0.04094** -0.00522 
(p-value) (0.1448) (0.0878) (0.6473) (0.1111) (0.0446) (0.6462) 
Complete 0.01734** 0.027** -0.0007647 0.02149*** 0.03327*** -6.711E-05 
(p-value) (0.0281) (0.0186) (0.9287) (0.0069) (0.0038) (0.9937) 
Adj-R2 0.1854 0.1716 0.1083 0.1622 0.1325 0.1114 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-57   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder (Expanded Sample) 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43].. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days 
before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the 
announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days 
before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value 
of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and 
the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple 
Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the 
announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.13623*** 0.21704*** 0.04392 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2334) 
AIV-Bidder -0.08788*** -0.11591*** -0.00579 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.7933) 
VIV-Bidder (0.01545) (0.07638) (-0.09078) 
(p-value) (0.8128) (0.546) (0.1403) 
Target Size -0.00808*** -0.01251*** -0.00214 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2173) 
Target Turnover -0.0001304 -3.533E-05 -0.0002361 
(p-value) (0.5597) (0.9156) (0.2936) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0007424 0.01067 -0.01072** 
(p-value) (0.8748) (0.1537) (0.0419) 
Target B/M 0.00308 -0.0004736 0.00464* 
(p-value) (0.297) (0.9504) (0.0855) 
Target Runup 0.00614 0.0074 0.00701 
(p-value) (0.1824) (0.2431) (0.2289) 
Target Markup -0.01487** -0.02038 -0.00608 
(p-value) (0.0165) (0.1064) (0.268) 
Collar -0.00219 -0.00416 -0.01681 
(p-value) (0.7715) (0.6148) (0.3471) 
Toehold Exist 0.01617* 0.03846*** 0.01101 
(p-value) (0.0578) (0.0052) (0.3329) 
Horizontal 0.00644 -0.0008299 0.01199** 
(p-value) (0.1698) (0.9032) (0.0373) 
Tender Offer 0.00313 -0.00268 0.00313 
(p-value) (0.4815) (0.8201) (0.4941) 
Cash Bid 0.02047***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01196 0.0507** -0.02493** 
(p-value) (0.326) (0.0368) (0.0354) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00547 0.01572 -0.0111* 
(p-value) (0.3299) (0.1221) (0.0595) 
Rumor 0.01634 0.03577* -0.00518 
(p-value) (0.1461) (0.0906) (0.649) 
Complete 0.01723*** 0.02661** -0.0002598 
(p-value) (0.0293) (0.0205) (0.9757) 
Adj-R2 0.1848 0.1709 0.11 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 








Table 2-58   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer (Expanded Sample) 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target 
(acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by 
the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, 
Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target (Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is 
a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of 
target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). 
The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -2.8763 -1.1652 -4.5941 20.1771 13.7781 19.8543** 
(p-value) (0.843) (0.933) (0.7521) (0.044) (0.1568) (0.0477) 
AIV-Variable -5.8493***   -6.5159*** -4.8635***   -6.3021*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
VIV-Variable  -3.5363** 3.9603**  -1.4028 9.8956*** 
(p-value)   (0.0158) (0.0209)   (0.3906) (<.0001) 
Target Size -1.3582** -0.2104 -1.4527** 0.4895 0.5597 0.4417 
(p-value) (0.0471) (0.7416) (0.0343) (0.3309) (0.2538) (0.3809) 
Target Turnover 0.0098 -0.0138 0.0126 -0.00857 -0.0174** -0.00771 
(p-value) (0.3314) (0.1266) (0.2171) (0.2652) (0.0171) (0.3219) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5836** -0.496** -0.5763** -0.366** -0.3566** -0.3402* 
(p-value) (0.0168) (0.0289) (0.018) (0.0398) (0.0377) (0.0586) 
Target B/M 0.0408 0.00252 0.0124 0.0625 -0.0252 0.0862 
(p-value) (0.8207) (0.9837) (0.939) (0.57) (0.8224) (0.4338) 
Acquirer Size 1.044* 0.3509 1.1298* -0.4724 -0.3504 -0.4472 
(p-value) (0.0972) (0.5543) (0.0737) (0.2799) (0.4111) (0.307) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00967 -0.0237** -0.00845 0.0122 -0.0144* 0.0155* 
(p-value) (0.4505) (0.0242) (0.5144) (0.1801) (0.0622) (0.0884) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.00147 0.0663 0.0322 -0.1863 0.1708 -0.1645 
(p-value) (0.995) (0.7583) (0.8918) (0.2753) (0.2863) (0.34) 
Acquirer B/M 0.675* 0.7335** 0.6049 0.7051** 0.6973*** 0.6043** 
(p-value) (0.08) (0.0394) (0.1231) (0.0117) (0.0062) (0.0305) 
Relative Size 10.9683 -2.5326 12.9558 -19.6779* -19.1421* -18.7088* 
(p-value) (0.4755) (0.8626) (0.4003) (0.0829) (0.0832) (0.0994) 
Collar -2.8844*** -2.7551*** -2.8966*** -2.9102*** -2.984*** -2.8915*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist 0.6158 0.6018 0.6579 -0.3087 -0.2803 -0.3382 
(p-value) (0.2771) (0.2825) (0.2471) (0.4235) (0.465) (0.3863) 
Horizontal -0.5492** -0.6314*** -0.53** -0.4504*** -0.5377*** -0.4395** 
(p-value) (0.0184) (0.0035) (0.0235) (0.008) (0.0009) (0.0108) 
Tender Offer 2.0667*** 1.7735*** 2.0755*** 2.1123*** 1.9772*** 2.1815*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile 0.4932 0.5821 0.4754 0.2741 0.1868 0.3019 
(p-value) (0.3643) (0.2839) (0.3821) (0.5715) (0.6931) (0.537) 
Multiple Bidders 0.5529* 0.6485** 0.4994 0.3137 0.3334 0.3067 
(p-value) (0.0684) (0.0214) (0.105) (0.1466) (0.1087) (0.1593) 
Rumor 0.7801** 0.5906 0.7755** 0.5714 0.6317* 0.5181 
(p-value) (0.0443) (0.1046) (0.0468) (0.1213) (0.0784) (0.1612) 
Complete -0.1485 0.0418 -0.1943 -0.2511 -0.1674 -0.2677 
(p-value) (0.6284) (0.8826) (0.5318) (0.2798) (0.4549) (0.2531) 
Adj-R2 0.3908 0.2999 0.3951 0.3432 0.2935 0.3542 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 







Table 2-59   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target (Expanded Sample) 
Table 52. Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target and VIV- (Bidder) Target (Expanded Sample) 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share 
outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 
days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before 
the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. 
NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the 
deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the 
bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month 
period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -2.6624 -3.2926 -2.668 5.3464*** 4.0952*** 5.3835*** 
(p-value) (0.3053) (0.1683) (0.3045) (0.0004) (0.0044) (0.0004) 
AIV-Variable -0.324   -0.361 -1.3774***   -1.5796*** 
(p-value) (0.5588)  (0.5486) (0.0033)  (0.0051) 
VIV-Variable  -0.1551 0.3342  -2.1296 1.6671 
(p-value)   (0.9366) (0.8757)   (0.2855) (0.5316) 
Target Size 0.2605** 0.2831** 0.2607** -0.1098 -0.0744 -0.1105 
(p-value) (0.0314) (0.0144) (0.0313) (0.1376) (0.3029) (0.1358) 
Target Turnover -0.00505 -0.00649 -0.00491 0.000506 -0.00474 0.000681 
(p-value) (0.5677) (0.4422) (0.5813) (0.956) (0.5832) (0.9411) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.645** -0.6169** -0.6437** -0.3681 -0.2999 -0.3611 
(p-value) (0.0239) (0.0287) (0.0244) (0.1187) (0.1979) (0.1265) 
Target B/M -0.3399 -0.3656 -0.3426 -0.2044 -0.251* -0.2006 
(p-value) (0.24) (0.2054) (0.2369) (0.1776) (0.0916) (0.1873) 
Target Runup 0.6191 0.6085 0.6168 0.5736 0.6393* 0.5925 
(p-value) (0.1812) (0.1929) (0.1833) (0.1133) (0.0902) (0.1045) 
Target Markup -0.1784 -0.2166 -0.1745 -0.0894 -0.0861 -0.0951 
(p-value) (0.6837) (0.6166) (0.6911) (0.7683) (0.7764) (0.7543) 
Collar 0.5962 0.6127 0.596 0.1621 0.1533 0.1561 
(p-value) (0.2559) (0.2439) (0.2558) (0.6511) (0.668) (0.6631) 
Toehold Exist -0.9326* -0.9364* -0.9338* -0.9842** -0.8944** -0.9934** 
(p-value) (0.0983) (0.0965) (0.0977) (0.0247) (0.0409) (0.0233) 
Horizontal 0.2949 0.2981 0.2964 0.1092 0.0496 0.1093 
(p-value) (0.2958) (0.2913) (0.2937) (0.6294) (0.8249) (0.629) 
Tender Offer 1.2224*** 1.2031*** 1.2186*** 1.1191*** 1.0884*** 1.122*** 
(p-value) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Cash Bid 0.3032 0.3565 0.3002 0.0964 0.2811 0.0762 
(p-value) (0.2786) (0.1759) (0.2847) (0.6646) (0.1805) (0.7346) 
Hostile -3.6386*** -3.6297*** -3.6372*** -2.7225*** -2.7084*** -2.7159*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.2344*** -2.2294*** -2.239*** -2.0238*** -2.0341*** -2.0251*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.3969 0.3747 0.3919 0.3876 0.4772 0.3739 
(p-value) (0.4442) (0.4688) (0.4505) (0.4646) (0.3686) (0.4812) 
Adj-R2 0.1871 0.1867 0.1871 0.1303 0.1255 0.1305 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 




2.15 Appendix H – Tests Performed with Idiosyncratic Volatility being the Main Explanatory 
Variable in the Expanded Sample 
 
Table 2-60   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on Target and Bidder Idiosyncratic (Expanded Sample) 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
 Target Tests Bidder Tests 








Constant 0.07762 0.02259 0.18629** 0.12349*** 0.20959*** 0.04184 
(p-value) (0.3944) (0.8651) (0.0348) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2542) 
Idio_Vol -0.11722 0.18028 -0.27466 -1.26266*** -1.58278*** -0.28191 
(p-value) (0.7268) (0.7271) (0.3554) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4241) 
Target Size (-0.00857)** (-0.00691) (-0.00761)** (-0.00783)*** (-0.01224)**** (-0.00184) 
(p-value) (0.0239) (0.2316) (0.0276) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2831) 
Target Turnover -0.0003235 -0.0004084 3.34E-05 -0.000164 -9.56E-05 -0.0002136 
(p-value) (0.2888) (0.4057) (0.9212) (0.4582) (0.7756) (0.3327) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00682 0.01051 -0.00291 0.0008216 0.00985 -0.01047** 
(p-value) (0.4407) (0.5232) (0.6816) (0.8617) (0.1906) (0.0459) 
Target B/M -0.01292*** -0.01371*** -0.00661 0.00347 0.0003684 0.00486* 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4825) (0.2536) (0.9613) (0.0791) 
Target Runup -0.0091 -0.00021 -0.00347 0.00615 0.00783 0.00747 
(p-value) (0.6158) (0.9934) (0.7954) (0.1904) (0.2209) (0.2055) 
Target Markup -0.03315** -0.04077 -0.021** -0.01702*** -0.02373* -0.00695 
(p-value) (0.0302) (0.1149) (0.0352) (0.0066) (0.0622) (0.2093) 
Collar 0.02159 0.02328 0.01354 -0.0008713 -0.00257 -0.01345 
(p-value) (0.2127) (0.2679) (0.4998) (0.9085) (0.7569) (0.4267) 
Toehold Exist 0.02475* 0.05465** 0.02427 0.01664** 0.03847*** 0.01066 
(p-value) (0.0813) (0.0492) (0.1121) (0.0477) (0.003) (0.3454) 
Horizontal 0.0006616 -0.01593 0.01772** 0.00609 -0.00155 0.01231** 
(p-value) (0.9377) (0.2034) (0.0204) (0.1957) (0.8202) (0.036) 
Tender Offer 0.00884 0.03174** 0.0003192 0.00345 -0.00322 0.00349 
(p-value) (0.1795) (0.0444) (0.9595) (0.4368) (0.7853) (0.447) 
Cash Bid 0.0284***   0.02043***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00921 0.00411 -0.04224*** 0.01352 0.05226** -0.02445** 
(p-value) (0.5357) (0.8942) (0.0016) (0.266) (0.0339) (0.0401) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00567 0.0155 -0.01459* 0.00543 0.01758* -0.01163** 
(p-value) (0.6301) (0.4908) (0.0761) (0.3298) (0.0776) (0.0476) 
Rumor 0.02115 0.05075* -0.00713 0.01479 0.03431* -0.00565 
(p-value) (0.1297) (0.0728) (0.5217) (0.1835) (0.0946) (0.6216) 
Complete 0.03012** 0.03733* 0.0031 0.017** 0.02711** -0.0007559 
(p-value) (0.0198) (0.0621) (0.7759) (0.0312) (0.0168) (0.9305) 
Adj-R2 0.1559 0.1059 0.1464 0.1795 0.1648 0.1071 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2-61   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on Target and Bidder Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded 
Sample) 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
 Target Tests Bidder Tests 








Constant 0.06059 0.00343 0.18689** 0.11796*** 0.20314*** 0.0385 
(p-value) (0.5118) (0.9793) (0.0278) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.2934) 
Idio_Vol 0.0142 0.33362 -0.27851 -1.15158*** -1.46629*** -0.20353 
(p-value) (0.9686) (0.5358) (0.3176) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5458) 
Target Size (-0.00804)** (-0.00632) (-0.00772)** (-0.00766)*** (-0.01207)*** (-0.00171) 
(p-value) (0.0333) (0.2661) (0.0236) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3182) 
Target Turnover -0.0003766 -0.0004908 3.95E-05 -0.0001887 -1.33E-04 -0.0002201 
(p-value) (0.241) (0.3343) (0.907) (0.3967) (0.6939) (0.3201) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00737 0.01125 -0.00313 0.00102 0.01008 -0.01041** 
(p-value) (0.409) (0.4984) (0.6604) (0.8288) (0.1805) (0.0472) 
Target B/M -0.01286*** -0.01349*** -0.00669 0.00351 0.0001046 0.00481* 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.4722) (0.2489) (0.989) (0.0811) 
Target Runup -0.01001 0.0003373 -0.00524 0.00622 0.00794 0.00764 
(p-value) (0.5683) (0.989) (0.6828) (0.1874) (0.2149) (0.1974) 
Target Markup -0.03346** -0.04037 -0.02132** -0.01687*** -0.02366* -0.00672 
(p-value) (0.0275) (0.1169) (0.032) (0.0073) (0.0645) (0.2255) 
Collar 0.0221 0.02362 0.01426 -0.0008936 -0.00272 -0.01398 
(p-value) (0.2008) (0.2578) (0.4807) (0.9066) (0.7434) (0.4116) 
Toehold Exist 0.02389* 0.05508** 0.02462 0.01716** 0.0395*** 0.01071 
(p-value) (0.0869) (0.0491) (0.1043) (0.0406) (0.0021) (0.3445) 
Horizontal 0.0005876 -0.01582 0.01766** 0.0058 -0.00196 0.01216** 
(p-value) (0.9446) (0.2028) (0.0211) (0.2182) (0.7739) (0.0383) 
Tender Offer 0.00894 0.0324** 0.000195 0.00341 -0.00298 0.00339 
(p-value) (0.1746) (0.0405) (0.9751) (0.4443) (0.8023) (0.4614) 
Cash Bid 0.02876***   0.02106**   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00907 0.00473 -0.04183*** 0.01399 0.05292** -0.02456** 
(p-value) (0.5421) (0.8782) (0.0017) (0.2505) (0.0319) (0.0393) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00526 0.01546 -0.01551* 0.00527 0.01757* -0.01174** 
(p-value) (0.6535) (0.4906) (0.0631) (0.3443) (0.0783) (0.045) 
Rumor 0.0206 0.0507* -0.007 0.01489 0.03468* -0.00563 
(p-value) (0.144) (0.0754) (0.5302) (0.1795) (0.0898) (0.6226) 
Complete 0.02992** 0.03665* 0.00288 0.01734** 0.02781** -0.0006186 
(p-value) (0.0198) (0.0647) (0.7913) (0.0287) (0.0146) (0.9431) 
Adj-R2 0.1558 0.1066 0.1464 0.1767 0.1613 0.1066 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2-62   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on Target and Bidder Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded 
Sample) 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
 Target Tests Bidder Tests 








Constant 0.07671 0.04975 0.14883** 0.11337*** 0.18304*** 0.04708 
(p-value) (0.3415) (0.681) (0.0471) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.1931) 
Idio_Vol -0.12294 -0.03988 -0.04867 -1.10281*** -1.32489*** -0.42224 
(p-value) (0.4578) (0.883) (0.7134) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1753) 
Target Size (-0.00854)** (-0.00779) (-0.00659)** (-0.0072)*** (-0.01135)*** (-0.00197) 
(p-value) (0.0163) (0.1556) (0.0392) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2495) 
Target Turnover -0.0003473 -0.0003155 -6.92E-05 -0.0002172 -1.86E-04 -0.000207 
(p-value) (0.2048) (0.4474) (0.8237) (0.32) (0.5732) (0.3523) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00684 0.00926 -0.0025 0.00179 0.01243 -0.01063** 
(p-value) (0.4413) (0.5716) (0.7275) (0.7054) (0.1006) (0.0431) 
Target B/M -0.01279*** -0.01378*** -0.00619 0.0026 -0.0005655 0.00482* 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5123) (0.3901) (0.9427) (0.0702) 
Target Runup -0.00723 0.00143 -0.00448 0.00742 0.0089 0.00728 
(p-value) (0.7034) (0.9555) (0.7486) (0.1283) (0.1909) (0.2175) 
Target Markup -0.03236** -0.0405 -0.02195** -0.01581** -0.0226* -0.00723 
(p-value) (0.0372) (0.1206) (0.034) (0.0107) (0.0699) (0.1957) 
Collar 0.02134 0.02241 0.01401 -0.001 -0.00239 -0.01224 
(p-value) (0.2174) (0.2865) (0.4892) (0.8949) (0.7755) (0.4703) 
Toehold Exist 0.02544* 0.05486* 0.02323 0.01744** 0.04003*** 0.0105 
(p-value) (0.0755) (0.0507) (0.1244) (0.0374) (0.0029) (0.343) 
Horizontal 0.0007769 -0.01544 0.01787** 0.00543 -0.0025 0.01251** 
(p-value) (0.9272) (0.2248) (0.019) (0.2468) (0.7139) (0.0311) 
Tender Offer 0.0091 0.0307* -2.086E-05 0.00392 -0.0006087 0.00369 
(p-value) (0.1663) (0.0501) (0.9974) (0.3754) (0.9581) (0.4203) 
Cash Bid 0.02832***   0.02238***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00965 0.0036 -0.04243*** 0.01239 0.05173** -0.02438** 
(p-value) (0.5159) (0.9075) (0.0017) (0.3168) (0.0348) (0.0417) 
Multiple Bidders 0.0064 0.01609 -0.01471* 0.00529 0.01533 -0.01122* 
(p-value) (0.5928) (0.4773) (0.0702) (0.3434) (0.1222) (0.0575) 
Rumor 0.02166 0.05173* -0.00809 0.01589 0.03627* -0.00548 
(p-value) (0.1202) (0.0689) (0.4679) (0.1596) (0.0829) (0.6327) 
Complete 0.02982** 0.03783* 0.00341 0.01787** 0.02763** -0.0005624 
(p-value) (0.021) (0.0575) (0.7543) (0.0228) (0.0139) (0.948) 
Adj-R2 0.1564 0.1057 0.1447 0.1776 0.1582 0.1095 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2-63   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the Deal will be a Cash-Only Offer Versus a Being a Non-Cash-
Only Offer using Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample) 
The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) 
market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the 
announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size 
is the ratio of the target size divided by the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target (Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, 
the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value 
of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Estimated over [-256,-43] Interval Estimated over [-256,-2] Interval Estimated over [-43,-2] Interval 
Independent Variable Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target Acquirer 
Constant -8.6899 21.2268** -8.3731 22.9321** -4.7199 23.1545** 
(p-value) (0.5245) (0.0381) (0.5396) (0.0259) (0.731) (0.0225) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -79.658*** -89.3175*** -75.1827*** -93.86*** -27.3817*** -69.595*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size (-1.332)** (0.4726) (-1.286)** (0.5313) (-0.5778) (0.7017) 
(p-value) (0.04) (0.3566) (0.047) (0.3024) (0.3647) (0.1686) 
Target Turnover 0.0205** -0.00685 0.0169 -0.00639 -0.00604 -0.0107 
(p-value) (0.0483) (0.3882) (0.1008) (0.4242) (0.5156) (0.163) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.6159** -0.3336* -0.6017** -0.3306* -0.5177** -0.3381* 
(p-value) (0.0105) (0.0621) (0.0123) (0.0656) (0.0254) (0.0579) 
Target B/M -0.0528 0.1486 -0.0195 0.1319 0.0298 0.0295 
(p-value) (0.7567) (0.1917) (0.9152) (0.2435) (0.8305) (0.7862) 
Acquirer Size 1.1141* -0.5087 1.0859* -0.5707 0.6203 -0.6308 
(p-value) (0.0614) (0.2542) (0.0679) (0.2031) (0.2938) (0.1546) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.0137 0.0158* -0.013 0.0165* -0.0186* 0.00198 
(p-value) (0.28) (0.0852) (0.298) (0.0759) (0.0936) (0.818) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.0305 -0.2177 -0.0186 -0.2263 0.08 -0.0745 
(p-value) (0.8947) (0.2089) (0.9358) (0.1932) (0.7163) (0.6589) 
Acquirer B/M 0.459 0.4295 0.49 0.4085 0.6121* 0.5223* 
(p-value) (0.2279) (0.1162) (0.1955) (0.1423) (0.0873) (0.0604) 
Relative Size 14.003 -19.5985* 13.2374 -21.1389* 3.4764 -24.2433** 
(p-value) (0.3342) (0.0903) (0.3609) (0.0691) (0.8109) (0.0349) 
Collar -2.6912*** -2.7954*** -2.6092*** -2.7704*** -2.7293*** -2.8126*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist 0.9536 -0.2082 1.1163* -0.2222 1.0055* -0.2854 
(p-value) (0.1018) (0.5909) (0.0547) (0.5659) (0.0872) (0.4551) 
Horizontal -0.5907** -0.4456*** -0.6168*** -0.4442*** -0.6489*** -0.4679*** 
(p-value) (0.011) (0.0093) (0.0079) (0.0099) (0.0035) (0.0061) 
Tender Offer 1.8757*** 2.1418*** 1.8826*** 2.153*** 1.8357*** 2.1218*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile 0.7562 0.4738 0.6239 0.4489 0.4506 0.2421 
(p-value) (0.1799) (0.3437) (0.27) (0.3704) (0.4189) (0.6227) 
Multiple Bidders 0.759** 0.3523 0.8921*** 0.3661* 0.855*** 0.382* 
(p-value) (0.0129) (0.1053) (0.0032) (0.0942) (0.003) (0.0793) 
Rumor 0.6306* 0.4794 0.6665* 0.4653 0.6736* 0.492 
(p-value) (0.0941) (0.1988) (0.078) (0.2114) (0.0669) (0.1772) 
Complete 0.0982 -0.1937 0.0281 -0.2059 -0.0241 -0.2559 
(p-value) (0.7468) (0.4085) (0.9259) (0.3812) (0.9335) (0.2727) 
Adj-R2 0.3764 0.3558 0.3727 0.3599 0.3255 0.3462 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 
Number of Cases 743 1342 743 1342 743 1342 
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Table 2-64   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the Deal Will be completed successfully on Target and Bidder 
Divergence of Opinion (Expanded Sample) 
The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns.  Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value 
of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M 
is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P -2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the 
offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath 
and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Estimated over [-256,-2 Interval Estimated over [-256,-43] Interval Estimated over [-43,-2] Interval 
Deal-Type Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target Acquirer 
Constant -4.371* 5.4858*** -5.1217* 5.4482*** -2.97 4.9085*** 
(p-value) (0.0918) (0.0004) (0.0528) (0.0004) (0.2145) (0.0009) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility  8.7049 -22.837*** 14.8377 -21.9368*** -3.3758 -17.74** 
(p-value) (0.3292) (0.0027) (0.1228) (0.0032) (0.4821) (0.0114) 
Target Size (0.3229)*** (-0.1178) (0.351)*** (-0.1172) (0.2713)** (-0.0971) 
(p-value) (0.0081) (0.1147) (0.0046) (0.1172) (0.0189) (0.1836) 
Target Turnover -0.0103 0.000894 -0.0133 0.000679 -0.0056 -0.00113 
(p-value) (0.2641) (0.9224) (0.1558) (0.941) (0.5138) (0.9) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5587* -0.3689 -0.5291* -0.3657 -0.6394** -0.3382 
(p-value) (0.0507) (0.1183) (0.0635) (0.1212) (0.0238) (0.1494) 
Target B/M -0.411 -0.1917 -0.4334 -0.1912 -0.3461 -0.2134 
(p-value) (0.1631) (0.2118) (0.1458) (0.2131) (0.2279) (0.1543) 
Target Runup 0.5518 0.585 0.5938 0.5966 0.67 0.5865 
(p-value) (0.2508) (0.1087) (0.2151) (0.1037) (0.1535) (0.1061) 
Target Markup -0.2359 -0.1541 -0.2392 -0.1536 -0.1993 -0.124 
(p-value) (0.5865) (0.6116) (0.5812) (0.6129) (0.6455) (0.6821) 
Collar 0.6325 0.2082 0.6356 0.2084 0.5998 0.182 
(p-value) (0.2318) (0.5647) (0.2304) (0.5648) (0.2532) (0.611) 
Toehold Exist -0.9886* -0.9846** -0.9538* -0.9743** -0.8848 -0.9779** 
(p-value) (0.0794) (0.0243) (0.0918) (0.0259) (0.123) (0.0249) 
Horizontal 0.3117 0.1074 0.3147 0.1096 0.2927 0.0691 
(p-value) (0.2717) (0.6344) (0.2671) (0.6278) (0.2986) (0.7579) 
Tender Offer 1.1818*** 1.1261*** 1.1768*** 1.1261*** 1.2191*** 1.1112*** 
(p-value) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0001) (0.0014) (0.0001) 
Cash Bid 0.439 0.0578 0.4973* 0.0656 0.3278 0.1221 
(p-value) (0.1094) (0.7986) (0.0716) (0.7714) (0.2198) (0.5829) 
Hostile -3.6325*** -2.7058*** -3.6488*** -2.7005*** -3.6393*** -2.7143*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.2609*** -2.02*** -2.2564*** -2.0237*** -2.204*** -2.0125*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.3465 0.3678 0.3438 0.3749 0.4003 0.3832 
(p-value) (0.502) (0.4893) (0.5068) (0.4809) (0.44) (0.4712) 
Adj-R2 0.1878 0.1304 0.1895 0.1302 0.1872 0.1288 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 
Number of Cases 743 1342 743 1342 743 1342 
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2.16 Appendix I – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with 
idiosyncratic volatility as Control in the Expanded Sample 
Table 2-65   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample) 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.10326 0.06535 0.14953* 0.07576 0.05326 0.14528* 
(p-value) (0.2787) (0.6314) (0.0929) (0.3752) (0.6738) (0.0556) 
AIV-Variable -0.01502 -0.00924 -0.0003794    
(p-value) (0.5383) (0.7795) (0.988)    
VIV-Variable    0.00477 -0.0231 0.01643 
(p-value)       (0.9413) (0.8225) (0.7483) 
Idio_Vol -0.05483 0.0055 -0.0472 -0.12683 -0.01731 -0.05838 
(p-value) (0.7639) (0.9855) (0.7716) (0.4094) (0.9462) (0.6705) 
Target Size -0.0095** -0.00834 -0.00662* -0.0085** -0.00794 -0.00637** 
(p-value) (0.0194) (0.1623) (0.077) (0.0257) (0.1674) (0.0488) 
Target Turnover -0.0002946 -0.0002813 -0.000068 -0.0003466 -0.0003218 -6.755E-05 
(p-value) (0.3123) (0.5218) (0.8368) (0.202) (0.4361) (0.8277) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00625 0.00881 -0.0025 0.00686 0.00923 -0.00249 
(p-value) (0.4815) (0.5939) (0.7289) (0.4397) (0.5722) (0.7285) 
Target B/M -0.01269*** -0.01362*** -0.0062 -0.01282*** -0.01374*** -0.00649 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5117) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4954) 
Target Runup -0.00805 0.0008382 -0.00449 -0.00724 0.001 -0.00529 
(p-value) (0.6696) (0.9739) (0.7496) (0.7035) (0.9684) (0.712) 
Target Markup -0.03163** -0.04016 -0.02192** -0.03236** -0.04064 -0.0222** 
(p-value) (0.0463) (0.1279) (0.0357) (0.0371) (0.119) (0.0335) 
Collar 0.02063 0.02222 0.01401 0.02137 0.02246 0.01385 
(p-value) (0.2418) (0.2949) (0.4894) (0.2191) (0.2847) (0.4914) 
Toehold Exist 0.02517* 0.05386* 0.02324 0.0255* 0.05509* 0.02354 
(p-value) (0.0757) (0.0559) (0.1222) (0.0728) (0.0517) (0.1226) 
Horizontal 0.0007376 -0.01543 0.01787** 0.0008189 -0.01553 0.01808** 
(p-value) (0.9308) (0.2247) (0.0193) (0.9223) (0.2187) (0.0173) 
Tender Offer 0.00917 0.03057* -1.073E-05 0.00906 0.03144* -2.907E-05 
(p-value) (0.1638) (0.0511) (0.9987) (0.1685) (0.0509) (0.9963) 
Cash Bid 0.0274***   0.02838***   
(p-value) (0.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00986 0.00257 -0.04241*** -0.00969 0.00321 -0.04301*** 
(p-value) (0.5051) (0.9341) (0.002) (0.5167) (0.9174) (0.0016) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00577 0.01592 -0.01473* 0.00634 0.01639 -0.01505* 
(p-value) (0.6313) (0.4815) (0.0767) (0.596) (0.4682) (0.0597) 
Rumor 0.02212 0.0519* -0.00807 0.02162 0.05195* -0.00824 
(p-value) (0.1122) (0.0679) (0.4762) (0.1152) (0.0659) (0.4626) 
Complete 0.02968** 0.03779* 0.00342 0.02983** 0.03758* 0.00308 
(p-value) (0.0212) (0.0573) (0.7539) (0.0208) (0.0553) (0.7765) 
Adj-R2 0.1556 0.1031 0.1414 0.1552 0.1031 0.1417 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 743 407 336 515 258 257 
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Table 2-66   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) 
while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample) 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.13615*** 0.21404*** 0.04947 0.11347*** 0.18238*** 0.04988 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1771) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.166) 
AIV-Variable -0.07053*** -0.09428** -0.00595    
(p-value) (0.0041) (0.0104) (0.814)    
VIV-Variable    -0.06691 -0.03125 -0.08228 
(p-value)       (0.2385) (0.7846) (0.1252) 
Idio_Vol -0.29254 -0.24103 -0.35839 -1.00509*** -1.28224*** -0.28594 
(p-value) (0.4179) (0.6299) (0.3654) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.3556) 
Target Size -0.00807*** -0.01242*** -0.00206 -0.00732*** -0.01134*** -0.0023 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2323) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1814) 
Target Turnover -0.0001269 -2.678E-05 -0.0002043 -0.0002102 -0.0001783 -0.0002215 
(p-value) (0.5678) (0.9367) (0.3575) (0.3408) (0.5901) (0.3233) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0007248 0.01041 -0.01068** 0.00158 0.01224 -0.01083** 
(p-value) (0.8777) (0.1642) (0.0424) (0.7376) (0.105) (0.0399) 
Target B/M 0.00306 -0.000368 0.00486* 0.00256 -0.0006046 0.00474* 
(p-value) (0.3004) (0.9617) (0.069) (0.3958) (0.9387) (0.0741) 
Target Runup 0.00622 0.0074 0.00718 0.00709 0.00882 0.00677 
(p-value) (0.1784) (0.2485) (0.2189) (0.1424) (0.1943) (0.2455) 
Target Markup -0.01511** -0.021* -0.00724 -0.01552** -0.02271* -0.00668 
(p-value) (0.0147) (0.097) (0.1948) (0.0121) (0.0687) (0.2214) 
Collar -0.00186 -0.0035 -0.01224 -0.0009755 -0.00228 -0.01504 
(p-value) (0.8052) (0.6725) (0.4704) (0.8973) (0.7851) (0.3918) 
Toehold Exist 0.01617* 0.03859*** 0.01045 0.01777** 0.04018*** 0.01092 
(p-value) (0.0582) (0.0057) (0.3461) (0.0371) (0.003) (0.3321) 
Horizontal 0.0065 -0.0008822 0.01255** 0.00549 -0.00249 0.01236** 
(p-value) (0.1653) (0.8969) (0.0304) (0.2411) (0.7152) (0.0332) 
Tender Offer 0.00323 -0.00267 0.0037 0.00361 -0.0006878 0.00342 
(p-value) (0.464) (0.8187) (0.418) (0.4147) (0.9526) (0.4562) 
Cash Bid 0.02033***   0.02244***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01182 0.0505** -0.0244** 0.01235 0.05166** -0.02461** 
(p-value) (0.332) (0.0388) (0.0412) (0.3181) (0.0355) (0.0382) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00558 0.01582 -0.01118* 0.00553 0.01535 -0.01087* 
(p-value) (0.3195) (0.1164) (0.0588) (0.3212) (0.1209) (0.0658) 
Rumor 0.01616 0.03587* -0.00541 0.01615 0.03642* -0.00526 
(p-value) (0.1502) (0.089) (0.6367) (0.1519) (0.081) (0.6451) 
Complete 0.01712** 0.02672** -0.0006814 0.01821** 0.02777** -0.0004385 
(p-value) (0.0295) (0.019) (0.9366) (0.0203) (0.0135) (0.9593) 
Adj-R2 0.1854 0.1706 0.1081 0.178 0.1569 0.1114 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-67   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample) 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P -2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.13673*** 0.21831*** 0.04458 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2263) 
AIV-Bidder -0.07241*** -0.10218** 0.01449 
(p-value) (0.0096) (0.0104) (0.6102) 
VIV-Bidder 0.01271 0.07979 (-0.09747) 
(p-value) (0.8462) (0.5289) (0.1117) 
Idio_Vol -0.28955 -0.25913 -0.41628 
(p-value) (0.4258) (0.6052) (0.2985) 
Target Size -0.00807*** -0.01252*** -0.00212 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2212) 
Target Turnover -0.0001258 -0.0000326 -0.0002309 
(p-value) (0.5713) (0.9218) (0.3008) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0007359 0.01073 -0.01074** 
(p-value) (0.8759) (0.1523) (0.0422) 
Target B/M 0.00308 -0.0002516 0.00462* 
(p-value) (0.2981) (0.9739) (0.0813) 
Target Runup 0.00625 0.00747 0.00691 
(p-value) (0.1761) (0.2406) (0.234) 
Target Markup -0.01515** -0.02059 -0.00657 
(p-value) (0.0147) (0.1027) (0.2287) 
Collar -0.00189 -0.00387 -0.01555 
(p-value) (0.8023) (0.6408) (0.3782) 
Toehold Exist 0.01607* 0.03809*** 0.0111 
(p-value) (0.0588) (0.0055) (0.3238) 
Horizontal 0.00652 -0.0007805 0.01223** 
(p-value) (0.1654) (0.9089) (0.0349) 
Tender Offer 0.00327 -0.00265 0.00333 
(p-value) (0.46) (0.8217) (0.4668) 
Cash Bid 0.02026***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01182 0.05056** -0.0246** 
(p-value) (0.3322) (0.0371) (0.0383) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00554 0.0158 -0.01091* 
(p-value) (0.3227) (0.1189) (0.0654) 
Rumor 0.01612 0.03547* -0.00539 
(p-value) (0.1513) (0.0922) (0.6367) 
Complete 0.01704** 0.02628** -0.0001257 
(p-value) (0.0304) (0.0211) (0.9883) 
Adj-R2 0.1848 0.17 0.1102 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2-68   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for idiosyncratic volatility (Expanded Sample) 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is 
constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by 
the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target 
(Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal 
is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively.  
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -1.5672 -4.0841 -3.302 23.1069** 22.4895** 22.1475** 
(p-value) (0.9154) (0.7667) (0.8239) (0.0227) (0.0275) (0.0294) 
AIV-Variable -6.4708***   -7.305*** -2.426***   -4.1576*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0023)  (<.0001) 
VIV-Variable  -1.5612 4.2746**  4.811** 9.0923*** 
(p-value)   (0.3073) (0.0138)   (0.0313) (0.0002) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 8.8669 -26.2444*** 10.308 -43.8632*** -74.8794*** -36.1843*** 
(p-value) (0.2088) (<.0001) (0.1211) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0014) 
Target Size -1.319* -0.577 -1.424** 0.6205 0.6839 0.5474 
(p-value) (0.0569) (0.3661) (0.0414) (0.2233) (0.1817) (0.2838) 
Target Turnover 0.0101 -0.00657 0.0131 -0.00874 -0.011 -0.00782 
(p-value) (0.3196) (0.4805) (0.2035) (0.2613) (0.1527) (0.3198) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5849** -0.5256** -0.5733** -0.3515** -0.3222* -0.3297* 
(p-value) (0.0166) (0.0233) (0.0187) (0.0497) (0.0714) (0.0677) 
Target B/M 0.0353 0.0379 0.00356 0.0514 0.0299 0.0728 
(p-value) (0.8459) (0.7927) (0.9826) (0.636) (0.7833) (0.5038) 
Acquirer Size 1.0003 0.6093 1.0933* -0.5958 -0.61 -0.5453 
(p-value) (0.1168) (0.3033) (0.0889) (0.1783) (0.1708) (0.2192) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00968 -0.0187* -0.00817 0.00914 0.00113 0.0127 
(p-value) (0.4529) (0.0917) (0.5316) (0.3232) (0.8952) (0.1751) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.0147 0.0672 0.0207 -0.1605 -0.0332 -0.1458 
(p-value) (0.9504) (0.761) (0.9305) (0.3512) (0.8454) (0.4024) 
Acquirer B/M 0.695* 0.6452* 0.6315 0.5976** 0.453 0.5181* 
(p-value) (0.0711) (0.0727) (0.1067) (0.0355) (0.1048) (0.0689) 
Relative Size 9.8251 3.1138 11.9116 -22.8237** -23.7099** -21.2235* 
(p-value) (0.529) (0.8306) (0.4483) (0.0469) (0.0401) (0.0652) 
Collar -2.9197*** -2.7319*** -2.9463*** -2.8399*** -2.798*** -2.8297*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist 0.5354 0.985* 0.5866 -0.2981 -0.3002 -0.3262 
(p-value) (0.3481) (0.0943) (0.303) (0.4374) (0.4336) (0.4004) 
Horizontal -0.5348** -0.6563*** -0.5146** -0.452*** -0.4679*** -0.44** 
(p-value) (0.0217) (0.0031) (0.0277) (0.0084) (0.0063) (0.0111) 
Tender Offer 2.0698*** 1.8445*** 2.089*** 2.1379*** 2.135*** 2.1867*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile 0.5253 0.4528 0.5035 0.2677 0.2471 0.2968 
(p-value) (0.3312) (0.4173) (0.352) (0.5852) (0.6168) (0.5472) 
Multiple Bidders 0.487 0.8624*** 0.4189 0.3572 0.3858* 0.3416 
(p-value) (0.1144) (0.0028) (0.181) (0.1017) (0.0779) (0.1205) 
Rumor 0.7611* 0.6872* 0.7544* 0.5221 0.4563 0.4784 
(p-value) (0.0504) (0.0621) (0.0542) (0.1551) (0.2108) (0.1939) 
Compelte -0.1401 -0.0224 -0.1905 -0.2616 -0.2525 -0.2711 
(p-value) (0.6481) (0.9381) (0.5404) (0.2632) (0.2802) (0.2491) 
Adj-R2 0.3921 0.3265 0.3969 0.351 0.3489 0.3593 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-69   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable. (Expanded Sample) 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2].  Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before 
the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is 
preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value of 1 if 
there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Idiosyncratic vol estimated over [-43, -2]. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43, -2] 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -2.7693 -3.0118 -2.7786 5.345*** 4.9107*** 5.3822*** 
(p-value) (0.2887) (0.2128) (0.2874) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0004) 
AIV-Variable -0.1366   -0.174 -1.2503   -1.4952 
(p-value) (0.8484)  (0.8151) (0.1329)  (0.1054) 
VIV-Variable  0.2604 0.3959  -0.0928 1.6401 
(p-value)   (0.9008) (0.855)   (0.9696) (0.5409) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -2.6276 -3.5683 -2.7141 -2.3275 -17.6157** -1.4757 
(p-value) (0.6739) (0.4794) (0.666) (0.8531) (0.0227) (0.9081) 
Target Size 0.2642** 0.2728** 0.2645** -0.1097 -0.0972 -0.1104 
(p-value) (0.0295) (0.019) (0.0294) (0.1377) (0.1834) (0.1358) 
Target Turnover -0.00519 -0.00557 -0.00503 0.000539 -0.00112 0.000693 
(p-value) (0.558) (0.5166) (0.5728) (0.9531) (0.901) (0.9401) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.6469** -0.6369** -0.6452** -0.368 -0.3389 -0.3611 
(p-value) (0.0235) (0.0248) (0.0241) (0.1188) (0.1498) (0.1266) 
Target B/M -0.3389 -0.3496 -0.3421 -0.2034 -0.2134 -0.2001 
(p-value) (0.2414) (0.2254) (0.2377) (0.1796) (0.1542) (0.1884) 
Target Runup 0.6604 0.6705 0.6585 0.5709 0.5852 0.5905 
(p-value) (0.1611) (0.1534) (0.1626) (0.1147) (0.1083) (0.1057) 
Target Markup -0.187 -0.1987 -0.1828 -0.0938 -0.1234 -0.0977 
(p-value) (0.6694) (0.6467) (0.6772) (0.7579) (0.6838) (0.7483) 
Collar 0.5956 0.6004 0.5953 0.166 0.1823 0.1585 
(p-value) (0.2565) (0.2526) (0.2564) (0.644) (0.6105) (0.6586) 
Toehold Exist -0.8942 -0.8831 -0.8941 -0.9871** -0.9775** -0.9951** 
(p-value) (0.12) (0.1238) (0.1199) (0.0243) (0.025) (0.0231) 
Horizontal 0.2922 0.2939 0.2939 0.1067 0.0695 0.1077 
(p-value) (0.2996) (0.2969) (0.2971) (0.6377) (0.7569) (0.6347) 
Tender Offer 1.2241*** 1.2157*** 1.22*** 1.1193*** 1.1111*** 1.122*** 
(p-value) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cash Bid 0.3114 0.3286 0.3082 0.0921 0.1228 0.0739 
(p-value) (0.2673) (0.2189) (0.2733) (0.6805) (0.582) (0.743) 
Hostile -3.641*** -3.6382*** -3.6396*** -2.7226*** -2.7148*** -2.7161*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.2113*** -2.2058*** -2.2161*** -2.0219*** -2.0125*** -2.0239*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.4047 0.3957 0.399 0.3834 0.3838 0.3715 
(p-value) (0.4358) (0.446) (0.4428) (0.47) (0.4706) (0.4843) 
Adj-R2 0.1873 0.1873 0.1873 0.1303 0.1288 0.1305 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 
Number of Cases 743 743 743 1342 1342 1342 
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2.17 Appendix J – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables while being 
orthogonalized for the idiosyncratic volatility in the Expanded Sample 
Table 2-70   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.09809 0.0622 0.1494* 0.07594 0.05246 0.14597* 
(p-value) (0.2813) (0.636) (0.077) (0.3681) (0.6751) (0.0535) 
AIV-Variable -0.01502 -0.00924 -0.0003794    
(p-value) (0.5383) (0.7795) (0.988)    
VIV-Variable    0.00477 -0.0231 0.01643 
(p-value)       (0.9413) (0.8225) (0.7483) 
Idio_Vol -0.16332 -0.07182 -0.04919 -0.12224 -0.04092 -0.04346 
(p-value) (0.3988) (0.8192) (0.7212) (0.4702) (0.8813) (0.7435) 
Target Size -0.0095** -0.00834 -0.00662* -0.0085** -0.00794 -0.00637** 
(p-value) (0.0194) (0.1623) (0.077) (0.0257) (0.1674) (0.0488) 
Target Turnover -0.0002946 -0.0002813 -0.000068 -0.0003466 -0.0003218 -6.755E-05 
(p-value) (0.3123) (0.5218) (0.8368) (0.202) (0.4361) (0.8277) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00625 0.00881 -0.0025 0.00686 0.00923 -0.00249 
(p-value) (0.4815) (0.5939) (0.7289) (0.4397) (0.5722) (0.7285) 
Target B/M -0.01269*** -0.01362*** -0.0062 -0.01282*** -0.01374*** -0.00649 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5117) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4954) 
Target Runup -0.00805 0.0008382 -0.00449 -0.00724 0.001 -0.00529 
(p-value) (0.6696) (0.9739) (0.7496) (0.7035) (0.9684) (0.712) 
Target Markup -0.03163** -0.04016 -0.02192** -0.03236** -0.04064 -0.0222** 
(p-value) (0.0463) (0.1279) (0.0357) (0.0371) (0.119) (0.0335) 
Collar 0.02063 0.02222 0.01401 0.02137 0.02246 0.01385 
(p-value) (0.2418) (0.2949) (0.4894) (0.2191) (0.2847) (0.4914) 
Toehold Exist 0.02517* 0.05386* 0.02324 0.0255* 0.05509* 0.02354 
(p-value) (0.0757) (0.0559) (0.1222) (0.0728) (0.0517) (0.1226) 
Horizontal 0.0007376 -0.01543 0.01787** 0.0008189 -0.01553 0.01808** 
(p-value) (0.9308) (0.2247) (0.0193) (0.9223) (0.2187) (0.0173) 
Tender Offer 0.00917 0.03057* -1.073E-05 0.00906 0.03144* -2.907E-05 
(p-value) (0.1638) (0.0511) (0.9987) (0.1685) (0.0509) (0.9963) 
Cash Bid 0.0274***   0.02838***   
(p-value) (0.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00986 0.00257 -0.04241*** -0.00969 0.00321 -0.04301*** 
(p-value) (0.5051) (0.9341) (0.002) (0.5167) (0.9174) (0.0016) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00577 0.01592 -0.01473* 0.00634 0.01639 -0.01505* 
(p-value) (0.6313) (0.4815) (0.0767) (0.596) (0.4682) (0.0597) 
Rumor 0.02212 0.0519* -0.00807 0.02162 0.05195* -0.00824 
(p-value) (0.1122) (0.0679) (0.4762) (0.1152) (0.0659) (0.4626) 
Complete 0.02968** 0.03779* 0.00342 0.02983** 0.03758* 0.00308 
(p-value) (0.0212) (0.0573) (0.7539) (0.0208) (0.0553) (0.7765) 
Adj-R2 0.1556 0.1031 0.1414 0.1552 0.1031 0.1417 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 743 407 336 515 258 257 
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Table 2-71   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) 
while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.12636*** 0.20014*** 0.04864 0.1127*** 0.18216*** 0.0488 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.1786) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.1758) 
AIV-Variable -0.07053*** -0.09428** -0.00595    
(p-value) (0.0041) (0.0104) (0.814)    
VIV-Variable    -0.06691 -0.03125 -0.08228 
(p-value)       (0.2385) (0.7846) (0.1252) 
Idio_Vol -1.21861*** -1.47087*** -0.43444 -1.09378*** -1.32604*** -0.39805 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1743) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.193) 
Target Size -0.00807*** -0.01242*** -0.00206 -0.00732*** -0.01134*** -0.0023 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2323) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1814) 
Target Turnover -0.0001269 -2.678E-05 -0.0002043 -0.0002102 -0.0001783 -0.0002215 
(p-value) (0.5678) (0.9367) (0.3575) (0.3408) (0.5901) (0.3233) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0007248 0.01041 -0.01068** 0.00158 0.01224 -0.01083** 
(p-value) (0.8777) (0.1642) (0.0424) (0.7376) (0.105) (0.0399) 
Target B/M 0.00306 -0.000368 0.00486* 0.00256 -0.0006046 0.00474* 
(p-value) (0.3004) (0.9617) (0.069) (0.3958) (0.9387) (0.0741) 
Target Runup 0.00622 0.0074 0.00718 0.00709 0.00882 0.00677 
(p-value) (0.1784) (0.2485) (0.2189) (0.1424) (0.1943) (0.2455) 
Target Markup -0.01511** -0.021* -0.00724 -0.01552** -0.02271* -0.00668 
(p-value) (0.0147) (0.097) (0.1948) (0.0121) (0.0687) (0.2214) 
Collar -0.00186 -0.0035 -0.01224 -0.0009755 -0.00228 -0.01504 
(p-value) (0.8052) (0.6725) (0.4704) (0.8973) (0.7851) (0.3918) 
Toehold Exist 0.01617* 0.03859*** 0.01045 0.01777** 0.04018*** 0.01092 
(p-value) (0.0582) (0.0057) (0.3461) (0.0371) (0.003) (0.3321) 
Horizontal 0.0065 -0.0008822 0.01255** 0.00549 -0.00249 0.01236** 
(p-value) (0.1653) (0.8969) (0.0304) (0.2411) (0.7152) (0.0332) 
Tender Offer 0.00323 -0.00267 0.0037 0.00361 -0.0006878 0.00342 
(p-value) (0.464) (0.8187) (0.418) (0.4147) (0.9526) (0.4562) 
Cash Bid 0.02033***   0.02244***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01182 0.0505** -0.0244** 0.01235 0.05166** -0.02461** 
(p-value) (0.332) (0.0388) (0.0412) (0.3181) (0.0355) (0.0382) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00558 0.01582 -0.01118* 0.00553 0.01535 -0.01087* 
(p-value) (0.3195) (0.1164) (0.0588) (0.3212) (0.1209) (0.0658) 
Rumor 0.01616 0.03587* -0.00541 0.01615 0.03642* -0.00526 
(p-value) (0.1502) (0.089) (0.6367) (0.1519) (0.081) (0.6451) 
Complete 0.01712** 0.02672** -0.0006814 0.01821** 0.02777** -0.0004385 
(p-value) (0.0295) (0.019) (0.9366) (0.0203) (0.0135) (0.9593) 
Adj-R2 0.1854 0.1706 0.1081 0.178 0.1569 0.1114 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-72   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.12683*** 0.2038*** 0.04531 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.2114) 
AIV-Bidder -0.07241*** -0.10218** 0.01449 
(p-value) (0.0096) (0.0104) (0.6102) 
VIV-Bidder 0.01271 0.07979 -0.09747 
(p-value) (0.8462) (0.5289) (0.1117) 
Idio_Vol -1.2234*** -1.48015*** -0.36386 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2456) 
Target Size -0.00807*** -0.01252*** -0.00212 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2212) 
Target Turnover -0.0001258 -0.0000326 -0.0002309 
(p-value) (0.5713) (0.9218) (0.3008) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0007359 0.01073 -0.01074** 
(p-value) (0.8759) (0.1523) (0.0422) 
Target B/M 0.00308 -0.0002516 0.00462* 
(p-value) (0.2981) (0.9739) (0.0813) 
Target Runup 0.00625 0.00747 0.00691 
(p-value) (0.1761) (0.2406) (0.234) 
Target Markup -0.01515** -0.02059 -0.00657 
(p-value) (0.0147) (0.1027) (0.2287) 
Collar -0.00189 -0.00387 -0.01555 
(p-value) (0.8023) (0.6408) (0.3782) 
Toehold Exist 0.01607* 0.03809*** 0.0111 
(p-value) (0.0588) (0.0055) (0.3238) 
Horizontal 0.00652 -0.0007805 0.01223** 
(p-value) (0.1654) (0.9089) (0.0349) 
Tender Offer 0.00327 -0.00265 0.00333 
(p-value) (0.46) (0.8217) (0.4668) 
Cash Bid 0.02026***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01182 0.05056** -0.0246** 
(p-value) (0.3322) (0.0371) (0.0383) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00554 0.0158 -0.01091* 
(p-value) (0.3227) (0.1189) (0.0654) 
Rumor 0.01612 0.03547* -0.00539 
(p-value) (0.1513) (0.0922) (0.6367) 
Complete 0.01704** 0.02628** -0.0001257 
(p-value) (0.0304) (0.0211) (0.9883) 
Adj-R2 0.1848 0.17 0.1102 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2-73   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for idiosyncratic volatility 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is 
constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by 
the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target 
(Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal 
is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively.  
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -3.7964 -4.1438 -5.655 22.7701** 22.5444** 21.6741** 
(p-value) (0.797) (0.7634) (0.7034) (0.0248) (0.0271) (0.0331) 
AIV-Variable -6.4708***   -7.305*** -2.426***   -4.1576*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0023)  (<.0001) 
VIV-Variable  -1.5612 4.2746**  4.811** 9.0923*** 
(p-value)   (0.3073) (0.0138)   (0.0313) (0.0002) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -37.8733*** -27.747*** -38.3435*** -75.7157*** -68.5023*** -78.7206*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size -1.319* -0.577 -1.424** 0.6205 0.6839 0.5474 
(p-value) (0.0569) (0.3661) (0.0414) (0.2233) (0.1817) (0.2838) 
Target Turnover 0.0101 -0.00657 0.0131 -0.00874 -0.011 -0.00782 
(p-value) (0.3196) (0.4805) (0.2035) (0.2613) (0.1527) (0.3198) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5849** -0.5256** -0.5733** -0.3515* -0.3222* -0.3297* 
(p-value) (0.0166) (0.0233) (0.0187) (0.0497) (0.0714) (0.0677) 
Target B/M 0.0353 0.0379 0.00356 0.0514 0.0299 0.0728 
(p-value) (0.8459) (0.7927) (0.9826) (0.636) (0.7833) (0.5038) 
Acquirer Size 1.0003 0.6093 1.0933* -0.5958 -0.61 -0.5453 
(p-value) (0.1168) (0.3033) (0.0889) (0.1783) (0.1708) (0.2192) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00968 -0.0187* -0.00817 0.00914 0.00113 0.0127 
(p-value) (0.4529) (0.0917) (0.5316) (0.3232) (0.8952) (0.1751) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.0147 0.0672 0.0207 -0.1605 -0.0332 -0.1458 
(p-value) (0.9504) (0.761) (0.9305) (0.3512) (0.8454) (0.4024) 
Acquirer B/M 0.695* 0.6452* 0.6315 0.5976** 0.453 0.5181* 
(p-value) (0.0711) (0.0727) (0.1067) (0.0355) (0.1048) (0.0689) 
Relative Size 9.8251 3.1138 11.9116 -22.8237** -23.7099** -21.2235* 
(p-value) (0.529) (0.8306) (0.4483) (0.0469) (0.0401) (0.0652) 
Collar -2.9197*** -2.7319*** -2.9463*** -2.8399*** -2.798*** -2.8297*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist 0.5354 0.985* 0.5866 -0.2981 -0.3002 -0.3262 
(p-value) (0.3481) (0.0943) (0.303) (0.4374) (0.4336) (0.4004) 
Horizontal -0.5348** -0.6563*** -0.5146** -0.452*** -0.4679*** -0.44** 
(p-value) (0.0217) (0.0031) (0.0277) (0.0084) (0.0063) (0.0111) 
Tender Offer 2.0698*** 1.8445*** 2.089*** 2.1379*** 2.135*** 2.1867*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile 0.5253 0.4528 0.5035 0.2677 0.2471 0.2968 
(p-value) (0.3312) (0.4173) (0.352) (0.5852) (0.6168) (0.5472) 
Multiple Bidders 0.487 0.8624*** 0.4189 0.3572 0.3858* 0.3416 
(p-value) (0.1144) (0.0028) (0.181) (0.1017) (0.0779) (0.1205) 
Rumor 0.7611* 0.6872* 0.7544* 0.5221 0.4563 0.4784 
(p-value) (0.0504) (0.0621) (0.0542) (0.1551) (0.2108) (0.1939) 
Compelte -0.1401 -0.0224 -0.1905 -0.2616 -0.2525 -0.2711 
(p-value) (0.6481) (0.9381) (0.5404) (0.2632) (0.2802) (0.2491) 
Adj-R2 0.3921 0.3265 0.3969 0.351 0.3489 0.3593 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-74   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 43 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-43, -2].  Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before 
the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is 
preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value of 1 if 
there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-43,-2] window 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -2.8164 -3.0018 -2.8233 5.1714*** 4.9097*** 5.1934*** 
(p-value) (0.264) (0.2125) (0.2631) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) 
AIV-Variable -0.1366   -0.174 -1.2503   -1.4952 
(p-value) (0.8484)  (0.8151) (0.1329)  (0.1054) 
VIV-Variable  0.2604 0.3959  -0.0928 1.6401 
(p-value)   (0.9008) (0.855)   (0.9696) (0.5409) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -3.6145 -3.3177 -3.5897 -18.7437*** -17.7387** -18.933*** 
(p-value) (0.4688) (0.4917) (0.4725) (0.0082) (0.0114) (0.0078) 
Target Size 0.2642** 0.2728** 0.2645** -0.1097 -0.0972 -0.1104 
(p-value) (0.0295) (0.019) (0.0294) (0.1377) (0.1834) (0.1358) 
Target Turnover -0.00519 -0.00557 -0.00503 0.000539 -0.00112 0.000693 
(p-value) (0.558) (0.5166) (0.5728) (0.9531) (0.901) (0.9401) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.6469** -0.6369** -0.6452** -0.368 -0.3389 -0.3611 
(p-value) (0.0235) (0.0248) (0.0241) (0.1188) (0.1498) (0.1266) 
Target B/M -0.3389 -0.3496 -0.3421 -0.2034 -0.2134 -0.2001 
(p-value) (0.2414) (0.2254) (0.2377) (0.1796) (0.1542) (0.1884) 
Target Runup 0.6604 0.6705 0.6585 0.5709 0.5852 0.5905 
(p-value) (0.1611) (0.1534) (0.1626) (0.1147) (0.1083) (0.1057) 
Target Markup -0.187 -0.1987 -0.1828 -0.0938 -0.1234 -0.0977 
(p-value) (0.6694) (0.6467) (0.6772) (0.7579) (0.6838) (0.7483) 
Collar 0.5956 0.6004 0.5953 0.166 0.1823 0.1585 
(p-value) (0.2565) (0.2526) (0.2564) (0.644) (0.6105) (0.6586) 
Toehold Exist -0.8942 -0.8831 -0.8941 -0.9871** -0.9775** -0.9951** 
(p-value) (0.12) (0.1238) (0.1199) (0.0243) (0.025) (0.0231) 
Horizontal 0.2922 0.2939 0.2939 0.1067 0.0695 0.1077 
(p-value) (0.2996) (0.2969) (0.2971) (0.6377) (0.7569) (0.6347) 
Tender Offer 1.2241*** 1.2157*** 1.22*** 1.1193*** 1.1111*** 1.122*** 
(p-value) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cash Bid 0.3114 0.3286 0.3082 0.0921 0.1228 0.0739 
(p-value) (0.2673) (0.2189) (0.2733) (0.6805) (0.582) (0.743) 
Hostile -3.641*** -3.6382*** -3.6396*** -2.7226*** -2.7148*** -2.7161*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.2113*** -2.2058*** -2.2161*** -2.0219*** -2.0125*** -2.0239*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.4047 0.3957 0.399 0.3834 0.3838 0.3715 
(p-value) (0.4358) (0.446) (0.4428) (0.47) (0.4706) (0.4843) 
Adj-R2 0.1873 0.1873 0.1873 0.1303 0.1288 0.1305 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





2.18 Appendix K – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with 
idiosyncratic volatility as Control – Idiosyncratic Volatility Estimated over the [-256, -2] 
interval 
Table 2-75   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Target and VIV-Target with Divergence of 
Opinion used as Control Variable 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43].  The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Target firms estimated over the runup period [-42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the 
daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. Target Size is the logarithm of the 
target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. 
Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of 
the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price 
divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy 
variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is 
hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes 
a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-
digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 








Constant 0.13396* 0.08479 0.12892** 0.1257** 0.05788 0.15089** 
(p-value) (0.0181) (0.3499) (0.0332) (0.0256) (0.4823) (0.0157) 
AIV-Target -0.02272 -0.04851 0.05806**    
(p-value) (0.3194) (0.191) (0.0282)    
VIV-Target    -0.02753 -0.05448 0.00744 
(p-value)    (0.5261) (0.4573) (0.8785) 
Idio_Vol -0.08548 0.2302 -0.93338** -0.3175 -0.35885 -0.37249 
(p-value) (0.83) (0.7451) (0.0203) (0.2995) (0.4619) (0.2243) 
Target Size -0.01051*** -0.01128 -0.00565 -0.00997*** -0.01064** -0.00792** 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0224) (0.1211) (0.0012) (0.0294) (0.0299) 
Target Turnover -0.0001333** -0.0001509*** -8.33E-06 -0.0001338*** -0.0001465** 0.0000307 
(p-value) (0.0106) (0.0095) (0.9057) (0.0083) (0.0115) (0.6491) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00353 8.019E-05 -0.00137 0.00356 -0.0001291 -0.00189 
(p-value) (0.6413) (0.9953) (0.866) (0.6381) (0.9924) (0.8152) 
Target B/M -0.00757 -0.01976 -0.00562 -0.00746 -0.02163 -0.00466 
(p-value) (0.3616) (0.2144) (0.4865) (0.3648) (0.1647) (0.5637) 
Target Runup 0.00319 0.01222 -0.00144 0.00499 0.01503 -0.00401 
(p-value) (0.8429) (0.6535) (0.9171) (0.7529) (0.5747) (0.7784) 
Target Markup -0.03288*** -0.02703 -0.0394*** -0.03368*** -0.0286* -0.03509*** 
(p-value) (0.0058) (0.1007) (0.0019) (0.0044) (0.0822) (0.0055) 
Collar -0.0282* -0.03778** 0.02306 -0.02762* -0.03603** 0.02408 
(p-value) (0.0572) (0.0235) (0.2867) (0.0623) (0.0305) (0.2978) 
Toehold Exist 0.01325 0.05028* -0.00311 0.01374 0.05686* -0.0008372 
(p-value) (0.4379) (0.0936) (0.9068) (0.4312) (0.0532) (0.9744) 
Horizontal 0.00625 -0.00314 0.01253 0.00627 -0.00309 0.01155 
(p-value) (0.3815) (0.783) (0.101) (0.3797) (0.7876) (0.1314) 
Tender Offer 0.0026 0.02002 -0.00219 0.00218 0.01926 -0.0004021 
(p-value) (0.6905) (0.2276) (0.7413) (0.7349) (0.2508) (0.9513) 
Cash Bid 0.02934***   0.02977***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.01059 0.01672 -0.0334* -0.01052 0.01979 -0.03257* 
(p-value) (0.5887) (0.6314) (0.073) (0.5911) (0.5744) (0.096) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00972 0.03057 -0.01195 0.01144 0.03339 -0.01379 
(p-value) (0.3702) (0.1399) (0.3155) (0.2937) (0.1019) (0.2568) 
Rumor 0.00676 0.01011 -0.0053 0.00651 0.00894 -0.00505 
(p-value) (0.5057) (0.5611) (0.6656) (0.5191) (0.6044) (0.6783) 
Complete 0.03041*** 0.04371*** 0.00969 0.03087*** 0.04465*** 0.01097 
(p-value) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.448) (0.005) (0.0044) (0.4043) 
Adj-R2 0.2055 0.1568 0.0812 0.2047 0.1533 0.069 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 572 284 288 572 284 288 
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Table 2-76   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) 
while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.16727*** 0.13723* 0.09132 0.16191*** 0.11499 0.10265 
(p-value) (0.0025) (0.0716) (0.1612) (0.0033) (0.1273) (0.1201) 
AIV-Variable -0.04438 -0.12502 0.06814    
(p-value) (0.4765) (0.1473) (0.2261)    
VIV-Variable    -0.18669 -0.2292 -0.1909 
(p-value)    (0.2289) (0.3085) (0.2636) 
Idio_Vol -0.83087 -0.25576 -0.29993 -1.17024** -1.62476** 0.83034 
(p-value) (0.4342) (0.8506) (0.7809) (0.0361) (0.0255) (0.3163) 
Target Size -0.01047*** -0.01157** -0.00575 -0.0101*** -0.01077** -0.00631* 
(p-value) (0.0003) (0.013) (0.1017) (0.0004) (0.0197) (0.0742) 
Target Turnover -0.0001111** -9.939E-05 5.13E-06 -0.0001069** -8.338E-05 -2.99E-06 
(p-value) (0.0343) (0.2267) (0.9289) (0.0404) (0.2964) (0.9596) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00235 -0.00701 -0.00146 0.00173 -0.00788 -0.00112 
(p-value) (0.7492) (0.5847) (0.8563) (0.8138) (0.5411) (0.8918) 
Target B/M -0.00622 -0.0227 -0.0063 -0.00589 -0.02161 -0.00554 
(p-value) (0.431) (0.1416) (0.4286) (0.4549) (0.1617) (0.4853) 
Target Runup 0.0008121 0.01271 -0.00398 0.00129 0.01053 -0.00488 
(p-value) (0.9578) (0.6213) (0.7689) (0.9327) (0.683) (0.7161) 
Target Markup -0.03571** -0.02741* -0.03632*** -0.03653*** -0.03262** -0.03332*** 
(p-value) (0.0021) (0.0792) (0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0332) (0.0077) 
Collar -0.03195 -0.04208*** 0.01942 -0.03087** -0.03678** 0.02178 
(p-value) (0.0229) (0.0058) (0.3838) (0.0243) (0.0151) (0.3392) 
Toehold Exist 0.00638 0.04363 0.00133 0.00544 0.0437 0.00383 
(p-value) (0.7095) (0.1375) (0.96) (0.7509) (0.1237) (0.8775) 
Horizontal 0.00929 0.00318 0.01082 0.00989 0.00367 0.01156 
(p-value) (0.1911) (0.7736) (0.1631) (0.1587) (0.7437) (0.1425) 
Tender Offer -7.301E-05 0.01059 -0.00212 -0.0005077 0.01015 -0.0017 
(p-value) (0.9909) (0.5212) (0.7504) (0.9359) (0.5281) (0.7986) 
Cash Bid 0.02156***   0.0219***   
(p-value) (0.0021)   (0.0017)   
Hostile -0.00737 0.02365 -0.03717* -0.00795 0.01856 -0.03493* 
(p-value) (0.6931) (0.4668) (0.0652) (0.6695) (0.5867) (0.0931) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01333 0.0356* -0.01656 0.01303 0.03624* -0.01687 
(p-value) (0.2321) (0.0905) (0.1696) (0.239) (0.0799) (0.1547) 
Rumor 0.00227 -0.0003627 -0.00859 0.0018 0.000654 -0.00492 
(p-value) (0.8208) (0.9829) (0.4815) (0.8565) (0.9692) (0.6857) 
Complete 0.02696** 0.03727** 0.00976 0.02773*** 0.03909** 0.01185 
(p-value) (0.013) (0.0195) (0.4493) (0.0099) (0.0121) (0.3613) 
Adj-R2 0.2287 0.2161 0.0738 0.2303 0.2061 0.0725 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-77   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.16249*** 0.13328* 0.09322 
(p-value) (0.0029) (0.0801) (0.1515) 
AIV-Bidder -0.02025 -0.11696 0.13317** 
(p-value) (0.7775) (0.2274) (0.0388) 
VIV-Bidder -0.15867 -0.05927 -0.41332** 
(p-value) (0.3694) (0.8166) (0.0386) 
Idio_Vol -0.93569 -0.28122 -0.67747 
(p-value) (0.3977) (0.8387) (0.5362) 
Target Size -0.01015*** -0.01129** -0.00597* 
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0161) (0.0858) 
Target Turnover -0.0001084** -9.761E-05 4.84E-06 
(p-value) (0.0423) (0.242) (0.9315) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00184 -0.00734 -0.00221 
(p-value) (0.8006) (0.5614) (0.7859) 
Target B/M -0.00594 -0.02248 -0.00463 
(p-value) (0.4521) (0.144) (0.5564) 
Target Runup 0.00121 0.01263 -0.00101 
(p-value) (0.9368) (0.6231) (0.9411) 
Target Markup -0.03592*** -0.02765* -0.0335*** 
(p-value) (0.002) (0.077) (0.006) 
Collar -0.03134** -0.0414*** 0.01602 
(p-value) (0.0226) (0.0072) (0.4575) 
Toehold Exist 0.00566 0.04355 -0.0016 
(p-value) (0.7414) (0.1377) (0.9502) 
Horizontal 0.00994 0.00351 0.01189 
(p-value) (0.1575) (0.7489) (0.1201) 
Tender Offer -0.0003062 0.0109 -0.00374 
(p-value) (0.9617) (0.5058) (0.5719) 
Cash Bid 0.02167***   
(p-value) (0.0019)   
Hostile -0.00783 0.02272 -0.03241 
(p-value) (0.6758) (0.491) (0.1032) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01302 0.03554* -0.01763 
(p-value) (0.2402) (0.0902) (0.1349) 
Rumor 0.0021 -0.0002308 -0.00785 
(p-value) (0.8334) (0.9891) (0.5175) 
Complete 0.02757** 0.03752** 0.01139 
(p-value) (0.0101) (0.0174) (0.3681) 
Adj-R2 0.229 0.2127 0.0826 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2-78   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for idiosyncratic volatility 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is 
constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by 
the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target 
(Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal 
is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.0426 -2.2117 0.114 5.019 5.4706 5.703 
(p-value) (0.9966) (0.8231) (0.9909) (0.5757) (0.5442) (0.5258) 
AIV-Variable -3.7963***  -4.3907*** -4.5827**  -6.3063*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0118)  (0.0021) 
VIV-Variable  -2.1676 2.0136  2.1081 9.9009* 
(p-value)   (0.2118) (0.3105)   (0.6509) (0.0759) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -28.8209** -67.928*** -23.4851 -62.0271** -125.6*** -51.3479* 
(p-value) (0.0398) (<.0001) (0.1179) (0.0289) (<.0001) (0.074) 
Target Size -0.9002 -0.7663 -0.899 -0.2335 -0.1545 -0.2183 
(p-value) (0.1936) (0.2665) (0.1963) (0.7013) (0.8004) (0.7202) 
Target Turnover 0.00241 0.00262 2.30E-03 0.0012 0.00197 0.00108 
(p-value) (0.3594) (0.3261) (0.3808) (0.7013) (0.5194) (0.7293) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.3468 -0.3919 -0.3368 -0.1339 -0.137 -0.0889 
(p-value) (0.19) (0.1342) (0.2031) (0.6127) (0.6034) (0.7385) 
Target B/M 0.4095 0.4168 0.365 0.4456 0.392 0.4336 
(p-value) (0.2463) (0.222) (0.3102) (0.1858) (0.2451) (0.2052) 
Acquirer Size 0.8087 0.7793 0.8073 0.1792 0.1129 0.1492 
(p-value) (0.1823) (0.1974) (0.1852) (0.7388) (0.8343) (0.7818) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00777 -0.0079 -0.0082 0.0108 0.00385 0.0109 
(p-value) (0.4804) (0.4449) (0.4619) (0.342) (0.7174) (0.3243) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.263 -0.208 -0.2703 -0.2475 -0.1959 -0.2477 
(p-value) (0.2565) (0.359) (0.2442) (0.2853) (0.3927) (0.2869) 
Acquirer B/M 0.8807* 0.8549* 0.8487* 0.3651 0.1741 0.2712 
(p-value) (0.073) (0.0777) (0.0855) (0.4848) (0.7374) (0.6084) 
Relative Size 2.184 2.3667 2.179 -2.5534 -3.5422 -2.9427 
(p-value) (0.8423) (0.8294) (0.8435) (0.7949) (0.7199) (0.7647) 
Collar -2.3832*** -2.2525*** -2.395*** -2.4348*** -2.3415*** -2.4335*** 
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Toehold Exist -0.4847   -0.7431   
(p-value) (0.5121)   (0.3128)   
Horizontal -0.5913** -0.6052** -0.5836** -0.5215** -0.516** -0.5279** 
(p-value) (0.0219) (0.0181) (0.0237) (0.0452) (0.0455) (0.0433) 
Tender Offer 1.7498*** 1.6299*** 1.7521*** 1.6411*** 1.6021*** 1.6761*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.2502 -0.381 -0.2132 0.0143 0.0274 0.0437 
(p-value) (0.6686) (0.5288) (0.7145) (0.9816) (0.9656) (0.9442) 
Multiple Bidders 0.8808 1.1503*** 0.8232** 1.0726*** 1.1367*** 1.0756*** 
(p-value) (0.0149) (0.0014) (0.0248) (0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0034) 
Rumor 0.5236 0.4775 0.5303 0.13 0.0514 0.1062 
(p-value) (0.2184) (0.253) (0.2134) (0.756) (0.9025) (0.799) 
Adj-R2 0.3584 0.3402 0.3595 0.3702 0.3632 0.3740 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-79   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2].  Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before 
the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is 
preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value of 1 if 
there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.49 -0.731 0.1375 0.3594 0.1983 0.3809 
(p-value) (0.8203) (0.7327) (0.9499) (0.8583) (0.9214) (0.8505) 
AIV-Variable -1.3619  -2.0276* -1.4137  -1.6533 
(p-value) (0.1836)  (0.0772) (0.4174)  (0.3995) 
VIV-Variable  1.9382 3.6978  -0.5578 1.6967 
(p-value)   (0.4675) (0.1949)   (0.9196) (0.7852) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 12.4418 -4.3896 18.6656 -0.8884 -19.609 0.6538 
(p-value) (0.43) (0.6733) (0.2658) (0.9739) (0.1473) (0.9813) 
Target Size 0.1931 0.2563* 0.2166 0.2243 0.2269 0.2226 
(p-value) (0.1838) (0.0796) (0.1428) (0.1113) (0.1073) (0.1152) 
Target Turnover 0.000111 -0.00024 -2.00E-04 0.000122 0.000207 0.000106 
(p-value) (0.976) (0.9475) (0.9557) (0.9737) (0.9545) (0.9771) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5845* -0.5698* -0.5757* -0.668** -0.6611** -0.6595** 
(p-value) (0.0807) (0.0885) (0.0882) (0.0435) (0.0466) (0.0471) 
Target B/M -0.6943* -0.7535** -0.7385** -0.6565* -0.6611* -0.6622* 
(p-value) (0.0508) (0.0369) (0.0377) (0.0714) (0.0697) (0.0697) 
Target Runup 0.6939 0.7715 0.5343 0.7531 0.76 0.7527 
(p-value) (0.2739) (0.2219) (0.4091) (0.2185) (0.2157) (0.2201) 
Target Markup -0.3617 -0.4103 -0.3038 -0.391 -0.442 -0.3832 
(p-value) (0.4181) (0.3564) (0.4997) (0.3818) (0.3193) (0.3922) 
Collar 0.7445 0.769 0.777 0.7072 0.7313 0.7003 
(p-value) (0.2523) (0.232) (0.2323) (0.2773) (0.2592) (0.283) 
Toehold Exist -1.4773** -1.4501** -1.5626** -1.5267** -1.544** -1.5118** 
(p-value) (0.0337) (0.0381) (0.0254) (0.0301) (0.0284) (0.0322) 
Horizontal -0.0945 -0.0939 -0.096 -0.016 -0.0383 -0.0219 
(p-value) (0.7665) (0.7681) (0.764) (0.9603) (0.9049) (0.946) 
Tender Offer 1.5104*** 1.3766*** 1.5092*** 1.4276*** 1.4113*** 1.4254*** 
(p-value) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Cash Bid 0.0672   -0.0852   
(p-value) (0.8301)   (0.7971)   
Hostile -3.7067*** -3.6483*** -3.729*** -3.6603*** -3.668*** -3.6518*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.8583*** -2.7784*** -2.9561*** -2.7331*** -2.7199*** -2.7272*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.5515 0.4923 0.5557 0.4519 0.4431 0.4473 
(p-value) (0.3929) (0.4387) (0.391) (0.4791) (0.4886) (0.4837) 
Adj-R2 0.2010 0.1995 0.2037 0.2030 0.2021 0.2031 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 






2.19 Appendix L – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with 
idiosyncratic volatility as Control – Idiosyncratic Volatility Estimated over the [-256, -43] 
interval 
Table 2-80   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.13591* 0.08475 0.14856** 0.12814** 0.0572 0.16405** 
(p-value) (0.0171) (0.3497) (0.0186) (0.0228) (0.4803) (0.0116) 
AIV-Variable -0.02122 -0.04445 0.0481**    
(p-value) (0.309) (0.192) (0.045)    
VIV-Variable    -0.03042 -0.05719 0.00441 
(p-value)    (0.4856) (0.4383) (0.9273) 
Idio_Vol -0.13445 0.139 -0.88551** -0.33474 -0.34759 -0.4573 
(p-value) (0.712) (0.8212) (0.0177) (0.2739) (0.4517) (0.1366) 
Target Size -0.01058*** -0.01131** -0.00659* -0.01012*** -0.01067** -0.00842** 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0221) (0.0717) (0.001) (0.0286) (0.0233) 
Target Turnover -0.0001315** -0.0001491** -5.36E-06 -0.0001325*** -0.0001459** 3.441E-05 
(p-value) (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.94) (0.0088) (0.0116) (0.6137) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00332 -0.0001512 -0.00218 0.00333 -0.0001947 -0.00247 
(p-value) (0.6627) (0.991) (0.7873) (0.6614) (0.9885) (0.7604) 
Target B/M -0.00772 -0.02011 -0.00623 -0.0077 -0.02174 -0.00494 
(p-value) (0.3516) (0.2054) (0.4349) (0.3451) (0.1623) (0.5372) 
Target Runup 0.0032 0.01259 -0.00435 0.00461 0.01499 -0.0047 
(p-value) (0.8408) (0.6423) (0.7455) (0.7709) (0.5759) (0.74) 
Target Markup -0.03294*** -0.02696* -0.03941*** -0.03385*** -0.0289* -0.03512*** 
(p-value) (0.0057) (0.0996) (0.002) (0.0041) (0.0773) (0.0057) 
Collar -0.02813* -0.03769** 0.0244 -0.02757* -0.0359** 0.02484 
(p-value) (0.0579) (0.0241) (0.2699) (0.0627) (0.0314) (0.2839) 
Toehold Exist 0.01324 0.05125* -0.00133 0.01355 0.05633* -0.0007743 
(p-value) (0.4386) (0.0852) (0.9582) (0.4346) (0.0535) (0.976) 
Horizontal 0.00634 -0.00303 0.01289* 0.00642 -0.00317 0.01174 
(p-value) (0.3756) (0.7908) (0.0919) (0.3698) (0.7825) (0.1236) 
Tender Offer 0.00249 0.01978 -0.00238 0.00199 0.01925 -0.0004981 
(p-value) (0.7035) (0.2339) (0.72) (0.7568) (0.2507) (0.9395) 
Cash Bid 0.02926***   0.02955***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.01043 0.01715 -0.03139* -0.01014 0.01964 -0.03135 
(p-value) (0.5934) (0.6226) (0.0947) (0.6038) (0.5771) (0.109) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00958 0.03083 -0.01493 0.01089 0.03323 -0.01493 
(p-value) (0.3736) (0.1331) (0.212) (0.3164) (0.1036) (0.22) 
Rumor 0.00694 0.01022 -0.00425 0.00666 0.00893 -0.00424 
(p-value) (0.495) (0.5557) (0.7305) (0.5104) (0.6046) (0.729) 
Complete 0.03045*** 0.04377*** 0.00934 0.03094*** 0.0447*** 0.01088 
(p-value) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.4645) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.4064) 
Adj-R2 0.2056 0.1566 0.0805 0.2048 0.1534 0.0703 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 515 258 257 515 258 257 
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Table 2-81   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.16554*** 0.13585* 0.09251 0.15961*** 0.10682 0.10925* 
(p-value) (0.0028) (0.0722) (0.1536) (0.0041) (0.1477) (0.0953) 
AIV-Variable -0.05811 -0.13277* 0.07241    
(p-value) (0.2934) (0.0904) (0.148)    
VIV-Variable    -0.21177 -0.26987 -0.16238 
(p-value)    (0.1616) (0.2187) (0.3275) 
Idio_Vol -0.58342 -0.11391 -0.39758 -1.04724* -1.44964** 0.60998 
(p-value) (0.5228) (0.9237) (0.6702) (0.0514) (0.0386) (0.4348) 
Target Size -0.01046*** -0.01152** -0.00576* -0.01006*** -0.01071** -0.00651* 
(p-value) (0.0003) (0.0133) (0.099) (0.0005) (0.0205) (0.0648) 
Target Turnover -0.0001122** -0.0001014 6.17E-06 -0.0001062** -8.284E-05 -3.34E-06 
(p-value) (0.035) (0.219) (0.9146) (0.0437) (0.3013) (0.9552) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00251 -0.00688 -0.00146 0.00186 -0.00762 -0.00107 
(p-value) (0.734) (0.5918) (0.8569) (0.801) (0.5554) (0.897) 
Target B/M -0.00621 -0.0227 -0.00617 -0.0058 -0.02136 -0.0053 
(p-value) (0.433) (0.1413) (0.4385) (0.4621) (0.1653) (0.5081) 
Target Runup 0.0007529 0.01287 -0.00377 0.00122 0.00988 -0.0054 
(p-value) (0.9609) (0.6157) (0.7817) (0.9366) (0.7024) (0.6875) 
Target Markup -0.03522*** -0.02702* -0.03637*** -0.03648*** -0.03295** -0.03413*** 
(p-value) (0.0024) (0.0821) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0324) (0.006) 
Collar -0.03203** -0.04224*** 0.0191 -0.03049** -0.0361** 0.02249 
(p-value) (0.0227) (0.0057) (0.3913) (0.0259) (0.0172) (0.3298) 
Toehold Exist 0.0067 0.04378 0.0008755 0.00568 0.04445 0.00373 
(p-value) (0.6958) (0.1373) (0.9735) (0.7414) (0.1193) (0.879) 
Horizontal 0.00929 0.00312 0.01093 0.00983 0.00357 0.01168 
(p-value) (0.1914) (0.7774) (0.1613) (0.1617) (0.7511) (0.1424) 
Tender Offer 6.152E-05 0.01089 -0.00227 -0.0005483 0.01088 -0.00153 
(p-value) (0.9923) (0.5098) (0.7338) (0.9309) (0.4987) (0.8193) 
Cash Bid 0.02174***   0.02238***   
(p-value) (0.0019)   (0.0013)   
Hostile -0.00744 0.02378 -0.03703* -0.00816 0.01834 -0.03406 
(p-value) (0.6916) (0.4634) (0.0651) (0.6624) (0.5946) (0.1005) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01325 0.03548* -0.01639 0.01296 0.03605* -0.01626 
(p-value) (0.2356) (0.0919) (0.1738) (0.2419) (0.0825) (0.1726) 
Rumor 0.0025 -0.0002848 -0.00888 0.00177 0.0008399 -0.00516 
(p-value) (0.8029) (0.9866) (0.4668) (0.8584) (0.9604) (0.6725) 
Complete 0.02709** 0.03735** 0.00953 0.02807*** 0.04004** 0.01181 
(p-value) (0.0129) (0.019) (0.4614) (0.0093) (0.0104) (0.367) 
Adj-R2 0.2279 0.2159 0.0743 0.2287 0.2026 0.0702 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-82   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.16111** 0.13209* 0.09453 
(p-value) (0.0033) (0.0808) (0.1428) 
AIV-Bidder -0.03475 -0.12495 0.1387** 
(p-value) (0.5932) (0.166) (0.0181) 
VIV-Bidder -0.15585 -0.05713 -0.42729** 
(p-value) (0.38) (0.8242) (0.0324) 
Idio_Vol -0.68119 -0.1396 -0.77304 
(p-value) (0.4749) (0.9086) (0.414) 
Target Size -0.01016*** -0.01126** -0.00598* 
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0162) (0.0833) 
Target Turnover -0.0001093** -9.953E-05 6.39E-06 
(p-value) (0.0437) (0.2347) (0.9097) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00201 -0.0072 -0.00221 
(p-value) (0.7837) (0.5691) (0.7865) 
Target B/M -0.00592 -0.02249 -0.00442 
(p-value) (0.4545) (0.1436) (0.5751) 
Target Runup 0.00112 0.01278 -0.0005635 
(p-value) (0.9416) (0.6182) (0.9673) 
Target Markup -0.03544*** -0.02726* -0.03334*** 
(p-value) (0.0023) (0.0799) (0.0057) 
Collar -0.03142** -0.04158*** 0.01541 
(p-value) (0.0225) (0.0071) (0.474) 
Toehold Exist 0.00599 0.04371 -0.00228 
(p-value) (0.7271) (0.1374) (0.929) 
Horizontal 0.00993 0.00344 0.01209 
(p-value) (0.1583) (0.7533) (0.1166) 
Tender Offer -0.0001802 0.01119 -0.00402 
(p-value) (0.9775) (0.4952) (0.5432) 
Cash Bid 0.02184**   
(p-value) (0.0017)   
Hostile -0.00788 0.02289 -0.03221 
(p-value) (0.6749) (0.4867) (0.1042) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01296 0.03541* -0.01747 
(p-value) (0.2434) (0.0916) (0.1386) 
Rumor 0.00232 -0.0001659 -0.00817 
(p-value) (0.8167) (0.9922) (0.5009) 
Complete 0.02769** 0.0376** 0.01108 
(p-value) (0.01) (0.017) (0.3819) 
Adj-R2 0.2281 0.2125 0.0838 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-83   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for idiosyncratic volatility 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before 
the announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is 
constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by 
the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target 
(Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal 
is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -1.173 -2.7907 -1.1181 5.0038 5.3053 5.6698 
(p-value) (0.9074) (0.7821) (0.9119) (0.5768) (0.5563) (0.5279) 
AIV-Variable -3.3871***  -3.6713*** -5.2093***  -6.9237*** 
(p-value) (0.0001)  (0.0005) (0.0021)  (0.0003) 
VIV-Variable  -2.881* 1.01  0.4004 9.9425* 
(p-value)   (0.0963) (0.6165)   (0.9284) (0.0733) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -43.1916*** -76.7137*** -40.4383*** -50.2445** -115.8*** -39.8615 
(p-value) (0.0017) (<.0001) (0.0065) (0.0474) (<.0001) (0.1205) 
Target Size -1.0332 -0.8998 -1.0288 -0.2332 -0.147 -0.2178 
(p-value) (0.1447) (0.2016) (0.1472) (0.7017) (0.8099) (0.7206) 
Target Turnover 0.0029 0.00333 2.81E-03 0.00118 0.00215 0.00103 
(p-value) (0.2714) (0.2206) (0.2878) (0.7058) (0.4808) (0.7406) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.3841 -0.4387* -0.3774 -0.1339 -0.1429 -0.0883 
(p-value) (0.1494) (0.0967) (0.1569) (0.6125) (0.5861) (0.7401) 
Target B/M 0.4084 0.4054 0.3844 0.4538 0.4002 0.439 
(p-value) (0.2477) (0.2294) (0.2837) (0.179) (0.2364) (0.2008) 
Acquirer Size 0.9133 0.8653 0.9101 0.1815 0.1164 0.152 
(p-value) (0.1402) (0.161) (0.1424) (0.7356) (0.8291) (0.7776) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00711 -0.00717 -0.00732 0.0114 0.00356 0.0114 
(p-value) (0.5196) (0.491) (0.5103) (0.3183) (0.7397) (0.3001) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.2663 -0.2046 -0.2701 -0.2544 -0.203 -0.2542 
(p-value) (0.2527) (0.3705) (0.2463) (0.2717) (0.3737) (0.274) 
Acquirer B/M 0.8213* 0.7965 0.8083 0.3866 0.2012 0.2944 
(p-value) (0.0981) (0.1036) (0.1043) (0.4588) (0.6963) (0.5774) 
Relative Size 4.0109 3.9284 3.9607 -2.5884 -3.6647 -2.9695 
(p-value) (0.7205) (0.7262) (0.7245) (0.7921) (0.7106) (0.7625) 
Collar -2.3442*** -2.2466*** -2.3476*** -2.454*** -2.361*** -2.4538*** 
(p-value) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Toehold Exist -0.7059   -0.742   
(p-value) (0.3671)   (0.3134)   
Horizontal -0.5588** -0.5513** -0.557** -0.5269** -0.5246** -0.5329** 
(p-value) (0.0315) (0.0326) (0.032) (0.0429) (0.0413) (0.0412) 
Tender Offer 1.762*** 1.6568*** 1.7611*** 1.6322*** 1.5723*** 1.6697*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.1959 -0.2717 -0.1815 0.0204 0.0341 0.0466 
(p-value) (0.7401) (0.6556) (0.7581) (0.9737) (0.9569) (0.9402) 
Multiple Bidders 0.8323** 0.9957*** 0.8098** 1.0598*** 1.1285*** 1.0631*** 
(p-value) (0.0214) (0.0064) (0.0264) (0.0039) (0.002) (0.0038) 
Rumor 0.526 0.5002 0.5284 0.1405 0.065 0.1176 
(p-value) (0.2187) (0.2348) (0.2167) (0.7369) (0.8771) (0.7779) 
Adj-R2 0.3649 0.3504 0.3652 0.3692 0.3582 0.3731 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 






Table 2-84   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43].  Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before 
the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is 
preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value of 1 if 
there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.351 -0.952 -0.0899 0.3433 0.1556 0.3639 
(p-value) (0.8705) (0.6621) (0.9673) (0.8647) (0.9383) (0.8571) 
AIV-Variable -1.4787  -2.2326** -1.6347  -1.904 
(p-value) (0.1191)  (0.0401) (0.3012)  (0.2947) 
VIV-Variable  1.8052 4.1125  -1.0845 1.9262 
(p-value)   (0.4907) (0.158)   (0.8414) (0.7587) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 16.8452 -1.0939 24.942 3.0154 -17.2026 4.7351 
(p-value) (0.2862) (0.9224) (0.1465) (0.9012) (0.1897) (0.8506) 
Target Size 0.1968 0.2654* 0.2238 0.2252 0.2268 0.2235 
(p-value) (0.1742) (0.0717) (0.1295) (0.1099) (0.1074) (0.1138) 
Target Turnover -0.00011 -0.00047 -5.40E-04 0.00007 0.000216 0.000045 
(p-value) (0.9754) (0.8943) (0.8806) (0.9848) (0.9525) (0.9903) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5587* -0.5446 -0.5398 -0.6651** -0.6526** -0.6557** 
(p-value) (0.0957) (0.1052) (0.1109) (0.0443) (0.0493) (0.0481) 
Target B/M -0.6918* -0.7641** -0.7398** -0.6588* -0.6624* -0.6653* 
(p-value) (0.0505) (0.0359) (0.036) (0.0705) (0.0696) (0.0684) 
Target Runup 0.7502 0.7553 0.6082 0.7534 0.7627 0.7534 
(p-value) (0.2381) (0.2332) (0.3479) (0.2186) (0.2147) (0.2201) 
Target Markup -0.364 -0.4162 -0.3025 -0.3817 -0.4439 -0.3726 
(p-value) (0.4157) (0.3515) (0.5017) (0.3929) (0.3177) (0.4052) 
Collar 0.724 0.7704 0.752 0.7041 0.7361 0.6962 
(p-value) (0.2648) (0.232) (0.2458) (0.2797) (0.2558) (0.2861) 
Toehold Exist -1.4158** -1.4712** -1.4679** -1.5204** -1.5371** -1.5038** 
(p-value) (0.0446) (0.0347) (0.0396) (0.0306) (0.029) (0.033) 
Horizontal -0.1118 -0.0979 -0.1221 -0.0147 -0.0403 -0.0211 
(p-value) (0.7257) (0.7591) (0.703) (0.9637) (0.9) (0.9478) 
Tender Offer 1.5145*** 1.3558*** 1.5112*** 1.4293*** 1.4068*** 1.4269*** 
(p-value) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Cash Bid 0.1004   -0.0776   
(p-value) (0.7507)   (0.8148)   
Hostile -3.7016*** -3.6356*** -3.7202*** -3.6585*** -3.6635*** -3.6492*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.8344*** -2.7803*** -2.9251*** -2.7375*** -2.7238*** -2.7307*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.5399 0.487 0.539 0.4567 0.4477 0.4518 
(p-value) (0.4041) (0.4445) (0.4073) (0.4743) (0.4839) (0.4792) 
Adj-R2 0.2018 0.1992 0.2050 0.2030 0.2016 0.2031 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 






2.20 Appendix M – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with 
idiosyncratic volatility as Control – Idiosyncratic Volatility Estimated over the [-256, -2] 
interval – AIV and VIV are orthogonalizedd against the Idiosyncratic Volatility  
Table 2-85   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Target and VIV-Target with Divergence of 
Opinion used as Control Variable 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43].  The AIV-Target and VIV-Target are the mean and standard deviation of the 
Implied Volatilities of Target firms estimated over the runup period [-42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the 
daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. The AIV (and VIV) used in our 
regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility. Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 
days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the 
ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the 
announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days 
before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value 
of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the 
deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. 
The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders 
within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement 
year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.16554*** 0.07782 0.13888** 0.12472** 0.05563 0.15108** 
(p-value) (0.0028) (0.3797) (0.0219) (0.0256) (0.4956) (0.0156) 
AIV-Target -0.05811 -0.04851 0.05806**    
(p-value) (0.2934) (0.191) (0.0282)    
VIV-Target    -0.02753 -0.05448 0.00744 
(p-value)      (0.5261) (0.4573) (0.8785) 
Idio_Vol -0.58342 -0.42326 -0.2392 -0.34592 -0.4021 -0.36171 
(p-value) (0.5228) (0.3913) (0.4404) (0.2621) (0.4161) (0.2368) 
Target Size -0.01046*** -0.01128** -0.00565 -0.00997*** -0.01064** -0.00792** 
(p-value) (0.0003) (0.0224) (0.1211) (0.0012) (0.0294) (0.0299) 
Target Turnover -0.0001122 -0.0001509*** -8.33E-06 -0.0001338*** -0.0001465** 0.0000307 
(p-value) (0.035) (0.0095) (0.9057) (0.0083) (0.0115) (0.6491) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00251 8.019E-05 -0.00137 0.00356 -0.0001291 -0.00189 
(p-value) (0.734) (0.9953) (0.866) (0.6381) (0.9924) (0.8152) 
Target B/M -0.00621 -0.01976 -0.00562 -0.00746 -0.02163 -0.00466 
(p-value) (0.433) (0.2144) (0.4865) (0.3648) (0.1647) (0.5637) 
Target Runup 0.0007529 0.01222 -0.00144 0.00499 0.01503 -0.00401 
(p-value) (0.9609) (0.6535) (0.9171) (0.7529) (0.5747) (0.7784) 
Target Markup -0.03522*** -0.02703 -0.0394*** -0.03368*** -0.0286* -0.03509*** 
(p-value) (0.0024) (0.1007) (0.0019) (0.0044) (0.0822) (0.0055) 
Collar -0.03203** -0.03778** 0.02306 -0.02762* -0.03603** 0.02408 
(p-value) (0.0227) (0.0235) (0.2867) (0.0623) (0.0305) (0.2978) 
Toehold Exist 0.0067 0.05028* -0.00311 0.01374 0.05686* -0.0008372 
(p-value) (0.6958) (0.0936) (0.9068) (0.4312) (0.0532) (0.9744) 
Horizontal 0.00929 -0.00314 0.01253 0.00627 -0.00309 0.01155 
(p-value) (0.1914) (0.783) (0.101) (0.3797) (0.7876) (0.1314) 
Tender Offer 6.152E-05 0.02002 -0.00219 0.00218 0.01926 -0.0004021 
(p-value) (0.9923) (0.2276) (0.7413) (0.7349) (0.2508) (0.9513) 
Cash Bid 0.02174***   0.02977***   
(p-value) (0.0019)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00744 0.01672 -0.0334* -0.01052 0.01979 -0.03257* 
(p-value) (0.6916) (0.6314) (0.073) (0.5911) (0.5744) (0.096) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01325 0.03057 -0.01195 0.01144 0.03339 -0.01379 
(p-value) (0.2356) (0.1399) (0.3155) (0.2937) (0.1019) (0.2568) 
Rumor 0.0025 0.01011 -0.0053 0.00651 0.00894 -0.00505 
(p-value) (0.8029) (0.5611) (0.6656) (0.5191) (0.6044) (0.6783) 
Complete 0.02709** 0.04371*** 0.00969 0.03087*** 0.04465*** 0.01097 
(p-value) (0.0129) (0.0054) (0.448) (0.005) (0.0044) (0.4043) 
Adj-R2 0.2279 0.1568 0.0812 0.2047 0.1533 0.069 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 572 284 288 572 284 288 
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Table 2-86   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) 
while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. 
The AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility. Target Size is the logarithm of the 
target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. 
Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of 
the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price 
divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy 
variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is 
hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes 
a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-
digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.16314*** 0.12437 0.09744 0.1596*** 0.11295 0.09977 
(p-value) (0.0038) (0.1009) (0.1376) (0.0039) (0.1354) (0.1332) 
AIV-Variable -0.04438 -0.12502 0.06814    
(p-value) (0.4765) (0.1473) (0.2261)    
VIV-Variable    -0.18669 -0.2292 -0.1909 
(p-value)       (0.2289) (0.3085) (0.2636) 
Idio_Vol -1.45052*** -1.97491*** 0.64712 -1.39649*** -1.92277*** 0.61828 
(p-value) (0.0023) (0.0006) (0.3951) (0.0047) (0.0019) (0.4233) 
Target Size -0.01047*** -0.01157** -0.00575 -0.0101*** -0.01077** -0.00631* 
(p-value) (0.0003) (0.013) (0.1017) (0.0004) (0.0197) (0.0742) 
Target Turnover -0.0001111** -9.939E-05 5.13E-06 -0.0001069** -8.338E-05 -2.99E-06 
(p-value) (0.0343) (0.2267) (0.9289) (0.0404) (0.2964) (0.9596) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00235 -0.00701 -0.00146 0.00173 -0.00788 -0.00112 
(p-value) (0.7492) (0.5847) (0.8563) (0.8138) (0.5411) (0.8918) 
Target B/M -0.00622 -0.0227 -0.0063 -0.00589 -0.02161 -0.00554 
(p-value) (0.431) (0.1416) (0.4286) (0.4549) (0.1617) (0.4853) 
Target Runup 0.0008121 0.01271 -0.00398 0.00129 0.01053 -0.00488 
(p-value) (0.9578) (0.6213) (0.7689) (0.9327) (0.683) (0.7161) 
Target Markup -0.03571*** -0.02741* -0.03632*** -0.03653*** -0.03262** -0.03332*** 
(p-value) (0.0021) (0.0792) (0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0332) (0.0077) 
Collar -0.03195** -0.04208*** 0.01942 -0.03087** -0.03678** 0.02178 
(p-value) (0.0229) (0.0058) (0.3838) (0.0243) (0.0151) (0.3392) 
Toehold Exist 0.00638 0.04363 0.00133 0.00544 0.0437 0.00383 
(p-value) (0.7095) (0.1375) (0.96) (0.7509) (0.1237) (0.8775) 
Horizontal 0.00929 0.00318 0.01082 0.00989 0.00367 0.01156 
(p-value) (0.1911) (0.7736) (0.1631) (0.1587) (0.7437) (0.1425) 
Tender Offer -7.301E-05 0.01059 -0.00212 -0.0005077 0.01015 -0.0017 
(p-value) (0.9909) (0.5212) (0.7504) (0.9359) (0.5281) (0.7986) 
Cash Bid 0.02156***   0.0219***   
(p-value) (0.0021)   (0.0017)   
Hostile -0.00737 0.02365 -0.03717* -0.00795 0.01856 -0.03493* 
(p-value) (0.6931) (0.4668) (0.0652) (0.6695) (0.5867) (0.0931) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01333 0.0356* -0.01656 0.01303 0.03624* -0.01687 
(p-value) (0.2321) (0.0905) (0.1696) (0.239) (0.0799) (0.1547) 
Rumor 0.00227 -0.0003627 -0.00859 0.0018 0.000654 -0.00492 
(p-value) (0.8208) (0.9829) (0.4815) (0.8565) (0.9692) (0.6857) 
Complete 0.02696** 0.03727** 0.00976 0.02773*** 0.03909** 0.01185 
(p-value) (0.013) (0.0195) (0.4493) (0.0099) (0.0121) (0.3613) 
Adj-R2 0.2287 0.2161 0.0738 0.2303 0.2061 0.0725 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-87   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. The 
AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility.  Target Size is the logarithm of the 
target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. 
Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of 
the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price 
divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy 
variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is 
hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes 
a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-
digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.15865*** 0.12073 0.09895 
(p-value) (0.0045) (0.1094) (0.1318) 
AIV-Bidder -0.02025 -0.11696 0.13317** 
(p-value) (0.7775) (0.2274) (0.0388) 
VIV-Bidder (-0.15867) -0.05927 -0.41332** 
(p-value) (0.3694) (0.8166) (0.0386) 
Idio_Vol -1.41064*** -1.96657*** 0.71422 
(p-value) (0.0032) (0.0007) (0.3449) 
Target Size -0.01015*** -0.01129** -0.00597* 
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0161) (0.0858) 
Target Turnover -0.0001084** -9.761E-05 4.84E-06 
(p-value) (0.0423) (0.242) (0.9315) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00184 -0.00734 -0.00221 
(p-value) (0.8006) (0.5614) (0.7859) 
Target B/M -0.00594 -0.02248 -0.00463 
(p-value) (0.4521) (0.144) (0.5564) 
Target Runup 0.00121 0.01263 -0.00101 
(p-value) (0.9368) (0.6231) (0.9411) 
Target Markup -0.03592*** -0.02765* -0.0335*** 
(p-value) (0.002) (0.077) (0.006) 
Collar -0.03134** -0.0414*** 0.01602 
(p-value) (0.0226) (0.0072) (0.4575) 
Toehold Exist 0.00566 0.04355 -0.0016 
(p-value) (0.7414) (0.1377) (0.9502) 
Horizontal 0.00994 0.00351 0.01189 
(p-value) (0.1575) (0.7489) (0.1201) 
Tender Offer -0.0003062 0.0109 -0.00374 
(p-value) (0.9617) (0.5058) (0.5719) 
Cash Bid 0.02167***   
(p-value) (0.0019)   
Hostile -0.00783 0.02272 -0.03241 
(p-value) (0.6758) (0.491) (0.1032) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01302 0.03554* -0.01763 
(p-value) (0.2402) (0.0902) (0.1349) 
Rumor 0.0021 -0.0002308 -0.00785 
(p-value) (0.8334) (0.9891) (0.5175) 
Complete 0.02757** 0.03752** 0.01139 
(p-value) (0.0101) (0.0174) (0.3681) 
Adj-R2 0.229 0.2127 0.0826 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-88   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. The AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) 
on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target 
(acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the 
nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by the acquirer size (in log terms). 
NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target (Acquirer) is listed on 
NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed 
successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold 
dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same 
contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -0.2295 -2.1217 -0.1056 4.7287 5.6118 5.3357 
(p-value) (0.9816) (0.831) (0.9916) (0.5986) (0.5347) (0.5534) 
AIV-Variable -3.8781***   -4.5472*** -4.6212**   -6.3541*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0113)  (0.0019) 
VIV-Variable  -2.1456 2.2233  2.1739 10.0099* 
(p-value)   (0.2172) (0.267)   (0.6412) (0.073) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -78.9956*** -70.4798*** -79.4271*** -126.8*** -123.8*** -128.3*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size -0.9012 -0.7603 -0.8993 -0.2344 -0.1553 -0.2227 
(p-value) (0.1964) (0.2723) (0.1999) (0.7007) (0.7999) (0.7153) 
Target Turnover 0.00245 0.00263 0.00235 0.00117 0.00195 0.00105 
(p-value) (0.3504) (0.3255) (0.3703) (0.7121) (0.5297) (0.739) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.365 -0.402 -0.356 -0.1536 -0.1548 -0.1099 
(p-value) (0.1693) (0.1257) (0.1801) (0.5637) (0.5592) (0.6818) 
Target B/M 0.3863 0.407 0.3331 0.4334 0.3832 0.4193 
(p-value) (0.273) (0.2335) (0.3536) (0.1954) (0.2533) (0.2178) 
Acquirer Size 0.8162 0.7805 0.8143 0.1867 0.1203 0.16 
(p-value) (0.1812) (0.1986) (0.1848) (0.7286) (0.8239) (0.7668) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00746 -0.00778 -0.00783 0.0112 0.00412 0.0113 
(p-value) (0.5011) (0.4533) (0.4854) (0.3255) (0.6991) (0.307) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.2564 -0.2039 -0.2635 -0.2411 -0.1906 -0.2413 
(p-value) (0.2693) (0.3691) (0.2567) (0.2984) (0.4062) (0.3001) 
Acquirer B/M 0.8802* 0.851* 0.8455* 0.366 0.1695 0.2696 
(p-value) (0.0736) (0.0791) (0.0872) (0.4843) (0.7443) (0.6112) 
Relative Size 2.0925 2.2691 2.0523 -2.5345 -3.5182 -2.8624 
(p-value) (0.8499) (0.8371) (0.8537) (0.7967) (0.7222) (0.7713) 
Collar -2.3315*** -2.2244*** -2.3358*** -2.396*** -2.3061*** -2.391*** 
(p-value) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Toehold Exist -0.5483 -0.353 -0.6134 -0.7773 -0.8854 -0.7158 
(p-value) (0.4602) (0.6439) (0.4127) (0.2915) (0.2448) (0.333) 
Horizontal -0.596** -0.6073** -0.5886** -0.5223** -0.5152** -0.5287** 
(p-value) (0.0212) (0.0178) (0.023) (0.0452) (0.0461) (0.0433) 
Tender Offer 1.7858*** 1.6475*** 1.7922*** 1.6704*** 1.628*** 1.7074*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.4307 -0.482 -0.4102 -0.1196 -0.0939 -0.0955 
(p-value) (0.4811) (0.4446) (0.5001) (0.8527) (0.8863) (0.8826) 
Multiple Bidders 0.7386* 1.0693*** 0.658 0.9598** 1.0359*** 0.9571** 
(p-value) (0.0578) (0.0059) (0.0972) (0.0147) (0.0078) (0.0148) 
Rumor 0.5336 0.4808 0.5425 0.1428 0.0593 0.1195 
(p-value) (0.2121) (0.2508) (0.2056) (0.7338) (0.8879) (0.7754) 
Complete -0.3313 -0.1874 -0.3699 -0.2709 -0.251 -0.2864 
(p-value) (0.3349) (0.5795) (0.2865) (0.4354) (0.466) (0.411) 
Adj-R2 0.3594 0.3406 0.3608 0.3709 0.3638 0.3747 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-89   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2].  The AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) 
on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility. Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the 
ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value 
divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the 
target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the 
announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the 
Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is 
completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.2828 -0.6622 -0.0397 0.2279 0.1914 0.248 
(p-value) (0.8935) (0.7551) (0.9852) (0.9095) (0.9241) (0.9019) 
AIV-Variable -1.3619   -2.0276* -1.4137   -1.6533 
(p-value) (0.1836)  (0.0772) (0.4174)  (0.3995) 
VIV-Variable  1.9382 3.6978  -0.5578 1.6967 
(p-value)   (0.4675) (0.1949)   (0.9196) (0.7852) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -5.2152 -2.3885 -3.8051 -20.6256* -20.285* -20.3722 
(p-value) (0.6142) (0.818) (0.7121) (0.0946) (0.0995) (0.1002) 
Target Size 0.1931 0.2563* 0.2166 0.2243 0.2269 0.2226 
(p-value) (0.1838) (0.0796) (0.1428) (0.1113) (0.1073) (0.1152) 
Target Turnover 0.000111 -0.00024 -0.0002 0.000122 0.000207 0.000106 
(p-value) (0.976) (0.9475) (0.9557) (0.9737) (0.9545) (0.9771) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5845* -0.5698* -0.5757* -0.668** -0.6611** -0.6595** 
(p-value) (0.0807) (0.0885) (0.0882) (0.0435) (0.0466) (0.0471) 
Target B/M -0.6943* -0.7535** -0.7385** -0.6565* -0.6611* -0.6622* 
(p-value) (0.0508) (0.0369) (0.0377) (0.0714) (0.0697) (0.0697) 
Target Runup 0.6939 0.7715 0.5343 0.7531 0.76 0.7527 
(p-value) (0.2739) (0.2219) (0.4091) (0.2185) (0.2157) (0.2201) 
Target Markup -0.3617 -0.4103 -0.3038 -0.391 -0.442 -0.3832 
(p-value) (0.4181) (0.3564) (0.4997) (0.3818) (0.3193) (0.3922) 
Collar 0.7445 0.769 0.777 0.7072 0.7313 0.7003 
(p-value) (0.2523) (0.232) (0.2323) (0.2773) (0.2592) (0.283) 
Toehold Exist -1.4773** -1.4501** -1.5626** -1.5267** -1.544** -1.5118** 
(p-value) (0.0337) (0.0381) (0.0254) (0.0301) (0.0284) (0.0322) 
Horizontal -0.0945 -0.0939 -0.096 -0.016 -0.0383 -0.0219 
(p-value) (0.7665) (0.7681) (0.764) (0.9603) (0.9049) (0.946) 
Tender Offer 1.5104*** 1.3766*** 1.5092*** 1.4276*** 1.4113*** 1.4254*** 
(p-value) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Cash Bid 0.0672 0.1222 0.051 -0.0852 -0.0694 -0.0937 
(p-value) (0.8301) (0.6933) (0.8716) (0.7971) (0.8341) (0.7784) 
Hostile -3.7067*** -3.6483*** -3.729*** -3.6603*** -3.668*** -3.6518*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.8583*** -2.7784*** -2.9561*** -2.7331*** -2.7199*** -2.7272*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.5515 0.4923 0.5557 0.4519 0.4431 0.4473 
(p-value) (0.3929) (0.4387) (0.391) (0.4791) (0.4886) (0.4837) 
Adj-R2 0.201 0.1995 0.2037 0.203 0.2021 0.2031 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 




2.21 Appendix N – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with 
idiosyncratic volatility as Control – Idiosyncratic Volatility Estimated over the [-256, -43] 
interval – AIV and VIV are orthogonalized against the Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Table 2-90   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) 
while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. 
The AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility.  Target Size is the logarithm of the 
target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. 
Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of 
the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price 
divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy 
variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is 
hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes 
a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-
digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.13249** 0.07732 0.15622** 0.12686** 0.05461 0.1642** 
(p-value) (0.0182) (0.3805) (0.0135) (0.0228) (0.496) (0.0116) 
AIV-Variable -0.02122 -0.04445 0.0481**    
(p-value) (0.309) (0.192) (0.045)    
VIV-Variable    -0.03042 -0.05719 0.00441 
(p-value)       (0.4856) (0.4383) (0.9273) 
Idio_Vol -0.40491 -0.42472 -0.27511 -0.35997 -0.3857 -0.45192 
(p-value) (0.2006) (0.3646) (0.3929) (0.2436) (0.4103) (0.1449) 
Target Size -0.01058*** -0.01131** -0.00659* -0.01012*** -0.01067** -0.00842** 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0221) (0.0717) (0.001) (0.0286) (0.0233) 
Target Turnover -0.0001315** -0.0001491** -5.36E-06 -0.0001325*** -0.0001459** 3.441E-05 
(p-value) (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.94) (0.0088) (0.0116) (0.6137) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00332 -0.0001512 -0.00218 0.00333 -0.0001947 -0.00247 
(p-value) (0.6627) (0.991) (0.7873) (0.6614) (0.9885) (0.7604) 
Target B/M -0.00772 -0.02011 -0.00623 -0.0077 -0.02174 -0.00494 
(p-value) (0.3516) (0.2054) (0.4349) (0.3451) (0.1623) (0.5372) 
Target Runup 0.0032 0.01259 -0.00435 0.00461 0.01499 -0.0047 
(p-value) (0.8408) (0.6423) (0.7455) (0.7709) (0.5759) (0.74) 
Target Markup -0.03294*** -0.02696* -0.03941*** -0.03385*** -0.0289* -0.03512*** 
(p-value) (0.0057) (0.0996) (0.002) (0.0041) (0.0773) (0.0057) 
Collar -0.02813* -0.03769** 0.0244 -0.02757* -0.0359** 0.02484 
(p-value) (0.0579) (0.0241) (0.2699) (0.0627) (0.0314) (0.2839) 
Toehold Exist 0.01324 0.05125* -0.00133 0.01355 0.05633* -0.0007743 
(p-value) (0.4386) (0.0852) (0.9582) (0.4346) (0.0535) (0.976) 
Horizontal 0.00634 -0.00303 0.01289* 0.00642 -0.00317 0.01174 
(p-value) (0.3756) (0.7908) (0.0919) (0.3698) (0.7825) (0.1236) 
Tender Offer 0.00249 0.01978 -0.00238 0.00199 0.01925 -0.0004981 
(p-value) (0.7035) (0.2339) (0.72) (0.7568) (0.2507) (0.9395) 
Cash Bid 0.02926***   0.02955***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.01043 0.01715 -0.03139* -0.01014 0.01964 -0.03135 
(p-value) (0.5934) (0.6226) (0.0947) (0.6038) (0.5771) (0.109) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00958 0.03083 -0.01493 0.01089 0.03323 -0.01493 
(p-value) (0.3736) (0.1331) (0.212) (0.3164) (0.1036) (0.22) 
Rumor 0.00694 0.01022 -0.00425 0.00666 0.00893 -0.00424 
(p-value) (0.495) (0.5557) (0.7305) (0.5104) (0.6046) (0.729) 
Complete 0.03045*** 0.04377*** 0.00934 0.03094*** 0.0447*** 0.01088 
(p-value) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.4645) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.4064) 
Adj-R2 0.2056 0.1566 0.0805 0.2048 0.1534 0.0703 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 572 284 288 572 284 288 
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Table 2-91   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43].  
The AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility. Target Size is the logarithm of the 
target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. 
Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of 
the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price 
divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy 
variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is 
hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes 
a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-
digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.15948*** 0.12019 0.10002 0.15667*** 0.10387 0.10648 
(p-value) (0.0046) (0.107) (0.1238) (0.0049) (0.1605) (0.1057) 
AIV-Variable -0.05811 -0.13277* 0.07241    
(p-value) (0.2934) (0.0904) (0.148)    
VIV-Variable    -0.21177 -0.26987 -0.16238 
(p-value)       (0.1616) (0.2187) (0.3275) 
Idio_Vol -1.35919*** -1.85328*** 0.54217 -1.28732*** -1.77779*** 0.45033 
(p-value) (0.003) (0.0008) (0.4617) (0.0078) (0.0035) (0.5448) 
Target Size -0.01046*** -0.01152** -0.00576* -0.01006*** -0.01071** -0.00651* 
(p-value) (0.0003) (0.0133) (0.099) (0.0005) (0.0205) (0.0648) 
Target Turnover -0.0001122** -0.0001014 6.17E-06 -0.0001062** -8.284E-05 -3.34E-06 
(p-value) (0.035) (0.219) (0.9146) (0.0437) (0.3013) (0.9552) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00251 -0.00688 -0.00146 0.00186 -0.00762 -0.00107 
(p-value) (0.734) (0.5918) (0.8569) (0.801) (0.5554) (0.897) 
Target B/M -0.00621 -0.0227 -0.00617 -0.0058 -0.02136 -0.0053 
(p-value) (0.433) (0.1413) (0.4385) (0.4621) (0.1653) (0.5081) 
Target Runup 0.0007529 0.01287 -0.00377 0.00122 0.00988 -0.0054 
(p-value) (0.9609) (0.6157) (0.7817) (0.9366) (0.7024) (0.6875) 
Target Markup -0.03522*** -0.02702* -0.03637*** -0.03648*** -0.03295** -0.03413*** 
(p-value) (0.0024) (0.0821) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0324) (0.006) 
Collar -0.03203** -0.04224*** 0.0191 -0.03049** -0.0361** 0.02249 
(p-value) (0.0227) (0.0057) (0.3913) (0.0259) (0.0172) (0.3298) 
Toehold Exist 0.0067 0.04378 0.0008755 0.00568 0.04445 0.00373 
(p-value) (0.6958) (0.1373) (0.9735) (0.7414) (0.1193) (0.879) 
Horizontal 0.00929 0.00312 0.01093 0.00983 0.00357 0.01168 
(p-value) (0.1914) (0.7774) (0.1613) (0.1617) (0.7511) (0.1424) 
Tender Offer 6.152E-05 0.01089* -0.00227 -0.0005483 0.01088 -0.00153 
(p-value) (0.9923) (0.5098) (0.7338) (0.9309) (0.4987) (0.8193) 
Cash Bid 0.02174***   0.02238***   
(p-value) (0.0019)   (0.0013)   
Hostile -0.00744 0.02378 -0.03703* -0.00816 0.01834 -0.03406 
(p-value) (0.6916) (0.4634) (0.0651) (0.6624) (0.5946) (0.1005) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01325 0.03548* -0.01639 0.01296 0.03605* -0.01626 
(p-value) (0.2356) (0.0919) (0.1738) (0.2419) (0.0825) (0.1726) 
Rumor 0.0025 -0.0002848 -0.00888 0.00177 0.0008399 -0.00516 
(p-value) (0.8029) (0.9866) (0.4668) (0.8584) (0.9604) (0.6725) 
Complete 0.02709** 0.03735** 0.00953 0.02807*** 0.04004** 0.01181 
(p-value) (0.0129) (0.019) (0.4614) (0.0093) (0.0104) (0.367) 
Adj-R2 0.2279 0.2159 0.0743 0.2287 0.2026 0.0702 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-92   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. 
The AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility.  Target Size is the logarithm of the 
target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. 
Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of 
the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price 
divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy 
variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is 
hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes 
a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies corresponding to the target two-
digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.15532*** 0.11672 0.10162 
(p-value) (0.0054) (0.1159) (0.1173) 
AIV-Bidder -0.03475 -0.12495 0.1387** 
(p-value) (0.5932) (0.166) (0.0181) 
VIV-Bidder (-0.15585) -0.05713 -0.42729** 
(p-value) (0.38) (0.8242) (0.0324) 
Idio_Vol -1.32185*** -1.8461*** 0.60684 
(p-value) (0.0042) (0.0009) (0.4057) 
Target Size -0.01016*** -0.01126** -0.00598* 
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0162) (0.0833) 
Target Turnover -0.0001093** -9.953E-05 6.39E-06 
(p-value) (0.0437) (0.2347) (0.9097) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00201 -0.0072 -0.00221 
(p-value) (0.7837) (0.5691) (0.7865) 
Target B/M -0.00592 -0.02249 -0.00442 
(p-value) (0.4545) (0.1436) (0.5751) 
Target Runup 0.00112 0.01278 -0.0005635 
(p-value) (0.9416) (0.6182) (0.9673) 
Target Markup -0.03544*** -0.02726* -0.03334*** 
(p-value) (0.0023) (0.0799) (0.0057) 
Collar -0.03142** -0.04158*** 0.01541 
(p-value) (0.0225) (0.0071) (0.474) 
Toehold Exist 0.00599 0.04371 -0.00228 
(p-value) (0.7271) (0.1374) (0.929) 
Horizontal 0.00993 0.00344 0.01209 
(p-value) (0.1583) (0.7533) (0.1166) 
Tender Offer -0.0001802 0.01119 -0.00402 
(p-value) (0.9775) (0.4952) (0.5432) 
Cash Bid 0.02184***   
(p-value) (0.0017)   
Hostile -0.00788 0.02289 -0.03221 
(p-value) (0.6749) (0.4867) (0.1042) 
Multiple Bidders 0.01296 0.03541* -0.01747 
(p-value) (0.2434) (0.0916) (0.1386) 
Rumor 0.00232 -0.0001659 -0.00817 
(p-value) (0.8167) (0.9922) (0.5009) 
Complete 0.02769** 0.0376** 0.01108 
(p-value) (0.01) (0.017) (0.3819) 
Adj-R2 0.2281 0.2125 0.0838 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2-93   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. The AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and 
VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target 
(acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the 
nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by the acquirer size (in log terms). 
NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target (Acquirer) is listed on 
NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed 
successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold 
dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same 
contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -1.422 -2.7333 -1.3255 4.6083 5.4261 5.1898 
(p-value) (0.8885) (0.7872) (0.8963) (0.608) (0.5484) (0.5642) 
AIV-Variable -3.4719***   -3.8214*** -5.2604***   -6.9851*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (0.0004) (0.002)  (0.0003) 
VIV-Variable  -2.8672* 1.2122  0.4402 10.0513* 
(p-value)   (0.0983) (0.5515)   (0.9214) (0.0706) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -87.059*** -79.2247*** -87.1508*** -120.5*** -115.8*** -121.8*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size -1.0312 -0.8912 -1.0256 -0.2329 -0.1462 -0.2214 
(p-value) (0.1478) (0.2073) (0.151) (0.7025) (0.8112) (0.7167) 
Target Turnover 0.00291 0.00333 0.00281 0.00115 0.00213 0.001 
(p-value) (0.2682) (0.22) (0.2863) (0.7173) (0.4904) (0.7508) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.3998 -0.4457* -0.393 -0.1531 -0.1586 -0.1087 
(p-value) (0.1348) (0.0924) (0.1417) (0.5647) (0.5477) (0.6847) 
Target B/M 0.3915 0.3995 0.3607 0.4408 0.3919 0.4239 
(p-value) (0.2663) (0.2363) (0.3137) (0.1894) (0.2445) (0.2142) 
Acquirer Size 0.9178 0.8623 0.9139 0.1879 0.1219 0.162 
(p-value) (0.1403) (0.1635) (0.143) (0.7269) (0.8216) (0.7638) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00681 -0.00708 -0.007 0.0118 0.00377 0.0118 
(p-value) (0.54) (0.4971) (0.5316) (0.3026) (0.725) (0.2835) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.2603 -0.2014 -0.2643 -0.2483 -0.1986 -0.248 
(p-value) (0.2642) (0.3784) (0.2572) (0.284) (0.3847) (0.2865) 
Acquirer B/M 0.8222 0.7934 0.8072 0.3887 0.1976 0.294 
(p-value) (0.0983) (0.1052) (0.1054) (0.4569) (0.7016) (0.5785) 
Relative Size 3.8897 3.7929 3.8111 -2.5908 -3.6665 -2.9048 
(p-value) (0.7302) (0.7362) (0.7362) (0.7923) (0.7111) (0.7679) 
Collar -2.2976*** -2.2259*** -2.297*** -2.4151*** -2.3277*** -2.4114*** 
(p-value) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Toehold Exist -0.759 -0.782 -0.7663 -0.7743 -0.9151 -0.7097 
(p-value) (0.334) (0.3356) (0.3295) (0.2931) (0.2339) (0.3364) 
Horizontal -0.5631** -0.5531** -0.5615** -0.5277** -0.5233** -0.5338** 
(p-value) (0.0306) (0.0321) (0.0311) (0.0429) (0.042) (0.0412) 
Tender Offer 1.7941*** 1.6691*** 1.7953*** 1.6607*** 1.5943*** 1.7002*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile -0.3571 -0.3445 -0.352 -0.111 -0.0739 -0.0905 
(p-value) (0.5628) (0.5877) (0.5672) (0.8627) (0.9099) (0.8883) 
Multiple Bidders 0.7019* 0.936** 0.6648* 0.9489** 1.0393*** 0.9464** 
(p-value) (0.0726) (0.0177) (0.0933) (0.016) (0.0077) (0.016) 
Rumor 0.5343 0.5031 0.538 0.1532 0.0713 0.1308 
(p-value) (0.2134) (0.2329) (0.2106) (0.7152) (0.8656) (0.7546) 
Complete -0.2987 -0.1365 -0.3216 -0.264 -0.2202 -0.2798 
(p-value) (0.3883) (0.6911) (0.3569) (0.448) (0.5221) (0.4224) 
Adj-R2 0.3657 0.3506 0.3661 0.3699 0.3586 0.3738 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-94   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43].  The AIV (and VIV) used in our regressions are the residuals obtain after regressing the AIV (and 
VIV) on the corresponding idiosyncratic volatility. Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is 
the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value 
divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement divided by the 
target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target (acquirer) price 2 days before the 
announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the 
Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is 
completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant 0.1125 -0.8764 -0.2778 0.1726 0.1406 0.1918 
(p-value) (0.9575) (0.6845) (0.897) (0.9315) (0.9442) (0.9241) 
AIV-Variable -1.4787   -2.2326** -1.6347   -1.904 
(p-value) (0.1191)  (0.0401) (0.3012)  (0.2947) 
VIV-Variable  1.8052 4.1125  -1.0845 1.9262 
(p-value)   (0.4907) (0.158)   (0.8414) (0.7587) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -2.0006 0.4033 -0.1024 -18.8091 -18.4321 -18.502 
(p-value) (0.8579) (0.9714) (0.9927) (0.1227) (0.1279) (0.131) 
Target Size 0.1968 0.2654* 0.2238 0.2252 0.2268 0.2235 
(p-value) (0.1742) (0.0717) (0.1295) (0.1099) (0.1074) (0.1138) 
Target Turnover -0.00011 -0.00047 -0.00054 0.00007 0.000216 0.000045 
(p-value) (0.9754) (0.8943) (0.8806) (0.9848) (0.9525) (0.9903) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5587* -0.5446 -0.5398 -0.6651** -0.6526** -0.6557** 
(p-value) (0.0957) (0.1052) (0.1109) (0.0443) (0.0493) (0.0481) 
Target B/M -0.6918* -0.7641** -0.7398** -0.6588* -0.6624* -0.6653* 
(p-value) (0.0505) (0.0359) (0.036) (0.0705) (0.0696) (0.0684) 
Target Runup 0.7502 0.7553 0.6082 0.7534 0.7627 0.7534 
(p-value) (0.2381) (0.2332) (0.3479) (0.2186) (0.2147) (0.2201) 
Target Markup -0.364 -0.4162 -0.3025 -0.3817 -0.4439 -0.3726 
(p-value) (0.4157) (0.3515) (0.5017) (0.3929) (0.3177) (0.4052) 
Collar 0.724 0.7704 0.752 0.7041 0.7361 0.6962 
(p-value) (0.2648) (0.232) (0.2458) (0.2797) (0.2558) (0.2861) 
Toehold Exist -1.4158** -1.4712** -1.4679** -1.5204** -1.5371** -1.5038** 
(p-value) (0.0446) (0.0347) (0.0396) (0.0306) (0.029) (0.033) 
Horizontal -0.1118 -0.0979 -0.1221 -0.0147 -0.0403 -0.0211 
(p-value) (0.7257) (0.7591) (0.703) (0.9637) (0.9) (0.9478) 
Tender Offer 1.5145*** 1.3558*** 1.5112*** 1.4293*** 1.4068*** 1.4269*** 
(p-value) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Cash Bid 0.1004 0.1464 0.0972 -0.0776 -0.048 -0.0871 
(p-value) (0.7507) (0.6409) (0.76) (0.8148) (0.8843) (0.7935) 
Hostile -3.7016*** -3.6356*** -3.7202*** -3.6585*** -3.6635*** -3.6492*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.8344*** -2.7803*** -2.9251*** -2.7375*** -2.7238*** -2.7307*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.5399 0.487 0.539 0.4567 0.4477 0.4518 
(p-value) (0.4041) (0.4445) (0.4073) (0.4743) (0.4839) (0.4792) 
Adj-R2 0.2018 0.1992 0.205 0.203 0.2016 0.2031 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 







2.22 Appendix O – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with 
idiosyncratic volatility as Control in the Expanded Sample – Idiosyncratic Volatility Estimated 
over the [-256, -2]  
Table 2-95   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample). 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.10173 0.0481 0.17355* 0.07825 0.02701 0.18284** 
(p-value) (0.2962) (0.7296) (0.0614) (0.4085) (0.8441) (0.0386) 
AIV-Variable -0.02282 -0.02615 0.01098    
(p-value) (0.4034) (0.4889) (0.679)    
VIV-Variable    -0.00369 -0.03305 0.01928 
(p-value)       (0.9558) (0.7539) (0.7032) 
Idio_Vol 0.10097 0.4478 -0.36645 -0.11372 0.21482 -0.29128 
(p-value) (0.8073) (0.4953) (0.3352) (0.7313) (0.6714) (0.3379) 
Target Size -0.00951** -0.00787 -0.00703* -0.0086** -0.00711 -0.0074** 
(p-value) (0.0201) (0.1925) (0.0573) (0.0319) (0.2376) (0.0326) 
Target Turnover -0.0003108 -0.0003939 0.0000234 -0.0003249 -0.0004234 3.871E-05 
(p-value) (0.311) (0.4257) (0.9453) (0.2799) (0.3868) (0.9087) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00644 0.00993 -0.00284 0.00681 0.01046 -0.00295 
(p-value) (0.465) (0.5464) (0.6898) (0.4406) (0.5244) (0.6783) 
Target B/M -0.0126*** -0.01289*** -0.00646 -0.0129*** -0.01359*** -0.00695 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.4938) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4619) 
Target Runup -0.00967 -0.00169 -0.00375 -0.00906 -0.0005724** -0.00464 
(p-value) (0.5915) (0.9465) (0.7774) (0.624) (0.9818) (0.7374) 
Target Markup -0.03167** -0.03936 -0.02202** -0.03313** -0.04083 -0.0214** 
(p-value) (0.0456) (0.1374) (0.0316) (0.0309) (0.1147) (0.0346) 
Collar 0.02077 0.02305 0.01366 0.02156 0.0233 0.01342 
(p-value) (0.2383) (0.2751) (0.4935) (0.2163) (0.2669) (0.5013) 
Toehold Exist 0.02411* 0.05244* 0.02417 0.02472* 0.05513* 0.02471 
(p-value) (0.087) (0.0619) (0.1167) (0.0804) (0.0507) (0.1092) 
Horizontal 0.0006245 -0.01579 0.01777** 0.0006316 -0.01598 0.01795** 
(p-value) (0.9411) (0.2079) (0.0205) (0.9397) (0.2006) (0.0183) 
Tender Offer 0.00925 0.03208** 2.876E-05 0.00888 0.03282** 0.0002943 
(p-value) (0.1621) (0.0428) (0.9964) (0.1767) (0.0435) (0.9627) 
Cash Bid 0.02726***   0.02835***   
(p-value) (0.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00975 0.00179 -0.04268*** -0.00919 0.00362 -0.04286*** 
(p-value) (0.5087) (0.9535) (0.0014) (0.5377) (0.9066) (0.0014) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00493 0.01498 -0.01424* 0.00573 0.01599 -0.01508* 
(p-value) (0.6761) (0.5043) (0.086) (0.6268) (0.4771) (0.0617) 
Rumor 0.02176 0.05146* -0.00747 0.02119 0.05123* -0.00728 
(p-value) (0.1185) (0.0685) (0.5073) (0.1218) (0.067) (0.5151) 
Complete 0.02949** 0.03633* 0.0029 0.0301** 0.03685* 0.00269 
(p-value) (0.0206) (0.0649) (0.7887) (0.0192) (0.0594) (0.8039) 
Adj-R2 0.1556 0.1043 0.1436 0.1547 0.1035 0.1436 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 743 407 336 743 407 336 
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Table 2-96   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample). 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.13692*** 0.21849*** 0.04826 0.11834*** 0.20221*** 0.04334 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1889) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.231) 
AIV-Variable -0.07081** -0.083* -0.02605    
(p-value) (0.0212) (0.0838) (0.4177)    
VIV-Variable    -0.08422 -0.02659 -0.09684* 
(p-value)       (0.1435) (0.8186) (0.0835) 
Idio_Vol -0.29154 -0.45401 0.08049 -1.03867*** -1.42886*** -0.08594 
(p-value) (0.5622) (0.5437) (0.8867) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.799) 
Target Size -0.00817*** -0.01257*** -0.00207 -0.00779*** -0.01205*** -0.00214 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2292) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.213) 
Target Turnover -0.0001215 -1.736E-05 -0.0002129 -0.0001796 -0.000127 -0.0002359 
(p-value) (0.5855) (0.9588) (0.3384) (0.4246) (0.7059) (0.2906) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.000567 0.00989 -0.01068** 0.0008047 0.00997 -0.01069** 
(p-value) (0.9042) (0.1859) (0.0419) (0.8642) (0.1847) (0.0422) 
Target B/M 0.00324 -0.0001 0.00483* 0.00339 6.052E-05 0.00467* 
(p-value) (0.2758) (0.9895) (0.0714) (0.2644) (0.9937) (0.0834) 
Target Runup 0.00597 0.00726 0.00728 0.00591 0.00789 0.00699 
(p-value) (0.1932) (0.2521) (0.2115) (0.2064) (0.2177) (0.2293) 
Target Markup -0.01535** -0.02151* -0.00665 -0.01642*** -0.02372* -0.00615 
(p-value) (0.013) (0.0878) (0.2219) (0.0086) (0.0642) (0.2536) 
Collar -0.00187 -0.0034 -0.01376 -0.0008584 -0.00262 -0.01686 
(p-value) (0.805) (0.6807) (0.4247) (0.91) (0.753) (0.3429) 
Toehold Exist 0.0161* 0.03826*** 0.01038 0.01755** 0.03963*** 0.01112 
(p-value) (0.0587) (0.0053) (0.3575) (0.0399) (0.0022) (0.3313) 
Horizontal 0.00656 -0.0007753 0.01225** 0.00588 -0.00195 0.01203** 
(p-value) (0.1618) (0.9092) (0.0372) (0.2113) (0.7743) (0.0405) 
Tender Offer 0.00312 -0.0032 0.00346 0.00307 -0.00299 0.00313 
(p-value) (0.4816) (0.785) (0.4513) (0.4914) (0.801) (0.4972) 
Cash Bid 0.02007***   0.02118***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01216 0.05077** -0.0248** 0.01376 0.05283** -0.02484** 
(p-value) (0.3167) (0.0381) (0.0376) (0.2589) (0.0325) (0.0359) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00557 0.01642 -0.01131* 0.00559 0.01754* -0.01115* 
(p-value) (0.32) (0.1051) (0.0545) (0.3157) (0.0784) (0.0573) 
Rumor 0.01596 0.03532* -0.00514 0.0153 0.03483* -0.00529 
(p-value) (0.1535) (0.092) (0.653) (0.1682) (0.0881) (0.6427) 
Complete 0.01703** 0.02664** -0.0006744 0.01777** 0.02791** -0.0003281 
(p-value) (0.0306) (0.0195) (0.9379) (0.0248) (0.0143) (0.9696) 
Adj-R2 0.1851 0.1711 0.1068 0.1777 0.16 0.11 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-97   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample). 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.13724*** 0.22275*** 0.04432 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2297) 
AIV-Bidder -0.07227** -0.09119* 0.0051 
(p-value) (0.0385) (0.0675) (0.8925) 
VIV-Bidder (0.00759) (0.07851) (-0.09942) 
(p-value) (0.9091) (0.5316) (0.1262) 
Idio_Vol -0.28293 -0.46433 -0.20324 
(p-value) (0.5828) (0.5331) (0.736) 
Target Size -0.00817*** -0.01266*** -0.00218 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2066) 
Target Turnover -0.0001211 -2.302E-05 -0.0002323 
(p-value) (0.5867) (0.9446) (0.2963) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0005784 0.01018 -0.0107** 
(p-value) (0.9023) (0.1736) (0.042) 
Target B/M 0.00324 1.024E-05 0.00471* 
(p-value) (0.275) (0.9989) (0.0834) 
Target Runup 0.00599 0.00732 0.0069 
(p-value) (0.1911) (0.2445) (0.2348) 
Target Markup -0.01536** -0.02111* -0.00634 
(p-value) (0.013) (0.093) (0.2375) 
Collar -0.00189 -0.00378 -0.01655 
(p-value) (0.8025) (0.6481) (0.3493) 
Toehold Exist 0.01604* 0.03778*** 0.01116 
(p-value) (0.0592) (0.0051) (0.3334) 
Horizontal 0.00657 -0.000675 0.01214** 
(p-value) (0.1621) (0.9211) (0.0389) 
Tender Offer 0.00315 -0.00319 0.00319 
(p-value) (0.4796) (0.7872) (0.4869) 
Cash Bid 0.02004***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01215 0.05084** -0.0247** 
(p-value) (0.3171) (0.0364) (0.0363) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00555 0.01641 -0.01114* 
(p-value) (0.322) (0.1072) (0.0591) 
Rumor 0.01595 0.03493* -0.0054 
(p-value) (0.1539) (0.0952) (0.6357) 
Complete 0.01699** 0.02622** -0.0004398 
(p-value) (0.0312) (0.0217) (0.9593) 
Adj-R2 0.1845 0.1705 0.1086 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2-98   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for idiosyncratic volatility (Expanded Sample). 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is 
constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by 
the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target 
(Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal 
is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively.  
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -6.3848 -7.4615 -6.8569 23.0043** 22.5788** 22.2514** 
(p-value) (0.653) (0.5859) (0.6309) (0.0252) (0.029) (0.0305) 
AIV-Variable -4.3841***   -5.1613*** -0.542   -2.2051** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.5433)  (0.0405) 
VIV-Variable  -1.9526 2.7975  5.5588** 7.6818*** 
(p-value)   (0.2252) (0.1249)   (0.018) (0.0024) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -30.7056** -74.0747*** -24.2545* -86.5621*** -100.4*** -73.3771*** 
(p-value) (0.0124) (<.0001) (0.0629) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size -1.5784** -1.2859** -1.5954** 0.5276 0.5224 0.4852 
(p-value) (0.0197) (0.0474) (0.0189) (0.3052) (0.3124) (0.346) 
Target Turnover 0.0161 0.0165 0.0167 -0.00626 -0.0065 -0.00603 
(p-value) (0.1251) (0.1106) (0.1127) (0.4338) (0.4176) (0.4515) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5994** -0.6113** -0.5939** -0.3337* -0.3185* -0.3237* 
(p-value) (0.0144) (0.0111) (0.0153) (0.0634) (0.0765) (0.0729) 
Target B/M 0.0246 -0.00273 0.00556 0.1288 0.1422 0.1342 
(p-value) (0.8989) (0.989) (0.9746) (0.2542) (0.2109) (0.2339) 
Acquirer Size 1.2269** 1.0703* 1.2467** -0.5696 -0.5625 -0.5351 
(p-value) (0.0479) (0.0724) (0.0454) (0.2034) (0.2117) (0.2323) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00905 -0.0134 -0.00826 0.0172* 0.0155* 0.0182** 
(p-value) (0.4826) (0.2839) (0.5255) (0.0668) (0.0918) (0.048) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.0182 -0.0383 0.00942 -0.2335 -0.1844 -0.2009 
(p-value) (0.9386) (0.8687) (0.9684) (0.1804) (0.2928) (0.2522) 
Acquirer B/M 0.6068 0.5328 0.5684 0.4327 0.3343 0.3985 
(p-value) (0.1254) (0.1614) (0.1543) (0.1252) (0.2278) (0.1566) 
Relative Size 15.2924 12.7286 15.7639 -21.1073* -20.8346* -20.1104* 
(p-value) (0.3104) (0.3808) (0.2979) (0.0692) (0.0744) (0.0835) 
Collar -2.7645*** -2.6133*** -2.79*** -2.7786*** -2.7546*** -2.7805*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist 0.8169 1.0994* 0.7938 -0.231 -0.2396 -0.2752 
(p-value) (0.1553) (0.0599) (0.167) (0.5509) (0.538) (0.4806) 
Horizontal -0.5729** -0.6318*** -0.5541** -0.4424** -0.4421** -0.4331** 
(p-value) (0.0147) (0.0066) (0.0186) (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0127) 
Tender Offer 2.0601*** 1.8966*** 2.0634*** 2.154*** 2.1679*** 2.1845*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile 0.5129 0.6236 0.4985 0.4396 0.4692 0.4376 
(p-value) (0.351) (0.2717) (0.3626) (0.3796) (0.3514) (0.382) 
Multiple Bidders 0.6607** 0.9146*** 0.5966* 0.3614* 0.3646* 0.3459 
(p-value) (0.0329) (0.0025) (0.0575) (0.0988) (0.0966) (0.1157) 
Rumor 0.7678** 0.6821* 0.7679** 0.4738 0.4294 0.448 
(p-value) (0.0481) (0.0719) (0.0489) (0.2035) (0.2488) (0.229) 
Complete -0.1098 0.0298 -0.1481 -0.2132 -0.199 -0.2258 
(p-value) (0.7228) (0.9213) (0.6356) (0.3651) (0.399) (0.3397) 
Adj-R2 0.396 0.3739 0.398 0.3629 0.3629 0.3649 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-99   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable (Expanded Sample). 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2].  Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before 
the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is 
preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value of 1 if 
there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -3.2315 -4.2868*** -3.3013 5.5277*** 5.4839*** 5.5309*** 
(p-value) (0.2225) (0.1004) (0.2146) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
AIV-Variable -1.5113*   -1.7501* -0.6585   -0.893 
(p-value) (0.0587)  (0.0527) (0.5026)  (0.425) 
VIV-Variable  -0.4848 1.2349  0.2611 1.2289 
(p-value)   (0.8012) (0.562)   (0.9152) (0.6554) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 25.8279** 9.0651 27.735** -13.469 -23.198*** -11.803 
(p-value) (0.0473) (0.3157) (0.0412) (0.3995) (0.0054) (0.4771) 
Target Size 0.283** 0.3198*** 0.286** -0.1173 -0.1178 -0.1169 
(p-value) (0.0217) (0.009) (0.0209) (0.116) (0.1149) (0.1177) 
Target Turnover -0.011 -0.0104 -0.0108 0.00117 0.000883 0.0012 
(p-value) (0.2358) (0.2586) (0.246) (0.899) (0.9234) (0.8965) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5805** -0.5632** -0.5742** -0.3752 -0.367 -0.3686 
(p-value) (0.0427) (0.0491) (0.0457) (0.1125) (0.1212) (0.1197) 
Target B/M -0.3598 -0.404 -0.369 -0.1934 -0.1914 -0.1923 
(p-value) (0.2283) (0.1727) (0.217) (0.2068) (0.2127) (0.2097) 
Target Runup 0.5162 0.5538 0.5034 0.5724 0.5889 0.5863 
(p-value) (0.2782) (0.2483) (0.2924) (0.1145) (0.1084) (0.1083) 
Target Markup -0.0894 -0.2358 -0.0668 -0.1273 -0.1557 -0.126 
(p-value) (0.8397) (0.586) (0.8808) (0.6778) (0.6084) (0.6812) 
Collar 0.5945 0.63 0.596 0.1921 0.2079 0.1843 
(p-value) (0.2588) (0.2338) (0.2569) (0.5954) (0.5654) (0.6104) 
Toehold Exist -1.0743* -0.9883* -1.0892* -0.991** -0.9851** -0.9963 
(p-value) (0.0579) (0.0797) (0.0546) (0.0236) (0.0242) (0.0228) 
Horizontal 0.3178 0.3095 0.3227 0.1126 0.1067 0.1116 
(p-value) (0.2639) (0.2753) (0.257) (0.6186) (0.6366) (0.6217) 
Tender Offer 1.259*** 1.1905*** 1.2424*** 1.1257*** 1.1263*** 1.1267*** 
(p-value) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cash Bid 0.3449 0.4378 0.3355 0.0603 0.0557 0.0511 
(p-value) (0.218) (0.1104) (0.2323) (0.7904) (0.8064) (0.8222) 
Hostile -3.6925*** -3.6365*** -3.6892*** -2.7149*** -2.7043*** -2.7109*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.3347*** -2.2561*** -2.358*** -2.0206*** -2.0202*** -2.022*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.4267 0.3567 0.411 0.3702 0.3661 0.3628 
(p-value) (0.4188) (0.4914) (0.4363) (0.4858) (0.4916) (0.495) 
Adj-R2 0.1916 0.1879 0.192 0.1307 0.1304 0.1308 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 






2.23 Appendix P – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with 
idiosyncratic volatility as Control in the Expanded Sample – Idiosyncratic Volatility Estimated 
over the [-256, -43]  
Table 2-100   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample). 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.09173 0.03352 0.17662* 0.06244 0.00993 0.1829** 
(p-value) (0.3506) (0.8098) (0.0532) (0.5191) (0.9433) (0.0327) 
AIV-Variable -0.02636 -0.02643 0.00759    
(p-value) (0.3222) (0.4662) (0.7543)    
VIV-Variable    -0.00729 -0.02781 0.01631 
(p-value)    (0.9136) (0.7937) (0.7444) 
Idio_Vol 0.2369 0.56959 -0.33349 0.01642 0.3405 -0.28623 
(p-value) (0.5835) (0.3798) (0.3174) (0.9637) (0.5272) (0.3096) 
Target Size -0.00923** -0.00745 -0.0073** -0.00812** -0.00658 -0.00751** 
(p-value) (0.0239) (0.216) (0.0466) (0.0445) (0.2762) (0.0284) 
Target Turnover -0.0003655 -0.0004702 2.977E-05 -0.0003776 -0.0004937 4.138E-05 
(p-value) (0.2564) (0.3558) (0.9307) (0.2386) (0.3331) (0.9026) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00679 0.01039 -0.00311 0.00733 0.01108 -0.00315 
(p-value) (0.4442) (0.5309) (0.6626) (0.4093) (0.5032) (0.6578) 
Target B/M -0.01245*** -0.0126*** -0.00657 -0.01281*** -0.0134*** -0.00696 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0003) (0.4807) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.4555) 
Target Runup -0.00911 8.729E-05 -0.00588 -0.00987 0.0001956 -0.00634 
(p-value) (0.6058) (0.9971) (0.6443) (0.5849) (0.9936) (0.6382) 
Target Markup -0.03136** -0.03859 -0.02216** -0.03341** -0.0404 -0.02171** 
(p-value) (0.0479) (0.1451) (0.0317) (0.0286) (0.117) (0.0324) 
Collar 0.02086 0.02312 0.01452 0.02201 0.02356 0.0142 
(p-value) (0.236) (0.2728) (0.4729) (0.2062) (0.2601) (0.4806) 
Toehold Exist 0.02382* 0.05317* 0.02458 0.02387* 0.0555* 0.02497 
(p-value) (0.0877) (0.0602) (0.1066) (0.087) (0.0508) (0.102) 
Horizontal 0.0006839 -0.01536 0.01768** 0.0005323 -0.01582 0.01785** 
(p-value) (0.9356) (0.2199) (0.0212) (0.9492) (0.2028) (0.0192) 
Tender Offer 0.00946 0.03252** -4.899E-05 0.00901 0.0332** 0.0001577 
(p-value) (0.1525) (0.0403) (0.9939) (0.1704) (0.0412) (0.9799) 
Cash Bid 0.02732***   0.02865***   
(p-value) (0.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00994 0.00245 -0.04205*** -0.00904 0.00426 -0.04234*** 
(p-value) (0.5001) (0.9364) (0.0016) (0.544) (0.89) (0.0016) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00498 0.01524 -0.01547* 0.0054 0.01594 -0.01596* 
(p-value) (0.6717) (0.4967) (0.0628) (0.6452) (0.4779) (0.0514) 
Rumor 0.02163 0.05187* -0.00725 0.02071 0.05118* -0.00715 
(p-value) (0.1231) (0.0677) (0.5206) (0.1323) (0.0675) (0.5241) 
Complete 0.02913** 0.03557* 0.0027 0.0299** 0.0363* 0.00253 
(p-value) (0.0211) (0.0673) (0.8023) (0.0194) (0.0619) (0.815) 
Adj-R2 0.156 0.1052 0.1434 0.1545 0.1041 0.1435 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 743 407 336 743 407 336 
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Table 2-101   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample). 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.13648*** 0.21768*** 0.04768 0.11347*** 0.18238*** 0.04988 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1937) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.166) 
AIV-Variable -0.07675*** -0.08912** -0.03124    
(p-value) (0.0067) (0.0386) (0.3103)    
VIV-Variable    -0.06691 -0.03125 -0.08228 
(p-value)    (0.2385) (0.7846) (0.1252) 
Idio_Vol -0.17845 -0.34418 0.19601 -1.00509*** -1.28224*** -0.28594 
(p-value) (0.6913) (0.5975) (0.7047) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.3556) 
Target Size -0.00815*** -0.01255*** -0.00205 -0.00732*** -0.01134*** -0.0023 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.235) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1814) 
Target Turnover -0.000125 -2.011E-05 -0.000217 -0.0002102 -0.0001783 -0.0002215 
(p-value) (0.5761) (0.9524) (0.3311) (0.3408) (0.5901) (0.3233) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0006125 0.00994 -0.0107** 0.00158 0.01224 -0.01083** 
(p-value) (0.8965) (0.1835) (0.0418) (0.7376) (0.105) (0.0399) 
Target B/M 0.0032 -0.0001946 0.00474* 0.00256 -0.0006046 0.00474* 
(p-value) (0.2803) (0.9796) (0.0728) (0.3958) (0.9387) (0.0741) 
Target Runup 0.00599 0.00724 0.00732 0.00709 0.00882 0.00677 
(p-value) (0.1906) (0.2522) (0.2082) (0.1424) (0.1943) (0.2455) 
Target Markup -0.01515** -0.02133* -0.00647 -0.01552** -0.02271* -0.00668 
(p-value) (0.0139) (0.0905) (0.2349) (0.0121) (0.0687) (0.2214) 
Collar -0.00197 -0.0035 -0.01406 -0.0009755 -0.00228 -0.01504 
(p-value) (0.7947) (0.6722) (0.4186) (0.8973) (0.7851) (0.3918) 
Toehold Exist 0.01618* 0.03849*** 0.01029 0.01777** 0.04018*** 0.01092 
(p-value) (0.0577) (0.0051) (0.3607) (0.0371) (0.003) (0.3321) 
Horizontal 0.00652 -0.0008125 0.01213** 0.00549 -0.00249 0.01236** 
(p-value) (0.1646) (0.9049) (0.039) (0.2411) (0.7152) (0.0332) 
Tender Offer 0.00309 -0.00315 0.00341 0.00361 -0.0006878 0.00342 
(p-value) (0.4858) (0.7886) (0.4583) (0.4147) (0.9526) (0.4562) 
Cash Bid 0.02023***   0.02244***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01214 0.05081** -0.02496** 0.01235 0.05166** -0.02461** 
(p-value) (0.3181) (0.0379) (0.037) (0.3181) (0.0355) (0.0382) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00555 0.01634 -0.01123* 0.00553 0.01535 -0.01087* 
(p-value) (0.3227) (0.1071) (0.056) (0.3212) (0.1209) (0.0658) 
Rumor 0.0161 0.03548* -0.00499 0.01615 0.03642* -0.00526 
(p-value) (0.1507) (0.0914) (0.6623) (0.1519) (0.081) (0.6451) 
Complete 0.01713** 0.02677** -0.0004695 0.01821** 0.02777** -0.0004385 
(p-value) (0.0298) (0.0193) (0.9568) (0.0203) (0.0135) (0.9593) 
Adj-R2 0.1849 0.1709 0.107 0.178 0.1569 0.1114 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-102   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample). 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.13688*** 0.22174*** 0.04403 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2324) 
AIV-Bidder -0.07861** -0.09758** -0.00294 
(p-value) (0.0147) (0.0308) (0.9351) 
VIV-Bidder (0.00987) (0.07665) (-0.09337) 
(p-value) (0.8817) (0.5412) (0.1507) 
Idio_Vol -0.16809 -0.34551 -0.05251 
(p-value) (0.7139) (0.5943) (0.9241) 
Target Size -0.00814*** -0.01264*** -0.00215 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2122) 
Target Turnover -0.0001245 -2.587E-05 -0.0002351 
(p-value) (0.5775) (0.9379) (0.2927) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0006278 0.01024 -0.01071** 
(p-value) (0.8939) (0.1711) (0.0418) 
Target B/M 0.00321 -9.586E-05 0.00467* 
(p-value) (0.2794) (0.99) (0.0823) 
Target Runup 0.00602 0.0073 0.00698 
(p-value) (0.1878) (0.2447) (0.229) 
Target Markup -0.01516** -0.02092* -0.00615 
(p-value) (0.014) (0.0959) (0.2535) 
Collar -0.002 -0.00388 -0.01677 
(p-value) (0.7915) (0.6399) (0.3469) 
Toehold Exist 0.01611* 0.03803*** 0.01106 
(p-value) (0.0583) (0.0049) (0.3371) 
Horizontal 0.00652 -0.0007174 0.01204** 
(p-value) (0.1648) (0.9162) (0.0404) 
Tender Offer 0.00312 -0.00312 0.00314 
(p-value) (0.4826) (0.7913) (0.4938) 
Cash Bid 0.02019***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01212 0.05088** -0.02487** 
(p-value) (0.3187) (0.0363) (0.0356) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00551 0.01631 -0.01112* 
(p-value) (0.3252) (0.1094) (0.0592) 
Rumor 0.01609 0.03511* -0.00524 
(p-value) (0.1512) (0.0944) (0.6455) 
Complete 0.01708** 0.02636** -0.0003245 
(p-value) (0.0305) (0.0213) (0.97) 
Adj-R2 0.1843 0.1702 0.1084 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 1342 677 665 
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Table 2-103   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility (Expanded Sample). 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before 
the announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is 
constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by 
the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target 
(Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal 
is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively.  
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -7.2118 -7.343 -7.6075 21.883** 20.7509** 21.094** 
(p-value) (0.6093) (0.5921) (0.5913) (0.0323) (0.0432) (0.0389) 
AIV-Variable -4.1628***   -4.7397*** -1.4458*   -3.1532*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0713)  (0.0013) 
VIV-Variable  -2.8845* 2.1395  4.2328* 7.8532*** 
(p-value)   (0.0673) (0.2471)   (0.0626) (0.0016) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -39.3365*** -78.8937*** -34.2109*** -71.085*** -93.521*** -57.7297*** 
(p-value) (0.001) (<.0001) (0.007) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size -1.6615** -1.3419** -1.6718** 0.4787 0.4588 0.4348 
(p-value) (0.014) (0.039) (0.0136) (0.3499) (0.3718) (0.3958) 
Target Turnover 0.0198* 0.0203* 0.0198* -0.00634 -0.007 -0.0061 
(p-value) (0.0652) (0.0523) (0.0645) (0.4252) (0.3783) (0.4439) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.6092** -0.6312*** -0.6046** -0.341* -0.3238* -0.3288* 
(p-value) (0.0131) (0.0089) (0.0138) (0.0573) (0.0704) (0.0682) 
Target B/M 0.009 -0.0278 -0.00483 0.1367 0.1578 0.1405 
(p-value) (0.9633) (0.8846) (0.9786) (0.227) (0.1677) (0.2135) 
Acquirer Size 1.2857** 1.0958* 1.3005** -0.5226 -0.4948 -0.4861 
(p-value) (0.0375) (0.0662) (0.036) (0.2406) (0.2687) (0.2749) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00944 -0.0142 -0.00865 0.018* 0.0147 0.0189** 
(p-value) (0.4697) (0.262) (0.5098) (0.0537) (0.105) (0.0375) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.0286 -0.0586 -0.00667 -0.2395 -0.1839 -0.2076 
(p-value) (0.904) (0.8009) (0.9776) (0.1683) (0.2922) (0.2355) 
Acquirer B/M 0.573 0.5147 0.5485 0.4893* 0.374 0.4489 
(p-value) (0.1536) (0.1799) (0.1737) (0.0793) (0.171) (0.1072) 
Relative Size 16.7076 13.3794 17.0442 -19.9277* -19.1877* -18.8968 
(p-value) (0.2654) (0.3574) (0.2576) (0.0846) (0.0981) (0.1019) 
Collar -2.7483*** -2.6786*** -2.7643*** -2.8117*** -2.7858*** -2.8111*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist 0.7806 0.9176 0.7851 -0.2345 -0.2225 -0.281 
(p-value) (0.1776) (0.1164) (0.1747) (0.5452) (0.5673) (0.472) 
Horizontal -0.5667** -0.6094*** -0.5549** -0.4405** -0.4448*** -0.4311** 
(p-value) (0.0161) (0.0089) (0.0187) (0.0103) (0.0096) (0.0129) 
Tender Offer 2.0704*** 1.9031*** 2.0714*** 2.1465*** 2.1526*** 2.1834*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile 0.5739 0.7524 0.5532 0.445 0.4879 0.4356 
(p-value) (0.297) (0.1845) (0.3132) (0.3718) (0.3311) (0.3823) 
Multiple Bidders 0.6284** 0.7974*** 0.5874* 0.342 0.3508 0.3289 
(p-value) (0.0426) (0.0092) (0.0605) (0.1166) (0.1075) (0.1333) 
Rumor 0.746* 0.6583* 0.7482* 0.4974 0.4548 0.4692 
(p-value) (0.0554) (0.0818) (0.0553) (0.1829) (0.2228) (0.2084) 
Complete -0.0705 0.1014 -0.1049 -0.2161 -0.188 -0.2312 
(p-value) (0.8209) (0.7394) (0.7385) (0.3574) (0.4235) (0.3273) 
Adj-R2 0.4001 0.3791 0.4012 0.3574 0.3576 0.3627 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-104   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable (Expanded Sample). 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43].  Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before 
the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is 
preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value of 1 if 
there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -3.8718 -5.0405* -4.0683 5.5301*** 5.4482*** 5.5317*** 
(p-value) (0.1507) (0.0598) (0.1341) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
AIV-Variable -1.5658**   -2.0022** -0.7611   -0.9856 
(p-value) (0.0317)  (0.0209) (0.3886)  (0.3336) 
VIV-Variable  -0.353 2.1281  -0.00221 1.226 
(p-value)   (0.8529) (0.3445)   (0.9993) (0.6555) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 31.9691** 14.9477 36.3593*** -11.7415 -21.9341*** -10.2381 
(p-value) (0.0128) (0.1208) (0.0089) (0.4037) (0.0064) (0.4832) 
Target Size 0.3068** 0.348*** 0.3149** -0.1174 -0.1172 -0.117 
(p-value) (0.0141) (0.0053) (0.0125) (0.116) (0.1173) (0.1179) 
Target Turnover -0.0142 -0.0133 -0.0144 0.00115 0.000679 0.00119 
(p-value) (0.1348) (0.1549) (0.1334) (0.9007) (0.941) (0.8979) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5638** -0.5333* -0.5508* -0.3754 -0.3657 -0.3688 
(p-value) (0.0486) (0.0621) (0.0552) (0.1123) (0.1223) (0.1195) 
Target B/M -0.3628 -0.4274 -0.3777 -0.1927 -0.1912 -0.1918 
(p-value) (0.2309) (0.1541) (0.2134) (0.2083) (0.2132) (0.2109) 
Target Runup 0.6505 0.5973 0.636 0.5756 0.5966 0.5891 
(p-value) (0.1658) (0.2119) (0.1776) (0.1132) (0.1056) (0.1071) 
Target Markup -0.0729 -0.2385 -0.0336 -0.1232 -0.1536 -0.1222 
(p-value) (0.8692) (0.582) (0.9401) (0.6871) (0.6133) (0.6897) 
Collar 0.5912 0.6333 0.5952 0.1905 0.2084 0.1828 
(p-value) (0.2611) (0.2322) (0.2568) (0.5985) (0.5648) (0.6132) 
Toehold Exist -0.9585* -0.9525* -0.9697* -0.9874** -0.9743** -0.9931** 
(p-value) (0.0943) (0.0926) (0.0898) (0.0241) (0.0259) (0.0233) 
Horizontal 0.3108 0.3129 0.3172 0.1152 0.1096 0.1139 
(p-value) (0.273) (0.27) (0.2641) (0.6108) (0.628) (0.6149) 
Tender Offer 1.2692*** 1.1836*** 1.2432*** 1.1259*** 1.1261*** 1.1269*** 
(p-value) (0.001) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cash Bid 0.3963 0.4949* 0.3893 0.0628 0.0656 0.0534 
(p-value) (0.1597) (0.0732) (0.1687) (0.7814) (0.7719) (0.8141) 
Hostile -3.7217*** -3.6516*** -3.7207*** -2.7135*** -2.7005*** -2.7098*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.3022*** -2.2522*** -2.3387*** -2.0225*** -2.0237*** -2.0236*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.456 0.3521 0.4328 0.3738 0.3749 0.3659 
(p-value) (0.3941) (0.4987) (0.4188) (0.4815) (0.4811) (0.4912) 
Adj-R2 0.1944 0.1895 0.1954 0.1307 0.1302 0.1308 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 







2.24 Appendix Q – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with 
idiosyncratic volatility as Control in the Expanded Sample – Idiosyncratic Volatility Estimated 
over the [-256, -2] interval – AIV and VIV are orthogonalizedd against the Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
Table 2-105   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) 
while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.09764 0.04336 0.17571* 0.07812 0.02583 0.18342** 
(p-value) (0.3077) (0.7521) (0.0541) (0.4051) (0.8494) (0.0377) 
AIV-Variable -0.02282 -0.02615 0.01098    
(p-value) (0.4034) (0.4889) (0.679)    
VIV-Variable    -0.00369 -0.03305 0.01928 
(p-value)       (0.9558) (0.7539) (0.7032) 
Idio_Vol -0.17626 0.1232 -0.24563 -0.1175 0.18354 -0.26555 
(p-value) (0.6133) (0.8152) (0.4148) (0.7268) (0.7204) (0.3693) 
Target Size -0.00951** -0.00787 -0.00703* -0.0086** -0.00711 -0.0074** 
(p-value) (0.0201) (0.1925) (0.0573) (0.0319) (0.2376) (0.0326) 
Target Turnover -0.0003108 -0.0003939 0.0000234 -0.0003249 -0.0004234 3.871E-05 
(p-value) (0.311) (0.4257) (0.9453) (0.2799) (0.3868) (0.9087) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00644 0.00993 -0.00284 0.00681 0.01046 -0.00295 
(p-value) (0.465) (0.5464) (0.6898) (0.4406) (0.5244) (0.6783) 
Target B/M -0.0126*** -0.01289*** -0.00646 -0.0129*** -0.01359*** -0.00695 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.4938) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4619) 
Target Runup -0.00967 -0.00169 -0.00375 -0.00906 -0.0005724 -0.00464 
(p-value) (0.5915) (0.9465) (0.7774) (0.624) (0.9818) (0.7374) 
Target Markup -0.03167** -0.03936 -0.02202** -0.03313** -0.04083 -0.0214** 
(p-value) (0.0456) (0.1374) (0.0316) (0.0309) (0.1147) (0.0346) 
Collar 0.02077 0.02305 0.01366 0.02156 0.0233 0.01342 
(p-value) (0.2383) (0.2751) (0.4935) (0.2163) (0.2669) (0.5013) 
Toehold Exist 0.02411* 0.05244* 0.02417 0.02472* 0.05513* 0.02471 
(p-value) (0.087) (0.0619) (0.1167) (0.0804) (0.0507) (0.1092) 
Horizontal 0.0006245 -0.01579 0.01777** 0.0006316 -0.01598 0.01795** 
(p-value) (0.9411) (0.2079) (0.0205) (0.9397) (0.2006) (0.0183) 
Tender Offer 0.00925 0.03208** 0.00002876 0.00888 0.03282** 0.0002943 
(p-value) (0.1621) (0.0428) (0.9964) (0.1767) (0.0435) (0.9627) 
Cash Bid 0.02726***   0.02835***   
(p-value) (0.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00975 0.00179 -0.04268*** -0.00919 0.00362 -0.04286*** 
(p-value) (0.5087) (0.9535) (0.0014) (0.5377) (0.9066) (0.0014) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00493 0.01498 -0.01424* 0.00573 0.01599 -0.01508* 
(p-value) (0.6761) (0.5043) (0.086) (0.6268) (0.4771) (0.0617) 
Rumor 0.02176 0.05146* -0.00747 0.02119 0.05123* -0.00728 
(p-value) (0.1185) (0.0685) (0.5073) (0.1218) (0.067) (0.5151) 
Complete 0.02949** 0.03633* 0.0029 0.0301** 0.03685* 0.00269 
(p-value) (0.0206) (0.0649) (0.7887) (0.0192) (0.0594) (0.8039) 
Adj-R2 0.1556 0.1043 0.1436 0.1547 0.1035 0.1436 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-106   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) 
while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.13068*** 0.21121*** 0.04601 0.1226*** 0.20968*** 0.04402 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2075) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2268) 
AIV-Variable -0.07081** -0.083* -0.02605    
(p-value) (0.0212) (0.0838) (0.4177)    
VIV-Variable    -0.06776 0.00196 -0.09396* 
(p-value)       (0.2383) (0.9867) (0.0914) 
Idio_Vol -1.3016*** -1.63651*** -0.29486 -1.25063*** -1.58283*** -0.25263 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.402) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4668) 
Target Size -0.00817*** -0.01257*** -0.00207 -0.00791*** -0.01224*** -0.0022 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2292) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1984) 
Target Turnover -0.0001215 -1.736E-05 -0.0002129 -0.0001594 -9.592E-05 -0.0002311 
(p-value) (0.5855) (0.9588) (0.3384) (0.4751) (0.7737) (0.2991) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.000567 0.00989 -0.01068** 0.000673 0.00985 -0.01073** 
(p-value) (0.9042) (0.1859) (0.0419) (0.8863) (0.1904) (0.0416) 
Target B/M 0.00324 -0.0001 0.00483* 0.00337 0.0003723 0.00472* 
(p-value) (0.2758) (0.9895) (0.0714) (0.2664) (0.961) (0.0816) 
Target Runup 0.00597 0.00726 0.00728 0.00592 0.00783 0.0069 
(p-value) (0.1932) (0.2521) (0.2115) (0.2053) (0.2203) (0.2346) 
Target Markup -0.01535** -0.02151* -0.00665 -0.01664*** -0.02373* -0.00632 
(p-value) (0.013) (0.0878) (0.2219) (0.0076) (0.0625) (0.2401) 
Collar -0.00187 -0.0034 -0.01376 -0.0008479 -0.00258 -0.01644 
(p-value) (0.805) (0.6807) (0.4247) (0.9108) (0.7564) (0.3527) 
Toehold Exist 0.0161* 0.03826*** 0.01038 0.01701** 0.03846*** 0.01108 
(p-value) (0.0587) (0.0053) (0.3575) (0.0462) (0.003) (0.3317) 
Horizontal 0.00656 -0.0007753 0.01225** 0.00612 -0.00155 0.01214** 
(p-value) (0.1618) (0.9092) (0.0372) (0.1932) (0.8203) (0.0388) 
Tender Offer 0.00312 -0.0032 0.00346 0.00318 -0.00322 0.0032 
(p-value) (0.4816) (0.785) (0.4513) (0.475) (0.7854) (0.4864) 
Cash Bid 0.02007***   0.0206***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01216 0.05077** -0.0248** 0.01337 0.05226** -0.02476** 
(p-value) (0.3167) (0.0381) (0.0376) (0.2717) (0.0338) (0.0365) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00557 0.01642 -0.01131* 0.00567 0.01758* -0.01111* 
(p-value) (0.32) (0.1051) (0.0545) (0.3086) (0.0776) (0.0589) 
Rumor 0.01596 0.03532* -0.00514 0.01513 0.0343* -0.00532 
(p-value) (0.1535) (0.092) (0.653) (0.1735) (0.094) (0.641) 
Complete 0.01703** 0.02664** -0.0006744 0.01738** 0.0271** -0.0004421 
(p-value) (0.0306) (0.0195) (0.9379) (0.0275) (0.0168) (0.9591) 
Adj-R2 0.1851 0.1711 0.1068 0.1799 0.1634 0.1101 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 2-107   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.13142*** 0.21591*** 0.04367 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2333) 
AIV-Bidder -0.07364** -0.08766* -0.00332 
(p-value) (0.0287) (0.07) (0.9283) 
VIV-Bidder 0.01866 0.08392 -0.08068 
(p-value) (0.7685) (0.4791) (0.1955) 
Idio_Vol -1.31092*** -1.67088*** -0.25193 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4697) 
Target Size -0.00816*** -0.01266*** -0.00217 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2078) 
Target Turnover -0.0001205 -2.321E-05 -0.0002288 
(p-value) (0.5878) (0.9442) (0.3038) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0006001 0.01027 -0.01069** 
(p-value) (0.8986) (0.17) (0.042) 
Target B/M 0.00325 7.211E-05 0.00476* 
(p-value) (0.2744) (0.9925) (0.0824) 
Target Runup 0.00604 0.00736 0.00697 
(p-value) (0.1874) (0.2425) (0.2308) 
Target Markup -0.01537** -0.02112* -0.00635 
(p-value) (0.0129) (0.0918) (0.2389) 
Collar -0.00191 -0.0037 -0.01627 
(p-value) (0.8006) (0.6548) (0.3568) 
Toehold Exist 0.01596* 0.03765*** 0.01103 
(p-value) (0.0598) (0.0052) (0.3394) 
Horizontal 0.00658 -0.0006616 0.01214** 
(p-value) (0.1614) (0.9227) (0.0388) 
Tender Offer 0.00319 -0.00312 0.00321 
(p-value) (0.4727) (0.7911) (0.4843) 
Cash Bid 0.02***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01211 0.05077** -0.02475** 
(p-value) (0.3185) (0.0365) (0.036) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00552 0.01638 -0.01123* 
(p-value) (0.3246) (0.1074) (0.0567) 
Rumor 0.01592 0.03485* -0.00535 
(p-value) (0.1546) (0.0957) (0.6386) 
Complete 0.01692** 0.02609** -0.0005706 
(p-value) (0.0318) (0.022) (0.9473) 
Adj-R2 0.1846 0.1707 0.1076 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2-108   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is 
constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by 
the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target 
(Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal 
is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively.  
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -7.1702 -7.5308 -7.6823 22.9565** 22.6269** 22.1235** 
(p-value) (0.6136) (0.5824) (0.5903) (0.0255) (0.0287) (0.0314) 
AIV-Variable -4.3841***  -5.1613*** -0.542  -2.2051** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.5433)  (0.0405) 
VIV-Variable  -1.9526 2.7975  5.5588** 7.6818*** 
(p-value)  (0.2252) (0.1249)  (0.018) (0.0024) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -83.9757*** -76.0789*** -84.0966*** -94.2935*** -92.9124*** -94.5123*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size -1.5784** -1.2859** -1.5954** 0.5276 0.5224 0.4852 
(p-value) (0.0197) (0.0474) (0.0189) (0.3052) (0.3124) (0.346) 
Target Turnover 0.0161 0.0165 0.0167 -0.00626 -0.0065 -0.00603 
(p-value) (0.1251) (0.1106) (0.1127) (0.4338) (0.4176) (0.4515) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5994** -0.6113** -0.5939** -0.3337* -0.3185* -0.3237* 
(p-value) (0.0144) (0.0111) (0.0153) (0.0634) (0.0765) (0.0729) 
Target B/M 0.0246 -0.00273 0.00556 0.1288 0.1422 0.1342 
(p-value) (0.8989) (0.989) (0.9746) (0.2542) (0.2109) (0.2339) 
Acquirer Size 1.2269** 1.0703* 1.2467** -0.5696 -0.5625 -0.5351 
(p-value) (0.0479) (0.0724) (0.0454) (0.2034) (0.2117) (0.2323) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00905 -0.0134 -0.00826 0.0172* 0.0155* 0.0182** 
(p-value) (0.4826) (0.2839) (0.5255) (0.0668) (0.0918) (0.048) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.0182 -0.0383 0.00942 -0.2335 -0.1844 -0.2009 
(p-value) (0.9386) (0.8687) (0.9684) (0.1804) (0.2928) (0.2522) 
Acquirer B/M 0.6068 0.5328 0.5684 0.4327 0.3343 0.3985 
(p-value) (0.1254) (0.1614) (0.1543) (0.1252) (0.2278) (0.1566) 
Relative Size 15.2924 12.7286 15.7639 -21.1073* -20.8346* -20.1104* 
(p-value) (0.3104) (0.3808) (0.2979) (0.0692) (0.0744) (0.0835) 
Collar -2.7645*** -2.6133*** -2.79*** -2.7786*** -2.7546*** -2.7805*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist 0.8169 1.0994* 0.7938 -0.231 -0.2396 -0.2752 
(p-value) (0.1553) (0.0599) (0.167) (0.5509) (0.538) (0.4806) 
Horizontal -0.5729** -0.6318*** -0.5541** -0.4424** -0.4421** -0.4331** 
(p-value) (0.0147) (0.0066) (0.0186) (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0127) 
Tender Offer 2.0601*** 1.8966*** 2.0634*** 2.154*** 2.1679*** 2.1845*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile 0.5129 0.6236 0.4985 0.4396 0.4692 0.4376 
(p-value) (0.351) (0.2717) (0.3626) (0.3796) (0.3514) (0.382) 
Multiple Bidders 0.6607*** 0.9146*** 0.5966* 0.3614* 0.3646* 0.3459 
(p-value) (0.0329) (0.0025) (0.0575) (0.0988) (0.0966) (0.1157) 
Rumor 0.7678** 0.6821* 0.7679** 0.4738 0.4294 0.448 
(p-value) (0.0481) (0.0719) (0.0489) (0.2035) (0.2488) (0.229) 
Complete -0.1098 0.0298 -0.1481 -0.2132 -0.199 -0.2258 
(p-value) (0.7228) (0.9213) (0.6356) (0.3651) (0.399) (0.3397) 
Adj-R2 0.396 0.3739 0.398 0.3601 0.3629 0.3649 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 






Table 2-109   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 2 trading days before the announcement [-256, -2]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before 
the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is 
preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value of 1 if 
there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-2] window 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -3.5022 -4.304* -3.571 5.4696*** 5.4862*** 5.4628*** 
(p-value) (0.1816) (0.098) (0.1752) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
AIV-Variable -1.5113*   -1.7501* -0.6585   -0.893 
(p-value) (0.0587)  (0.0527) (0.5026)  (0.425) 
VIV-Variable  -0.4848 1.2349  0.2611 1.2289 
(p-value)   (0.8012) (0.562)   (0.9152) (0.6554) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 7.4644 8.5675 7.7379 -22.8627*** -22.8471*** -22.8911*** 
(p-value) (0.4079) (0.3378) (0.3918) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) 
Target Size 0.283** 0.3198*** 0.286** -0.1173 -0.1178 -0.1169 
(p-value) (0.0217) (0.009) (0.0209) (0.116) (0.1149) (0.1177) 
Target Turnover -0.011 -0.0104 -0.0108 0.00117 0.000883 0.0012 
(p-value) (0.2358) (0.2586) (0.246) (0.899) (0.9234) (0.8965) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5805** -0.5632** -0.5742** -0.3752 -0.367 -0.3686 
(p-value) (0.0427) (0.0491) (0.0457) (0.1125) (0.1212) (0.1197) 
Target B/M -0.3598 -0.404 -0.369 -0.1934 -0.1914 -0.1923 
(p-value) (0.2283) (0.1727) (0.217) (0.2068) (0.2127) (0.2097) 
Target Runup 0.5162 0.5538 0.5034 0.5724 0.5889 0.5863 
(p-value) (0.2782) (0.2483) (0.2924) (0.1145) (0.1084) (0.1083) 
Target Markup -0.0894 -0.2358 -0.0668 -0.1273 -0.1557 -0.126 
(p-value) (0.8397) (0.586) (0.8808) (0.6778) (0.6084) (0.6812) 
Collar 0.5945 0.63 0.596 0.1921 0.2079 0.1843 
(p-value) (0.2588) (0.2338) (0.2569) (0.5954) (0.5654) (0.6104) 
Toehold Exist -1.0743* -0.9883* -1.0892* -0.991** -0.9851** -0.9963** 
(p-value) (0.0579) (0.0797) (0.0546) (0.0236) (0.0242) (0.0228) 
Horizontal 0.3178 0.3095 0.3227 0.1126 0.1067 0.1116 
(p-value) (0.2639) (0.2753) (0.257) (0.6186) (0.6366) (0.6217) 
Tender Offer 1.259*** 1.1905*** 1.2424*** 1.1257*** 1.1263*** 1.1267*** 
(p-value) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cash Bid 0.3449 0.4378 0.3355 0.0603 0.0557 0.0511 
(p-value) (0.218) (0.1104) (0.2323) (0.7904) (0.8064) (0.8222) 
Hostile -3.6925*** -3.6365*** -3.6892*** -2.7149*** -2.7043*** -2.7109*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.3347*** -2.2561*** -2.358*** -2.0206*** -2.0202*** -2.022*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.4267 0.3567 0.411 0.3702 0.3661 0.3628 
(p-value) (0.4188) (0.4914) (0.4363) (0.4858) (0.4916) (0.495) 
Adj-R2 0.1916 0.1879 0.192 0.1307 0.1304 0.1308 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 
Number of Cases 743 743 743 1342 1342 1342 
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2.25 Appendix R – Tests Performed with AIV and VIV as main explanatory Variables with 
idiosyncratic volatility as Control in the Expanded Sample – Idiosyncratic Volatility Estimated 
over the [-256, -43] interval – AIV and VIV are orthogonalizedd against the Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
Table 2-110   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
 Target AIV Related Tests Target VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.08666 0.02819 0.17812** 0.06211 0.00866 0.18354** 
(p-value) (0.3696) (0.8371) (0.047) (0.517) (0.9499) (0.0316) 
AIV-Variable -0.02636 -0.02643 0.00759    
(p-value) (0.3222) (0.4662) (0.7543)    
VIV-Variable    -0.00729 -0.02781 0.01631 
(p-value)       (0.9136) (0.7937) (0.7444) 
Idio_Vol -0.077 0.25421 -0.24816 0.01093 0.3216 -0.26943 
(p-value) (0.8338) (0.6375) (0.3979) (0.9759) (0.5536) (0.3323) 
Target Size -0.00923** -0.00745 -0.0073** -0.00812** -0.00658 -0.00751* 
(p-value) (0.0239) (0.216) (0.0466) (0.0445) (0.2762) (0.0284) 
Target Turnover -0.0003655 -0.0004702 0.00002977 -0.0003776 -0.0004937 4.138E-05 
(p-value) (0.2564) (0.3558) (0.9307) (0.2386) (0.3331) (0.9026) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.00679 0.01039 -0.00311 0.00733 0.01108 -0.00315 
(p-value) (0.4442) (0.5309) (0.6626) (0.4093) (0.5032) (0.6578) 
Target B/M -0.01245*** -0.0126*** -0.00657 -0.01281*** -0.0134*** -0.00696 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0003) (0.4807) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.4555) 
Target Runup -0.00911 0.00008729 -0.00588 -0.00987 0.0001956 -0.00634 
(p-value) (0.6058) (0.9971) (0.6443) (0.5849) (0.9936) (0.6382) 
Target Markup -0.03136** -0.03859 -0.02216** -0.03341** -0.0404 -0.02171** 
(p-value) (0.0479) (0.1451) (0.0317) (0.0286) (0.117) (0.0324) 
Collar 0.02086 0.02312 0.01452 0.02201 0.02356 0.0142 
(p-value) (0.236) (0.2728) (0.4729) (0.2062) (0.2601) (0.4806) 
Toehold Exist 0.02382* 0.05317* 0.02458 0.02387* 0.0555* 0.02497 
(p-value) (0.0877) (0.0602) (0.1066) (0.087) (0.0508) (0.102) 
Horizontal 0.0006839 -0.01536 0.01768** 0.0005323 -0.01582 0.01785** 
(p-value) (0.9356) (0.2199) (0.0212) (0.9492) (0.2028) (0.0192) 
Tender Offer 0.00946 0.03252** -4.899E-05 0.00901 0.0332 0.0001577 
(p-value) (0.1525) (0.0403) (0.9939) (0.1704) (0.0412) (0.9799) 
Cash Bid 0.02732***   0.02865***   
(p-value) (0.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile -0.00994 0.00245 -0.04205*** -0.00904 0.00426 -0.04234*** 
(p-value) (0.5001) (0.9364) (0.0016) (0.544) (0.89) (0.0016) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00498 0.01524 -0.01547* 0.0054 0.01594 -0.01596* 
(p-value) (0.6717) (0.4967) (0.0628) (0.6452) (0.4779) (0.0514) 
Rumor 0.02163 0.05187* -0.00725 0.02071 0.05118* -0.00715 
(p-value) (0.1231) (0.0677) (0.5206) (0.1323) (0.0675) (0.5241) 
Complete 0.02913** 0.03557* 0.0027 0.0299** 0.0363* 0.00253 
(p-value) (0.0211) (0.0673) (0.8023) (0.0194) (0.0619) (0.815) 
Adj-R2 0.156 0.1052 0.1434 0.1545 0.1041 0.1435 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Cases 743 407 336 743 407 336 
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Table 2-111   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV-Bidder (Target) while 
controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by 
Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement 
day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
 Bidder AIV Related Tests Bidder VIV  Related Tests 








Constant 0.12867*** 0.20822*** 0.04458 0.11743** 0.20213*** 0.04167 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2203) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.2503) 
AIV-Variable -0.07675*** -0.08912** -0.03124    
(p-value) (0.0067) (0.0386) (0.3103)    
VIV-Variable    -0.08422 -0.02659 -0.09684* 
(p-value)       (0.1435) (0.8186) (0.0835) 
Idio_Vol -1.22664*** -1.55346*** -0.23151 -1.1444*** -1.46719*** -0.18714 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4917) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5738) 
Target Size -0.00815*** -0.01255*** -0.00205 -0.00779*** -0.01205*** -0.00214 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.235) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.213) 
Target Turnover -0.000125 -2.011E-05 -0.000217 -0.0001796 -0.000127 -0.0002359 
(p-value) (0.5761) (0.9524) (0.3311) (0.4246) (0.7059) (0.2906) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0006125 0.00994 -0.0107** 0.0008047 0.00997 -0.01069** 
(p-value) (0.8965) (0.1835) (0.0418) (0.8642) (0.1847) (0.0422) 
Target B/M 0.0032 -0.0001946 0.00474* 0.00339 6.052E-05 0.00467* 
(p-value) (0.2803) (0.9796) (0.0728) (0.2644) (0.9937) (0.0834) 
Target Runup 0.00599 0.00724 0.00732 0.00591 0.00789 0.00699 
(p-value) (0.1906) (0.2522) (0.2082) (0.2064) (0.2177) (0.2293) 
Target Markup -0.01515** -0.02133* -0.00647 -0.01642*** -0.02372 -0.00615 
(p-value) (0.0139) (0.0905) (0.2349) (0.0086) (0.0642) (0.2536) 
Collar -0.00197 -0.0035 -0.01406 -0.0008584 -0.00262 -0.01686 
(p-value) (0.7947) (0.6722) (0.4186) (0.91) (0.753) (0.3429) 
Toehold Exist 0.01618* 0.03849*** 0.01029 0.01755** 0.03963*** 0.01112 
(p-value) (0.0577) (0.0051) (0.3607) (0.0399) (0.0022) (0.3313) 
Horizontal 0.00652 -0.0008125 0.01213** 0.00588 -0.00195 0.01203** 
(p-value) (0.1646) (0.9049) (0.039) (0.2113) (0.7743) (0.0405) 
Tender Offer 0.00309 -0.00315 0.00341 0.00307 -0.00299 0.00313 
(p-value) (0.4858) (0.7886) (0.4583) (0.4914) (0.801) (0.4972) 
Cash Bid 0.02023***   0.02118***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01214 0.05081** -0.02496** 0.01376 0.05283** -0.02484** 
(p-value) (0.3181) (0.0379) (0.037) (0.2589) (0.0325) (0.0359) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00555 0.01634 -0.01123* 0.00559 0.01754* -0.01115* 
(p-value) (0.3227) (0.1071) (0.056) (0.3157) (0.0784) (0.0573) 
Rumor 0.0161 0.03548* -0.00499 0.0153 0.03483* -0.00529 
(p-value) (0.1507) (0.0914) (0.6623) (0.1682) (0.0881) (0.6427) 
Complete 0.01713** 0.02677** -0.0004695 0.01777** 0.02791** -0.0003281 
(p-value) (0.0298) (0.0193) (0.9568) (0.0248) (0.0143) (0.9696) 
Adj-R2 0.1849 0.1709 0.107 0.1777 0.16 0.11 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 2-112   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder Announcement CAR on AIV-Bidder and VIV-Bidder while controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
Bidder CAR is equal to the sum of Bidder Abnormal Return (ARi,t) estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1]. ARi,t is equal to 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑅𝑀,𝑡). ERi,t is the bidder 
company ‘i' return on day ‘t’ above the risk free rate on that day. ERM,t is the CRSP Value Weighted Index return on day ‘t’ in excess of the risk free rate on that day. The model’s 
components (𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖) are obtained by estimating the model (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡) over the [-256; -43]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. . 
Target Size is the logarithm of the target market value of equity 42 days before the announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 
days before the announcement. Target B/M is constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target 
runup is defined as the ratio of the target price 2 days before the announcement divided by the target price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined 
as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and 
Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1S if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash 
only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the 
same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. 
Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). Industry and year dummies 
corresponding to the target two-digit SIC codes and to the announcement year. The p-values are given underneath and are the White Heteroscedasticity consistent p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
Deal-Type All Control Bids Non-Cash-Only Control Bids Cash-Only Control Bids 
Constant 0.12899*** 0.2116*** 0.04212 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2479) 
AIV-Bidder -0.07861** -0.09758** -0.00294 
(p-value) (0.0147) (0.0308) (0.9351) 
VIV-Bidder 0.00987 0.07665 -0.09337 
(p-value) (0.8817) (0.5412) (0.1507) 
Idio_Vol -1.2293*** -1.55913*** -0.19036 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5676) 
Target Size -0.00814*** -0.01264*** -0.00215 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2122) 
Target Turnover -0.0001245 -2.587E-05 -0.0002351 
(p-value) (0.5775) (0.9379) (0.2927) 
Target NYSE/Amex 0.0006278 0.01024 -0.01071** 
(p-value) (0.8939) (0.1711) (0.0418) 
Target B/M 0.00321 -9.586E-05 0.00467* 
(p-value) (0.2794) (0.99) (0.0823) 
Target Runup 0.00602 0.0073 0.00698 
(p-value) (0.1878) (0.2447) (0.229) 
Target Markup -0.01516** -0.02092* -0.00615 
(p-value) (0.014) (0.0959) (0.2535) 
Collar -0.002 -0.00388 -0.01677 
(p-value) (0.7915) (0.6399) (0.3469) 
Toehold Exist 0.01611* 0.03803*** 0.01106 
(p-value) (0.0583) (0.0049) (0.3371) 
Horizontal 0.00652 -0.0007174 0.01204** 
(p-value) (0.1648) (0.9162) (0.0404) 
Tender Offer 0.00312 -0.00312 0.00314 
(p-value) (0.4826) (0.7913) (0.4938) 
Cash Bid 0.02019***   
(p-value) (<.0001)   
Hostile 0.01212 0.05088** -0.02487** 
(p-value) (0.3187) (0.0363) (0.0356) 
Multiple Bidders 0.00551 0.01631 -0.01112* 
(p-value) (0.3252) (0.1094) (0.0592) 
Rumor 0.01609 0.03511* -0.00524 
(p-value) (0.1512) (0.0944) (0.6455) 
Complete 0.01708** 0.02636** -0.0003245 
(p-value) (0.0305) (0.0213) (0.97) 
Adj-R2 0.1843 0.1702 0.1084 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2-113   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer while controlling for Idiosyncratic Volatility. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. ]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. Target (Acquirer) Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before 
the announcement and target (acquirer) turnover is the ratio of the target (acquirer) volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is 
constructed as the ratio of the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Relative size is the ratio of the target size divided by 
the acquirer size (in log terms). NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that respectively take the value of 1 if the Target 
(Acquirer) is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is preceded by a rumor and the deal 
is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The 
Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Multibid dummy takes a value of 1 if there are multiple Bidders within 
the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively.  
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
Independent Variable AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -8.012 -7.4719 -8.423 21.7359** 20.7962** 20.8573** 
(p-value) (0.5702) (0.5855) (0.5522) (0.0334) (0.0428) (0.0411) 
AIV-Variable -4.1628***   -4.7397*** -1.4458*   -3.1532*** 
(p-value) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (0.0713)  (0.0013) 
VIV-Variable  -2.8845* 2.1395  4.2328* 7.8532*** 
(p-value)   (0.0673) (0.2471)   (0.0626) (0.0016) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -88.8999*** -81.0643*** -89.0327*** -90.8318*** -88.2067*** -90.9361*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size -1.6615** -1.3419** -1.6718** 0.4787 0.4588 0.4348 
(p-value) (0.014) (0.039) (0.0136) (0.3499) (0.3718) (0.3958) 
Target Turnover 0.0198* 0.0203* 0.0198* -0.00634 -0.007 -0.0061 
(p-value) (0.0652) (0.0523) (0.0645) (0.4252) (0.3783) (0.4439) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.6092** -0.6312*** -0.6046** -0.341* -0.3238* -0.3288* 
(p-value) (0.0131) (0.0089) (0.0138) (0.0573) (0.0704) (0.0682) 
Target B/M 0.009 -0.0278 -0.00483 0.1367 0.1578 0.1405 
(p-value) (0.9633) (0.8846) (0.9786) (0.227) (0.1677) (0.2135) 
Acquirer Size 1.2857** 1.0958* 1.3005** -0.5226 -0.4948 -0.4861 
(p-value) (0.0375) (0.0662) (0.036) (0.2406) (0.2687) (0.2749) 
Acquirer Turnover -0.00944 -0.0142 -0.00865 0.018* 0.0147 0.0189** 
(p-value) (0.4697) (0.262) (0.5098) (0.0537) (0.105) (0.0375) 
Acquirer NYSE/Amex -0.0286 -0.0586 -0.00667 -0.2395 -0.1839 -0.2076 
(p-value) (0.904) (0.8009) (0.9776) (0.1683) (0.2922) (0.2355) 
Acquirer B/M 0.573 0.5147 0.5485 0.4893* 0.374 0.4489 
(p-value) (0.1536) (0.1799) (0.1737) (0.0793) (0.171) (0.1072) 
Relative Size 16.7076 13.3794 17.0442 -19.9277* -19.1877* -18.8968 
(p-value) (0.2654) (0.3574) (0.2576) (0.0846) (0.0981) (0.1019) 
Collar -2.7483*** -2.6786*** -2.7643*** -2.8117*** -2.7858*** -2.8111*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist 0.7806 0.9176 0.7851 -0.2345 -0.2225 -0.281 
(p-value) (0.1776) (0.1164) (0.1747) (0.5452) (0.5673) (0.472) 
Horizontal -0.5667** -0.6094*** -0.5549** -0.4405** -0.4448*** -0.4311** 
(p-value) (0.0161) (0.0089) (0.0187) (0.0103) (0.0096) (0.0129) 
Tender Offer 2.0704*** 1.9031*** 2.0714*** 2.1465*** 2.1526*** 2.1834*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile 0.5739 0.7524 0.5532 0.445 0.4879 0.4356 
(p-value) (0.297) (0.1845) (0.3132) (0.3718) (0.3311) (0.3823) 
Multiple Bidders 0.6284** 0.7974*** 0.5874* 0.342 0.3508 0.3289 
(p-value) (0.0426) (0.0092) (0.0605) (0.1166) (0.1075) (0.1333) 
Rumor 0.746* 0.6583* 0.7482* 0.4974 0.4548 0.4692 
(p-value) (0.0554) (0.0818) (0.0553) (0.1829) (0.2228) (0.2084) 
Complete -0.0705 0.1014 -0.1049 -0.2161 -0.188 -0.2312 
(p-value) (0.8209) (0.7394) (0.7385) (0.3574) (0.4235) (0.3273) 
Adj-R2 0.4001 0.3791 0.4012 0.3574 0.3576 0.3627 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 





Table 2-114   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a completed successfully on AIV- (Bidder) Target 
and VIV- (Bidder) Target with Idiosyncratic Volatility used as Control Variable. 
The AIV-Bidder (Target) and VIV- Bidder (Target) are the mean and standard deviation of the Implied Volatilities of Bidder (Target) Companies estimated over the runup period [-
42,-2]. The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the market adjusted residuals of the daily returns measured during the period spanning 256 trading days 
before the announcement to 43 trading days before the announcement [-256, -43]. Target Size is the logarithm of the target (acquirer) market value of equity 42 days before the 
announcement and target turnover is the ratio of the target volume to share outstanding estimated 42 days before the announcement. Target (acquirer) B/M is constructed as the ratio of 
the nearest target stock book value divided by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement. Target runup is defined as the ratio of the target (acquirer) price 2 days before 
the announcement divided by the target (acquirer) price 42 days before the announcement [(P-2 / P-42) - 1]. Target markup is defined as the ratio of the offer price divided by the target 
(acquirer) price 2 days before the announcement [(Offer-Price / P-2) - 1]. NYSE/AMEX, Collar, Tender Offer, Cash-Only, Hostile, Rumor, and Complete are dummy variables that 
respectively take the value of 1 if the Target is listed on NYSE/AMEX, the deal has a collar, the deal is a tender offer, the deal is financed by Cash only, the deal is hostile, the deal is 
preceded by a rumor and the deal is completed successfully. Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder and target share the same four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Code. The Toehold dummy takes a value of one if the bidder own more than 5% of target before the announcement day. Mult ibid dummy takes a value of 1 if 
there are multiple Bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period from the first bidder’s bid). The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility is estimated over the [-256,-43] window 
Deal-Type AIV-Target VIV-Target AIV-Target and VIV-
Target 
AIV-Bidder VIV-Bidder AIV-Bidder and VIV-
Bidder 
Constant -4.1728 -5.0562* -4.3581 5.4527*** 5.4482*** 5.4446*** 
(p-value) (0.118) (0.0578) (0.1054) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
AIV-Variable -1.5658**   -2.0022** -0.7611   -0.9856 
(p-value) (0.0317)  (0.0209) (0.3886)  (0.3336) 
VIV-Variable  -0.353 2.1281  -0.00221 1.226 
(p-value)   (0.8529) (0.3445)   (0.9993) (0.6555) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 13.3267 14.6821 14.1217 -22.1364*** -21.9368*** -22.1598*** 
(p-value) (0.1715) (0.1283) (0.1497) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) 
Target Size 0.3068** 0.348*** 0.3149** -0.1174 -0.1172 -0.117 
(p-value) (0.0141) (0.0053) (0.0125) (0.116) (0.1173) (0.1179) 
Target Turnover -0.0142 -0.0133 -0.0144 0.00115 0.000679 0.00119 
(p-value) (0.1348) (0.1549) (0.1334) (0.9007) (0.941) (0.8979) 
Target NYSE/Amex -0.5638** -0.5333* -0.5508* -0.3754 -0.3657 -0.3688 
(p-value) (0.0486) (0.0621) (0.0552) (0.1123) (0.1223) (0.1195) 
Target B/M -0.3628 -0.4274 -0.3777 -0.1927 -0.1912 -0.1918 
(p-value) (0.2309) (0.1541) (0.2134) (0.2083) (0.2132) (0.2109) 
Target Runup 0.6505 0.5973 0.636 0.5756 0.5966 0.5891 
(p-value) (0.1658) (0.2119) (0.1776) (0.1132) (0.1056) (0.1071) 
Target Markup -0.0729 -0.2385 -0.0336 -0.1232 -0.1536 -0.1222 
(p-value) (0.8692) (0.582) (0.9401) (0.6871) (0.6133) (0.6897) 
Collar 0.5912 0.6333 0.5952 0.1905 0.2084 0.1828 
(p-value) (0.2611) (0.2322) (0.2568) (0.5985) (0.5648) (0.6132) 
Toehold Exist -0.9585* -0.9525* -0.9697 -0.9874** -0.9743** -0.9931** 
(p-value) (0.0943) (0.0926) (0.0898) (0.0241) (0.0259) (0.0233) 
Horizontal 0.3108 0.3129 0.3172 0.1152 0.1096 0.1139 
(p-value) (0.273) (0.27) (0.2641) (0.6108) (0.628) (0.6149) 
Tender Offer 1.2692*** 1.1836*** 1.2432*** 1.1259*** 1.1261*** 1.1269*** 
(p-value) (0.001) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cash Bid 0.3963 0.4949* 0.3893 0.0628 0.0656 0.0534 
(p-value) (0.1597) (0.0732) (0.1687) (0.7814) (0.7719) (0.8141) 
Hostile -3.7217*** -3.6516*** -3.7207*** -2.7135*** -2.7005*** -2.7098*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Multiple Bidders -2.3022*** -2.2522*** -2.3387*** -2.0225*** -2.0237**** -2.0236*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Rumor 0.456 0.3521 0.4328 0.3738 0.3749 0.3659 
(p-value) (0.3941) (0.4987) (0.4188) (0.4815) (0.4811) (0.4912) 
Adj-R2 0.1944 0.1895 0.1954 0.1307 0.1302 0.1308 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Industry Dummies No No No No No No 






3 CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle and Mergers and Acquisitions Activity 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There is an extensive empirical literature analyzing the relationship between idiosyncratic 
volatility and stock returns. The signals emanating from this literature are diverse if not to say 
mixed; they vary depending on the model used to estimate idiosyncratic volatility, the frequency 
of the returns data used to estimate idiosyncratic volatility, and whether or not microstructure 
noise or return reversals are controlled for. This paper offers a new perspective to the debate 
regarding one of the most prominent regularities identified: the puzzling negative relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent month performance as documented by Ang et al. 
(2006).  Specifically, in this paper we test whether this puzzle is related to mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A hereafter) activity. The M&A literature suggests that a nationwide M&A 
wave is a clustering of a series of M&A waves in different industries (e.g. Ahern and Harford 
(2014)). This clustering is boosted or facilitated by liquidity and misvaluation. The industry 
waves themselves are usually initiated by internal shocks that are likely the results of 
technological changes in the corresponding industry. Both industry internal shocks and market 
misvaluations create uncertainty related to the future prospects of firms that are varying from one 
industry to another and from one company to another. In addition, a company involved in an 
M&A deal would pass through a period of instability related to its own future prospects as the 
deal is negotiated and in the transitional period through which visions, cultures and operations 
are combined under one management. Finally, that acquisitions initiated during merger have 
been shown to be associated with poorer quality of analysts’ forecasts, greater uncertainty and 
weaker CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, leading to inferior monitoring and inefficient 
mergers (Duchin and Schmidt (2013)). We hypothesize that these sources of uncertainty about 
the firm’s future prospects should be incorporated into the firm’s actual idiosyncratic volatility 
and will influence the observed relationship between measured idiosyncratic volatility and the 
next month’s expected returns.  
 Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis.  Specifically, we find that the 
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle documented by Ang et al. (2006) is related to M&A activity: the 
negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent month returns is 
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considerably stronger in periods of high M&A activity than in periods of low M&A activity, 
with the greatest impact observed during the intense M&A wave spanning the period 1982-1989. 
The observed trends in both alphas and returns decrease systematically while moving from the 
lowest to the highest idiosyncratic volatility quintile in addition to the significant negative 
performance of the zero-investment portfolio that is long the high idiosyncratic volatility quintile 
(Q5) and short the low idiosyncratic volatility quintile (Q1). It seems that M&A activities are 
amplifying the uncertainties surrounding the firms’ (bidders and targets) future prospects. These 
uncertainties are transmitted to higher firm specific volatilities. When the number of such firms 
increases during a specific period of time, their effect gets into the relationship between 
idiosyncratic volatility and the next month’s performance touching the well-known idiosyncratic 
volatility puzzle.  
 In a recent paper, Herskovic et al. (2016) show that shocks to the common idiosyncratic 
volatility factor (CIV) are priced and that stocks with lower CIV-exposure in a particular month 
perform better than their higher CIV-exposure peers in the next month. They attribute this result 
to household utility effects arising from cross sectional volatility in consumption growth. Our 
study tests whether the CIV exposure effect may be a consequence of perceived volatility of firm 
prospects arising from changes in the market for corporate control. Specifically, we test whether 
the CIV exposure effect is persistent across periods of high and low mergers and acquisitions 
activities. Our motives to investigate such a relationship between mergers’ activities and the 
exposure to the common idiosyncratic volatility factor is driven by the economy wide 
uncertainty, which may give rise to mispricing at the firm level. Consistent with Herskovic et al. 
(2016), we find that firms with higher exposure to the CIV factor exhibit lower future returns. 
However, in contest with the negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and M&A 
activity, this relationship is not affected by M&A activity. In other words, economy-wide 
uncertainty as reflected in the CIV factor is not significantly influenced by M&A activity. M&A 
activity can in part explain the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, but it does not subsume the 
negative relationship between CIV exposure and firm returns. 
 The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief review 
of the relevant literature and introduce our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data and 
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methodology. The empirical results follow in Sections 4 to 7. The paper concludes with a 
summary in Section 8. 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Firm Level Idiosyncratic Volatility and Stock Returns 
Ang et al. (2006) find that stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility have lower returns. This 
result is puzzling, in that conventional theory suggests that idiosyncratic volatility should not be 
priced, as it is diversifiable.  If idiosyncratic volatility cannot be diversified away, then investors 
would demand compensation for bearing the idiosyncratic risk and this should be translated into 
stock with higher idiosyncratic volatility associated with higher returns. More recent theoretical 
extensions have looked at the effects of risk tolerance, information (firm visibility), transaction 
costs, and short selling constraints in establishing a premium for idiosyncratic volatility (e.g. 
Levy (1978), Merton (1987), Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003), and Malkiel and Xu (2006), and 
Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar, and Sorescu (2009) ). These papers show that stocks that face short-
sale constraints and belong to less visible firms exhibit a positive relationship between expected 
returns and idiosyncratic volatility). Ang et al. (2009) find that the idiosyncratic volatility effect 
is not limited to the USA: it is also observed for other G7 countries.   
 A considerable body of work has emerged that addresses this puzzle as a model based 
problem and/or a returns distribution problem. Brockman and Schutte (2007) show that using an 
EGARCH to model expected idiosyncratic volatility would lead to a positive relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns in the international market. They attribute the 
negative relationship to the use of the previous month’s idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy to the 
next month’s expected volatility. Fu (2009) argues in this vein and in line with Huang, Liu, 
Rhee, and Zhang (2009), shows that return reversal of stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility 
also plays a role. More specifically, stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility may exhibit high 
contemporaneous returns. The positive abnormal returns tend to reverse, resulting in negative 
abnormal returns in the following month. From this perspective, the negative relationship found 
between idiosyncratic volatility and expected stock returns may be explained by two combined 
effects: the negative serial correlation in monthly returns of individual stocks and the positive 
contemporaneous relation between realized monthly idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns. 
Spiegel and Wang (2007) show that idiosyncratic volatility and stock liquidity are negatively 
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correlated. In addition, they demonstrate that stocks are decreasing in liquidity and increasing in 
idiosyncratic volatility and that the idiosyncratic volatility effect dominates the liquidity effect 
when tested together. In contrast to Ang et al. (2006), they use monthly return observations 
rather than daily returns observations in estimating their idiosyncratic volatility. They also test 
the contemporaneous relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and returns and not a lead-lag 
relationship as in Ang et al. (2006). Bali and Cakici (2008) show that if only stocks listed on 
NYSE are used to create the portfolio quintiles cut-off point, (in line with Fama and French 
‘1993’ portfolio creation approach), rather than the entire CRSP universe, then the relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and stock expected returns becomes insignificant. In addition, 
forming equally weighted portfolios instead of value-weighted portfolio dilutes the significance 
of puzzle. Finally, they demonstrate that the negative relationship between idiosyncratic 
volatility and expected stock returns is not significant, when monthly data instead of intra month 
daily data are used to estimate idiosyncratic volatility. Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar, and Sorescu 
(2009) show that stocks that face short-sale constraints and belong to less visible firms exhibit a 
positive relationship between expected returns and idiosyncratic volatility. Switzer and Picard 
(2015) incorporate momentum and liquidity into the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
to estimate idiosyncratic volatility. They found no idiosyncratic volatility effect for developed 
markets using this model. 
 Another branch of literature links the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle to market 
imperfections and microstructure noise. Han and Lesmond (2011) argue that the idiosyncratic 
volatility puzzle diminishes if we use the quoted mid-point based returns instead of using the 
closing price returns. They interpret their result by explaining that the mid-point quoted prices 
would correct for microstructure noise (bid-ask bounce) argued by Blume and Stambaugh 
(1983). Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2009) link the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle to earning shocks and 
firm visibility. They show that idiosyncratic volatility is inversely related to expected earnings 
and earning shocks. This relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and expected earning is 
inducing the negative relationship observed between idiosyncratic volatility and expected 
returns. In other words, controlling for earning shocks would remove the significance of the 
negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns. In addition, they also 
link the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and expected earning to selective corporate 
disclosure practices. This link is more robust for firms with less sophisticated investors. Chen 
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and Petkova (2012) associate the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle with a missing systematic risk 
factor in the Fama-French model. They show that portfolios with high idiosyncratic volatility 
have positive exposure to innovations in the average stock variances and consequently they have 
a lower expected return. More recently, Hou and Loh (2016) try to measure how much of the 
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is explained by market frictions factors (including return reversals, 
bid-ask spread, Amihud illiquidity, clustered zero-return observations), investors preferences for 
lottery stocks (exhibiting skewness, co- skewness, maximum daily return), and other factors 
including earnings surprises. They find that while much of the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is 
explained by the previously mentioned factors, a significant portion of the puzzle remains 
unexplained.  
 Our work sheds new light on firm level idiosyncratic volatility puzzle in two ways. First 
we show that the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is stronger in high M&A activity periods than in 
low M&A activity periods. This result is consistent with the existence of a spillover effect from 
the uncertainty about the future prospects of companies (target and acquirer) involved in an 
M&A deal to the firm specific uncertainty that is incorporated into the firms’ idiosyncratic 
volatility. Second, we show that using daily or monthly returns in the performance estimation 
window and Fama and French’s (1993) three-factors model or Fama and French’s (2015) five-
factor model affects the robustness of the puzzle across our total sample but does not mitigate 
our basic result that the negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and the next 
month’s performance is clustered in periods of high M&A activity relative to periods of low 
M&A activity.  
3.2.2 Aggregate Idiosyncratic Volatility, Common Factor Idiosyncratic Volatility and Stock 
Returns 
A related branch of literature assesses the effect of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility as a risk 
factor on stock returns. Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) report that the equal-weighted total 
volatility is positively and significantly related to future stock market returns, although stock 
market volatility is not. Guo and Savickas (2008) show that idiosyncratic volatility has predictive 
power over aggregate stock market returns. They also show that the aggregate idiosyncratic 
volatility and aggregate B/M ratio are significantly negatively correlated and that the 
idiosyncratic volatility factor explains the cross-section of stock returns as well as the B/M ratio 
when tested on the 25 Fama and French (1993) portfolios. Duarte, Kamara, Siegle, and Sun 
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(2014) show that the pricing of aggregate idiosyncratic volatility is due to unaccounted 
systematic risk factor. They call their factor Predicted Idiosyncratic Volatility (PIV). They show 
that the first common idiosyncratic volatility component is significantly correlated with business 
cycle variables such as default spread as well as average stock volatility. They constructed a PIV 
risk factor in the footsteps from Fama and French’s (1993) factors by obtaining the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of stocks in the highest quintile of predicted idiosyncratic 
volatility and the return on a portfolio of the stocks in the lowest quintile of predicted 
idiosyncratic volatility. Their PIV explains the excess return of the 30 Fama and French (1993) 
industry portfolios and is priced even in the presence of momentum and liquidity factor. 
Herskovic, Kelly, and Lustig (2016) show that the firm-level idiosyncratic volatilities possess a 
high degree of co-movement that is described by a factor model; they called it a common factor 
in idiosyncratic volatility (CIV). They show that CIV is correlated to idiosyncratic income risk. 
They estimate their CIV as an equal-weighted average of market model residuals. They show 
that average returns are decreasing with CIV beta exposures: firms that have a more positive 
exposure to CIV innovations earn lower average returns. Their results are robust after accounting 
for the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure. In this study, we build on their finding and test 
whether the results found by Herskovic et al (2016) are driven by model specification as well as 
by M&A activities.  
3.2.3 Linking Takeover Waves to Idiosyncratic Volatility  
As defined in Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) on page 297 first paragraph: “A merger wave 
is a clustering in time of successful takeover bids at the industry or economy wide level”. In this 
paper we focus our analysis on economy wide clustering of merger activities. There are two main 
hypotheses that compete in explaining merger waves: the neoclassical hypothesis pioneered by 
Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) and the inefficient markets hypothesis of Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004). Under the neoclassical hypothesis, 
merger waves are preceded by technological, regulatory, and economic shocks in the industry in 
which the wave is occurring. Managers, reacting to these shocks, engage in M&A activity in 
their attempt to compete for the optimal asset combination. Under the inefficient markets 
hypothesis, market misvaluation is the main driver of merger waves.  
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 Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1989) study tender offers in an efficient markets neoclassical 
framework, using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for management skill. They find that takeovers of poorly 
managed targets (low Tobin’s Q) by better-managed bidders (high Tobin’s Q) have higher 
bidder, target, and total (bidder plus target) gains. Servaes (1991) extends the analyses of Lang, 
Stulz and Walking (1989) by covering both mergers and tender offers. He shows that targets’, 
bidders’ and total returns are larger when targets have low Tobin’s Q ratios and bidders have 
high Tobin’s Q ratios. This finding is consistent with the argument that value is created when 
well-managed bidders overtake poorly managed targets. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) show that 
takeover activities in the 1980’s are clustered in industries that experience fundamental shocks to 
technology, government policies, and demand and supply conditions, which is also consistent 
with the efficient markets neoclassical framework.  Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) contend that 
the merger waves of the 1900 and the 1920s, 1980s, and 1990s were a response to profitable 
reallocation opportunities, in contrast to the 1960s wave, which remains unexplained. Harford 
(2005) presents evidence in support of the neoclassical hypothesis with minor modifications: 
industry shocks would lead to merger waves in a particular industry only when there was enough 
liquidity to accommodate the reallocation of asset. Thus industry merger activities may have to 
wait until enough liquidity is present in the market. Consequently, industry merger waves may 
cluster leading to an aggregate economy wide merger waves. 
 Shleifer and Vishny (2003) assume that financial markets are inefficient, leading to firm 
mispricing. Rational managers seek to exploit this mispricing by acquiring less valued targets 
through stock rather than cash acquisitions. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) show that merger 
activities coincide with higher market valuations, similar to Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001). Their findings are consistent with the inefficient markets 
approach. Dong et al. (2003) find that more highly valued bidders are more likely to use stock, 
less likely to use cash, willing to pay more relative to target market price and earn lower 
announcement period returns. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) decompose the 
M/B ratio into three components: the firm specific pricing deviation from short-run industry 
pricing; the short-run deviations from firms’ long-run pricing; and the long-run pricing to book, 
which serves as a proxy for the firm’s growth potential. Based on this decomposition, they 
uncover several relevant findings: the large difference in the target and acquirer M/B is mainly 
driven by the higher firm specific error in the acquirer M/B. The target M/B has a minimal 
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portion of firm specific error. They also demonstrate that acquirers and targets cluster in sectors 
with high time-series sector error. They both have a common misvaluation component in their 
M/B. It seems that overvalued firms buy less overvalued firms that are by themselves 
overvalued. In addition, firms with higher firm specific error are more likely to become acquirers 
of firms with transactions that are financed by stock issuance. These results suggest that although 
economic shocks maybe driving merger activities in an industry, misvaluation plays an important 
role in determining who buys whom. Ang and Cheng (2006) show that acquirers are more 
overvalued in successful stock mergers than in withdrawn mergers. They also find that the 
probability of a firm becoming a stock acquirer increases with its overvaluation. In addition, they 
show that if the acquirer level of overvaluation is greater than the premium adjusted 
overvaluation then the acquirer firms are better off than their non-merged peers, consistent with 
positive synergy in mergers. 
 Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) allude to industry shocks as drivers of merger waves, such 
as  monopoly creation as the main driver of the 1890s merger wave, oligopoly creation for the 
1920s merger wave, conglomerate diversification for 1960s merger wave, break-down of the 
1960’s conglomerate cohort for the 1980s merger wave, and deregulation for the 1990s wave. 
More recently, Duchin and Schmidt (2013) demonstrate that acquisitions initiated during 
industry specific merger waves are associated with poorer quality of analysts’ forecasts, greater 
uncertainty, and weaker CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. These factors inhibit monitoring, 
giving rise to more inefficient mergers. We hypothesize that shocks’ propagation and 
misvaluations would find their way into the firm level idiosyncratic volatility if they do not span 
the whole economy, the market as well as the risk factors’ inherent in the model used as a 
benchmark in the estimation of the firm’s expected returns. In other words, we expect that 
merger waves should impact directly on the estimation of idiosyncratic volatility per se, and in 
turn on the robustness of the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. 
 We propose to test for the first time the mergers wave effect as a driver of idiosyncratic 
volatility shocks that systematically affect stock returns. Hypothesis 1:  M&A waves are 
associated with increased misvaluations that are due to increased uncertainty about the firm’s 
future prospects that are incorporated into the firm’s actual idiosyncratic volatility. This will 
influence the observed relationship between measured idiosyncratic volatility and the next 
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month’s expected returns. As a consequence, the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is stronger in 
periods of high M&A activity than in periods of low M&A activity. Hypothesis 2: The negative 
relationship between CIV exposure and firm returns is related to changes in uncertainties in 
firms’ opportunity sets, including uncertainties in marginal returns investment associated with 
M&A waves. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
The sample for our study spans the period 1960-2013. Harford (2005) analyzes two aggregate 
merger waves in the 1980s and 1990s: one spanning from 1986 to 1988 and another spanning 
from 1996 to 1999. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) identify five merger waves in the US as: 
wave 1 (1890s-1903), wave 2 (1910s-1929), wave 3 (1950s-1973), wave 4 (1981-1989), wave 5 
(1993-2001). Ahern and Harford’s (2014) (2003-2008) merger wave overlaps with Martynova 
and Renneboog (2008) sixth merger wave. Our analyses cover the following five merger wave 
periods from 1960-2013: Wave A (1960-1972), Wave B (1982-1989), Wave C (1993-2000), 
Wave D (2004-2007), and Wave E (2013); the latter represents the onset of the most recent 
merger wave, based on Mergerstat.
20
 The corresponding periods of no merger wave (‘1973-
1981’, ‘1990-1992’, ‘2001-2003’, ‘2008-2012’) as those with low mergers and acquisitions 
activity. 
 Stock price and return data are obtained from CRSP covering stocks listed on NYSE, 
NYSE MKT (formerly AMEX), and NASDAQ. Consistent with the previous literature, we have 
removed ETFs, Closed End Funds, and REITS from our sample. 
 Our initial benchmark for testing the effect of lagged monthly idiosyncratic volatility on 
monthly performances uses the Ang et al. (2006) specification. We divide our sample period 
between periods with high M&A activity versus period with low M&A activity. Idiosyncratic 
volatility is measured as the realized volatility of the residuals obtained after estimating the Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model. Using daily data, for each stock in our sample, for every 
month, we estimate the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model:  
ri,t −  Rf,t =  αi + βMKT,i(Rm,t −  Rf,t) + βSMB,iSMBt + βHML,iHMLt + ϵt.               (1) 
                                                          
20
 See Cretin, Dieudonné, and Bouacha (2014). 
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ri,t −  Rf,t corresponds to the excess daily return of stock i on day t, αiis the Fama-French 
adjusted alpha, Rm,t − Rf,t, SMBt , HMLt correspond to the market risk premium, small cap 
premium factor and the value premium factor respectively. 
 As complementary tests, we estimate the idiosyncratic volatility using the Fama and 
French (2015) five-factor model: 
ri,t −  Rf,t =  αi + βMKT,i(Rm,t −  Rf,t) + βSMB,iSMBt + βHML,iHMLt + βRMW,iRMWt +
βCMA,iCMAt + ϵt   (2) 
where Rm,t − Rf,t, SMBt , HMLt are as defined as in (1), RMWt is the difference between the 
returns on a diversified portfolios of stocks with robust and weak profitability, and CMAt is the 
difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of stocks with low and high investment 
firms. As such, RMW and CMA would proxy for profitability and investment respectively. We 
estimate the idiosyncratic volatility for the Fama and French (2015) model in exactly the same 
way we did for the Fama and French (1993) model. In addition, once stocks are sorted into 
quintiles based on their respective lagged idiosyncratic volatility, value-weighted portfolios are 
formed and their Five-Factor Alpha as well as their average returns are estimated. The Fama and 
French (1993; 2015) factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s webpage.  
 Once idiosyncratic volatilities are estimated, stocks are sorted into quintile portfolios 
based on their idiosyncratic volatility. The quintile portfolios are value-weighted, formed at the 
beginning of the month and kept for one month. The process is repeated recursively on a 
monthly basis and we end up having five quintile portfolios with value-weighted daily returns.  
 Next we estimate the Fama and French (1993) adjusted alpha for these portfolios as well 
as the average returns of these portfolios over our total sample period, high M&A activity sub-
periods and low M&A activities sub-period. In order for a firm monthly idiosyncratic volatility 
to be included in our sample, we require the presence of at least 12 daily observations within the 
idiosyncratic volatility estimation month; otherwise the stock’s monthly observation is dropped 
out from our sample and consequently it is not included in forming next month quintile 
portfolios. 
 We also estimate the performance of the portfolios using monthly returns for comparative 
purposes. 
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3.4 Trends in Aggregate Volatilities 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) of the monthly returns of all 
the stocks in our sample per year of observation as well as the number of stocks in the sample for 
each year.  We also report the average monthly idiosyncratic volatilities estimated using daily 
returns using the Fama-French three-factor model. In addition, we report the ratios of 
idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility. Table 3.1 reports the estimates using equal-weighted 
idiosyncratic volatility. Table 3.2 shows the results using value weighted idiosyncratic volatility. 
As can be seen therein, there is considerable variation through time of the volatility measures.  
There is some secular decline in the number of stocks in the sample each year since 1999. 
 Considerable volatility spikes are observed for the OPEC Oil Crisis period 1973-74, for 
the stock market crash year of 1987, and the Russian Default and Long term Capital 
Management Crises of 1998; peak volatilities for the sample are observed during the Great 
Financial Crisis of 2008-9.  
<Please insert Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 here> 
 Volatility changes for firms occur due to external forces that have impact on all firms, 
such as the crises above.  To get a clearer picture about the behavior of the impact of M&A 
intensity on idiosyncratic volatility, we also provide Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 to show scaled 
measures of volatility, computed as the ratio of the monthly aggregate idiosyncratic volatility to 
the monthly aggregate return volatility. In Table 3.3 below, we note that the scaled equal 
weighted volatility and scaled value weighted volatility measures are significantly higher in the 
periods of high merger activity. For the merger wave periods, the scaled value-weighted 
idiosyncratic volatility is approximately 5.8% higher than during the corresponding non-wave 
periods. The difference is statistically significant with a t-value of 9.3. For the scaled equal-
weighted idiosyncratic volatility the difference is somewhat smaller, but remains significant, 
with a t-value of 5.9.  
<Please insert Table 3.3 here. 
 Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present graphs of the time series of the equal-weighted as well as 
value-weighted aggregate idiosyncratic volatility from July, 1963 to December, 2013. All stocks 
listed on NYSE, NYSE MKT (formerly AMEX), and NASDAQ, and having data on the CRSP 
database, are included in our sample. In Figure 3.1, idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the 
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standard deviation of the residuals resulting from estimating the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model; in Figure 3.2, the estimates are from the Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
model. Merger Wave Periods are highlighted in grey. Both of these show similar patterns. Equal 
weighted idiosyncratic volatility measures are considerably higher than their value weighted 
counterparts, reflecting the larger relative influence of small stocks in the equal-weighted 
measure. The cyclical relationship between idiosyncratic volatility is most apparent for the 
longest merger wave period from 1990 to 2000, when all of the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility 
measures rise in tandem, and then show a distinct downward trend in the 2001-03 no wave 
period.  
<Please insert Figures 3.1 and 3.2 here> 
 Figure 3.3 graphs the scaled measures of idiosyncratic volatility over the sample period.  
Value-weighted estimates are shown based on the Fama-French (1993) three-factor and Fama-
French (2015) five-factor models.  Scaled volatility measures again are computed by dividing 
monthly aggregate idiosyncratic volatility by monthly aggregate returns’ volatility.  
<Please insert Figure 3.3 here > 
 The pattern shown in Table 3.4 is consistent with the study’s basic motivation: as we 
move into period of high merger intensity, the importance of idiosyncratic volatility as a share of 
total volatility tends to rise. As we move out of a merger wave period, the role of idiosyncratic 
volatility falls. Similar results are observed using equal-weighted volatilities. 
3.5 The Relationship between the Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle and M&A Activity using Daily 
Returns for Performance Estimation 
Table 3.4 presents a summary of the main results for the analyses relating to the performance for 
alternative portfolios that are sorted into portfolios based on the previous month’s idiosyncratic 
volatility.  The analyses use daily returns for the idiosyncratic volatility estimation and daily 
returns for the subsequent performance estimation. The table reports the results showing the 
returns from a zero-investment portfolio constructed by being long the fifth (highest 
idiosyncratic volatility) quintile and short the first (lowest idiosyncratic volatility) quintile.  
 177 
Detailed results are documented in Appendix A. For presentation reasons only, we have 
transformed the daily performance measures into monthly performance measures.
21
.  
<Please insert Table 3.4 here> 
 For both the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model as well as the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model, we corroborate the existence of the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle if the 
zero-investment portfolio (Q5 ‘high idiosyncratic volatility portfolio’ – Q1 ‘low idiosyncratic 
volatility portfolio’) has a negative and significant performance measure. If in addition to the 
zero-investment portfolio negative significant performance, we observe a strictly decreasing 
trend while moving from the lowest to the highest quintile, then this would be of great support to 
the existence of the puzzle. However, this latter is not always observed in the literature as 
highlighted by Bali and Cakici (2008). We also treat a non-significant performance measure 
(whether positive or negative) and a positive significant performance measure as an indication 
that the puzzle cannot be supported by the corresponding test.  
 Our results show that when idiosyncratic volatility is estimated using the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model, the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle persists as the alpha of the 
zero-investment portfolio is negative and significant. However, the average return of the zero-
investment portfolio is not significant. This leads us to conclude that using daily return in 
estimating our performance measure weakens the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle but does not 
eliminate it (previous papers mostly use monthly returns in estimating their quintile portfolio 
performances instead of daily returns). On the other side, using the Fama and French (2015) five-
factor model, the puzzle is not evident: both alpha and the average return of the zero-investment 
portfolio are no more significant. 
 When the sample is divided into high M&A activity periods and the low M&A activity 
periods, the results that we obtain are consistent with Hypothesis 1: the idiosyncratic volatility 
puzzle is present in the high intensity sample and is not present in the low intensity sample. In 
particular, the results of our tests show that there is a negative relationship between idiosyncratic 
volatility and the next month’s stock performance when performance is measured by both alpha 
and average returns and the three-factor model is used to estimate the idiosyncratic volatility. 
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 We use the following formula to transfer daily effective returns into monthly effective returns: 




When the five-factor model is used to estimate the idiosyncratic volatility, only the average 
returns performance measure is still negatively related to idiosyncratic volatility. For the period 
of low M&A activity, the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and the next month’s 
performance is either positive or non-significant. 
 Given this provocative finding that is consistent with Hypothesis 1, we also estimate our 
performance measures over the high M&A activity sub-periods and the low M&A activity sub-
periods. We find that the high M&A activity sub-periods exhibit mostly a negative significant or 
a non-significant relationship between performances and lagged idiosyncratic volatility whereas 
low M&A activity sub-periods exhibit mostly a positive significant or non-significant 
relationship between performances and lagged idiosyncratic volatility. These results are also 
obtained if we are to use the five-factor model instead of the three-factor model. What is 
intriguing is that for the high M&A activity sub-period spanning 1982 to 1989, the idiosyncratic 
volatility puzzle exhibits its strongest form: all performance measures of the zero investment 
portfolio are negative and significant. In addition, a decreasing trend can be clearly observed.
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In a nutshell, our results seem to support that the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle intensifies in high 
M&A activity periods and weakens in low M&A activity periods, consistent with Hypothesis 1.  
3.6 The Relationship between the Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle and M&A Activity using 
Monthly Returns for Performance Estimation 
Much of the previous literature on the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle uses monthly returns to 
estimate the performances of the quintile portfolios obtained after sorting stocks based on their 
idiosyncratic volatility. We repeated our tests using our monthly portfolio returns.  
 Table 3.5 presents a summary of the main results for the analyses relating to the 
performance for alternative portfolios that are sorted into portfolios based on the previous 
month’s idiosyncratic volatility. The analyses use daily returns for the idiosyncratic volatility 
estimation and monthly returns for the subsequent performance estimation. The table reports the 
results showing the returns from a zero-investment portfolio constructed by being long the fifth 
(highest idiosyncratic volatility) quintile and short the first (lowest idiosyncratic volatility) 
quintile. Detailed results are documented in Appendix B in Tables B.1 to B.8. 
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 In unreported tests, we limit this sub-period to span from 1982 to 1987 but similar results are obtained. 
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 In contrast to the results using daily returns, we find that the idiosyncratic volatility 
puzzle is now strong for our total sample: both the alpha and the average returns of the zero-
investment portfolio are negative and significant. Second, using the Fama and French (2015) 
five-factor model does not mitigate the puzzle as reported for the daily performance measure: 
both alpha and average returns of the zero-investment portfolio are still negative and significant. 
Third, when we divide the sample into high M&A activity periods versus low M&A activity 
periods it seems that the puzzle is still strong for the high M&A activity period: both alpha and 
average return are negative and significant for the zero-investment portfolio. For the period of 
the low M&A activity period: both alpha and average return of the zero investment portfolios are 
negative but only the alpha is significant. The idiosyncratic volatility puzzle exists mildly for the 
low M&A activity period but its effect is still weaker than in the high M&A activity period.  
Consistent with the results using daily data, the strongest idiosyncratic volatility effect is still 
observed in the period spanning from 1982 to 1989. To summarize, our results using monthly 
returns are in line with Hypothesis 1 supporting a link between the IV puzzle and M&A 
intensity.  
3.7 The Relationship between the Exposure to the Common Idiosyncratic Volatility Factor and 
M&A Activity  
Herskovic et al. (2016) show that shocks to the common idiosyncratic volatility (CIV) factor are 
priced and that stocks with lower CIV-exposure in a particular month perform better than their 
higher CIV-exposure peers in the next month. CIV factor is correlated with income risk faced by 
households, not related to risk of firms in M&A. In this section, we test whether this relationship 
is persistent across periods of high and low mergers and acquisitions activities.  
 We construct our common idiosyncratic volatility factor following the approach of 
Herskovic et al. (2016). For each month, we estimate a regression of daily individual stock 
returns on the CRSP value-weighted index (our proxy for market return in this case: Rm,t ) for all 
the CRSP stocks with non-missing data for that month as per the model below: 
ri,t =  αi + βMKT,i(Rm,t) + ϵt 
 Next, individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the variance of the residuals 
resulting from the above model: Idiosyncratic_Variancei,t =  σ
2(ϵt). Once individual variances 
are obtained, an equal-weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This 
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latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks to the CIV 
factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV 
values.  
 Herskovic et al. (2016) also compute a market variance (MV) factor as a control variable 
for testing the predictive power of the CIV factor. Following their approach, we also construct 
our MV factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by 
relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to CIV shocks, MV shocks are 
obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. 
 Once CIV and MV shocks are obtained, and for every month and for every stock in our 
sample, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed on CIV and MV shocks using a 60-month 
historical window. As in the idiosyncratic volatility analysis, we limited the sample to stocks 
with share codes 10, 11, and 12. We require stocks to have at least 60 historical monthly return 
observations to be kept in our sample of stocks. These regressions would lead to a monthly series 
of stocks’ exposure to CIV shocks and MV shocks; the CIV-Betas and the MV-Betas.  
 Next, we sort stocks into equal-weighted quintile portfolios based on their CIV-Betas and 
estimate the next month returns for these portfolios as well as the next month return on a self-
financing portfolio that is long the highest CIV-Beta quintile portfolio and short the lowest CIV-
Beta quintile portfolio. We use equally weighted portfolios as per Herskovic et al. (2016). In 
addition, both the Fama and French (1993) three-factor and Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
models are used to estimate the stocks’ idiosyncratic variances and in turn, the common 
idiosyncratic volatility factor. Monthly first differences are used to generate the factors’ shocks. 
The exposure to the CIV factor is obtained by regressing monthly stocks excess-returns on the 
CIV-factor, the Market Variance factor, the SMB Variance factor as well as the HML Variance 
factor for the case of Fama and French (1993) three-factor model benchmark.  
 Table 3.6 presents a summary of the main results. The table reports the results showing 
the returns from a zero-investment portfolio constructed by being long the fifth (highest CIV 
exposure) quintile and short the first (lowest CIV exposure) quintile. Detailed results are 
documented in Appendix C. 
<Please insert Table 3.6 here> 
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 At first, we check whether the results documented by Herskovic et al. (2016) are model 
specific. The authors build their work by estimating the idiosyncratic volatility relying on the 
single factor market model. Consistent with the factor model reported in this paper, we redo their 
tests using the Fama and French (1993) and the Fama and French (2015) factor models. Our 
findings are consistent with those reported by Herskovic et al. (2016) and similar across the 
different model specifications; the negative relationship between stock performance and lagged 
exposure to the CIV factor is significant whether we use the Market Model, the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model or the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. The results are also 
robust to whether we use an average return, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor alpha, or 
the Fama and French (2015) five-factor alpha to estimate our portfolio performances.     
Since the different factor models exhibit similar behavior, we rely on the market model 
used by Herskovic et al. (2016) to test whether the relationship between expected return and 
lagged exposure to the CIV factor is affected by mergers and acquisitions activities.  Our 
findings are not supportive of Hypothesis 2. M&A activity does not affect the relationship 
between expected returns and lagged exposure to the CIV factor: the relationship is negative and 
significant for the high M&A activity period, the low M&A activity period as well as most of 
their constituents’ sub-periods. Hence the results do not support Hypothesis 2. 
These reported findings might be due to the long window (60 months) used to estimate the 
exposure to the CIV factor. A 60-month window might easily span more than one adjacent sub-
period and cover both high and low M&A activity periods. Hence, we redo our tests while re-
estimating stocks’ exposure to the CIV factor over a 12-month estimation window rather than a 
60-month window. The results of these tests are summarized in Table 3.7 below with detailed 
estimates shown in Appendix D.  
<Please insert Table 3.7 here> 
Again, we fail to detect observable differences between the high and low M&A activity periods 
and their corresponding sub-periods. Considering that the first year of every sub-period would 
still rely on some observations from the previous sub-period, we decided to remove the first year 
of every sub-period while estimating our portfolio performances. Table 3.8 below summarizes 
the results that are reported in Appendix E. 
<Please insert Table 3.8 here> 
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 As we notice these extra tests did not change our initial findings: stock exposure to the 
CIV factor is still negatively related to stocks expected performances independent of the M&A 
activity.  
 When conditioned on M&A activity, the difference in behavior exhibited by stocks while 
ranked based on their previous month idiosyncratic volatility and their previous month exposure 
to the common idiosyncratic volatility factor reveals that these two measures are capturing 
different firms’ characteristics or risk exposure. 
3.8 Conclusion 
The idiosyncratic volatility puzzle revolves around a negative relationship between stocks’ 
idiosyncratic volatility and the next month’s expected performance. This observation is 
documented by Ang et al. (2006) and has been a topic of considerable interest lately. In this 
paper, we establish a relationship between the intensity of merger and acquisition activity and the 
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. In particular, we demonstrate that the puzzle is stronger in periods 
of high merger and acquisition activity than in periods of low merger and acquisition activity. 
This suggests the existence of a relationship between the intensity of M&A activity and the way 
in which idiosyncratic volatility affects stock expected returns. We classify nationwide merger 
waves as periods of high M&A activity and the periods when no waves are reported as low 
M&A activity. The M&A literature suggests that a nationwide M&A wave is a clustering of a 
series of M&A waves in different industries. This clustering is mainly boosted or facilitated by 
liquidity and misvaluations. The industry waves are usually initiated by internal shocks that are 
usually the results of technological changes in the corresponding industry. Merger waves are also 
associated with changes in legal and regulatory regimes. Both industry internal shocks and 
market misvaluation create uncertainty related to the future prospects of firms that are varying 
from one industry to another and from one company to another within the same industry 
according to the exposure of this company to the new way of the industry operation. In addition, 
a company involved in an M&A deal would pass through a period of instability related to its own 
future prospects as the deal being negotiated and until both firms combine their operation under 
one management, one vision and one culture. Uncertainty about the firm’s future prospects 
induces shocks to the firm’s idiosyncratic volatility that enhances the negative relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and the next month’s expected returns.  
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 We show that the link between idiosyncratic volatility puzzle and mergers and 
acquisitions is robust to whether or not we use daily or monthly data in the analyses, as well as to 
different model specifications: whether we use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
or the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model to estimate our idiosyncratic volatility.  
 Our attempts to link the mergers and acquisitions activity to the negative relationship 
between stocks’ expected returns and the previous month’s exposure to the common 
idiosyncratic volatility (CIV) factor proved futile. This leads us to conclude that firms’ 
idiosyncratic volatility and firms’ exposure to the CIV factor are catching two distinct firms’ 
characteristics or firms’ risk exposure. M&A activity can in part explain the idiosyncratic 
volatility puzzle but it does not subsume the negative relationship between CIV exposure and 
firm returns. Our paper identifies a number of questions and challenges for future research. One 
important challenge is to isolate the link between factors responsible for different merger waves 
that may account for the variations in the intensity of the IV puzzle.  Our results show that the 
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is stronger in high M&A activity periods. Indeed, during the 1982-
1989 merger wave period, all performance measures of the zero-investment portfolio are 
negative and significant. As noted by Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008), this period has been 
dubbed as the refocusing wave, where several mergers were either designed for firms to 
specialize their operations or to downsize. This is also a period in which the number of hostile 
bids reached a peak. To the extent that misvaluations that lead to the IV puzzle are greater for 
firms that restructure, or downsize, or that the takeovers are hostile as opposed to friendly bids, 
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Figure 3-1   Aggregate Idiosyncratic Volatility (using the Three-Factor Model) 
The below graphs present the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility from Jul 1963 to Dec 2013. All stocks listed on 
NYSE, NYSE MKT (formerly AMEX), and NASDAQ and having data on CRSP database are included in our 
sample. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals resulting from estimating the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The model is estimated using daily 
observations every month for every stock in our sample. Next, and for every month, we estimate the value weighted 
and equal weighted averages for all our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatilities available within this month. We use these 
averages as our proxy for value-weighted and equal-weighted idiosyncratic volatility respectively. Merger Waves 
Periods are highlighted in grey. 
 
Figure 3.1 – A – Value Weighted Aggregate Idiosyncratic Volatility 
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Figure 3-2   Aggregate Idiosyncratic Volatility (using the Five-Factor Model) 
The below graphs present the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility from Jul 1963 to Dec 2013. All stocks listed on NYSE, 
NYSE MKT (formerly AMEX), and NASDAQ and having data on CRSP database are included in our sample. 
Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals resulting from estimating the Fama and 
French (2015) five-factor model: 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −   𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The 
model is estimated using daily observations every month for every stock in our sample. Next, and for every month, we 
estimate the value weighted and equal weighted averages for all our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatilities available within 
this month. We use these averages as our proxy for value-weighted and equal-weighted idiosyncratic volatility 
respectively. Merger Waves Periods are highlighted in grey. 
Figure 3.2 – A – Value Weighted Aggregate Idiosyncratic Volatility 
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Figure 3-3   Value Weighted Scaled Idiosyncratic Volatility 
The below graphs present the aggregate scaled idiosyncratic volatility from Jul 1963 to Dec 2013. All stocks listed on 
NYSE MKT (formerly AMEX), and NASDAQ and having data on CRSP database are included in our sample. 
Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals resulting from estimating the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and the 
Fama and French (2015) five-factor model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The model is estimated using daily observations every month for every stock in our 
sample. Next, and for every month, we estimate the value weighted and equal weighted averages for all our stocks’ 
idiosyncratic volatilities available within this month. We use these averages as our proxy for value-weighted and equal-
weighted idiosyncratic volatility respectively. The idiosyncratic volatility are scaled by the returns volatility by dividing 
monthly aggregate idiosyncratic volatility by monthly aggregate returns’ volatility. Merger Waves Periods are highlighted 
in grey.   
 
Figure 3.3 – A – Value Weighted FF3 Scaled Idiosyncratic Volatility 
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Table 3-1   Descriptive Statistics – Equal-Weighted Volatility, Idiosyncratic Volatility, and Scaled Volatility 
In the table below we provide the average statistics for our sample. The monthly return is obtained every month for every firm in our sample. Then equal (value) 
weighted average for all firm’s return is obtained. The reported returns are then averaged for the 12 months within every year to obtain our yearly observations. 
The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated every month for every firm relative to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model using the daily returns within this 
month. Then, equal (value) weighted average for all firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is obtained. The reported idiosyncratic volatilities are then averaged for the 12 
months within every year to obtain our yearly observations. The return’s volatility is estimated every month for every firm using the daily returns within this 
month. Then, equal (value) weighted average for all firm’s return’s volatility is obtained. Then, equal (value) weighted average for all firm’s volatility is obtained. 
The reported volatilities are then averaged for the 12 months within every year to obtain our yearly observations. Scaled Idiosyncratic Volatility is obtained by 
dividing the monthly aggregate idiosyncratic volatility by the monthly aggregate return volatility.  The reported scaled idiosyncratic volatilities are then averaged 
for the 12 months within every year to obtain our yearly observations. The number of stocks per year is the total number of firms that are used within any month 








































1963 0.28% 2.24% 2.13% 95.55% 2073 1989 0.90% 3.14% 3.09% 98.25% 6723 
1964 1.42% 2.12% 2.09% 98.63% 2155 1990 -1.98% 4.01% 3.91% 97.67% 6547 
1965 2.66% 2.17% 2.10% 96.90% 2208 1991 3.78% 4.22% 4.14% 98.18% 6514 
1966 -0.44% 2.44% 2.26% 92.91% 2229 1992 2.29% 4.44% 4.39% 98.84% 6699 
1967 5.06% 2.46% 2.36% 96.10% 2271 1993 2.00% 4.22% 4.20% 99.32% 7058 
1968 3.09% 2.46% 2.33% 94.79% 2293 1994 -0.38% 4.01% 3.95% 98.55% 7529 
1969 -2.25% 2.35% 2.18% 92.81% 2361 1995 2.38% 3.93% 3.89% 99.14% 7864 
1970 -0.65% 2.97% 2.68% 91.11% 2430 1996 1.45% 3.88% 3.80% 98.11% 8396 
1971 1.73% 2.53% 2.38% 94.20% 2516 1997 1.69% 3.88% 3.77% 97.29% 8621 
1972 0.49% 2.35% 2.27% 96.57% 2649 1998 0.02% 4.45% 4.28% 96.39% 8441 
1973 -3.46% 2.98% 2.81% 94.76% 5697 1999 2.76% 4.43% 4.34% 97.93% 8093 
1974 -2.21% 3.25% 3.07% 94.47% 5115 2000 -0.91% 5.27% 4.99% 94.92% 7737 
1975 4.63% 3.04% 2.92% 96.09% 4922 2001 2.37% 4.80% 4.52% 94.41% 6989 
1976 3.64% 2.53% 2.46% 97.05% 4993 2002 -0.89% 4.31% 4.03% 93.69% 6265 
1977 1.83% 2.20% 2.15% 97.56% 4974 2003 5.12% 3.30% 3.10% 93.90% 5814 
1978 2.26% 2.44% 2.29% 94.36% 4931 2004 1.79% 2.76% 2.56% 92.70% 5631 
1979 3.07% 2.37% 2.26% 95.29% 4875 2005 0.44% 2.54% 2.37% 93.44% 5604 
1980 3.30% 2.70% 2.50% 93.24% 5048 2006 1.40% 2.46% 2.28% 92.66% 5527 
1981 0.09% 2.55% 2.40% 94.36% 5416 2007 -0.40% 2.66% 2.39% 90.42% 5518 
1982 1.97% 2.77% 2.63% 94.96% 5647 2008 -4.64% 4.93% 4.16% 86.32% 5220 
1983 2.86% 2.73% 2.63% 96.34% 6228 2009 4.91% 4.71% 4.09% 87.63% 4893 
1984 -1.00% 2.60% 2.51% 96.57% 6523 2010 2.33% 2.98% 2.57% 86.79% 4715 
1985 2.00% 2.77% 2.72% 98.15% 6578 2011 -0.85% 3.15% 2.54% 82.71% 4568 
1986 0.69% 3.05% 2.97% 97.54% 6876 2012 1.50% 2.68% 2.42% 90.28% 4414 
1987 -0.31% 3.65% 3.39% 94.97% 7082 2013 3.07% 2.41% 2.20% 91.55% 4397 
1988 
1.53% 3.28% 3.20% 97.69% 7040 
Total 
Sample 
1.23% 3.20% 3.02% 
94.78% 24644 
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Table 3-2   Descriptive Statistics – Value-Weighted Volatility, Idiosyncratic Volatility, and Scaled Volatility 
In the table below we provide the average statistics for our sample. The monthly return is obtained every month for every firm in our sample. Then equal (value) 
weighted average for all firm’s return is obtained. The reported returns are then averaged for the 12 months within every year to obtain our yearly observations. 
The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated every month for every firm relative to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model using the daily returns within this 
month. Then, equal (value) weighted average for all firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is obtained. The reported idiosyncratic volatilities are then averaged for the 12 
months within every year to obtain our yearly observations. The return’s volatility is estimated every month for every firm using the daily returns within this 
month. Then, equal (value) weighted average for all firm’s return’s volatility is obtained. Then, equal (value) weighted average for all firm’s volatility is obtained. 
The reported volatilities are then averaged for the 12 months within every year to obtain our yearly observations. Scaled Idiosyncratic Volatility is obtained by 
dividing the monthly aggregate idiosyncratic volatility by the monthly aggregate return volatility.  The reported scaled idiosyncratic volatilities are then averaged 
for the 12 months within every year to obtain our yearly observations. The number of stocks per year is the total number of firms that are used within any month 








































1963 1.63% 1.23% 1.01% 85.13% 2073 1989 2.63% 1.49% 1.26% 85.53% 6723 
1964 1.49% 1.05% 0.97% 92.95% 2155 1990 0.21% 1.79% 1.47% 83.41% 6547 
1965 1.42% 1.11% 1.01% 91.11% 2208 1991 3.17% 1.81% 1.54% 85.39% 6514 
1966 -0.30% 1.53% 1.29% 85.13% 2229 1992 1.31% 1.68% 1.52% 90.71% 6699 
1967 2.62% 1.47% 1.34% 91.42% 2271 1993 1.53% 1.74% 1.59% 92.10% 7058 
1968 1.65% 1.60% 1.45% 90.65% 2293 1994 0.53% 1.69% 1.54% 91.09% 7529 
1969 -0.45% 1.56% 1.37% 87.96% 2361 1995 3.21% 1.66% 1.54% 92.72% 7864 
1970 0.71% 1.86% 1.53% 83.77% 2430 1996 2.35% 1.84% 1.63% 89.09% 8396 
1971 1.73% 1.50% 1.32% 88.58% 2516 1997 3.11% 2.05% 1.69% 82.92% 8621 
1972 1.77% 1.39% 1.25% 90.37% 2649 1998 3.01% 2.40% 1.99% 84.26% 8441 
1973 -0.93% 1.89% 1.56% 83.17% 5697 1999 3.76% 2.70% 2.32% 86.06% 8093 
1974 -1.68% 2.28% 1.79% 79.13% 5115 2000 1.91% 3.68% 3.09% 84.66% 7737 
1975 3.52% 1.89% 1.58% 83.74% 4922 2001 0.71% 2.76% 2.19% 80.32% 6989 
1976 2.50% 1.44% 1.24% 85.94% 4993 2002 -0.75% 2.55% 1.93% 76.45% 6265 
1977 0.10% 1.25% 1.09% 87.38% 4974 2003 3.05% 1.79% 1.38% 78.33% 5814 
1978 1.26% 1.50% 1.23% 83.05% 4931 2004 1.50% 1.48% 1.23% 83.05% 5631 
1979 2.39% 1.48% 1.26% 85.55% 4875 2005 1.07% 1.41% 1.18% 83.80% 5604 
1980 3.45% 2.04% 1.67% 82.06% 5048 2006 1.70% 1.46% 1.23% 85.05% 5527 
1981 0.48% 1.86% 1.58% 84.90% 5416 2007 1.15% 1.65% 1.26% 77.56% 5518 
1982 2.39% 2.00% 1.62% 81.80% 5647 2008 -2.47% 3.30% 2.16% 69.49% 5220 
1983 2.45% 1.81% 1.57% 87.25% 6228 2009 3.58% 2.58% 1.81% 71.82% 4893 
1984 0.89% 1.66% 1.42% 85.43% 6523 2010 2.00% 1.72% 1.20% 71.60% 4715 
1985 2.88% 1.51% 1.34% 88.88% 6578 2011 0.51% 1.96% 1.25% 67.71% 4568 
1986 1.94% 1.77% 1.51% 85.82% 6876 2012 1.73% 1.47% 1.13% 77.22% 4414 
1987 1.26% 2.34% 1.70% 79.21% 7082 2013 2.81% 1.35% 1.08% 80.78% 4397 
1988 
1.92% 1.70% 1.36% 81.23% 7040 
Total 
Sample 





Table 3-3   Average Equal Weighted, Value Weighted and Scaled Idiosyncratic Volatility 
In the table below we provide the average idiosyncratic volatility for the stocks included in our sample while dividing the period into higher 
M&A activities (M&A waves) and low M&A activities (No M&A waves). The idiosyncratic volatility is estimated every month for every 
firm relative to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model using the daily returns within this month. Then, equal (value) weighted 
average for all firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is obtained. The reported idiosyncratic volatilities are then averaged across the specified periods. 
The return’s volatility is estimated every month for every firm using the daily returns within this month. Then, equal (value) weighted average 
for all firm’s return’s volatility is obtained. Scaled Idiosyncratic Volatility is obtained by dividing the monthly aggregate idiosyncratic 
volatility by the monthly aggregate return volatility. The reported scaled idiosyncratic volatilities are then averaged across the specified 
periods. 
Panel A: Equal Weighted Idiosyncratic Volatility  
Wave 4: 1960-1972 2.29% No Wave 1: 1973-1981 2.54% 
Wave 5: 1982-1989 2.89% No Wave 2: 1990-1992 4.15% 
Wave 6: 1993-2000 4.15% No Wave 3: 2001-2003 3.88% 
Wave 7: 2004-2007 2.40% No Wave 4: 2008-2012 3.16% 
Wave 8: 2013 2.20%   
All Merger Waves 2.96% No Merger Waves 3.12% 
Total Sample 3.02% 
Panel B: Scaled Equal Weighted Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Wave 4: 1960-1972 94.92% No Wave 1: 1973-1981 95.24% 
Wave 5: 1982-1989 96.81% No Wave 2: 1990-1992 98.23% 
Wave 6: 1993-2000 97.71% No Wave 3: 2001-2003 94.00% 
Wave 7: 2004-2007 92.30% No Wave 4: 2008-2012 86.75% 
Wave 8: 2013 91.55%   
All Merger Waves 95.96% No Merger Waves 93.38% 
Total Sample 94.78% 
Difference in Means between Mergers Waves and No Merger Waves: 2.3% (t-stat: 5.9 ***) 
Panel C: Value Weighted Idiosyncratic Volatility  
Wave 4: 1960-1972 1.27% No Wave 1: 1973-1981 1.44% 
Wave 5: 1982-1989 1.47% No Wave 2: 1990-1992 1.51% 
Wave 6: 1993-2000 1.93% No Wave 3: 2001-2003 1.83% 
Wave 7: 2004-2007 1.23% No Wave 4: 2008-2012 1.51% 
Wave 8: 2013 1.08%   
All Merger Waves 1.49% No Merger Waves 1.51% 
Total Sample 1.50% 
Panel D: Scaled  Value Weighted Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Wave 4: 1960-1972 88.89% No Wave 1: 1973-1981 83.88% 
Wave 5: 1982-1989 84.39% No Wave 2: 1990-1992 86.50% 
Wave 6: 1993-2000 87.86% No Wave 3: 2001-2003 78.37% 
Wave 7: 2004-2007 82.37% No Wave 4: 2008-2012 71.57% 
Wave 8: 2013 80.78%   
All Merger Waves 86.26% No Merger Waves 80.47% 
Total Sample 83.96% 






Table 3-4   Summary of the Portfolio Performance tests for portfolios constructed using the zero investment Idiosyncratic 
Volatility ranked portfolios using daily data (From Appendix A) 
Portfolios are formed based on previous month idiosyncratic volatility using daily Returns for the idiosyncratic volatility estimation and daily 
returns for the subsequent performance estimation. The table reports the results related to the zero investment portfolio obtained by being long 
the fifth (highest idiosyncratic volatility) quintile and short the first (lowest idiosyncratic volatility) quintile.   
Daily Returns – Fama and French (1993) Model  
 Total Sample High M&A Activity Low M&A Activity  
Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig +ve Non-Sig 
 
Daily Returns – Fama and French (2015) Model 
 Total Sample High M&A Activity Low M&A Activity  
Alpha -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig +ve Non-Sig 
 
Daily Returns – Fama and French (1993) Model – Sub-Periods of High M&A Activity 
 1960-1972 1982-1989 1993-2000 2004-2007 2013 
Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
 
Daily Returns – Fama and French (1993) Model – Sub-Periods of Low M&A Activity 
 1973-1981 1990-1992 2001-2003 2008-2012  
Alpha -ve Sig +ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
Average Return +ve Non-Sig +ve Sig +ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
 
Daily Returns – Fama and French (2015) Model – Sub-Periods of High M&A Activity 
 1960-1972 1982-1989 1993-2000 2004-2007 2013 
Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig +ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
 
Daily Returns – Fama and French (2015) Model – Sub-Periods of Low M&A Activity 
 1973-1981 1990-1992 2001-2003 2008-2012  
Alpha -ve Sig +ve Sig +ve Sig +ve Non-Sig 






Table 3-5   Summary of the Portfolio Performance tests for portfolios constructed using the zero investment Idiosyncratic 
Volatility ranked portfolios using monthly data (From Appendix B) 
Portfolios are formed based on previous month idiosyncratic volatility using monthly Returns for the idiosyncratic volatility estimation and 
monthly returns for the subsequent performance estimation. The table reports the results related to the zero investment portfolio obtained by 
being long the fifth (highest idiosyncratic volatility) quintile and short the first (lowest idiosyncratic volatility) quintile.   
Monthly Returns – Fama and French (1993) Model  
 Total Sample High M&A Activity Low M&A Activity  
Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig 
Average Return -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig 
 
Monthly Returns – Fama and French (2015) Model 
 Total Sample High M&A Activity Low M&A Activity  
Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig 
Average Return -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig 
 
Monthly Returns – Fama and French (1993) Model – Sub-Periods of High M&A Activity 
 1960-1972 1982-1989 1993-2000 2004-2007 2013 
Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
 
Monthly Returns – Fama and French (1993) Model – Sub-Periods of Low M&A Activity 
 1973-1981 1990-1992 2001-2003 2008-2012  
Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig +ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig +ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig 
 
Monthly Returns – Fama and French (2015) Model – Sub-Periods of High M&A Activity 
 1960-1972 1982-1989 1993-2000 2004-2007 2013 
Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
 
Monthly Returns – Fama and French (2015) Model – Sub-Periods of Low M&A Activity 
 1973-1981 1990-1992 2001-2003 2008-2012  
Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig +ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig 






Table 3-6   Summary of the Portfolio Performance tests for portfolios constructed using the zero investment factor Idiosyncratic 
Volatility ranked portfolios using monthly data (60 months window) (From Appendix C) 
Portfolios are formed based on previous month exposure to factor idiosyncratic volatility using monthly, using the Herskovic et al. (16) 
methodology. Returns for the idiosyncratic volatility estimation and monthly returns for the subsequent performance estimation. The table 
reports the results related to the zero investment portfolio obtained by being long the fifth (highest idiosyncratic volatility) quintile and short 
the first (lowest idiosyncratic volatility) quintile. The Table reports the results related to the zero investment portfolio obtained by being long 
the fifth (highest exposure to common idiosyncratic volatility factor) quintile and short the first (lowest exposure to common idiosyncratic 
volatility factor) quintile.   
CIV Constructed based on Market Model  vs. CIV Constructed based on Fama and French (1993) Three-factor model vs. CIV 
Constructed based on Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Model  





Three-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig 
Five-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig 
Average Return -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig 
 
CIV Constructed based on Market Model   
 Total Sample High M&A Activity Low M&A Activity  
Three-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig  
Five-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig  
Average Return -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig  
 
CIV Constructed based on Market Model  – Sub-Periods of High M&A Activity 
 1960-1972 1982-1989 1993-2000 2004-2007 2013 
Three-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig 
Five-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig 
 
CIV Constructed based on Market Model  – Sub-Periods of Low M&A Activity 
 1973-1981 1990-1992 2001-2003 2008-2012  
Three-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig 
Five-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig 





Table 3-7   Summary of the Portfolio Performance tests for portfolios constructed using the zero investment factor Idiosyncratic 
Volatility ranked portfolios using monthly data (12 months window) (From Appendix D) 
Summary of the main results related to sorting portfolios based on previous month exposure to common factor idiosyncratic volatility 
following Herskovic et al. (2016) Methodology but using 12 months to estimate the exposure to CIV instead of 60 months. The Table reports 
the results related to the zero investment portfolio obtained by being long the fifth (highest exposure to common idiosyncratic volatility 
factor) quintile and short the first (lowest exposure to common idiosyncratic volatility factor) quintile.   
CIV Constructed based on Market Model   
 High M&A Activity Low M&A Activity  
Three-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig 
Five-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig 
 
CIV Constructed based on Market Model  – Sub-Periods of High M&A Activity 
 1960-1972 1982-1989 1993-2000 2004-2007 2013 
Three-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig +ve Sig 
Five-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig +ve Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig 
 
CIV Constructed based on Market Model  – Sub-Periods of Low M&A Activity 
 1973-1981 1990-1992 2001-2003 2008-2012  
Three-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig 
Five-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig +ve Non-Sig -ve Sig 






Table 3-8   Summary of the Portfolio Performance tests for portfolios constructed using the zero investment factor Idiosyncratic 
Volatility ranked portfolios using monthly data (12 months window with no estimation overlap) (From Appendix E) 
Summary of the main results related to sorting portfolios based on previous month exposure to common factor idiosyncratic volatility 
following Herskovic et al. (2016) Methodology but using 12 months to estimate the exposure to CIV instead of 60 months and removing the 
first year of every sub-sample period. The Table reports the results related to the zero investment portfolio obtained by being long the fifth 
(highest exposure to common idiosyncratic volatility factor) quintile and short the first (lowest exposure to common idiosyncratic volatility 
factor) quintile.   
CIV Constructed based on Market Model   
 High M&A Activity Low M&A Activity  
Three-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig 
Five-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Sig 
 
CIV Constructed based on Market Model  – Sub-Periods of High M&A Activity 
 1961-1972 1983-1989 1994-2000 2005-2007  
Three-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
Five-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig 
Average Return -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Sig 
 
CIV Constructed based on Market Model  – Sub-Periods of Low M&A Activity 
 1974-1981 1991-1992 2002-2003 2009-2012  
Three-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Non-Sig -ve Non-Sig 
Five-Factor Alpha -ve Sig -ve Non-Sig +ve Sig -ve Non-Sig 





3.10 Appendix A 
 
Table 3-9   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-factor model - Daily 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (1993) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. 
The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 varying daily returns per month to 
be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, 
daily portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) daily factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) 
Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Daily Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters 
estimated by regressing the difference in daily returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans 
from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is 
not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample before creating our five quintiles. The 
*,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. We present daily returns that are 
monthly adjusted using the following formula: 𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =  (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦)
30
− 1. 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.16%*** 0.03% 0.15% -0.32%* -0.59%*** -1.34%*** 
(t-value) 3.31 0.5 1.47 -1.95 -2.83 -5.66 
       
Average Daily Return 1.39%*** 1.49%*** 1.71%*** 1.38%*** 1.19%*** -0.21% 






Table 3-10   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Model - Daily 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (2015) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 
varying daily returns per month to be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic 
volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, daily portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (2015) daily factors. The 
table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Daily Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) 
reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in daily returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero 
investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from 
our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample 
before creating our five quintiles. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the 
alphas. We present daily returns that are monthly adjusted using the following formula: 𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =  (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦)
30
− 1.   
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.07%* 0.11%* 0.51%*** 0.38%*** 0.23% -0.29% 
(t-value) -1.69 1.9 5.39 2.77 1.26 -1.45 
       
Average Daily Return 1.37%*** 1.52%*** 1.69%*** 1.37%*** 1.21%*** -0.15% 







Table 3-11   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-factor model – M&A 
Waves Daily 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (1993) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. 
The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 varying daily returns per month to 
be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, 
daily portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) daily factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) 
Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Daily Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters 
estimated by regressing the difference in daily returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans 
from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is 
not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample before creating our five quintiles. We 
divided our sample into tow sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. 
The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972], 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013-2015. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is 
reported for the alphas. We present daily returns that are monthly adjusted using the following formula: 𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =  (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦)
30
− 1. 
Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.17%*** 0.05% 0.16% -0.21% -0.53%** -1.30%*** 
(t-value) 3.04 0.65 1.42 -1.28 -2.44 -5.35 
             
Average Daily Return 1.88%*** 1.81%*** 1.94%*** 1.56%*** 1.16%** -0.69%* 
(t-value) 6.99 5.82 5.13 3.51 2.42 -1.89 
Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.02% 0.13% 0.38%* -0.05% -0.15% -0.73% 
(t-value) 0.18 1.24 1.9 -0.15 -0.36 -1.61 
             
Average Daily Return 0.66% 1.02%* 1.35%** 1.10% 1.24% 0.58% 






Table 3-12   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Model - Daily 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated using daily 
returns and relative to the Fama and French (2015) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 +
𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 varying daily returns per 
month to be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, 
daily portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (2015) daily factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-
Factor Alpha as well as the Average Daily Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by 
regressing the difference in daily returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and 
till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We 
made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample before creating our five quintiles. We divided our sample into tow sub-periods: high 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972], 1982-
1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013-2015. The low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. We present daily returns that are monthly adjusted using the 
following formula: 𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =  (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦)
30
− 1. 
Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.00% 0.00% 0.41%*** 0.30% 0.25% -0.39% 
(t-value) 0.07 0 3.01 1.64 0.99 -1.44 
             
Average Daily Return 2.17%*** 2.04%*** 2.12%*** 1.58%*** 1.26%** -0.90%* 
(t-value) 6.07 4.92 4.31 2.77 2.12 -1.92 
Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.30%*** 0.29%*** 0.93%*** 1.00%*** 0.91%*** 0.63%* 
(t-value) -3.91 2.8 5.39 3.98 2.64 1.68 
             
Average Daily Return 0.63% 1.04%* 1.31%* 1.16% 1.22% 0.58% 







Table 3-13   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-factor model - Daily 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (1993) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. 
The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 varying daily returns per month to 
be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, 
daily portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) daily factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) 
Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Daily Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters 
estimated by regressing the difference in daily returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans 
from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is 
equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample before creating our five quintiles. We divided 
our sample into tow sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high 
M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-
1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We present the parameters estimated for the high M&A activity sub-periods.  The *,**,*** represent significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. We present daily returns that are monthly adjusted using the 
following formula: 𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =  (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦)
30
− 1. 
1960-1972 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.16%*** 0.16% 0.14% -0.41%* -0.79%** -1.50%*** 
(t-value) 2.87 1.61 1.02 -1.84 -2.5 -4.41 
             
Average Daily Return 1.16%*** 1.35%*** 1.61%*** 1.32%** 1.10% -0.06% 
(t-value) 3.33 3.37 3.15 2.03 1.42 -0.12 
1982-1989 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.14%* 0.09% -0.11% -0.50%** -1.75%*** -2.78%*** 
(t-value) 1.69 0.81 -0.67 -2.02 -5.39 -7.79 
       
Average Daily Return 2.37%*** 2.19%*** 1.91%*** 1.35%* 0.00% -2.31%*** 
(t-value) 3.77 3.14 2.58 1.76 -0.01 -4.69 
1993-2000 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.29%* 0.03% 0.34% -0.16% 0.24% -0.61% 
(t-value) 1.89 0.17 1.14 -0.4 0.44 -1.01 
             
Average Daily Return 2.32%*** 2.00%*** 2.22%** 1.67% 1.96% -0.36% 
(t-value) 3.98 2.9 2.39 1.44 1.54 -0.32 
2004-2007 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.12% -0.06% 0.44% 0.48% 0.16% -0.36% 
(t-value) 1.26 -0.34 1.46 1.29 0.33 -0.66 
             
Average Daily Return 1.30%** 1.25% 1.78%* 1.75% 1.34% 0.04% 
(t-value) 1.98 1.5 1.81 1.62 1.18 0.06 
2013 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.04% -0.16% -0.56% -0.55% -0.15% -0.12% 
(t-value) -0.18 -0.64 -0.88 -0.83 -0.11 -0.08 
             
Average Daily Return 3.38%*** 3.69%** 3.66%** 3.88%** 4.13%* 0.72% 





Table 3-14   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-factor model - Daily 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (1993) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. 
The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 varying daily returns per month to 
be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, 
daily portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) daily factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) 
Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Daily Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters 
estimated by regressing the difference in daily returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans 
from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is 
not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample before creating our five quintiles. We 
divided our sample into tow sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. 
The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 
1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We present the parameters estimated for the low M&A activity sub-periods.  The *,**,*** represent 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. We present daily returns that are monthly adjusted 
using the following formula: 𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =  (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦)
30
− 1.   
1973-1981 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.21%** 0.44%*** 0.67%*** 0.41%* -0.54%* -1.26%*** 
(t-value) -2.34 4.53 4.62 1.91 -1.66 -3.46 
             
Average Daily Return 0.54% 1.27%** 1.64%** 1.55%** 0.88% 0.34% 
(t-value) 1.09 2.18 2.47 2.03 1.12 0.69 
1990-1992 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.06% 0.20% 0.33% -0.25% 1.53%*** 0.82% 
(t-value) 0.76 1.01 0.99 -0.7 2.74 1.45 
             
Average Daily Return 1.37%* 1.75%* 1.99%* 1.44% 3.07%*** 1.67%** 
(t-value) 1.65 1.78 1.82 1.29 2.97 2.08 
2001-2003 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.04% -0.16% 0.11% -0.65% -0.37% -0.66% 
(t-value) 0.11 -0.51 0.15 -0.52 -0.22 -0.35 
             
Average Daily Return 0.19% -0.03% -0.06% -0.90% 0.36% 0.17% 
(t-value) 0.15 -0.03 -0.03 -0.31 0.12 0.07 
2008-2012 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.17% -0.04% 0.38% 0.26% 0.22% 0.00% 
(t-value) 1.17 -0.16 0.73 0.33 0.25 0 
             
Average Daily Return 0.73% 0.77% 1.30% 1.30% 1.32% 0.59% 








Table 3-15   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Model - Daily 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (2015) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 
varying daily returns per month to be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic 
volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, daily portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (2015) daily factors. The 
table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Daily Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) 
reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in daily returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero 
investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from 
our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample 
before creating our five quintiles. We divided our sample into tow sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger 
and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low 
M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We present the parameters estimated for the high M&A activity sub-
periods.  The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. We present daily 
returns that are monthly adjusted using the following formula: 𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =  (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦)
30
− 1.   
1960-1972 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.12%** 0.24%** 0.17% -0.28% -0.57%** -1.24%*** 
(t-value) 2.16 2.44 1.31 -1.34 -2.02 -4.06 
             
Average Daily Return 1.15%*** 1.41%*** 1.58%*** 1.35%** 1.07% -0.09% 
(t-value) 3.28 3.54 3.1 2.08 1.42 -0.15 
1982-1989 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.02% 0.16% 0.14% -0.33% -1.31%*** -2.22%*** 
(t-value) 0.3 1.35 0.84 -1.39 -4.04 -6.2 
             
Average Daily Return 2.37%*** 2.19%*** 1.99%*** 1.19% 0.08% -2.23%*** 
(t-value) 3.75 3.14 2.7 1.56 0.11 -4.41 
1993-2000 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.03% 0.09% 0.68%** 0.42% 1.02%** 0.44% 
(t-value) 0.23 0.47 2.55 1.2 2.16 0.85 
             
Average Daily Return 2.26%*** 2.05%*** 2.18%** 1.55% 2.05% -0.21% 
(t-value) 3.85 2.93 2.38 1.35 1.64 -0.2 
2004-2007 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.12% 0.03% 0.25% 0.56%* 0.29% -0.23% 
(t-value) 1.39 0.17 0.91 1.7 0.69 -0.51 
             
Average Daily Return 1.28%* 1.34% 1.72%* 1.85%* 1.39% 0.11% 
(t-value) 1.95 1.62 1.75 1.73 1.26 0.16 
2013 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.14% -0.27% 0.05% -0.30% 0.06% 0.19% 
(t-value) -0.79 -1 0.11 -0.45 0.05 0.16 
             
Average Daily Return 3.35%*** 3.51%** 4.22%** 3.91%** 3.94%* 0.57% 






Table 3-16   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Model - Daily 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (2015) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 
varying daily returns per month to be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic 
volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, daily portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (2015) daily factors. The 
table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Daily Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) 
reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in daily returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero 
investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from 
our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample 
before creating our five quintiles. We divided our sample into tow sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger 
and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low 
M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We present the parameters estimated for the low M&A activity sub-
periods.  The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. We present daily 
returns that are monthly adjusted using the following formula: 𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =  (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦)
30
− 1.  
1973-1981 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.29%*** 0.50%*** 0.56%*** 0.53%*** -0.43% -1.07%*** 
(t-value) -3.34 5.27 4 2.68 -1.36 -3.06 
             
Average Daily Return 0.53% 1.30%** 1.51%** 1.64%** 0.90% 0.37% 
(t-value) 1.05 2.23 2.28 2.18 1.14 0.76 
1990-1992 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.04% 0.23% 0.50% -0.13% 2.10%*** 1.41%** 
(t-value) 0.48 1.17 1.54 -0.37 3.83 2.53 
             
Average Daily Return 1.38%* 1.73%* 2.05%* 1.36% 3.26%*** 1.84%** 
(t-value) 1.66 1.74 1.85 1.22 3.12 2.28 
2001-2003 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.84%*** 0.04% 1.93%*** 2.59%*** 2.44%** 3.04%** 
(t-value) -3.36 0.14 3.48 3.15 2 2.34 
             
Average Daily Return 0.13% -0.02% 0.01% -0.45% -0.27% -0.42% 
(t-value) 0.1 -0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.1 -0.17 
2008-2012 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.01% 0.35% 0.83%* 0.81% 1.08% 1.02% 
(t-value) 0.06 1.29 1.95 1.31 1.3 1.16 
             
Average Daily Return 0.69% 0.79% 1.28% 1.13% 1.48% 0.78% 





3.11 Appendix B 
 
Table 3-17   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-factor model - Monthly 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (1993) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. 
The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 varying daily returns per month to 
be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, 
monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French 
(1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) reports the corresponding 
parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our 
sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks 
whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample before creating our five 
quintiles. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas.  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.08%** -0.01% 0.02% -0.43%*** -1.16%*** -1.65%*** 
(t-value) 2.34 -0.26 0.27 -4.32 -7.5 -9.54 
             
Average Daily Return 0.93%*** 0.98%*** 1.08%*** 0.75%** 0.14% -0.79%*** 





Table 3-18   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Model - Monthly 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (2015) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 
varying daily returns per month to be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic 
volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (2015) monthly factors. 
The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column 
(5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the 
zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed 
from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our 
sample before creating our five quintiles. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported 
for the alphas. 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.03% 0.01% 0.16%** -0.06% -0.63%*** -1.02%*** 
(t-value) -1.05 0.2 2.46 -0.73 -4.52 -6.48 
             
Average Daily Return 0.92%*** 1.00%*** 1.07%*** 0.76%** 0.15% -0.76%*** 














Table 3-19   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-factor model – M&A 
Waves - Monthly 
 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (1993) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. 
The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 varying daily returns per month to 
be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, 
monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French 
(1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) reports the corresponding 
parameters estimated by regressing the difference in montly returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our 
sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks 
whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample before creating our five 
quintiles. We divided our sample into tow sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) 
activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972], 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013-2015. The low M&A activity periods 
span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat 
is reported for the alphas. 
Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.10%*** -0.04% -0.04% -0.38%*** -1.07%*** -1.60%*** 
(t-value) 2.76 -0.76 -0.48 -3.63 -5.91 -7.97 
             
Average Daily Return 1.28%*** 1.20%*** 1.25%*** 0.90%*** 0.16% -1.12%*** 
(t-value) 6.96 5.41 4.48 2.6 0.39 -3.27 
Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.03% 0.09% 0.14% -0.36%* -1.02%*** -1.39%*** 
(t-value) -0.51 1.17 1.15 -1.87 -3.53 -4.3 
             
Average Daily Return 0.42% 0.65%* 0.82%* 0.51% 0.12% -0.29% 





Table 3-20   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Model – M&A 
Waves - Monthly 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated using daily 
returns and relative to the Fama and French (2015) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 +
𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 varying daily returns per 
month to be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, 
monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (2015) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) 
Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by 
regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 
and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. 
We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample before creating our five quintiles. We divided our sample into tow sub-periods: 
high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972], 
1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013-2015. The low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** 
represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.02% -0.11% 0.07% -0.17% -0.66%*** -1.12%*** 
(t-value) 0.51 -1.55 0.67 -1.44 -2.99 -4.76 
             
Average Daily Return 1.47%*** 1.35%*** 1.34%*** 0.88%** 0.11% -1.36%*** 
(t-value) 6.42 4.86 3.94 2.04 0.21 -3.19 
Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.16%*** 0.18%** 0.37%*** 0.23% -0.41%* -0.67%** 
(t-value) -2.64 2.28 3.49 1.59 -1.76 -2.45 
             
Average Daily Return 0.40% 0.66%* 0.78%* 0.59% 0.10% -0.30% 





Table 3-21   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-factor model - Monthly 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (1993) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. 
The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 varying daily returns per month to 
be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, 
monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French 
(1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) reports the corresponding 
parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our 
sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks 
whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample before creating our five 
quintiles. We divided our sample into tow sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) 
activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We present the parameters estimated for the high M&A activity sub-periods.  The *,**,*** 
represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
1960-1972 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.09%** 0.07% 0.05% -0.38%** -1.02%*** -1.49%*** 
(t-value) 2.17 1.22 0.49 -2.47 -5.96 -7.87 
             
Average Daily Return 0.80%*** 0.92%** 1.08%** 0.84% 0.39% -0.41% 
(t-value) 2.69 2.48 2.29 1.45 0.58 -0.79 
1982-1989 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.14%** -0.04% -0.19% -0.64%*** -2.14%*** -2.91%*** 
(t-value) 2.07 -0.45 -1.64 -4.16 -8.54 -10.04 
             
Average Daily Return 1.63%*** 1.49%*** 1.27%** 0.77% -0.72% -2.35%*** 
(t-value) 3.74 2.79 2.15 1.21 -1.2 -5.99 
1993-2000 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.15% -0.06% -0.11% -0.62%*** -1.22%*** -1.76%*** 
(t-value) 1.28 -0.43 -0.55 -2.87 -2.81 -3.56 
             
Average Daily Return 1.55%*** 1.28%*** 1.30%** 0.76% 0.14% -1.41% 
(t-value) 4.15 2.97 2.11 0.89 0.13 -1.36 
2004-2007 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.06% -0.02% 0.33% 0.30% -0.01% -0.35% 
(t-value) 1.17 -0.2 1.52 1.13 -0.02 -0.98 
             
Average Daily Return 0.87%*** 0.81%* 1.18%** 1.12%* 0.82% -0.05% 
(t-value) 3.03 1.93 2.08 1.69 1.13 -0.1 
2013 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.16% -0.43%** -0.23% -0.48% 0.10% 0.26% 
(t-value) -0.53 -2.33 -0.43 -0.72 0.07 0.16 
             
Average Daily Return 2.33%*** 2.53%*** 2.50%** 2.62%** 2.43%** 0.10% 









Table 3-22   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-factor model - Monthly 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (1993) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. 
The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 varying daily returns per month to 
be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, 
monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French 
(1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column (5-1) reports the corresponding 
parameters estimated by regressing the difference in daily returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our 
sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks 
whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our sample before creating our five 
quintiles. We divided our sample into tow sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) 
activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We present the parameters estimated for the low M&A activity sub-periods.  The *,**,*** 
represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
1973-1981 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.19%** 0.32%*** 0.40%*** -0.03% -1.11%*** -1.58%*** 
(t-value) -2.21 3.54 3.3 -0.15 -5.05 -5.62 
             
Average Daily Return 0.39% 0.92%* 1.16%* 1.02% 0.36% -0.04% 
(t-value) 0.99 1.76 1.86 1.37 0.43 -0.06 
1990-1992 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.01% 0.08% 0.05% -0.72%*** -1.89%*** -2.36%*** 
(t-value) 0.1 0.48 0.22 -3.46 -4.41 -5.47 
             
Average Daily Return 0.95% 1.18% 1.23% 0.52% -0.78% -1.72%* 
(t-value) 1.45 1.36 1.21 0.43 -0.67 -1.81 
2001-2003 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.03% -0.17% -0.16% -0.49% 0.56% 0.42% 
(t-value) -0.22 -0.79 -0.56 -0.65 0.57 0.4 
             
Average Daily Return 0.03% -0.10% -0.19% -0.84% 0.30% 0.28% 
(t-value) 0.04 -0.1 -0.12 -0.42 0.12 0.13 
2008-2012 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.11% -0.15% 0.03% -0.32% -0.48% -0.62% 
(t-value) 1.23 -1.03 0.11 -0.7 -0.77 -0.92 
             
Average Daily Return 0.37% 0.29% 0.54% 0.42% 0.13% -0.23% 






Table 3-23   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Model - Monthly 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (2015) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 
varying daily returns per month to be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic 
volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (2015) monthly factors. 
The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column 
(5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the 
zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed 
from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our 
sample before creating our five quintiles. We divided our sample into tow sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low 
Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The 
low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We present the parameters estimated for the high M&A activity 
sub-periods.  The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
1960-1972 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.07%* 0.12%/ 0.05% -0.31%** -0.96%*** -1.41%*** 
(t-value) 1.74 1.78 0.57 -2.31 -5.52 -7.68 
             
Average Daily Return 0.79%*** 0.96%** 1.06%** 0.86% 0.38% -0.41% 
(t-value) 2.66 2.61 2.25 1.49 0.57 -0.81 
1982-1989 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.07% -0.09% -0.11% -0.58%*** -1.89%*** -2.59%*** 
(t-value) 0.96 -1.04 -0.9 -3.35 -7.6 -8.67 
             
Average Daily Return 1.63%*** 1.49%*** 1.32%** 0.68% -0.65% -2.27%*** 
(t-value) 3.74 2.75 2.26 1.06 -1.07 -5.75 
1993-2000 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.00% 0.04% 0.10% -0.39%** -0.73%* -1.12%*** 
(t-value) 0.01 0.32 0.54 -2.06 -1.89 -2.76 
             
Average Daily Return 1.51%*** 1.30%*** 1.28%** 0.70% 0.19% -1.32% 
(t-value) 4.02 3.05 2.09 0.81 0.17 -1.33 
2004-2007 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.08% 0.02% 0.18% 0.21% 0.22% -0.16% 
(t-value) 1.51 0.13 0.9 0.92 0.82 -0.55 
             
Average Daily Return 0.86%*** 0.87%** 1.13%** 1.19%* 0.86% 0.00% 
(t-value) 3.01 2.05 2.02 1.82 1.18 0 
2013 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.05% -0.45%** -0.62%* -0.83% 0.02% 0.07% 
(t-value) -0.25 -2.88 -2.37 -1.63 0.02 0.06 
             
Average Daily Return 2.31%** 2.41%*** 2.87%*** 2.56%** 2.49%** 0.18% 







Table 3-24   Portfolio Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Model - Monthly 
We have formed value-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on the previous month idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
using daily returns and relative to the Fama and French (2015) model: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. The idiosyncratic volatility was estimated as 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝜎2(𝜖𝑡). A stock should at least have 12 
varying daily returns per month to be included in our sample. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) idiosyncratic 
volatilities. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (2015) monthly factors. 
The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath.  Column 
(5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the 
zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous literature, we have removed 
from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. We made sure that there is at least 20 stocks in every month of our 
sample before creating our five quintiles. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low 
Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The 
low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We present the parameters estimated for the low M&A activity 
sub-periods.  The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
1973-1981 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.23%** 0.37%*** 0.38%*** 0.08% -1.04%*** -1.47%*** 
(t-value) -2.48 4.58 3.15 0.62 -5.18 -5.6 
             
Average Daily Return 0.38% 0.94%* 1.07%* 1.09% 0.36% -0.02% 
(t-value) 0.96 1.78 1.72 1.47 0.44 -0.04 
1990-1992 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.00% 0.10% 0.02% -0.58%** -1.20%*** -1.67%*** 
(t-value) -0.03 0.6 0.12 -2.36 -2.92 -3.89 
             
Average Daily Return 0.95% 1.16% 1.29% 0.44% -0.57% -1.52% 
(t-value) 1.46 1.34 1.21 0.38 -0.48 -1.54 
2001-2003 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.28% -0.13% 0.43% 1.13%** 1.56% 1.66% 
(t-value) -1.61 -0.55 1.28 2.23 1.67 1.67 
             
Average Daily Return -0.01% -0.10% -0.17% -0.47% -0.08% -0.07% 
(t-value) -0.01 -0.09 -0.11 -0.23 -0.03 -0.04 
2008-2012 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.01% -0.03% 0.37% 0.26% -0.05% -0.06% 
(t-value) -0.12 -0.17 1.22 0.67 -0.08 -0.11 
             
Average Daily Return 0.34% 0.28% 0.51% 0.43% 0.13% -0.21% 









3.12 Appendix C 
 
Table 3-25   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 60 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al. (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month 
exposure to the Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we 
estimate a regression of daily individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks 
monthly variances are estimated as the variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once 
individual variances are obtained, then an equal-weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as 
our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the 
previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance (MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted 
index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in 
the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed on CIV and MV shocks using a 60 months historical 
window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the 
lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French 
(1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-
statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth 
quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with 
previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is 
followed when constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors 
model However, instead of using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in 
estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we 
estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors included in our models. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
Herskovic et al (2016) Approach - CIV Exposure Constructed Based on Market Model)  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.30%** 0.19%** 0.07% 0.08% -0.09% -0.82%*** 
(t-value) 2.32 2.58 1.2 1.3 -1.03 -6.87 
             
Average Daily Return 1.55%*** 1.36%*** 1.21%*** 1.23%*** 1.08%*** -0.47%*** 
(t-value) 5.33 5.93 5.52 5.37 3.73 -3.76 
CIV Exposure Constructed Based on Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.29%** 0.18%** 0.10% 0.05% -0.06% -0.78%*** 
(t-value) 2.24 2.34 1.65 0.84 -0.69 -6.62 
             
Average Daily Return 1.55%*** 1.34%*** 1.25%*** 1.20%*** 1.11%*** -0.45%*** 
(t-value) 5.33 5.87 5.7 5.16 3.81 -3.51 
CIV Exposure Constructed Based on Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.26%* 0.18%** 0.10%* 0.07% -0.05% -0.74%*** 
(t-value) 1.95 2.39 1.71 1.12 -0.62 -6.09 
             
Average Daily Return 1.52%*** 1.36%*** 1.24%*** 1.21%*** 1.11%*** -0.41%*** 







Table 3-26   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 60 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month 
exposure to the Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we 
estimate a regression of daily individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks 
monthly variances are estimated as the variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once 
individual variances are obtained, then an equal-weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as 
our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the 
previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance (MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted 
index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in 
the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed on CIV and MV shocks using a 60 months historical 
window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the 
lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French 
(2015) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-
statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth 
quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with 
previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is 
followed when constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors 
model However, instead of using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in 
estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we 
estimate the variance of the three-factors  and five-factors included in our models. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
Herskovic et al (2016) Approach - CIV Exposure Constructed Based on Market Model)  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.48%*** 0.19%** 0.03% 0.04% 0.08% -0.83%*** 
(t-value) 3.03 2.37 0.5 0.57 0.79 -6.08 
       
Average Daily Return 1.55%*** 1.36%*** 1.21%*** 1.23%*** 1.08%*** -0.47%*** 
(t-value) 5.33 5.93 5.52 5.37 3.73 -3.76 
CIV Exposure Constructed Based on Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.47%*** 0.18%** 0.05% 0.00% 0.10% -0.81%*** 
(t-value) 3.06 2.25 0.86 0.06 0.96 -6.09 
       
Average Daily Return 1.55%*** 1.34%*** 1.25%*** 1.20%*** 1.11%*** -0.45%*** 
(t-value) 5.33 5.87 5.7 5.16 3.81 -3.51 
CIV Exposure Constructed Based on Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.46%*** 0.20%** 0.04% 0.02% 0.08% -0.81%*** 
(t-value) 2.9 2.43 0.75 0.28 0.86 -5.9 
       
Average Daily Return 1.52%*** 1.36%*** 1.24%*** 1.21%*** 1.11%*** -0.41%*** 









Table 3-27   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 60 Months using 
Window – Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 60 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for 
the alphas. 
Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.13% 0.05% -0.06% -0.08% -0.27%** -0.84%*** 
(t-value) 0.98 0.7 -0.77 -0.88 -2.18 -6.06 
             
Average Daily Return 1.25%*** 1.28%*** 1.21%*** 1.24%*** 0.96%*** -0.29%** 
(t-value) 4.14 5.31 4.87 4.64 2.73 -2.04 
Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.54%** 0.31%*** 0.16%* 0.19%** 0.13% -0.81%*** 
(t-value) 2.55 2.66 1.93 2.49 1 -4.29 
             
Average Daily Return 1.94%*** 1.46%*** 1.21%*** 1.23%*** 1.23%** -0.71%*** 





Table 3-28   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 60 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al. (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month 
exposure to the Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we 
estimate a regression of daily individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks 
monthly variances are estimated as the variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once 
individual variances are obtained, then an equal-weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as 
our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the 
previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance (MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted 
index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in 
the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed on CIV and MV shocks using a 60 months historical 
window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the 
lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French 
(2015) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-
statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth 
quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with 
previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is 
followed when constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors 
model However, instead of using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in 
estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we 
estimate the variance of the three-factors  and five-factors included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 
1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012.  The *,**,*** represent 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.21% 0.05% -0.07% -0.08% -0.11% -0.75%*** 
(t-value) 1.6 0.66 -1.13 -1 -0.9 -5.2 
             
Average Daily Return 1.25%*** 1.28%*** 1.21%*** 1.24%*** 0.96%*** -0.29%** 
(t-value) 4.14 5.31 4.87 4.64 2.73 -2.04 
Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.81%*** 0.36%*** 0.14% 0.16%* 0.31%** -0.91%*** 
(t-value) 3 2.79 1.52 1.92 2.04 -4.04 
       
Average Daily Return 1.94%*** 1.46%*** 1.21%*** 1.23%*** 1.23%** -0.71%*** 





Table 3-29   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 60 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al. (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 60 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for 
the alphas. 
1960-1972 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.01% 0.10% 0.07% 0.05% -0.44%* -0.88%*** 
(t-value) 0.04 1.26 0.72 0.52 -1.94 -2.91 
             
Average Daily Return 0.39% 0.55% 0.44% 0.32% -0.38% -0.77% 
(t-value) 0.57 0.81 0.55 0.35 -0.33 -1.32 
1982-1989 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.23% -0.05% 0.09% 0.11% -0.10% -0.51%*** 
(t-value) -1.2 -0.66 1.12 1.64 -0.71 -3.46 
             
Average Daily Return 1.26%** 1.40%*** 1.51%*** 1.52%*** 1.30%** 0.04% 
(t-value) 2.28 2.98 3.11 3.03 2.24 0.25 
1993-2000 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.40% 0.16% 0.09% 0.02% -0.05% -0.84%*** 
(t-value) 1.19 0.89 0.6 0.13 -0.21 -3.76 
             
Average Daily Return 1.61%*** 1.50%*** 1.41%*** 1.35%*** 1.15%* -0.46%** 
(t-value) 2.64 3.73 3.84 3.66 1.9 -2 
2004-2007 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.05% 0.14% -0.03% 0.13% 0.04% -0.30%** 
(t-value) 0.23 1.46 -0.38 1.05 0.15 -2.17 
             
Average Daily Return 0.89% 0.94%** 0.77%* 0.94%* 0.87% -0.02% 
(t-value) 1.54 2.14 1.74 1.86 1.22 -0.12 
2013 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.06% -0.05% -0.24% 0.64%** -0.10% -0.17% 
(t-value) 0.17 -0.17 -1.28 2.65 -0.18 -0.39 
             
Average Daily Return 3.58%*** 3.04%*** 2.55%*** 3.25%*** 3.14%*** -0.44% 




Table 3-30   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 60 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al. (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 60 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for 
the alphas. 
1973-1981 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.22% 0.18%* 0.01% 0.04% -0.02% -0.91%*** 
(t-value) 1.04 1.72 0.08 0.41 -0.23 -3.79 
             
Average Daily Return 1.94%** 1.62%** 1.34%** 1.32%** 1.26%* -0.69%** 
(t-value) 2.53 2.51 2.18 2.1 1.78 -2.26 
1990-1992 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 1.25%** 0.52%* 0.11% 0.23% 0.17% -1.55%*** 
(t-value) 2.58 1.93 0.7 1.69 1.06 -3.32 
             
Average Daily Return 2.28%* 1.58% 1.10% 1.20% 1.11% -1.17% 
(t-value) 1.75 1.53 1.36 1.61 1.54 -1.4 
2001-2003 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 1.56%** 0.94%*** 0.82%*** 0.80%*** 1.24%*** -0.50% 
(t-value) 2.13 3.48 4.11 4.12 3.15 -0.91 
             
Average Daily Return 2.96%* 2.01%** 1.92%** 1.84%* 2.20% -0.76% 
(t-value) 1.92 2.26 2.28 1.93 1.44 -1.18 
2008-2012 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.38% 0.16% 0.12% 0.15% 0.04% -0.37% 
(t-value) 0.95 0.71 0.76 1.06 0.14 -1.3 
             
Average Daily Return 1.12% 0.76% 0.64% 0.71% 0.67% -0.45% 





Table 3-31   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 60 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al. (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 60 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for 
the alphas. 
1960-1972 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.00% 0.04% 0.06% 0.07% -0.23% -0.67%*** 
(t-value) 0.02 0.42 0.67 0.67 -1.16 -2.59 
       
Average Daily Return 0.39% 0.55% 0.44% 0.32% -0.38% -0.77% 
(t-value) 0.57 0.81 0.55 0.35 -0.33 -1.32 
1982-1989 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.04% -0.01% 0.11% 0.19%*** 0.09% -0.51%*** 
(t-value) -0.18 -0.12 1.08 3.15 0.64 -2.9 
       
Average Daily Return 1.26%** 1.40%*** 1.51%*** 1.52%*** 1.30%** 0.04% 
(t-value) 2.28 2.98 3.11 3.03 2.24 0.25 
1993-2000 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.58%* 0.24% 0.15% 0.10% 0.24% -0.73%*** 
(t-value) 1.68 1.44 1.15 0.77 1.15 -2.91 
       
Average Daily Return 1.61%*** 1.50%*** 1.41%*** 1.35%*** 1.15%* -0.46%** 
(t-value) 2.64 3.73 3.84 3.66 1.9 -2 
2004-2007 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.09% 0.14% -0.07% 0.13% 0.20% -0.18% 
(t-value) 0.4 1.4 -0.94 1.11 0.9 -1.6 
       
Average Daily Return 0.89% 0.94%** 0.77%* 0.94%* 0.87% -0.02% 
(t-value) 1.54 2.14 1.74 1.86 1.22 -0.12 
2013 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.18% -0.25% -0.25%* 0.62%** -0.41% -0.23% 
(t-value) -0.46 -0.94 -1.99 2.86 -1.02 -0.6 
       
Average Daily Return 3.58%*** 3.04%*** 2.55%*** 3.25%*** 3.14%*** -0.44% 





Table 3-32   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 60 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al. (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month 
exposure to the Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we 
estimate a regression of daily individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks 
monthly variances are estimated as the variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once 
individual variances are obtained, then an equal-weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as 
our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the 
previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance (MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted 
index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in 
the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed on CIV and MV shocks using a 60 months historical 
window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the 
lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French 
(2015) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-
statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth 
quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with 
previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is 
followed when constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors 
model However, instead of using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in 
estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we 
estimate the variance of the three-factors  and five-factors included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 
1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012.  The *,**,*** represent 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
1973-1981 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.21% 0.19%* 0.00% 0.03% -0.04% -0.91%*** 
(t-value) 0.86 1.68 0 0.29 -0.31 -3.44 
       
Average Daily Return 1.94%** 1.62%** 1.34%** 1.32%** 1.26%* -0.69%** 
(t-value) 2.53 2.51 2.18 2.1 1.78 -2.26 
1990-1992 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 1.23%** 0.37%* 0.16% 0.10% 0.24% -1.47%*** 
(t-value) 2.72 1.74 0.87 0.7 1.43 -3.18 
       
Average Daily Return 2.28%* 1.58% 1.10% 1.20% 1.11% -1.17% 
(t-value) 1.75 1.53 1.36 1.61 1.54 -1.4 
2001-2003 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 2.12%* 1.10%*** 0.85%*** 0.83%*** 1.90%*** -0.39% 
(t-value) 2.01 2.77 2.76 3.08 4.08 -0.53 
       
Average Daily Return 2.96%* 2.01%** 1.92%** 1.84%* 2.20% -0.76% 
(t-value) 1.92 2.26 2.28 1.93 1.44 -1.18 
2008-2012 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 1.10%** 0.61%** 0.41%*** 0.36%** 0.48% -0.65%* 
(t-value) 2.26 2.45 2.82 2.51 1.53 -1.87 
       
Average Daily Return 1.12% 0.76% 0.64% 0.71% 0.67% -0.45% 




3.13 Appendix D 
 
Table 3-33   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al. (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for 
the alphas. 
Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.15% -0.03% 0.00% -0.08% -0.25%** -0.54%*** 
(t-value) -1.09 -0.41 -0.04 -1.14 -2.24 -4.19 
             
Average Daily Return 1.18%*** 1.27%*** 1.29%*** 1.24%*** 1.06%*** -0.12% 
(t-value) 3.69 5.2 5.5 4.83 3.08 -0.91 
Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.41%* 0.32%** 0.24%*** 0.21%** 0.06% -0.75%*** 
(t-value) 1.66 2.53 2.79 2.23 0.35 -3.31 
             
Average Daily Return 1.79%*** 1.45%*** 1.32%*** 1.26%*** 1.22%** -0.57%** 






Table 3-34   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al. (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (2015) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012.  The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for 
the alphas. 
Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.04% -0.04% -0.01% -0.03% -0.01% -0.40%*** 
(t-value) -0.28 -0.53 -0.18 -0.4 -0.14 -3.17 
             
Average Daily Return 1.18%*** 1.27%*** 1.29%*** 1.24%*** 1.06%*** -0.12% 
(t-value) 3.69 5.2 5.5 4.83 3.08 -0.91 
Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.85%** 0.48%*** 0.27%*** 0.24%** 0.28%* -0.98%*** 
(t-value) 2.47 2.93 2.65 2.28 1.69 -2.97 
       
Average Daily Return 1.79%*** 1.45%*** 1.32%*** 1.26%*** 1.22%** -0.57%** 














Table 3-35   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al. (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for 
the alphas. 
1960-1972 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.11% 0.14%* 0.10% -0.07% -0.47%*** -0.98%*** 
(t-value) 0.93 1.84 1.35 -0.76 -3.29 -4.85 
             
Average Daily Return 1.41%** 1.25%** 1.22%** 1.15%* 1.00% -0.42% 
(t-value) 2.33 2.49 2.33 1.96 1.36 -1.56 
1982-1989 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.64%*** -0.11% 0.05% -0.08% -0.55%** -0.54%** 
(t-value) -2.75 -0.84 0.43 -0.64 -2.45 -2.31 
             
Average Daily Return 0.83% 1.31%** 1.45%*** 1.30%** 0.81% -0.02% 
(t-value) 1.35 2.52 2.96 2.55 1.39 -0.09 
1993-2000 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.09% -0.04% -0.05% -0.05% -0.01% -0.49% 
(t-value) 0.22 -0.18 -0.28 -0.33 -0.04 -1.59 
             
Average Daily Return 1.31%* 1.26%*** 1.21%*** 1.22%*** 1.18% -0.13% 
(t-value) 1.94 2.98 3.21 2.8 1.58 -0.4 
2004-2007 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.31% 0.05% 0.09% 0.10% 0.04% 0.07% 
(t-value) -1.22 0.5 0.82 0.76 0.18 0.36 
             
Average Daily Return 0.62% 0.83% 0.86%* 0.91%* 0.93% 0.31% 
(t-value) 0.86 1.67 1.93 1.95 1.45 1.39 
2013 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.45%* -0.18% 0.13% 0.26% 0.43% 0.88%* 
(t-value) -1.65 -0.64 0.77 1.08 0.7 2.11 
             
Average Daily Return 3.31%** 2.76%*** 2.98%*** 3.06%*** 3.20%*** -0.10% 






Table 3-36   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for 
the alphas. 
1973-1981 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.07% 0.13% 0.08% 0.11% 0.01% -0.72%*** 
(t-value) 0.36 1.09 0.87 1.12 0.06 -3.18 
             
Average Daily Return 1.78%** 1.56%** 1.44%** 1.37%** 1.29%* -0.48% 
(t-value) 2.32 2.47 2.37 2.16 1.74 -1.4 
1990-1992 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.90%* 0.49%** 0.26% 0.18% 0.12% -1.24%*** 
(t-value) 1.93 2.29 1.55 1.34 0.42 -3.22 
             
Average Daily Return 1.91% 1.49% 1.22% 1.17% 1.19% -0.72% 
(t-value) 1.53 1.66 1.59 1.5 1.13 -1.37 
2001-2003 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 1.50% 0.95%** 1.12%*** 1.12%*** 1.40%** -0.27% 
(t-value) 1.47 2.35 4.64 4.41 2.36 -0.26 
             
Average Daily Return 2.81% 2.14%* 2.20%** 2.11%** 2.29% -0.52% 
(t-value) 1.39 1.85 2.39 2.06 1.34 -0.42 
2008-2012 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.38% 0.24% 0.09% 0.04% -0.18% -0.59%* 
(t-value) 0.89 0.87 0.56 0.21 -0.47 -1.69 
             
Average Daily Return 1.11% 0.81% 0.62% 0.63% 0.47% -0.64% 






Table 3-37   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for 
the alphas. 
1960-1972 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.12% 0.16%* 0.16%** 0.01% -0.32%** -0.83%*** 
(t-value) 0.95 1.91 2.03 0.09 -2.42 -4.36 
       
Average Daily Return 1.41%** 1.25%** 1.22%** 1.15%* 1.00% -0.42% 
(t-value) 2.33 2.49 2.33 1.96 1.36 -1.56 
1982-1989 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.32% 0.01% 0.14% 0.07% -0.34% -0.66%*** 
(t-value) -1.1 0.05 1.06 0.54 -1.42 -2.83 
       
Average Daily Return 0.83% 1.31%** 1.45%*** 1.30%** 0.81% -0.02% 
(t-value) 1.35 2.52 2.96 2.55 1.39 -0.09 
1993-2000 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.25% 0.11% 0.09% 0.17% 0.37% -0.26% 
(t-value) 0.61 0.51 0.57 1.13 1.55 -0.9 
       
Average Daily Return 1.31%* 1.26%*** 1.21%*** 1.22%*** 1.18% -0.13% 
(t-value) 1.94 2.98 3.21 2.8 1.58 -0.4 
2004-2007 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.27% 0.04% 0.11% 0.14% 0.16% 0.14% 
(t-value) -1.05 0.4 0.97 0.94 0.67 0.62 
       
Average Daily Return 0.62% 0.83% 0.86%* 0.91%* 0.93% 0.31% 
(t-value) 0.86 1.67 1.93 1.95 1.45 1.39 
2013 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.66%** -0.21% 0.01% 0.11% 0.12% 0.78%* 
(t-value) -2.54 -0.77 0.04 0.48 0.24 2.21 
       
Average Daily Return 3.31%** 2.76%*** 2.98%*** 3.06%*** 3.20%*** -0.10% 




Table 3-38   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window – 
Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (2015) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012.  The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for 
the alphas. 
1973-1981 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.11% 0.19% 0.10% 0.06% -0.05% -0.83%*** 
(t-value) 0.59 1.44 1.04 0.66 -0.38 -3.39 
       
Average Daily Return 1.78%** 1.56%** 1.44%** 1.37%** 1.29%* -0.48% 
(t-value) 2.32 2.47 2.37 2.16 1.74 -1.4 
1990-1992 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.88%** 0.51%** 0.23% 0.17% 0.15% -1.20%*** 
(t-value) 2.13 2.46 1.33 1.29 0.5 -3.1 
       
Average Daily Return 1.91% 1.49% 1.22% 1.17% 1.19% -0.72% 
(t-value) 1.53 1.66 1.59 1.5 1.13 -1.37 
2001-2003 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 2.33% 1.09%* 1.22%*** 1.53%*** 2.51%*** 0.00% 
(t-value) 1.5 1.75 3.45 5.35 5.48 0 
       
Average Daily Return 2.81% 2.14%* 2.20%** 2.11%** 2.29% -0.52% 
(t-value) 1.39 1.85 2.39 2.06 1.34 -0.42 
2008-2012 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 1.20%** 0.74%** 0.39%** 0.39%* 0.41% -0.81%** 
(t-value) 2.35 2.44 2.53 1.83 1.01 -2.05 
       
Average Daily Return 1.11% 0.81% 0.62% 0.63% 0.47% -0.64% 











3.14 Appendix E 
 
Table 3-39   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window with 
No Estimation Overlap – Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We have deleted the first year on ever sub-period as the CIV exposure estimation would contain monthly 
observations from the previous sub-period. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the 
alphas. 
Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.16% -0.05% -0.04% -0.13% -0.32%** -0.61%*** 
(t-value) -1.06 -0.58 -0.53 -1.59 -2.57 -4.36 
             
Average Daily Return 1.02%*** 1.13%*** 1.14%*** 1.08%*** 0.85%** -0.17% 
(t-value) 2.89 4.21 4.39 3.76 2.21 -1.11 
Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.38%* 0.44%*** 0.34%*** 0.32%*** 0.13% -0.66%*** 
(t-value) 1.71 3.24 3.7 3.43 0.71 -3.11 
             
Average Daily Return 2.60%*** 2.21%*** 2.03%*** 2.02%*** 2.14%*** -0.46%* 






Table 3-40   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window with 
No Estimation Overlap – Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month 
exposure to the Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we 
estimate a regression of daily individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks 
monthly variances are estimated as the variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once 
individual variances are obtained, then an equal-weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as 
our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the 
previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance (MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted 
index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in 
the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical 
window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the 
lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French 
(2015) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-
statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the fifth 
quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with 
previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is 
followed when constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors 
model However, instead of using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in 
estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we 
estimate the variance of the three-factors  and five-factors included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 
1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We have deleted the first 
year on ever sub-period as the CIV exposure estimation would contain monthly observations from the previous sub-period. The *,**,*** represent 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.04% -0.06% -0.05% -0.07% -0.06% -0.47%*** 
(t-value) -0.24 -0.67 -0.68 -0.89 -0.55 -3.38 
             
Average Daily Return 1.02%*** 1.13%*** 1.14%*** 1.08%*** 0.85%** -0.17% 
(t-value) 2.89 4.21 4.39 3.76 2.21 -1.11 
Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.62%** 0.54%*** 0.41%*** 0.41%*** 0.44%** -0.60%** 
(t-value) 2.53 3.35 4.21 4.39 2.36 -2.45 
       
Average Daily Return 2.60%*** 2.21%*** 2.03%*** 2.02%*** 2.14%*** -0.46%* 





Table 3-41   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window with 
No Estimation Overlap – Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the Common 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily individual stock returns 
on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the variance of the residuals resulting 
from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-weighted average of them is calculated for each 
month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month 
difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance (MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted 
index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from 
one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV 
coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, 
monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor 
Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the 
difference in monthly returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. 
Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed 
when constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of using 
the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −
 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and instead of estimating the 
market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors included in our models. We divide our 
sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods 
span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We have deleted 
the first year on ever sub-period as the CIV exposure estimation would contain monthly observations from the previous sub-period. The *,**,*** represent significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
1961-1972 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.11% 0.14%* 0.10% -0.07% -0.47%*** -0.98%*** 
(t-value) 0.93 1.84 1.35 -0.76 -3.29 -4.85 
             
Average Daily Return 1.41%** 1.25%** 1.22%** 1.15%* 1.00% -0.42% 
(t-value) 2.33 2.49 2.33 1.96 1.36 -1.56 
1983-1989 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.57%** -0.11% 0.03% -0.09% -0.61%** -0.65%*** 
(t-value) -2.24 -0.87 0.25 -0.68 -2.44 -2.67 
             
Average Daily Return 0.78% 1.18%** 1.31%** 1.16%** 0.60% -0.18% 
(t-value) 1.2 2.16 2.51 2.11 0.95 -0.81 
1994-2000 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.02% -0.08% -0.08% -0.12% -0.14% -0.53% 
(t-value) -0.05 -0.3 -0.46 -0.67 -0.46 -1.58 
             
Average Daily Return 1.14% 1.17%** 1.13%*** 1.11%** 1.02% -0.11% 
(t-value) 1.51 2.48 2.67 2.27 1.22 -0.32 
2005-2007 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.46% -0.03% -0.06% -0.01% 0.01% 0.12% 
(t-value) -1.63 -0.25 -0.49 -0.04 0.02 0.56 
             
Average Daily Return 0.17% 0.54% 0.53% 0.61% 0.63% 0.46%* 






Table 3-42   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window with 
No Estimation Overlap – Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (1993) Three-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the Common 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily individual stock returns 
on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the variance of the residuals resulting 
from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-weighted average of them is calculated for each 
month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month 
difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance (MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted 
index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from 
one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV 
coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, 
monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor 
Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the 
difference in monthly returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. 
Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed 
when constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of using 
the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −
 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and instead of estimating the 
market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors included in our models. We divide our 
sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods 
span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We have deleted 
the first year on ever sub-period as the CIV exposure estimation would contain monthly observations from the previous sub-period. The *,**,*** represent significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
1974-1981 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.02% 0.14% 0.09% 0.09% -0.06% -0.76%*** 
(t-value) 0.07 0.89 0.81 1.06 -0.38 -2.96 
             
Average Daily Return 2.40%*** 2.09%*** 1.97%*** 1.92%*** 1.95%*** -0.45% 
(t-value) 3.01 3.21 3.19 3.04 2.64 -1.22 
1991-1992 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.10% 0.57% 0.46%* 0.24%* -0.16% -0.62% 
(t-value) 0.17 1.48 1.73 1.73 -0.45 -1.36 
             
Average Daily Return 3.94%** 3.28%*** 2.73%*** 2.60%*** 2.88%** -1.07% 
(t-value) 2.46 3.37 3.44 3.32 2.4 -1.5 
2002-2003 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.60% 0.62%*** 1.03%*** 1.08%*** 1.43%* 0.72% 
(t-value) 1.29 2.97 4.91 3.9 1.77 1.14 
             
Average Daily Return 2.00% 1.81% 2.13%* 2.14%* 2.76% 0.76% 
(t-value) 1.26 1.64 2.06 1.76 1.32 0.86 
2009-2012 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.81% 0.59%** 0.33%** 0.36%* 0.12% -0.69% 
(t-value) 1.62 2.25 2.12 1.86 0.31 -1.65 
             
Average Daily Return 2.63%** 2.10%** 1.76%** 1.86%** 1.86% -0.77%** 





Table 3-43   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window with 
No Estimation Overlap – Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the Common 
Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily individual stock returns 
on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the variance of the residuals resulting 
from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-weighted average of them is calculated for each 
month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month 
difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance (MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted 
index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from 
one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV 
coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, 
monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed against the Fama and French (1993) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor 
Alpha as well as the Average Monthly Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the 
difference in monthly returns of the fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. 
Consistent with previous literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed 
when constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of using 
the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −
 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and instead of estimating the 
market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the Variance of the three-factors  and five-factors included in our models. We divide our 
sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods 
span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012. We have deleted 
the first year on ever sub-period as the CIV exposure estimation would contain monthly observations from the previous sub-period. The *,**,*** represent significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the alphas. 
1961-1972 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.12% 0.16%* 0.16%** 0.01% -0.32%** -0.83%*** 
(t-value) 0.95 1.91 2.03 0.09 -2.42 -4.36 
       
Average Daily Return 1.41%** 1.25%** 1.22%** 1.15%* 1.00% -0.42% 
(t-value) 2.33 2.49 2.33 1.96 1.36 -1.56 
1983-1989 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.12% 0.05% 0.14% 0.08% -0.34% -0.82%*** 
(t-value) -0.4 0.33 0.98 0.56 -1.32 -3.55 
       
Average Daily Return 0.78% 1.18%** 1.31%** 1.16%** 0.60% -0.18% 
(t-value) 1.2 2.16 2.51 2.11 0.95 -0.81 
1994-2000 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.13% 0.06% 0.06% 0.13% 0.31% -0.23% 
(t-value) 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.8 1.15 -0.68 
       
Average Daily Return 1.14% 1.17%** 1.13%*** 1.11%** 1.02% -0.11% 
(t-value) 1.51 2.48 2.67 2.27 1.22 -0.32 
2005-2007 Sub-Period of High Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept -0.47%* -0.03% -0.04% -0.01% 0.00% 0.13% 
(t-value) -1.76 -0.33 -0.35 -0.1 0.01 0.52 
       
Average Daily Return 0.17% 0.54% 0.53% 0.61% 0.63% 0.46%* 






Table 3-44   Portfolio Sorted by Exposure to Common Factor in Idiosyncratic Volatility estimated using 12 Months Window with 
No Estimation Overlap – Alphas are estimated using Fama and French (2015) Five-Factors Model 
Following Herskovic et al (2016), we form equal-weighted quintile portfolios every month by sorting stocks based on their previous month exposure to the 
Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) Factor. We construct the exposure to CIV as per the following: for each month, we estimate a regression of daily 
individual stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted index: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡. Next individual stocks monthly variances are estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from the above model: 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜎
2(𝜖𝑡). Once individual variances are obtained, then an equal-
weighted average of them is calculated for each month in our sample. This latter would serve as our Common Idiosyncratic Volatility (CIV) factor. Shocks 
to the CIV factors are obtained as the month-to-month difference between the previously constructed CIV values. We also construct the Market Variance 
(MV) factor by estimating the variance of the CRSP value-weighted index each month by relying on the daily observations within this month. Similar to 
CIV shocks, MV shocks are obtained as the first difference in the MV factor from one month to the other. Next, monthly stocks excess returns are regressed 
on CIV and MV shocks using a 12 months historical window and the corresponding CIV coefficient would serve as the exposure to the CIV factor. Portfolio 
1(5) is the portfolio of stocks with the lower (highest) CIV exposures. Once portfolios are formed, monthly portfolio returns are obtained and regressed 
against the Fama and French (2015) monthly factors. The table reports the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Alpha as well as the Average Monthly 
Return with the t-statistics underneath. Column (5-1) reports the corresponding parameters estimated by regressing the difference in monthly returns of the 
fifth quintile and the first quintile (the zero investment portfolio). Our sample spans from August 1963 and till December 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature, we have removed from our sample all CRSP stocks whose code is not equal to 10, 11, and 12. The same methodology is followed when 
constructing the CIV Factor using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factors model However, instead of 
using the single factor market model above we use: 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 respectively in estimating our stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and 
instead of estimating the market variance (MV) for the single CRSP Value-weighted Index, we estimate the variance of the three-factors  and five-factors 
included in our models. We divide our sample into two sub-periods: high Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities and low Merger and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activities. The high M&A activity periods span:  1960-1972, 1982-1989, 1993-2000, 2004-2007, and 2013. The low M&A activity periods span: 
1973-1981, 1990-1992, 2001-2003, 2008-2012.  We have deleted the first year on ever sub-period as the CIV exposure estimation would contain monthly 
observations from the previous sub-period. The *,**,*** represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Robust white’s t-stat is reported for the 
alphas. 
1974-1981 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.11% 0.26% 0.17% 0.08% -0.12% -0.92%*** 
(t-value) 0.46 1.57 1.53 1.04 -0.95 -3.6 
       
Average Daily Return 2.40%*** 2.09%*** 1.97%*** 1.92%*** 1.95%*** -0.45% 
(t-value) 3.01 3.21 3.19 3.04 2.64 -1.22 
1991-1992 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.14% 0.76%** 0.46% 0.25% -0.11% -0.62% 
(t-value) 0.25 2.13 1.6 1.68 -0.25 -1.12 
       
Average Daily Return 3.94%** 3.28%*** 2.73%*** 2.60%*** 2.88%** -1.07% 
(t-value) 2.46 3.37 3.44 3.32 2.4 -1.5 
2002-2003 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 0.51% 0.38% 1.00%*** 1.55%*** 2.70%*** 2.08%*** 
(t-value) 1.04 1.47 4.8 7.82 5.46 4.87 
       
Average Daily Return 2.00% 1.81% 2.13%* 2.14%* 2.76% 0.76% 
(t-value) 1.26 1.64 2.06 1.76 1.32 0.86 
2009-2012 Sub-Period of Low Mergers and Acquisitions Activities 
Sorting Statistics Quintile Portfolio 5-1 portfolio 
 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High 5-1 
Intercept 1.32%** 0.87%*** 0.57%*** 0.65%*** 0.75% -0.58% 
(t-value) 2.62 2.89 3.54 2.83 1.67 -1.46 
       
Average Daily Return 2.63%** 2.10%** 1.76%** 1.86%** 1.86% -0.77%** 





4 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Effect of Investors’ Sentiment on Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions have been studied extensively in the finance literature. Related work 
dates back to the early twentieth century and covers a wide range of topics spanning from 
synergy estimation to premium paid, to the relationship between runup and markup, to the stock 
reaction around the announcement day, to the choice of the medium of exchange, and to the 
motivation behind mergers and acquisitions
23
.  
 In contrast, there is a relatively new literature examining financial market anomalies in 
the context of simple human behavior – the behavioral finance literature. Behavioral finance 
relies on psychology to explain financial anomalies such as the home bias, overconfidence 
(leading to possible overreaction / underreaction in security prices), optimism, and prospect 
theory. 
 In this paper, we link behavioral finance to merger and acquisition activities. We 
investigate how investor sentiment affects different merger and acquisition characteristics. First, 
we show that periods of higher market sentiment are associated with more stock and mixed 
acquisitions than cash-only acquisitions. Baker and Wurgler (2012) discuss the presence of 
market-wide overpricing in periods of high market sentiment. It appears that bidder firm 
management attempt to capitalize on their stock overpricing when making acquisitions in high 
sentiment periods.  
 The market also reacts differently to a deal announcement observed in periods of higher 
market sentiment compared to periods of lower market sentiment. We observe lower bidder 
announcement returns in higher sentiment periods in stock and mixed offers. The literature 
regarding the bidder stock reaction at announcement generally finds that bidder abnormal returns 
are negative and significant for stock and mixed offers and positive or at least insignificant for 
cash offers. The negative reaction to the non-cash acquisition can be considered within the 
context of a signaling hypotheis: when bidder stock price is likely to be overvalued, opting for a 
stock or mixed offer will signal the market about this possible overvaluation, and the market will 
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 For example see Roll (1986), Bradly, Desai, and Kim (1988), Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Schwert (1996), 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Moeller and Schlingemann (2005)   
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react accordingly, and a negative performance announcement effect is observed. Overpricing is 
more pronounced in periods of high sentiment; consequently, our findings that lower bidder 
announcement returns are observed in higher sentiment periods can be consistent with this 
signalling hypothesis. 
 Building on the possible overpricing in high sentiment periods and the signalling 
implications of the choice of the medium of exchange, we check the effect of sentiment on target 
bargaining power and perceived synergy. Our results show that target bargaining power 
increases with the sentiment – a result that is more significant for stock or mixed offers. It 
appears that in periods of higher market sentiment, target management is also affected by the 
level of optimism in the market and have an optimistic view of their value. This optimism 
coupled with the high market valuations leads target firms to bargain for a better deal, especially 
if the method of payment, fully or partially, includes a possibly overpriced bidder stock. On the 
other hand, overvaluation may be the prime motive for a bidder firm’s decision to undertake the 
acquisition. In such an environment where overpricing and optimism are pronounced, bidder 
firms that undertake cash-only acquisitions should see greater value creation. In line with this 
line of thought, we find that the market anticipates higher (lower) synergy in periods of higher 
sentiment for cash-only (stock or mixed) offer. 
 Finally, we show that target runups are usually higher in periods of high investor 
sentiment than in periods of low investor sentiment. However, this higher runup is not associated 
with higher premiums paid by bidder firms. This lack of association is puzzling and is at odds 
with Welch’s (1996) markup pricing hypothesis that sees in the runup a direct cost to the bidder 
firm and therefore, suggests a higher premium in periods of higher market sentiment in line with 
the higher runup. It appears that in periods of high sentiment news about a possible acquisition is 
positively received by optimistic investors leading to a higher runup. However, bidder firm 
management appears to realize that this higher runup is not primarily due to an increase in the 
standalone target value and consequently do not offer a commensurate higher premium. Our 
results indicate that in periods of higher sentiment, the runup is higher than usual but bidder 
firms discount the runup when negotiating the deal with the target management. As such, our 
findings here are more consistent with deal anticipation and the subsequent substitution effect 




 Our results can be summarized as follows: In periods of high market sentiment 
overpricing is more pronounced and may be attributed to higher levels of investor 
overconfidence. These two phenomena (overconfidence and overpricing) have an effect on 
merger and acquisition activities. Consequently, in periods of high investor sentiment, we 
observe higher chances of a stock and or mixed acquisition, lower bidder announcement 
cumulative abnormal returns, higher target bargaining power, lower synergy when the offer is 
not a cash-only one, and a higher target runup. This higher runup is not associated with a higher 
premium, which suggests more substitution effects and less markup pricing effects in high 
sentiment periods relative to low sentiment periods.  
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review 
and the main hypothesis, section 3 summarizes the data and sample construction, section 4 
presents our results, section 5 includes robustness tests and section 6 concludes.  
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Formation 
4.2.1 Sentiment and the Stock Market 
Within the financial markets, investor rationality is taken for granted. However, recent findings 
show that some financial anomalies cannot be fully explained within the context of rational 
behavior: some market participants make financial decision driven by emotional rather than 
rational motives.  
 Griffin and Tversky (1992) analyze human rationality while making financial decisions. 
They show that people form blurred judgements by focusing on the strength of the signal (good 
or bad) rather than the quality of the signal (the credibility of the signal’s source). Griffin and 
Tversky (1992) summarize the core idea in “people focus on the strength or extremeness of the 
available evidence (e.g., the warmth of a letter or the size of an effect) with insufficient regards 
for its weight or credence (i.e., the credibility of the writer or the size of the sample). This mode 
of judgement yields overconfidence when strength is high and weight is low, and under-
confidence when strength is low and weight is high” (Tversky, 1992: page 411). In line with the 
above interpretation, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) show that investors underreact to a 
sudden new piece of news (like earnings announcements) and overreact to a series of consecutive 
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negative or positive pieces of news. They interpret their finding that when a new news 
announcement is received by investors, they underreact or react slowly simply because the signal 
from the announcement is not strong enough. Whereas when there is a series of announcements, 
investors overreact because the series of negative or positive news gives a strong signal although 
this latter signal may have a low weight if we consider that the events may not be serially 
correlated. Within the same context of analyzing signal’s strength versus quality, Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) show that the investors better perceive private signal than 
public signals. 
 In their seminal work, Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) explain how aggregate market 
sentiment affects investor decisions: they show that hard to arbitrage stocks are usually more 
overpriced in periods of high market sentiment and more underpriced in periods of low market 
sentiment. The authors interpret their findings as follows: sentiment affects stocks in general and 
may drive the prices away from fundamentals. For the easier to arbitrage stocks, arbitrage 
activities would usually drive prices back to their proper levels. For harder to arbitrage stocks, 
those where arbitrage activity is at its lowest levels, mispricing persists. The authors identified 
the harder to arbitrage stocks as those stocks that are, “younger, smaller, more volatile, 
unprofitable, non-dividend paying, distressed, or with extreme growth potential” (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2007: 132). Baker, Wurgler and Yuan (2012) expanded on their earlier work to cover 
six major international markets and found similar behavior to the US markets: periods of high 
market sentiment are followed by relatively lower subsequent returns for hard-to-arbitrage 
stocks.  
 Several papers followed Baker and Wurgler (2006) in studying the effect of aggregate 
market sentiment on the stock markets. In a study on international markets, Schmeling (2009) 
shows that periods of higher market sentiment are associated with lower subsequent returns. This 
effect is stronger in countries where collective spirit rather than individualistic spirit reign. Yu 
and Yuan (2011) show that mean-variance relationship is violated in high sentiment periods. 
Hwang (2011) shows that Closed End Fund (CEF) discount is higher for the funds investing in 
less popular countries. They associated popularity with the Gallup Poll on Americans’ Attitudes 
toward Other Countries. They also found out that US institutional investors tend to invest more 
than the retail investors in less popular countries – indicating that retail investors tend to be more 
affected by the sentiment. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) examine how the power of several 
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existing anomalies change with the sentiment. The authors find that the highest profit achieved 
by the long-short strategy based on the observed anomalies occurs in the periods following high 
investors sentiment. Kim, Ryu, and Seo (2014) show that investor disagreement is negatively 
related to future stock returns but only in periods of high market sentiment. In a study on the 
Taiwanese market, Tsai (2017) shows that institutional investor sentiment plays a role in periods 
of low sentiment but not in periods of high sentiment; institutional investor sentiment affects the 
stock markets when pessimism is reigning. The above-mentioned research shows that sentiment 
affects investor investment decisions leading to a relationship between sentiment and the stock 
market. Chatterjee, John, and Yan (2012) find a positive relationship between the investor 
sentiment and the runup, markup, and premium. 
4.2.2 Different Measures of Sentiment 
In addition to the University of Michigan Sentiment Index (MCSI) and the Baker and Wurgler 
Index that is used in this paper, several researchers tested different sentiment proxies that can be 
used to asses how investors are feeling towards a stock in particular or the aggregate market in 
general.  
 Kumar and Lee (2006) and Tsai (2007) use the buy-sell imbalance (BSI) as a proxy for 
investor sentiment for particular stocks and show a relationship between BSI and subsequent 
stock returns. Hwang (2011) uses the Gallup Poll on Americans’ attitude toward Other Countries 
as a proxy for US investor sentiment towards a particular country in studying CEF discounts. 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) use the Consumer Confidence Index published by the 
Conference Board (CBIND) as well the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
(MCSI) and find that hard to arbitrage stocks earn lower returns than larger stocks following 
high sentiment periods. Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2013) use the CBIND after 
orthogonalizing it to a set of macroeconomic variables. They found out that momentum strategy 
leads profits in periods of high market sentiment but not in periods of low market sentiment. 
They also show that small traders are more affected by sentiment. Roger (2014) uses the number 
of stocks held by individual small investors as a proxy for risk aversion and their sentiment 
proxy leads to similar results as those reported by Baker and Wurgler (2007): hard to arbitrage 
stocks seem to be more overvalued (undervalued) in high (low) sentiment periods than their 
peers. Sun, Najand, and Shen (2016) use Thompson Reuters MarketPysch Index (TRMI) as a 
sentiment proxy at the intraday level. They show that changes in investor sentiment are related to 
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the next half-hour S&P 500 ETF. Focusing on the European market, Cornelli, Goldreich and 
Ljungqvist (2006) use the grey market to measure small investors’ attitude towards an IPO24. 
The authors show that when small investors are optimistic towards an IPO, this leads to higher 
IPO values in the short run and lower performance in the long run. In contrast, when small 
investors are pessimistic as per the grey market, the IPO values are in line with fundamentals.  
The above findings reveal the continuous attempts by researchers to find a sentiment measure 
that can properly proxy for how investors are feeling towards a specific stock or the aggregate 
market and whether such feelings truly affect stock prices or not.   
4.2.3 Sentiment Measures Extracted from Social Media 
With the spread of the Internet, investors convey their feeling toward the market or specific 
stocks through their preferred social media. Building on this observation, several researchers 
worked on extracting sentiment’s proxy out of investors’ tweets and other web-based activities. 
Tetlock (2007) created an investor pessimism index measure relying on WSJ “Abreast of the 
Market” column. He found that high levels of pessimism lead to lower prices. At the same time, 
Das and Chen (2007) used message board postings to form stock and sector specific sentiment 
indices. They found that their sentiment proxy relates to stock indices but not strongly to 
individual stocks. Following the work of Tetlock (2007), Dougal, Engelber, Garcia, and Parsons 
(2012) highlight the importance of the journalist influence on the stock market: the writing of 
journalist on WSJ “Abreast of the Market” seems to influence investors trading and consequently 
market prices. Sprenger, Tumasjan, Sandner, and Welpe (2014) rely on Twitter tweets to build a 
stock specific sentiment measure and find that average positive tweets will lead to higher 
subsequent stock prices. Kim and Kim (2014) extract a firm-specific sentiment proxy from 
Yahoo Finance but find no relationship between their sentiment measure and the stock market: 
neither at the firm level nor at the aggregate market level. Siganos, Vagenas-Nanos, and 
Verwijmeren (2014) use Facebook’s Gross National Happiness Index (FGNHI) as a proxy for 
investor sentiment for a particular country and uncover a positive relationship between sentiment 
and contemporaneous returns and a negative relationship between sentiment and subsequent 
returns. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2014) build a sentiment proxy based on Google searches: 
www.google.com/trends and link it to stock returns. Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang (2014) show the 
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 The grey market is a pre-IPO market in Europe that allow investors to speculate on the stocks of firms that are 
planning to launch an IPO. 
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relevance of peer review and social media in predicting stock returns by focusing their analysis 
on the articles published on www.seekingalpha.com. Avery, Najand, and Shen (2016) rely on 
Motley Fool Company website (www.caps.fool.com) to extract how investors perceive stocks 
and find that being long the positively recommended stocks and short the negatively 
recommended stocks will lead positive abnormal returns.   
4.2.4 The effect of Weather and Sports on the Stock Markets 
The research on market sentiment goes beyond building a sentiment proxy and testing the 
relationship between sentiment and stock returns. Several papers directly link major events that 
are known to affect the mood of the population to investor activities and consequently stock 
prices. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) relate levels of sunshine to investor sentiment and 
subsequently to stock market performance. They show that the level of cloudiness is negatively 
related to stock returns. Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007) use sports game results as a measure 
of aggregate market mood. They show that unanticipated losses in sports lead to negative 
subsequent stock market performance and their results are more robust for soccer games than for 
other sports. Bassi, Collacito, and Fulghieri (2013) show that weather conditions affect risk 
aversion and thus related financial implications.   
4.2.5 Linking Sentiment to Mergers and Acquisitions Activities  
In the above section, we presented different links between investor sentiment and the stock 
market. In what follows we discuss the links we expect between aggregate market sentiment and 
mergers and acquisitions activities. We limit our work to aggregate market sentiment effect on 
mergers and acquisitions and leave the analysis of stock specific sentiment proxies for further 
research.  
4.2.5.1 Probability of Cash-Only Offer and Aggregate Market Sentiment 
Boone, Lie, and Liu (2014) show that there is an increase in the mixed payment frequency since 
the beginning of the century highlighting the importance of the mixed payment form as a 
category by itself. The authors also show that there is an increase (decrease) in the frequency of 
stock (cash) payments towards the end of the 1990s and a decrease (increase) in the respective 
distribution of both types of offers after this point in time. In our work, we link the above-
observed results to investor sentiment. Figure 4.1 plots the University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MSCI) over time and observe that periods of increasing market sentiment 
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develop in the 90s and are followed by a sentiment reversal in the following decade. Baker and 
Wurgler (2006, 2007) argue that periods of high market sentiment are usually associated with 
higher level of mispricing (overpricing mainly) - a result that is more present for hard to 
arbitrage stocks. We hypothesize that firms undertaking a merger and acquisition negotiation 
process fall into the category of hard to arbitrage stocks: to properly measure the synergy from a 
merger and allocate it between both parties is not a straight forward task, let alone incorporating 
the probability of negotiation success in the valuation process. Consequently, in periods of high 
market sentiment, bidder firms will try to benefit from the possible overpricing in their stocks 
and will opt for a stock or mixed offer rather than a cash-only offer thus leading to our first 
hypothesis:  
<Please insert figure 4.1 here > 
Hypothesis one: the higher the sentiment, the lower the probability of observing a cash-only 
offer.  
4.2.5.2 Acquirers’ Announcement Returns and Aggregate Market Sentiment 
Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013) show that overvalued acquirers that rely on stock as the medium of 
exchange do not necessarily benefit from their stock overvaluation because they are forced to 
pay a higher premium. This higher premium limits the potential profit – the perceived synergy. 
Work related to the choice of the medium of exchange and bidder firm announcement returns 
date back to the 1980s
25
. In general, this research concludes that investors react negatively to the 
announcement of a stock or mixed offer fearing that the bidder firm’s stock is overvalued. Since 
periods of higher market sentiment are also associated with high levels of mispricing, we 
hypothesize that investors will be more concerned about bidder stock overvaluation in periods of 
high sentiment in the case of stock or mixed offers and would react more negatively to such an 
announcement. Consequently, our second hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis two: the higher the sentiment, the lower the bidder firm announcement returns in 
stock or mixed (non-cash-only) offers.  
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4.2.5.3 Target Bargaining Power and Aggregate Market Sentiment 
Previous research indicates that target stock prices increase significantly relative to the bidder 
stock prices leading to the conclusion that targets usually benefit more from an acquisition than 
acquirers. However, Ahern (2012) found out that the dollar gains to targets are not very different 
from those of acquirers. The author highlights that the target’s bargaining power depends on its 
industry reliance; the more unique the target, the greater its bargaining power. Relying on 
Ahern’s (2012) measure of bargaining power, we argue that in periods of high market sentiment, 
target firms’ management are more optimistic about their future prospects and would bargain 
more. This negotiation would be stronger if the bidder is to pay in stock as the target would be 
bearing the possible bidder’s overvaluation. Hence, our third hypothesis:  
Hypothesis three: the higher the sentiment, the higher the target bargaining power. The 
relationship is expected to be stronger for stock and mixed acquisitions. 
4.2.5.4 Synergy and Aggregate Market Sentiment  
Rosen (2006) shows that in periods of high merger and acquisition activities, bidder firm 
announcement returns are higher than their peers whose announcements occur in periods of low 
merger and acquisition activities. The authors show that this better announcement performance is 
reversed in the long run – an indication that the announcement reactions are not based on 
differing fundamentals but rather on the positive investor sentiment in periods of high merger 
and acquisition activities. In this section, we link investor sentiment to perceived synergy. In 
periods of high market sentiment, bidder stock overpricing may be a major driver behind the 
deal. As such, we expect lower perceived synergy for stock or mixed acquisitions in periods of 
high market sentiment. In the same line of thought, in periods of high market sentiment, the 
target itself may be overvalued. Thus, for the bidder to pay in cash for a possibly overvalued 
target, the bidder would expect high levels of synergy. This leads us to our fourth hypothesis:  
Hypothesis four: the higher the sentiment, the lower (higher) the perceived synergy for stock or 
mixed (cash-only) acquisitions.    
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4.2.5.5 Runup, Markup, Premium and Market Sentiment26 
Schwert (1996) examines the target stock price increase (runup) before the deal announcement 
and its effect on the premium paid by the bidder. The author argues that two possible hypothesis 
can explain the runup. The first is that that the runup is occurring because of an increase in the 
price of the standalone target firm due to improved prospects. The second hypothesis is that the 
runup is due to the anticipation of the deal announcement during the deal negotiation period
27
. In 
the first case, the runup should be a signal to the target firm to increase its price; costing the 
bidder a higher premium. In the second case, the runup should not affect the offer price. In the 
latter case, we expect to see more substitution taking place between the runup and the markup 
since the premium is technically the sum of the runup and markup. Consequently, in a 
substitution context, the higher the runup, the lower the markup leading to a flat premium. 
Schwert (1996) rejects the substitution hypothesis and finds that a higher runup is associated 
with a higher premium as “…total premium increases one-for-one with the pre-bid runup…” 
(Schwert, 1996: pagre 168). 
 Following the same argument used to develop our second hypothesis, we expect that 
target firms undergoing a merger negotiation will be harder to arbitrage than their peers. Since 
these firms will encounter an increase in their stock price during the runup period (whether due 
to stand-alone value or deal anticipation), we expect that this increase in the target stock price 
would be higher in periods of high market sentiment relative to periods of low market sentiment. 
The runup is a positive signal to the market that is welcomed investors. In line with Schwert 
(1996), we assume that this higher runup would lead to higher markup and consequently a higher 
premium. This leads to our fifth hypothesis in its different forms: 
Hypothesis five-a: the higher the sentiment, the higher the target stock runup. 
Hypothesis five-b: the higher the sentiment, the higher the target stock markup. 
Hypothesis five-c: the higher the sentiment, the higher the premium paid.    
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the period from 42 days before to 2 days before the deal announcement. The markup is the increase in the target 
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announcement (days -1 to +1).  Table 1 presents different definitions for the runup, markup, and premium measures 
used in our work. 
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In testing the markup pricing hypothesis, Schwert (1996) focused on the slope of regressing the 
premium on the runup [𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 =  𝛽𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖]. The intuition is that if there is 
markup pricing, then the premium should increase with the runup and the coefficient of 
regressing the premium on the runup should be equal or greater than one (βrunup => 1). This 
brings us to our fifth hypothesis in its fourth form: 
Hypothesis five-d: the coefficient, 𝛽𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 in the [𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 =  𝛽𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖] 
regression, should not vary as a function of sentiment. 
4.3 Data and Sample Construction 
4.3.1 Mergers and Acquisitions Data 
Mergers and acquisitions data are obtained from SDC. We limit our sample to mergers, 
acquisitions of majority interest and acquisitions of remaining interest. We require that the deal 
has a reported final offer price in SDC and filter out the top and bottom 1% by offer premium to 
avoid outliers. The offer premium is defined as the final offer price divided by the target stock 
price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We remove any offer that is not the first 
offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than six months. We also remove deals whose value is less than $10 Million 
dollars or whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5 dollars. We require that both target 
and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. Prices, 
Returns and SIC codes are from CRSP and accounting data is from Compustat.  
4.3.2 Sentiment Data 
We obtain our primary sentiment measure from the University of Michigan that publishes a 
consumer sentiment index on a monthly basis. The index is constructed from surveys sent to 500 
participants in the United States. As highlighted on their website
28
, the survey covers three 
primary areas: “personal finances, business conditions, and future buying plans” (University of 
Michigan Webpage, http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/tables.html). We refer to this measure as the 
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). 





 In the robustness tests, we have also relied on the Baker and Wurgler (2007) sentiment 
indices obtained from Professor Wurgler’s website at NYU29. Baker and Wurgler construct their 
index as the first principal component of five series used in previous research as a proxy for 
investor sentiment: dividend premium, first-day IPO returns, IPO volume, Closed-end Fund 
discount and Equity Issue over the last twelve months. The five series are standardized and then 
orthogonalized against six macroeconomic indicators – the objective is to remove 
macroeconomic effects from the sentiment series. The authors use the residual from regressing 
their five series on the following macroeconomic indicators: growth in industrial production, real 
growth in durables, real growth in nondurables, real growth in services consumption, growth in 
employment, and the NBER recession indicator. Once the five series are standardized and 
orthogonalized, the first principal component is used as a proxy for sentiment index. We use this 
proxy as an additional measure of sentiment and refer to it as the Baker and Wurgler sentiment 
index (BW). The authors also provide another version of the index that is not orthogonalized 
against macroeconomic indicators. We use it as another sentiment proxy and refer to it as Baker 
and Wurgler non-orthogonalized sentiment index (BWN). The details and motivation of the 
Baker and Wurgler sentiment index construction are in Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007). 
Whereas the Baker and Wurgler indices reflect a top-down approach that relies on a reduced 
form approach in which the sentiment is extracted from the financial market, the MCSI is more 
of a bottom-up approach in which the sentiment is directly measured from individuals. Since 
both MCSI and BWN are not immune to macroeconomic events, we expect similar results in our 
work. Results obtained from using the orthogonalized sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler 
(BW) are presumed to be slightly different. 
 We use a monthly time series of the indices. To associate a deal with a sentiment level, 
we average the monthly sentiment observations that fall within the runup period of every deal in 
our sample. Our runup period spans 42 days before to two days before the deal announcement 
day. This differentiates our work from Chatterjee, John, and Yan (2012) who use the sentiment 
available during the pre-runup period. The abnormal returns earned by the target in the 42 days 
prior to the official announcement of the offer is generally believed to be either the result of 
anticipation or the leakage of private information. When the bidder is setting the offer price just 
prior to the announcement, they must make a decision about the source of the runup – we argue 





that their assessment of the runup will be related to the investor sentiment during the runup 
period. The investor sentiment during the pre-runup period (Chatterjee et al 2012) would be 
more likely to influence the decision to start the negotiations rather than the decisions made at 
the end of the process.  
4.3.3 Variable Definition 
We use two proxies for the offer premium. One is equal to the final offer price divided by the 
target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day - we term it as Price-Based-
Premium or simply Premium. We also use the target Cumulative Abnormal Return from the 
beginning of the Runup period (-42) until the completion day or 126 days after the deal is 
completed (whichever is shorter) – we call this the CAR-Based-Premium.  
 In line with our Premium definition, we use two proxies for Runup and Markup. For the 
price based runup and markup, we follow Betton et al. (2008) and divide the target stock price 
two days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the 
announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price two days before the 
announcement respectively. The CAR based runup and markup are estimated as the Target CAR 
[-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively.  
 The deal value is obtained from SDC. Firm size is the logarithm of the firm market 
capitalization 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market capitalization is 
determined by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). 
B/M is the ratio of the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity 42 days before 
the announcement. The book value of equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and 
French (1993) by adding the book value of equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred shares. Target (Acquirer) 
turnover is the average of the volume to share outstanding ratio calculated over the interval 
spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the 
beginning of the runup period). 
 We use SDC to define several dummy variables describing deal characteristics: Complete 
– whether the deal is completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the target attitude is 
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hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal follows a rumor30 or not, Cash-Only (Non-Cash-Only) – 
whether the deal medium of exchange is Cash, Tender – whether the deal is a tender offer or not, 
Toehold – whether the bidder has more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s 
announcement. Also,  NYSE/AMEX reflects whether the deal participants are listed on NYSE, 
AMEX or not, and Horizontal whether the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC 
code. Table 4.1 presents a brief description of the main variables used in our work.  
<Please insert table 4.1 here> 
 The definition of target bargaining power is defined as the ratio of the difference between 
target and acquirer dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of target and 
acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement and follows Ahern (2013). 
Synergy is estimated as the ratio of the sum of target and acquirer dollar Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) divided by the sum of target and acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the 
announcement. The dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar abnormal returns (AR). 
The dollar ARs are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the 
corresponding firm. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the 
firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model 
(r(i,t) = α+ β r(m,t) ) estimated over the interval (-253, -43) relative to the announcement day.  
4.3.4 Sample Characteristics 
Our sample covers the period 1982 to 2015 inclusive. Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for 
our sample and Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present descriptive statistics for the Non-Cash-Only (Stock or 
mixed Offers) and the Cash-Only subsamples respectively. We have 3705 deals in our sample 
comprised of 2591 Stock or Mixed deals and 1114 Cash-Only Deals.  Eighty-six percent of our 
deals are completed successfully, 23% are horizontal, 15% are tender offers, 3% are hostile and a 
rumor precedes 4%. The average premium is 40%, whereas the runup is approximately 8% and 
the markup is close to 31%. The tables also present the average sample characteristics classified 
into the four sentiment quartiles based on the logarithm of University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated with the deal. The sentiment index quartile cutoffs are 
estimated over the November 1981 to October 2015 period. This sample period matches our 
sample data. Q1 is the quartile with lowest sentiment level and Q4 is the quartile with the highest 
                                                          
30
 As defined by SDC 
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sentiment level. We can notice that rumored deal percentage decreases as we move up in the 
quartiles: the higher the sentiment the lower the percentage of rumored deals. A similar trend is 
observed for horizontal and Cash-Only deals. Tender offers are more frequent in periods of low 
sentiment relative to periods of high sentiment when it comes to stock or mixed offers – an 
opposite trend is observed for cash-only offers.  
<Please insert table 4.2 to 4.4 here> 
The time series behavior of the MCSI is shown in Figure 4.1. In the late 1970s the sentiment 
level was low and it jumped in the early 1980s only to drop back in the late 1980s. The sentiment 
level started increasing in the  early 1990s and continued until it declined at the beginning of the 
century.  
4.4 Empirical Tests and Results 
4.4.1 Univariate Tests Results 
Target and bidder cumulative abnormal returns are summarized in Figures 4.2 to 4.5. The deals 
are classified into one of four MCSI sentiment quartiles based on the sentiment during the deal. 
In Figure 4.2, we see that the CAR in the highest sentiment quartile (Q4) is greater during the 
runup period than that of the lowest quartile (Q1) – an observation valid for both cash-only and 
stock (mixed) deal. However, this dominance disappears as we move outside the runup period to 
the post announcement period and almost reverses when it comes to stock and mixed deals – a 
result that is more obvious by looking at Figure 4.3. Whereas the targets exhibit a higher runup 
in periods of high market sentiment relative to periods of low market sentiment, bidder CARs 
exhibit a very different trend as bidder CARs in the low sentiment period seem to outperform 
bidder CARs in high sentiment periods. The bidder results hold throughout the runup and 
announcement periods as is shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. 
<Please insert figures 4.2 to 4.5 here> 
Table 4.5 shows that for stock or mixed offers, the bidder announcement CAR is significantly 
higher for the low sentiment quartile (Q1) than for the high sentiment quartile (Q4). This 
observation is consistent with our first hypothesis, and it appears that market is reacting more 
negatively to stock (mixed) offer announcements when market sentiment is high.  
<Please insert table 4.5 here> 
249 
 
Table 4.6 reports the target bargaining power estimated over different intervals: [-1, +1], [-42, 
+1], and [-42, +126] in contrast to Ahern (2013) who estimates the bargaining power over the [-
1, +1] interval. Our results show that target bargaining power is larger for stock (mixed) offers in 
periods of high market sentiment but only when the estimation window spans 42 days before to 
126 days after the announcement. When we limit our tests to the announcement window in line 
with Ahern’s (2013) work, this additional bargaining power in the high sentiment quartile 
appears to wane.  We also estimate the synergy over the same three windows as the bargaining 
power. The results in Table 4.7 show that for stock (mixed) offers, the higher sentiment quartile 
exhibits lower synergy – results observed for all estimation windows. However, when it comes to 
cash-only offers, it seems that the univariate sorting does not reveal significant differences 
between low and high sentiment quartiles.  
<Please insert table 4.6 and 4.7 here> 
The univariate tests related to the effect of sentiment on runup, markup, and premium are 
summarized in Tables 4.8 to 4.12. Table 4.8 shows that target runup is significantly higher in the 
high sentiment quartile than in the low sentiment quartile. A relationship that is not true for the 
bidder firm (Table 4.9) indicating that sentiment does not affect bidder and target firms in the 
same way. Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 show that the markup or premium are not greater in 
periods of higher market sentiment. This result is quite different from the runup  findings and 
with hypothesis 5b and 5c. In fact, if we are to use the target CAR [-1, +1] as a proxy for the 
target markup then periods of low market sentiment exhibit a significantly higher markup. 
<Please insert tables 4.8 to 4.12 here> 
4.4.2 Models used in our Multivariate Tests 
To test the effect of sentiment on the choice of the medium of exchange, hypothesis 1, we use the 





1 − P(Cash_Offer = 1)
)
i
=  α +  β1 MCSIi  + γ1Target_Sizei  + γ2Target_Turnoveri
+  γ3Target_NYSE_AMEXi + γ4 Target_B/Mi + γ5Bidder_Turnoveri
+  γ6Bidder_NYSE_AMEXi + γ7 Bidder_B/Mi + γ8 Relative_Sizei
+  γ9Toeholdi +  γ10Horizontali +  γ11Tender_Offeri + γ12Hostilei
+  γ13Multiple_Bidderi +  γ14Rumori +  εi (Model 1) 
 To test the effect of sentiment on bidder announcement CAR, target bargaining power, 
synergy, target runup, target markup and premium, we use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
estimation. The model varies according to the hypothesis (2 to 5c) throught the inclusion of the 
appropriate control variables.  
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖  + γ1Target_Sizei  + γ2Target_Turnoveri
+  γ3Target_NYSE_AMEXi + γ4 Target_B/Mi + γ5Bidder_Turnoveri
+  γ6Bidder_NYSE_AMEXi + γ7 Bidder_B/Mi + γ8 Relative_Sizei
+  γ9Toeholdi +  γ10Horizontali +  γ11Tender_Offeri + γ12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎi + γ13Hostilei
+  γ14Multiple_Bidderi +  γ15Rumori +  γ16Completei
+  𝛾17s𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖 (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 2) 
 To test the markup pricing hypothesis, hypothesis 5d, we introduce interaction variables 
(runup multiplied by the quartile dummies) to capture any changes in the markup/substitution 
relationship due to investor sentiment. Equation 3 below illustrates our model: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2  [𝑄2 × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖] + 𝛽3  [𝑄3 × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖]
+ 𝛽4  [𝑄4 × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖] + γ1Target_Sizei  + γ2Target_Turnoveri
+  γ3Target_NYSE_AMEXi + γ4 Target_B/Mi + γ8 Relative_Sizei
+  γ9Toeholdi +  γ10Horizontali +  γ11Tender_Offeri + γ12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎi + γ13Hostilei
+  γ14Multiple_Bidderi +  γ15Rumori +  γ16Completei




 We expect 𝛽2, 𝛽3, and 𝛽4 to be insignificant indicating that the premium-runup 
relationship is not changing (the slope of the regression is not changing) as we move from one 
sentiment quartile to another.  
4.4.3 Multivariate Tests Results  
4.4.3.1 Probability of Cash-Only Offer and Aggregate Market Sentiment 
The relationship between sentiment and the likelihood of observing a Cash-Only offer is 
summarized in Table 4.13. In support of hypothesis 1, the logistic model estimation shows that 
MCSI negatively and significantly affects the probability of Cash-Only offers. In periods of 
higher market sentiment, bidder firms prefer stock or mixed offers to cash-only offers; possibly 
trying to benefit from potential overpricing associated with periods of high sentiment. In addition 
to our sentiment proxy, cash-only offers are less likely when the target size relative to the 
acquirer increases, and when the target and the acquirer are in the same industry. 
<Please insert table 4.13 here> 
 The negative relationship between sentiment and the likelihood of observing a cash-only 
offer gives an insight into the findings of Boone, Lie, and Liu (2014) who observe a decrease in 
the frequency of cash offers towards the end of the 1990s and an increase after that point in time. 
Considering the uncovered negative relationship between sentiment and the chances of a cash 
offer in addition to the fact that the sentiment increases in the 1990s to reach its peak by the end 
of that decade and reverse direction directly after that seems to give a partial explanation of the 
authors’ main findings.  
4.4.3.2 Acquirers’ Announcement Returns and Aggregate Market Sentiment 
Table 4.14 shows that sentiment is significantly negatively related to Bidder Announcement 
CAR for stock (mixed) acquisitions. This result supports our second hypothesis. It appears that in 
periods of high market sentiment, where higher valuations dominate the market, a bidder’s 
decision to make a stock or mixed offer is more negatively perceived by the market: bidder 
CARs [-1, +1] decrease more with an increase in sentiment for a stock or mixed acquisition. In 
addition, we observe that the bidder announcement CAR decreases with bidder size as well as 
with target acquirer relative size and increases if the bidder is listed on NYSE/AMEX or if the 
deal is preceded by a rumor.   
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<Please insert table 4.14 here> 
4.4.3.3 Target Bargaining Power and Aggregate Market Sentiment 
Tables 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17 report the results for the target bargaining power when estimated 
over three different intervals ([-1, +1], [-42, +1], and [-42, +126]). Our results show that target 
bargaining power significantly increases with the sentiment especially in the two longer 
intervals: [-42, +1], and [-42, +126]. These results are valid for our total sample and stock and 
mixed offer subsample and are consistent with our predictions. On average, target investors have 
lower bargaining power in cash only offers than in stock or mixed offers however, this result is 
not significant for the second estimation window [-42, +1].  
<Please insert table 4.15 to 4.17 here> 
4.4.3.4 Synergy and Aggregate Market Sentiment 
The results of the synergy and market sentiment tests vary according to the estimation window 
used for the synergy. This being said, the results we obtain do not lead us to reject our fourth 
hypothesis. When estimated over the interval [-1,+1], sentiment is negatively related to synergy 
for the total sample and for the stock (mixed) offer subsample but does not significantly affect 
the cash-only offers (Table 4.18). However, when estimated over the interval [-42, +1] add [-42, 
+126] sentiment is not significantly affecting stock (mixed) offers but it is affecting cash-only 
offers positively (see Tables 4.19 and 4.20). The main conclusion of our synergy multivariate 
tests is that synergy appears to be higher (lower) in periods of high market sentiment when it 
comes to cash-only (stock or mixed) offers. If an acquisition occurs in a period of high market 
sentiment when overpricing is a concern; bidder firms ensure that the target is a good fit before 
paying cash. We also observe that the higher the target size relative to the acquirer, the higher the 
synergy.  
<Please insert table 4.18 to 4.20 here> 
4.4.3.5 Runup, Markup, Premium and Aggregate Market Sentiment 
In line with our univariate tests, our multivariate tests in Tables 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23 show that 
target runup is positively and significantly related to sentiment – a relationship that is not valid 
for bidder stock returns during the runup period. Both our univariate and multivariate tests show 
that in periods of high market sentiment, we observe a greater increase in the target stock prices 
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during the runup period. This supports out fifth hypothesis in its first form (H-5a) and indicates 
that the target investors overreact to a possible merger and acquisition deal in periods of high 
market sentiment.  
<Please insert table 4.21 to 4.23 here> 
In line with our univariate tests but in contrast to our fifth hypothesis in its second and third form 
(H-5b and H-5c), we do not find a postive significant  relationship between sentiment and 
markup or sentiment and premium (see Tables 4.24, 4.25, 4.26 (for markup) and 4.27, 4.28 (for 
premium)). These results indicate that the higher runup in periods of higher market sentiment is 
not associated with higher markup nor with higher premium.  
<Please insert table 4.24 to 4.28 here> 
The findings of this section can be interpreted as follows: during periods of high market 
sentiment, an optimistic mood dominates the market and investors overreact to positive news 
and/or rumors resulting in higher runups than in the low sentiment periods. However, bidder 
firms know that part of this increase in the target price is because of optimistic investors 
overreaction and consequently they do not pay a higher premium in periods of high market 
sentiment: the higher runup does not translate into higher premium. 
4.4.3.6 Markup Pricing and Aggregate Market Sentiment 
The results reported in the above section may be at odds with the markup pricing hypothesis 
introduced by Schwert (1996) where the runup is a price to the bidder and an increase in the 
runup will lead to a one-to-one increase in the premium paid by the acquirer. A test for the 
markup pricing hypothesis would be to check the slope of the rununp in the following regression: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 =  𝛽𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖. If 𝛽𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 is less than 1 then we have the substitution effect 
and a higher runup is associated with a lower markup so that the premium does not strictly 
increase with the runup on a one to one basis. If, on the other hand,  𝛽𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 is greater than or 
equal to 1, then markup pricing is occurring and an increase in runup would lead to an increase 
in premium. In Table 4.27, we see that the runup coefficient is above 1 for our total sample 
supporting the markup pricing hypothesis of Schwert. Although Table 4.28 reports a runup 
coefficient value that is lower than 1 (around 0.88) but this is not an indicative figure as the 
premium is priced based whereas the runup is CAR based. We need to include a price based 
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runup is this regression to interpret its coefficient properly. However, this is not the objective of 
this table as the runup is only used as a control variable. Our task in this section is to test if there 
is lower markup pricing (more substitution effect) in periods of high market sentiment. 
Empirically, this would translate to lower 𝛽𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 in periods of higher market sentiment. In the 
testing framework of model three, this should translate into negative and significant coefficients 
for the interaction variables.  
 For the CAR based analysis, as seen in Table 4.29, we can see that the coefficients of the 
interaction variables are not significant for cash-only offers but are negative and significant for 
stock and mixed offers. It seems that for stock and mixed offers, we can reject our fifth 
hypothesis in its fourth form (H-5d) as the runup coefficient vary from the lowest sentiment 
quartile to the other quartiles: we can say that more markup pricing is happening for the lowest 
sentiment quartile. However, for cash-only offers we fail to reject our hypothesis and it seems 
that markup pricing is similar across the four sentiment quartiles. Why the cash-only offers differ 
from the stock and mixed offers is perplexing as the previous section results show that the 
sentiment has the same effect on the runup and premium for cash and stock (mixed) offers. We 
leave it to future research to further explore the relationship between runup and premium across 
the different market sentiment periods and different methods of payments.  
<Please insert table 4.29 and 4.30 here> 
4.5 Robustness Tests 
4.5.1 Using Baker and Wurgler Non-Orthogonalized Sentiment index (BWN) 
The results of the tests conducted using Baker and Wurgler Non-Orthogonalized Sentiment 
Index (BWN) are reported in Appendix A. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) present a detailed 
analysis of the sentiment index. From Professor Wurlger’s website we obtained the version of 
the index that is not orthogonalized to macroeconomic data. Since we do not orthogonalize the 
MCSI to macroeconomic data we expect the BWN index to lead to similar results as those of the 
MCSI.  
 First, we note from Figure 4.6 that the BWN index does not exactly match the MCSI; 
whereas the MCSI exhibit an increase in the 1990s followed by a trend reversal, the BWN shows 
a slight increase in the early 1990s to be reversed in the mid-90s – like a jump. After that, the 
BWN hovers around medium levels only to jump in the early 2000s to its highest level and drop 
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back almost within two years and then hover back around low levels. It appears that periods of 
high MCSI sentiment do not coincide with periods of high BWN sentiment and consequently, 
they will not have the same set of deals. Based on what we have just presented, we expect the 
results of our tests to differ while using BWN and MCSI although initially, we expected them to 
perform similarly.  
 Similar to those reported for MCSI, the CAR figures in Appendix A show that Target 
CAR for the highest BWN sentiment quartile is higher than the lowest BWN sentiment quartile – 
results that is more noticeable for the runup period (Figure 4.7 and 4.8).  
 The univariate tests show that the market still reacts more negatively when a deal is 
announced in a high market sentiment quartile but the significance is limited to the larger sample 
containing both cash and non-cash offers. A decreasing CAR trend still exists for stock and 
mixed offers but without significant difference between the lowest and highest sentiment 
quartiles (Table 4.34). For stock or mixed offers, synergy is slightly lower
31
 when it comes to 
high sentiment quartiles compared to low sentiment quartiles, but the target bargaining power 
does not significantly differ among sentiment quartiles (Table 4.35 and 4.36). When it comes to 
runup and markup, the runup is higher in periods of high market sentiment but the markup is 
lower. The premium results vary between not being affected by the sentiment for cash-only offer 
and being higher for stock or mixed offers
32
 (Tables 4.37, 4.39, and A4.41).  
<Please insert tables 4.34 to 4.41 here> 
 When it comes to multivariate tests, what stands out is the strong negative relationship 
between the BWN sentiment and the chances of observing a cash-only offer (Table 4.42). BWN 
negatively affects Bidder Announcement CAR when it comes to stock or mixed offers (Table 
4.43). Whereas the target bargaining power is not affected by the BWN sentiment index, the 
synergy is negatively related to the sentiment index when it comes to stock or mixed offers 
(Tables 4.47, 4.48, and 4.49). The positive relationship between runup and sentiment is now 
weak and only significant for cash-only offers when using the CAR-based-runup measure (Table 
4.50). There is no significant relationship between markup and the BWN sentiment measure, and 
                                                          
31
 The results are significant only for the synergy estimated over the [-1, +1] interval 
32
 The premium related results depend on the premium definition used in the analysis. For CAR-Based-Premium, the 
lower sentiment quartile is statically lower than the higher sentiment quartile but for the Price-Based-Premium the 
relationship reverses and the significance disappears.  
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a similar argument applies to the premium except for cash-only offers when using price-based-
premium (Table 4.57). Almost none of the interaction variables coefficients are significantly 
negatively related to the premium supporting the hypothesis that runup affects the premium in 
almost the same way across all sentiment periods.  
<Please insert table 4.42 to 4.59 here> 
 The results reported in this section show that there is a difference between the results of 
tests conducted using MCSI as a proxy for investor sentiment or BWN as a proxy for investor 
sentiment. This difference is worth further exploration in future research to properly identify the 
causes of these differences. Also, in higher sentiment periods we see lower chances of observing 
a cash-only offer, lower bidder announcement CAR, and lower synergy when it comes to stock 
or mixed offers. Finally, the relationship between sentiment and target bargaining power, runup, 
markup, and premium are weaker than that reported for the MCSI index and vary across the 
different definitions of runup, markup, and premium.  
4.5.2 Using Baker and Wurgler Sentiment index (BW) 
The results of the tests conducted using Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) are reported 
in Appendix B. The BW index is obtained in a similar way to the BWN index. What 
differentiates these two indices is that the BW index is orthogonalized to the macro-economic 
variables.  
 The figures show similar but weaker patterns for the CARs: the target CAR during the 
runup period is higher for the highest sentiment quartile when compared to the lowest sentiment 
quartile (Figure 4.12). 
 For the univariate tests’ results, the results are weaker than those observed in the BWN 
section. We still see lower bidder announcement CAR in periods of high market sentiment – a 
significant result for the total sample but the trend is apparent for stock and mixed offers (Table 
4.63). Target bargaining power is not affected by the sentiment but synergy seems to be higher in 
periods of higher market sentiment when it comes to cash-only offers (Table 4.64 and 4.65). 
When it comes to runup, markup, and premium we observe weak differences among sentiment 
periods with some significance when it comes to cash-only offers: periods of higher market 
sentiment are associated with higher target runup, lower target markup and lower premium. 
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However, these relationships are not robust across all the definitions of runup, markup and 
premium (Tables 4.66, 4.68, and 4.70).  
<Please insert table 4.60 to 4.70 here> 
 In the multivariate tests, the BW sentiment still negatively affects the probability of a 
cash-only offer (Table 4.71), the bidder announcement CAR (Table 4.72) and synergy (Tables 
4.76, 4.77, and 4.78)
33
 in stock or mixed offer. When it comes to target bargaining power, target 
runup, target markup, and premium as well as the runup-premium relationship, it appears that the 
BW sentiment plays a minimal role
34
.    
<Please insert table 4.71 to 4.88 here> 
 We observe in these tests that the BW and BWN sentiment proxy behave closer to each 
other than the MCSI sentiment. The similarity between BW and BWN within the context of our 
work is in line with Baker and Wurgler findings that both indices lead to close results. However, 
the differences arising from using the MCSI vs. BWN seem a bit of a surprise for us and worth 
further investigation.  
4.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we study the effect of aggregate investor sentiment on mergers and acquisitions. We 
show that in periods of higher market sentiment, bidder firms prefer a stock or mixed acquisition 
to a cash-only one. Considering that periods of higher market sentiment are usually associated 
with higher market overvaluations, we link our finding to the possibility that the acquirer 
management is trying to benefit from their stock overvaluations. Bidder firms’ investor reaction 
supports our above interpretation as they react more negatively in periods of higher market 
sentiment when a stock or mixed offer is announced. 
 Second, we show that target firm bargaining power is higher in periods of higher market 
sentiment for stock or mixed offers mainly. It seems that when a bidder firm is going for a stock 
or mixed offer in a period of high market sentiment, the target management (not only the bidder 
                                                          
33
 The synergy related tests do not lead to significant results when synergy is estimated over the [-42, +126] interval 
as reported in table 4.78. 
34
 Our results show a positive significant relationship between BW sentiment index and CAR-Based-Runup for 
Cash-Only-Offers (Table 4.79) and a negative significant relationship between BW sentiment index and Price-
Based-Premium for cash-only-offer (Table 4.86). However, since these significances are limited to the specific 
variable definition and is not present for other definition, we present caution in interpreting these findings.  
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firm investors) fear a possible overpricing in the bidder firm stock. Consequently, targets 
negotiate more aggressively and ask for a higher price leading to higher target bargaining power. 
In the same line of thoughts, bidder firms are also facing an overvaluation risk if they are to pay 
cash rather than stock for the target and the bidders will offer cash in cases of high potential 
synergy. The findings support this line of thought, and we show that synergy is higher in periods 
of high market sentiment in cash-only offers.  
 Next we test how sentiment affects target stock runup, target stock markup, and the 
premium paid. Considering that higher market sentiment periods are associated with high level 
of optimism, leading the documented overvaluation in these periods, we hypothesize that the 
market would overreact to the news of a company being a target relative to periods of low 
market sentiment and we expect a higher runup during higher sentiment periods. Our sentiment-
runup tests confirm this hypothesis. In addition, we do not observe higher markup and higher 
premium for periods of higher market sentiment. It appears that bidder firm management know 
that the market is likely to be overreacting and driving the target stock price to values above their 
fundamental values and, consequently, the bidder firms do not offer higher premiums in periods 
of higher market sentiment. 
 As robustness check, we use the Baker and Wurgler (2007) sentiment indices to see if our 
results are specific to the University of Michigan Sentiment Index (MCSI). We show that the 
different measures lead to similar conclusions regarding the effect of sentiment on the choice of 
the medium of exchange, the bidder firms market reaction to the deal announcement and the 
synergy. However, the results differ when it comes to the target bargaining power, runup, 
markup, and premium.  
 This paper adds to the existing literature linking investor sentiment to possible investors’ 
activities and consequently stock market reactions. The objective of our work is not to create a 
trading strategy around firms involved in a merger and acquisition negotiation relying on 
different sentiment periods. However, we want to highlight that bidders, targets and their 
respective investors are affected by the aggregate market sentiment during the deal process. In 
addition, we show that different sentiment proxies may lead to different results. Our work 
suggests different future research questions such as: why the Barker and Wurgler index leads to 
different results than MCSI. What is the optimal proxy for sentiment and what measure best 
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captures investor sentiments. Also, we identify different patterns in the markup pricing 
relationship (runup and premium) between stock (mixed) offers and cash-only offers using 
different sentiment proxies; the nature and causes of these differences remains for future work. 
The work presented here focuses on aggregate market sentiment and its effect on mergers and 
acquisitions activities. A question for future research is whether a stock specific sentiment proxy, 
possibly extracted from social media, might possess explanatory power for stocks involved in a 
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Figure 4-1   University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) for our sample period 
Panel A shows the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) brought from University of Michigan website for our sample period. Panel B reports the sentiment quartiles 
that are associated with our sample. For every deal, we estimate a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels during the deal’s runup period. The runup 
spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. We check where this sentiment measures ranks relative to the MCSI values and associate it with a sentiment 
quartile. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015.  
Panel A. The Sentiment Index Spanning our Sample 
 





































Figure 4-2   Target CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure shows the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Target firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 10 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is the sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized 
return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily data spanning 253 
trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for every 
firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The process 
is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartiles based on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
(MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the 
period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available 
during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) sentiment index level. 
Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We also required 
that the deal process a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid outliers. We removed any 
offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also require that 
both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only 
based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with a deal value greater 
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Figure 4-3   Target CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Target firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 126 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index (MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning 
the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available 
during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) sentiment index level. 
Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We also required 
that the deal process a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid outliers. We removed any 
offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also require that 
both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only 
based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with a deal value greater 
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Figure 4-4   Bidder CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Bidder firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 10 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index (MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning 
the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available 
during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) sentiment index level. 
Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We also required 
that the deal process a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid outliers. We removed any 
offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also require that 
both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only 
based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with a deal value greater 
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Figure 4-5   Bidder CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Bidder firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 126 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index (MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning 
the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available 
during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) sentiment index level. 
Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We also required 
that the deal process a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid outliers. We removed any 
offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also require that 
both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only 
based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with a deal value greater 
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Table 4-1   Variables Definition 
Description of the main variables used in our work and the brief description of their construction 
Variable Definition and Estimation 
Price-Based-Premium or Premium (Final_Offfer_Price/ P-42) – 1 
CAR-Based-Premium Minimum ( Target CAR [-42, Deal Completion], Target CAR [-42, +126] ) 
Price-Based-Runup or Runup (P-2/ P-42) – 1 
CAR-Based-Runup CAR [-42, -2] 
Price-Based-Marup or Markup (Final_Offfer_Price/ P-2) – 1 
CAR-Based-Markup Minimum ( Target CAR [-2, Deal Completion], Target CAR [-2, +126] ) 
CAR The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The 
AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected 
return is obtained using the market model (r(i,t)= α + β r(m,t)  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 
trading days before the announcement day to 43 trading days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index is 
used as a proxy for the market.    
Size Logarithm of target market value of equity 
Market Value of Equity Number of target shares outstanding multiplies by the target stock price at event day -42 
Turnover Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 
days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period). 
NYSE/ AMEX A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the target stock is listed on NYSE/ AMEX 
Book/Market ratio B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the 
announcement. 
Book Value The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value 
of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of 
preferred share. 
Toehold A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bidder has more than 5% ownership prior to the announcement 
Horizontal A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if bidder and target has the same 4 digits SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) 
code 
Tender Offer A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the Bid is a Tender Offer 
Cash A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the offer is in cash-only  
Hostile A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bid is hostile 
Multiple Bids A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there are multiple bidders within the same contest (a contest is a 6-Month period 
from the first bidder’s bid) 
Rumor A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the deal started with a rumor - We relied on SDC for our rumor source 
Complete A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the deal was completed 
Industry Dummies Industry dummies are created based on two digit SIC codes. 
MCSI The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index that is associated with the deal.  
BW The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is associated with the deal 
BWN The Maker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized against macroeconomic variables and that is associated 







Table 4-2   Descriptive Statistics - by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) – ALL 
The below table shows a general descriptive statistics (mean) for the main variables used in our tests. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns 
(AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the 
market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value 
weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
(MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. We relied on the logarithm of MCSI in our analysis. For every deal, we estimated a 
sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup per iod. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days 
before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and 
Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a 
reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the 
final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a 
multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target 
stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnormal Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms 
with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. 
Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by 
the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and 
markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is 
obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 
42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the 
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the 
runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder 
attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% 
ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the 
deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP.  
 All Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Target Size 19.4415 20.0268 19.6481 19.1248 19.3467 
Target Turnover 6.5291 8.7577 6.6163 5.9377 6.1912 
Target B/M 0.5794 0.6655 0.5576 0.6045 0.5525 
Acquirer Size 21.4060 21.8962 21.6207 21.0908 21.3330 
Acquirer Turnover 6.9172 8.8139 6.8109 7.0997 6.3355 
Acquirer B/M 0.5067 0.5899 0.5335 0.5271 0.4575 
      
Acquirer CAR [-42,-2] -0.0012 0.0061 -0.0103 0.0032 -0.0009 
Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] -0.0140 -0.0056 -0.0113 -0.0069 -0.0219 
Acquirer CAR [+2,+126] -0.0844 -0.0503 -0.0692 -0.0918 -0.0978 
      
Target CAR [-42,-2] ] – Target Runup – CAR-based 0.0474 0.0254 0.0194 0.0436 0.0706 
Target CAR [-1,+1] 0.2023 0.2621 0.2167 0.1937 0.1827 
Target CAR [+2,+126] -0.0175 -0.0134 -0.0254 -0.0395 -0.0019 
Target CAR [-1,+126] – Target Markup – CAR-based 0.1848 0.2487 0.1913 0.1541 0.1808 
Target CAR [-42,+126] – Target Premium – CAR-based 0.2322 0.2741 0.2107 0.1977 0.2514 
      
Target Runup [ (P-2/P-42) - 1] 0.0763 0.0455 0.0472 0.0791 0.0990 
Target Markup [ (Final Offer Price/P-2) - 1] 0.3141 0.3531 0.3119 0.2955 0.3148 
Premium [ (Final Offer Price/P-42) - 1] 0.4031 0.4032 0.3694 0.3865 0.4305 
      
Target Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.3565 0.4178 0.3587 0.3186 0.3597 
Acquirer Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.6507 0.6233 0.6655 0.6610 0.6448 
      
Toehold Exists 0.0413 0.0411 0.0483 0.0508 0.0322 
Horizontal Deal 0.2318 0.2763 0.2428 0.2407 0.2085 
Tender Offer 0.1579 0.2009 0.1256 0.1661 0.1583 
Cash Only Deal 0.3007 0.4155 0.3490 0.3175 0.2329 
Hostile Deal 0.0348 0.0297 0.0254 0.0475 0.0341 
First Bid in a Multibid Contest 0.0904 0.0890 0.0930 0.1096 0.0785 
Rumored Deal 0.0448 0.0799 0.0519 0.0407 0.0335 
Complete Deal 0.8618 0.8539 0.8696 0.8441 0.8700 
      
Log (MCSI) 4.5210 4.2563 4.4483 4.5254 4.6319 
      







Table 4-3   Descriptive Statistics - by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) –  Non-Cash-Only 
The below table shows a general descriptive statistics (mean) for the main variables used in our tests for the Non-Cash-Only (Stock and Mixed Deal) sample. The Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the 
expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement 
day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based 
on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. We relied on the logarithm 
of MCSI in our analysis. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This 
latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: 
November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of 
Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to 
avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the 
first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose 
value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC.  We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from 
the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both 
target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based 
on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 
days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of 
the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French 
(1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought 
from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement 
to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was 
completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or 
not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. 
 All Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Target Size 19.5059 19.9866 19.6490 19.2046 19.4905 
Target Turnover 6.4603 8.1643 6.0084 6.0665 6.4982 
Target B/M 0.5849 0.7469 0.6038 0.6048 0.5315 
Acquirer Size 21.2293 21.3156 21.2950 20.9451 21.3251 
Acquirer Turnover 7.1493 8.4950 6.7470 7.9096 6.6569 
Acquirer B/M 0.4821 0.6604 0.5016 0.4999 0.4260 
      
Acquirer CAR [-42,-2] -0.0017 0.0078 -0.0109 0.0026 -0.0018 
Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] -0.0236 -0.0139 -0.0198 -0.0166 -0.0310 
Acquirer CAR [+2,+126] -0.1074 -0.0570 -0.0827 -0.1133 -0.1264 
      
Target CAR [-42,-2] 0.0408 0.0220 0.0100 0.0362 0.0610 
Target CAR [-1,+1] 0.1677 0.2045 0.1827 0.1633 0.1553 
Target CAR [+2,+126] -0.0193 -0.0178 -0.0211 -0.0423 -0.0072 
Target CAR [-1,+126] – Target Markup – CAR-based 0.1484 0.1867 0.1616 0.1210 0.1481 
Target CAR [-42,+126] – Target Premium – CAR-based 0.1892 0.2087 0.1716 0.1572 0.2091 
      
Target Runup [ (P-2/P-42) - 1] 0.0700 0.0318 0.0396 0.0686 0.0928 
Target Markup [ (Final Offer Price/P-2) - 1] 0.2977 0.3298 0.3026 0.2811 0.2969 
Premium [ (Final Offer Price/P-42) - 1] 0.3787 0.3644 0.3516 0.3590 0.4040 
      
Target Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.3701 0.4844 0.3766 0.3394 0.3582 
Acquirer Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.6229 0.5820 0.6308 0.6374 0.6208 
      
Toehold Exists 0.0343 0.0430 0.0464 0.0447 0.0218 
Horizontal Deal 0.2493 0.3203 0.2709 0.2599 0.2190 
Tender Offer 0.0459 0.0742 0.0371 0.0497 0.0419 
Cash Only Deal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hostile Deal 0.0247 0.0234 0.0204 0.0381 0.0201 
First Bid in a Multibid Contest 0.0853 0.0898 0.0983 0.1093 0.0663 
Rumored Deal 0.0440 0.0664 0.0631 0.0414 0.0319 
Complete Deal 0.8584 0.8477 0.8534 0.8377 0.8733 
      
Log (MCSI) 4.5321 4.2577 4.4487 4.5245 4.6325 
      






Table 4-4   Descriptive Statistics - by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) –  Cash-Only 
The below table shows a general descriptive statistics (mean) for the main variables used in our tests for the Cash-Only sample. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum 
of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is 
obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement 
day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. We relied on the logarithm of MCSI in our analysis. For every deal, 
we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the 
announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 
2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required 
that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer 
premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million 
dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup 
period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms 
are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of 
exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days 
before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. 
For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by 
adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from 
Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 
days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was 
completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or 
not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. 
 All Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Target Size 19.2917 20.0834 19.6466 18.9532 18.8732 
Target Turnover 6.6891 9.5925 7.7500 5.6609 5.1805 
Target B/M 0.5667 0.5509 0.4714 0.6039 0.6218 
Acquirer Size 21.8169 22.7129 22.2281 21.4039 21.3588 
Acquirer Turnover 6.3776 9.2625 6.9300 5.3588 5.2770 
Acquirer B/M 0.5641 0.4907 0.5929 0.5856 0.5611 
      
Acquirer CAR [-42,-2] 0.0000 0.0036 -0.0090 0.0045 0.0020 
Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 0.0083 0.0060 0.0045 0.0139 0.0082 
Acquirer CAR [+2,+126] -0.0309 -0.0409 -0.0440 -0.0458 -0.0038 
      
Target CAR [-42,-2] 0.0627 0.0301 0.0368 0.0593 0.1024 
Target CAR [-1,+1] 0.2827 0.3432 0.2801 0.2590 0.2727 
Target CAR [+2,+126] -0.0132 -0.0072 -0.0333 -0.0336 0.0156 
Target CAR [-1,+126] – Target Markup – CAR-based 0.2695 0.3361 0.2468 0.2254 0.2884 
Target CAR [-42,+126] – Target Premium – CAR-based 0.3322 0.3661 0.2836 0.2848 0.3908 
      
Target Runup [ (P-2/P-42) - 1] 0.0909 0.0647 0.0613 0.1016 0.1194 
Target Markup [ (Final Offer Price/P-2) - 1] 0.3523 0.3858 0.3293 0.3266 0.3738 
Premium [ (Final Offer Price/P-42) - 1] 0.4600 0.4579 0.4027 0.4457 0.5178 
      
Target Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.3250 0.3242 0.3253 0.2740 0.3646 
Acquirer Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.7154 0.6813 0.7301 0.7117 0.7238 
      
Toehold Exists 0.0575 0.0385 0.0519 0.0641 0.0663 
Horizontal Deal 0.1912 0.2143 0.1903 0.1993 0.1740 
Tender Offer 0.4183 0.3791 0.2907 0.4164 0.5414 
Cash Only Deal 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Hostile Deal 0.0584 0.0385 0.0346 0.0676 0.0801 
First Bid in a Multibid Contest 0.1023 0.0879 0.0830 0.1103 0.1188 
Rumored Deal 0.0467 0.0989 0.0311 0.0391 0.0387 
Complete Deal 0.8698 0.8626 0.8997 0.8577 0.8591 
      
Log (MCSI) 4.4953 4.2544 4.4474 4.5273 4.6299 
      





Table 4-5   Bidder CAR during the Announcement Period – by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the Bidder CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1, +1] sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as 
sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected 
return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the 
announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. We relied on the logarithm of MCSI in our 
analysis. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 
days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 
till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. 
We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The 
offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a 
multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the 
Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer 
firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of 
exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days 
before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. 
For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by 
adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from 
Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 
days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was 
completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or 
not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the 
quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
-0.56% -1.13%*** -0.69%*** -2.19%*** 1.62%*** 
(-1.5) (-4.5) (-3.11) (-10.23) (3.61) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
-1.39%** -1.98%*** -1.66%*** -3.10%*** 1.71%*** 
(-2.56) (-5.82) (-6.08) (-12.98) (2.98) 
Cash-Only Deals 
0.60% 0.45% 1.39%*** 0.82%* -0.22% 







Table 4-6   Target Bargaining Power – by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table presents the deal estimated bargaining power over the different MCSI quartile. Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of 
Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are 
obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is 
calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is 
estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the 
market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI 
levels are brought from University of Michigan website. We relied on the logarithm of MCSI in our analysis. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted 
average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs 
are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We 
limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out 
the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 
42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value 
is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnormal Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever 
is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided 
our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price 
based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement 
date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and 
[-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of 
shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the 
firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we 
created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the 
deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are 
obtained from CRSP. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. 
Panel A: Target Bargaining Power is estimated over [-1,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
4.56%*** 4.27%*** 3.68%*** 4.74%*** -0.19% 
(12.54) (17.39) (15.54) (23.79) (-0.45) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
5.61%*** 4.85%*** 4.22%*** 5.02%*** 0.58% 
(11.68) (17.69) (15.12) (22.57) (1.1) 
Cash-Only Deals 
3.08%*** 3.19%*** 2.53%*** 3.82%*** -0.75% 
(5.72) (6.68) (5.78) (8.71) (-1.03) 
Panel B: Target Bargaining Power is estimated over [-42,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
4.61%*** 5.36%*** 4.06%*** 6.03%*** -1.42%* 
(7.36) (12.2) (9.78) (14.38) (-1.66) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
5.17%*** 5.82%*** 4.51%*** 6.20%*** -1.04% 
(6.02) (11.25) (9.47) (13.25) (-0.95) 
Cash-Only Deals 
3.83%*** 4.48%*** 3.09%*** 5.47%*** -1.64% 
(4.25) (5.58) (3.81) (5.86) (-1.12) 
Panel C: Target Bargaining Power is estimated over [-42,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
6.83%*** 9.47%*** 8.82%*** 11.67%*** -4.84%*** 
(5.81) (10.7) (10.73) (13.88) (-2.84) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
7.82%*** 10.69%*** 10.59%*** 13.11%*** -5.29%** 
(4.5) (9.08) (10.42) (13.43) (-2.35) 
Cash-Only Deals 
5.44%*** 7.18%*** 5.02%*** 6.93%*** -1.49% 





Table 4-7   Synergy – by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table presents the deal estimated synergy over the different MCSI quartile. Synergy is estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns 
(AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return 
of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days 
before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four 
sentiment quartile based on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. 
We relied on the logarithm of MCSI in our analysis. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during 
the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning 
the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority 
Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per 
their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We 
removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also 
filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target 
Cumulative Abnormal Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-
Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed 
or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton 
et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the 
logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). 
B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following 
the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of 
preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 
166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the follow ing dummy variables: 
complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed 
on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Firms’ SIC codes 
are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported 
underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Synergy is estimated over [-1,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
3.57%*** 2.42%*** 2.56%*** 1.25%*** 2.32%*** 
(8.75) (9.29) (10.44) (5.7) (4.99) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
3.04%*** 1.59%*** 1.58%*** 0.19% 2.85%*** 
(5.21) (5.03) (5.65) (0.79) (4.85) 
Cash-Only Deals 
4.32%*** 3.99%*** 4.66%*** 4.73%*** -0.41% 
(8.01) (8.9) (10.13) (10.39) (-0.55) 
Panel B: Synergy is estimated over [-42,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
3.65%*** 1.54%*** 2.94%*** 1.64%*** 2.00%* 
(4.98) (3.03) (6.19) (3.26) (1.95) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
2.98%*** 0.33% 1.65%*** 0.30% 2.68%** 
(2.9) (0.51) (2.82) (0.52) (2.01) 
Cash-Only Deals 
4.59%*** 3.80%*** 5.73%*** 6.07%*** -1.48% 
(4.55) (4.85) (7.22) (6) (-0.93) 
Panel C: Synergy is estimated over [-42,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
0.92% -3.46%*** -4.19%*** -4.28%*** 5.20%** 
(0.63) (-3.13) (-4.29) (-4.08) (2.45) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
-0.84% -5.54%*** -7.37%*** -7.47%*** 6.62%** 
(-0.38) (-3.63) (-5.96) (-5.98) (2.3) 
Cash-Only Deals 
3.40% 0.41% 2.65% 6.21% -2.81% 








Table 4-8   Target Runup - by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the Target Runup sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the 
specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model 
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted 
index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) that 
is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. We relied on the logarithm of MCSI in our analysis. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment 
measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the 
announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals 
are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer 
price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price 
divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if 
bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 
is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the 
deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return 
data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock 
price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we 
estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days 
before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance 
sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the 
runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder 
attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% 
ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the 
deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile 
with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Runup is estimated as the CAR of the target firm over [-42,-2] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
2.54%*** 1.94%*** 4.36%*** 7.06%*** -4.52%*** 
(2.92) (3.32) (7.23) (12.22) (-3.83) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
2.20%*** 1.00% 3.62%*** 6.10%*** -3.89%** 
(1.92) (1.39) (4.99) (9.14) (-2.54) 
Cash-Only Deals 
3.01%** 3.68%*** 5.93%*** 10.24%*** -7.23%*** 
(2.26) (3.71) (5.51) (9.02) (-3.89) 
Panel B: Priced Based Target Runup - Target Runup is estimated as [ (P-2 / P-42) – 1] 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
4.55%*** 4.72%*** 7.91%*** 9.90%*** -5.35%*** 
(4.92) (7.96) (12.69) (16.41) (-4.32) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
3.18%*** 3.96%*** 6.86%*** 9.28%*** -6.10%*** 
(2.67) (5.55) (8.93) (13.37) (-3.82) 
Cash-Only Deals 
6.47%*** 6.13%*** 10.16%*** 11.94%*** -5.46%*** 







Table 4-9   Bidder CAR [-42, -2] during the Runup Period - by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the Bidder CAR estimated over the runup period sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the 
Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is 
obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement 
day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartiles based on the University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. We relied on the logarithm of MCSI in our analysis. For every deal, 
we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the 
announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 
2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required 
that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer 
premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million 
dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup 
period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms 
are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of 
exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days 
before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. 
For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by 
adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from 
Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 
days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was 
completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or 
not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the 
quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
0.61% -1.03%** 0.32% -0.09% 0.70% 
(0.95) (-2.25) (0.72) (-0.2) (0.76) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
0.78% -1.09%* 0.26% -0.18% 0.96% 
(0.81) (-1.78) (0.45) (-0.34) (0.79) 
Cash-Only Deals 
0.36% -0.90% 0.45% 0.20% 0.17% 





Table 4-10   Target Markup - by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the Target Markup sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the 
specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model 
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted 
index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) that 
is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. We relied on the logarithm of MCSI in our analysis. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment 
measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the 
announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals 
are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer 
price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price 
divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if 
bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 
is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the 
deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return 
data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock 
price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we 
estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days 
before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance 
sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the 
runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder 
attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% 
ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the 
deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile 
with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Markup is estimated as the CAR of the target firm over [-1,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
24.87%*** 19.13%*** 15.41%*** 18.08%*** 6.79%*** 
(12.35) (17.25) (14.03) (19.88) (3.36) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
18.67%*** 16.16%*** 12.10%*** 14.81%*** 3.85% 
(6.58) (11.59) (8.97) (14.5) (1.5) 
Cash-Only Deals 
33.61%*** 24.68%*** 22.54%*** 28.84%*** 4.77% 
(12.78) (13.85) (12.38) (15.38) (1.47) 
Panel B: Priced Based Markup - Target Markup is estimated as [ (Final Offer Price / P-2) – 1] 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
35.31%*** 31.19%*** 29.55%*** 31.48%*** 3.83% 
(24.65) (20.67) (25.97) (25.42) (1.56) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
32.98%*** 30.26%*** 28.11%*** 29.69%*** 3.29% 
(17.73) (14.07) (19.34) (23.4) (1.15) 
Cash-Only Deals 
38.58%*** 32.93%*** 32.66%*** 37.38%*** 1.20% 







Table 4-11   Target CAR during the Announcement Period - by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the Target CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1, +1] sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as 
sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected 
return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the 
announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) that is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. We relied on the logarithm of MCSI in our 
analysis. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 
days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 
till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. 
We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The 
offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a 
multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the 
Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer 
firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of 
exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days 
before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. 
For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by 
adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from 
Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 
days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was 
completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or 
not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the 
quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
26.21%*** 21.67%*** 19.37%*** 18.27%*** 7.95%*** 
(22.91) (29.63) (28.96) (35.16) (6.9) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
20.45%*** 18.27%*** 16.33%*** 15.53%*** 4.91%*** 
(16.63) (22.51) (22.26) (29.04) (3.82) 
Cash-Only Deals 
34.32%*** 28.01%*** 25.90%*** 27.27%*** 7.05%*** 





Table 4-12    Premium - by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the Premium sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the 
specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model 
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted 
index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) that 
is associated with the deal. MCSI levels are brought from University of Michigan website. We relied on the logarithm of MCSI in our analysis. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment 
measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the 
announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals 
are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer 
price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price 
divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if 
bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 
is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the 
deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return 
data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock 
price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we 
estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days 
before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance 
sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the 
runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder 
attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% 
ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the 
deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile 
with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Premium is estimated as the CAR of the target firm over [-42,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
27.41%*** 21.07%*** 19.77%*** 25.14%*** 2.27% 
(11.6) (16.13) (15.39) (21.83) (0.91) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
20.87%*** 17.16%*** 15.72%*** 20.91%*** -0.04% 
(6.08) (10.43) (9.93) (15.72) (-0.01) 
Cash-Only Deals 
36.61%*** 28.36%*** 28.48%*** 39.08%*** -2.46% 
(12.7) (13.67) (13.57) (18.27) (-0.68) 
Panel B: Priced Based Premium - Target Markup is estimated as [ (Final Offer Price / P-42) – 1] 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
40.32%*** 36.94%*** 38.65%*** 43.05%*** -2.73% 
(23.25) (20.93) (29.34) (31) (-0.98) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
36.44%*** 35.16%*** 35.90%*** 40.40%*** -3.97% 
(15.88) (14.2) (20.86) (29.51) (-1.26) 
Cash-Only Deals 
45.79%*** 40.27%*** 44.57%*** 51.78%*** -5.99% 











Table 4-13   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer 
The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment 
measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days 
before the announcement. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of 
Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium 
in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any 
offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also 
filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We require that both target 
and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based 
on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying 
the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before 
the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the 
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or 
not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – 
whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and 
acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. The p-values are given underneath and are the MLE 
p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 1 2 3 
Constant 8.6644*** 17.8784*** 20.0556*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy -2.1062*** -2.9089*** -3.1061*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size  -0.0286 -0.029 
(p-value)  (0.4155) (0.4486) 
Target Turnover  -0.00102 -0.0174** 
(p-value)  (0.8738) (0.0214) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.0364 -0.0545 
(p-value)  (0.7282) (0.6359) 
Target B/M  -0.1945* 0.043 
(p-value)  (0.0637) (0.7238) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00375 -0.0195** 
(p-value)  (0.5861) (0.0164) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.1969* 0.1371 
(p-value)  (0.0538) (0.2219) 
Bidder B/M  0.1051** 0.119** 
(p-value)  (0.0184) (0.0277) 
Relative Size  -6.1086*** -6.5136*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  0.454** 0.3095 
(p-value)  (0.0264) (0.1555) 
Horizontal  -0.309*** -0.2656** 
(p-value)  (0.0047) (0.0233) 
Tender Offer  2.7573*** 2.4955*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile  0.1578 0.2749 
(p-value)  (0.5203) (0.2726) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.0255 -0.1483 
(p-value)  (0.8683) (0.355) 
Rumor  0.1581 0.1531 
(p-value)  (0.4624) (0.4994) 
Pseudo-R2 0.0162 0.2331 0.2871 
Industry Dummies No No Yes 





Table 4-14   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder CAR [-1,+1] on University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Bidder CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized 
return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 
trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the 
weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The 
quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer 
price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid 
contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock 
price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed 
firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported 
by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For 
the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) 
by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought 
from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the 
announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – 
whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the 
deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on 
NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ 
SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.18984*** 0.30421*** 0.241*** 0.433*** -0.09257 0.04406 
(p-value) (0.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.2145) (0.6867) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy -0.04509*** -0.04123*** -0.05839*** -0.05591*** 0.02244 0.00698 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1785) (0.6798) 
Bidder Size  -0.00373***  -0.00462***  -0.00333** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0212) 
Bidder Turnover  0.00000419  0.00002728  0.00015354 
(p-value)  (0.9516)  (0.6983)  (0.7169) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.00752**  0.01039***  0.00216 
(p-value)  (0.0166)  (0.0068)  (0.6845) 
Bidder B/M  -0.00012115  0.00337*  -0.00044816 
(p-value)  (0.8924)  (0.0969)  (0.6494) 
Target Turnover  -0.00054581***  -0.00064418***  0.0001956 
(p-value)  (0.0067)  (0.0057)  (0.5885) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00010256  0.00265  -0.00293 
(p-value)  (0.9737)  (0.4882)  (0.5775) 
Target B/M  0.00111  -0.00957**  0.01178** 
(p-value)  (0.7513)  (0.0409)  (0.042) 
CAR [-42,-2] Target  0.01333*  0.01777*  -0.00619 
(p-value)  (0.0935)  (0.0681)  (0.5448) 
CAR [-1,+1] Target  0.02194***  0.04315***  -0.01712** 
(p-value)  (0.0009)  (<.0001)  (0.0213) 
Relative Size  -0.06894**  -0.13815***  0.02106 
(p-value)  (0.0132)  (<.0001)  (0.6627) 
Toehold Exist  0.002  0.00361  0.00084053 
(p-value)  (0.7804)  (0.7183)  (0.9286) 
Horizontal  0.00038214  -0.00011737  0.0017 
(p-value)  (0.9077)  (0.9766)  (0.7574) 
Tender Offer  0.00692  0.01224  0.00311 
(p-value)  (0.1013)  (0.1164)  (0.5703) 
Cash Bid  0.02284***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  -0.00261  0.00973  -0.01696 
(p-value)  (0.7051)  (0.2577)  (0.1393) 
Multiple Bidders  0.00459  0.00659  -0.00134 
(p-value)  (0.3619)  (0.3177)  (0.8481) 
Rumor  0.01692***  0.02345***  0.00224 
(p-value)  (0.0079)  (0.0066)  (0.7873) 
Complete  0.00822  0.00636  0.00984 
(p-value)  (0.1081)  (0.2684)  (0.3335) 
Adj-R2 0.0055 0.085 0.0082 0.0794 0.0012 0.1066 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 







Table 4-15   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Bargaining Power estimated over [-1, +1] interval on University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of target bargaining power estimated over the interval [-1, +1] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). 
The Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum 
of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are 
estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock 
and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
(MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment 
index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated 
as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our 
sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top 
and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.01284 -0.36404*** 0.03407 -0.31358*** -0.00647 -0.38894*** 
(p-value) (0.7783) (<.0001) (0.5408) (<.0001) (0.9355) (<.0001) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy 0.01249 0.01867* 0.0032 0.01643 0.00858 0.00582 
(p-value) (0.2164) (0.0599) (0.7948) (0.1738) (0.6306) (0.7363) 
Target Size  0.00149  0.00431***  -0.00304 
(p-value)  (0.1631)  (0.0004)  (0.1455) 
Target Turnover  0.00054042***  0.00050427***  0.00058381 
(p-value)  (0.0018)  (0.0041)  (0.2563) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00122  -0.00331  0.00881* 
(p-value)  (0.6622)  (0.3231)  (0.0799) 
Target B/M  0.00946**  0.01842***  0.00091713 
(p-value)  (0.0149)  (<.0001)  (0.8498) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00006061  -0.00004322  -0.0000386 
(p-value)  (0.4408)  (0.5085)  (0.9233) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  -0.006*  -0.00945**  0.00421 
(p-value)  (0.0601)  (0.0109)  (0.474) 
Bidder B/M  0.00027551  -0.0011  0.00115 
(p-value)  (0.7323)  (0.593)  (0.3251) 
Relative Size  0.30038***  0.21059***  0.4697*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.0135**  -0.01159  -0.02108** 
(p-value)  (0.0259)  (0.1615)  (0.0193) 
Horizontal  0.00484  0.0072**  0.00034077 
(p-value)  (0.1286)  (0.0408)  (0.9633) 
Tender Offer  0.00356  0.00128  0.00628 
(p-value)  (0.3605)  (0.8684)  (0.1829) 
Cash Bid  -0.00914***     
(p-value)  (0.0041)     
Hostile  0.02809***  0.02551***  0.02059** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0051)  (0.0199) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.00437  -0.00581  0.00312 
(p-value)  (0.3309)  (0.3193)  (0.6267) 
Rumor  -0.02345***  -0.02652***  -0.01683** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0003)  (0.0428) 
Complete  0.00427  0.00467  0.00236 
(p-value)  (0.291)  (0.3245)  (0.7572) 
Adj-R2 0.0002 0.1357 -0.0004 0.105 -0.0007 0.2183 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-16   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Bargaining Power estimated over [-42, +1] interval on University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of target bargaining power estimated over the interval [-42, +1] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). 
The Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum 
of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are 
estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock 
and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
(MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment 
index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated 
as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our 
sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top 
and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the  final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.15506* -0.50512*** -0.18675* -0.37557*** -0.02634 -0.50414*** 
(p-value) (0.0775) (<.0001) (0.0879) (0.0023) (0.863) (0.0067) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy 0.04589*** 0.05126** 0.05362** 0.06186** 0.01552 -0.01346 
(p-value) (0.0189) (0.0114) (0.0272) (0.0104) (0.6502) (0.6978) 
Target Size  0.00231  0.00567**  -0.00437 
(p-value)  (0.2579)  (0.018)  (0.2565) 
Target Turnover  0.00035458  0.00024755  0.0013 
(p-value)  (0.4889)  (0.6707)  (0.1187) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.00075967  0.00227  -0.00767 
(p-value)  (0.8982)  (0.7506)  (0.4569) 
Target B/M  0.01214*  0.02768***  0.00056203 
(p-value)  (0.0823)  (0.0044)  (0.9511) 
Bidder Turnover  0.00026312  0.00032602  -0.00028352 
(p-value)  (0.4238)  (0.3068)  (0.7597) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  -0.0188***  -0.02454***  -0.00193 
(p-value)  (0.0015)  (0.0003)  (0.8664) 
Bidder B/M  -0.00307*  -0.00779  0.00007393 
(p-value)  (0.0629)  (0.1599)  (0.9775) 
Relative Size  0.2779***  0.05302  0.70316*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.2797)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02854**  -0.02178  -0.05919*** 
(p-value)  (0.0305)  (0.1932)  (0.0066) 
Horizontal  0.00368  0.00982  -0.00933 
(p-value)  (0.5496)  (0.156)  (0.467) 
Tender Offer  0.00923  0.01196  0.00846 
(p-value)  (0.2516)  (0.4358)  (0.3781) 
Cash Bid  -0.00601     
(p-value)  (0.3418)     
Hostile  0.03458**  0.00517  0.04042** 
(p-value)  (0.012)  (0.7925)  (0.0386) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.02495**  -0.04092***  0.00735 
(p-value)  (0.0105)  (0.0009)  (0.6091) 
Rumor  0.01117  0.00848  0.01025 
(p-value)  (0.2367)  (0.4569)  (0.5127) 
Complete  -0.00135  -0.00562  0.00257 
(p-value)  (0.8685)  (0.545)  (0.8737) 
Adj-R2 0.0014 0.0481 0.0019 0.0463 -0.0007 0.1277 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-17   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Bargaining Power estimated over [-42, +126] interval on University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of target bargaining power estimated over the interval [-42, +126] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). 
The Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum 
of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are 
estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock 
and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
(MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment 
index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated 
as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our 
sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top 
and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.56794*** -0.52395** -0.70872*** -0.30376 -0.0119 -0.59179 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.017) (0.0015) (0.263) (0.9626) (0.0803) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy 0.14758*** 0.12002*** 0.18175*** 0.13938*** 0.0166 0.00915 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0029) (0.0002) (0.0072) (0.7711) (0.8786) 
Target Size  -0.0035  -0.00151  -0.00781 
(p-value)  (0.3527)  (0.7437)  (0.2179) 
Target Turnover  0.00129  0.00137  0.00118 
(p-value)  (0.1539)  (0.1964)  (0.3531) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00506  0.00746  0.0126 
(p-value)  (0.6589)  (0.6048)  (0.4697) 
Target B/M  -0.01277  -0.00662  -0.00926 
(p-value)  (0.3519)  (0.7361)  (0.6139) 
Bidder Turnover  0.00128  0.00132  0.00218 
(p-value)  (0.204)  (0.1667)  (0.1645) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  -0.0443***  -0.05638***  -0.00095469 
(p-value)  (0.0003)  (0.0001)  (0.9599) 
Bidder B/M  -0.01557***  -0.03175**  -0.00663 
(p-value)  (0.0002)  (0.0346)  (0.2026) 
Relative Size  0.14452  -0.17434*  0.74853*** 
(p-value)  (0.1038)  (0.0958)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.00325  -0.00924  -0.01696 
(p-value)  (0.8887)  (0.7358)  (0.6801) 
Horizontal  0.00355  0.01602  -0.02625 
(p-value)  (0.7599)  (0.2492)  (0.1946) 
Tender Offer  -0.01689  -0.02576  -0.00536 
(p-value)  (0.2408)  (0.3795)  (0.7391) 
Cash Bid  -0.04096***     
(p-value)  (0.0007)     
Hostile  0.07482***  0.02971  0.08552** 
(p-value)  (0.005)  (0.3806)  (0.0404) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.02486  -0.03838  -0.00212 
(p-value)  (0.2167)  (0.1326)  (0.9368) 
Rumor  0.00458  0.00213  0.00281 
(p-value)  (0.7999)  (0.9286)  (0.9067) 
Complete  -0.0344  -0.04189*  -0.02494 
(p-value)  (0.0665)  (0.0635)  (0.4143) 
Adj-R2 0.0042 0.047 0.0054 0.0568 -0.0008 0.0572 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-18   Cross-sectional Regression of Synergy estimated over [-1, +1] interval on University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of synergy power estimated over the interval [-1, +1] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). Synergy is 
estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the 
announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market 
cap for the corresponding firm. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the 
market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP 
Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of 
Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This 
latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our 
analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and 
Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer 
premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed 
any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also 
filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target 
Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as 
CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-
Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, 
we followed Betton et al. (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final 
Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] 
respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares 
outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the 
firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax 
credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share 
Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on 
SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, 
Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the 
deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a 
Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. 
The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.28949*** 0.00574 0.37123*** 0.18995** -0.05942 -0.37309*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.926) (<.0001) (0.0158) (0.4162) (<.0001) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy -0.05939*** -0.04499*** -0.07951*** -0.06516*** 0.02313 0.01016 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1571) (0.4935) 
Target Size  -0.00503***  -0.00426***  -0.00809*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0013)  (<.0001) 
Target Turnover  -0.00037973*  -0.00062775**  0.0009329** 
(p-value)  (0.0822)  (0.0147)  (0.0332) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00435  0.00518  0.00528 
(p-value)  (0.1675)  (0.1885)  (0.2562) 
Target B/M  0.01108***  0.00501  0.01688*** 
(p-value)  (0.0023)  (0.3024)  (0.0086) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00007532  -0.00002756  0.00012157 
(p-value)  (0.1987)  (0.6148)  (0.7546) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.00566*  0.0059  0.00768 
(p-value)  (0.093)  (0.1328)  (0.1584) 
Bidder B/M  -0.00010274  0.00392*  0.00000911 
(p-value)  (0.925)  (0.0887)  (0.9938) 
Relative Size  0.33013***  0.19152***  0.57984*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.00997  -0.00030733  -0.02324** 
(p-value)  (0.1347)  (0.972)  (0.02) 
Horizontal  0.00291  0.00246  0.00623 
(p-value)  (0.3869)  (0.5273)  (0.3335) 
Tender Offer  0.01233***  0.02504***  0.0007624 
(p-value)  (0.0016)  (0.003)  (0.8566) 
Cash Bid  0.03133***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.02359***  0.04402***  -0.00012104 
(p-value)  (0.0006)  (<.0001)  (0.9892) 
Multiple Bidders  0.00060495  0.00123  -0.00084587 
(p-value)  (0.8985)  (0.8392)  (0.8978) 
Rumor  -0.00037508  0.00562  -0.01181 
(p-value)  (0.9495)  (0.4856)  (0.1099) 
Complete  0.0131***  0.00955*  0.02217*** 
(p-value)  (0.0021)  (0.0569)  (0.0013) 
Adj-R2 0.0088 0.1611 0.0152 0.0919 0.0007 0.3558 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 








Table 4-19   Cross-sectional Regression of Synergy estimated over [-42, +1] interval on University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of synergy power estimated over the interval [-42, +1] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). Synergy is 
estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the 
announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market 
cap for the corresponding firm. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the 
market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP 
Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of 
Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This 
latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our 
analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and 
Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer 
premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed 
any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also 
filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target 
Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as 
CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-
Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, 
we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final 
Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] 
respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares 
outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the 
firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to  the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax 
credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share 
Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on 
SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, 
Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the 
deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a 
Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. 
The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.22894** -0.14514 0.36014*** 0.03851 -0.27306* -0.67607*** 
(p-value) (0.0267) (0.2609) (0.007) (0.807) (0.0904) (0.0012) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy -0.04584** -0.02021 -0.07751*** -0.04651 0.07221** 0.07227** 
(p-value) (0.0464) (0.3986) (0.0089) (0.1233) (0.046) (0.0477) 
Target Size  -0.00837***  -0.00699**  -0.0118*** 
(p-value)  (0.0006)  (0.019)  (0.0024) 
Target Turnover  -0.00078254  -0.00128  0.00146* 
(p-value)  (0.2409)  (0.1264)  (0.0636) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00771  0.00053326  0.02714*** 
(p-value)  (0.2703)  (0.9521)  (0.0097) 
Target B/M  0.02955***  0.02256*  0.03183** 
(p-value)  (0.0009)  (0.059)  (0.0148) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00043789  -0.00038728  0.00007554 
(p-value)  (0.1301)  (0.2161)  (0.9337) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.01956***  0.01854**  0.02482** 
(p-value)  (0.0043)  (0.0256)  (0.0311) 
Bidder B/M  0.00204  0.01345**  0.00051554 
(p-value)  (0.333)  (0.0127)  (0.8051) 
Relative Size  0.43282***  0.27843***  0.70437*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.01589  -0.011  -0.01538 
(p-value)  (0.2756)  (0.5744)  (0.4852) 
Horizontal  0.00669  0.00402  0.01645 
(p-value)  (0.3624)  (0.6478)  (0.1995) 
Tender Offer  0.00869  0.01648  0.00046171 
(p-value)  (0.3092)  (0.3776)  (0.9614) 
Cash Bid  0.04143***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.0395**  0.08342***  -0.00778 
(p-value)  (0.0115)  (0.0002)  (0.7291) 
Multiple Bidders  0.00746  0.01486  -0.00992 
(p-value)  (0.4885)  (0.2842)  (0.4833) 
Rumor  0.00612  0.01502  -0.00812 
(p-value)  (0.594)  (0.3258)  (0.6224) 
Complete  0.03483***  0.03776***  0.03228** 
(p-value)  (0.0003)  (0.0012)  (0.047) 
Adj-R2 0.001 0.0753 0.0027 0.0556 0.0031 0.1443 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-20   Cross-sectional Regression of Synergy estimated over [-42, +126] interval on University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of synergy power estimated over the interval [-42, +126] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). Synergy 
is estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before 
the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily 
market cap for the corresponding firm. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained 
using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement 
day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from 
University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s 
runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the 
period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority 
Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by 
their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We 
removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. 
We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used 
Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this 
variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, 
Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and 
markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the 
Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, 
+126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of 
shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value 
of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share 
Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on 
SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, 
Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the 
deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a 
Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. 
The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.57533*** -0.43442 0.84075*** -0.26316 -0.49774* -1.14899*** 
(p-value) (0.0065) (0.1049) (0.0035) (0.4472) (0.0689) (0.0033) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy -0.13491*** -0.05122 -0.19961*** -0.08321 0.11817* 0.11277* 
(p-value) (0.0042) (0.2962) (0.0018) (0.205) (0.0546) (0.0782) 
Target Size  0.00233  0.00537  -0.00507 
(p-value)  (0.6283)  (0.3637)  (0.4811) 
Target Turnover  -0.00325***  -0.00457***  0.00339** 
(p-value)  (0.0033)  (0.0012)  (0.0109) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00835  -0.00331  0.02426 
(p-value)  (0.5472)  (0.8545)  (0.1939) 
Target B/M  0.12039***  0.1379***  0.08679*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0001) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00119  -0.00109  -0.00129 
(p-value)  (0.2678)  (0.3049)  (0.4196) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.04805***  0.05487***  0.02906 
(p-value)  (0.0007)  (0.0021)  (0.1452) 
Bidder B/M  0.01809***  0.04962***  0.00877* 
(p-value)  (0.0017)  (0.0072)  (0.0859) 
Relative Size  0.47902***  0.3089***  0.76809*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0109)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02212  0.01991  -0.08905** 
(p-value)  (0.4753)  (0.6304)  (0.0333) 
Horizontal  0.02414  0.02469  0.02903 
(p-value)  (0.1054)  (0.1824)  (0.182) 
Tender Offer  0.02793*  0.03974  0.01147 
(p-value)  (0.0653)  (0.2134)  (0.4755) 
Cash Bid  0.0837***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.10147***  0.13731***  0.07085 
(p-value)  (0.0018)  (0.0026)  (0.1572) 
Multiple Bidders  0.0624***  0.06317**  0.05115* 
(p-value)  (0.0073)  (0.0299)  (0.0705) 
Rumor  -0.01006  -0.00594  -0.01364 
(p-value)  (0.6818)  (0.8635)  (0.606) 
Complete  0.16881***  0.18219***  0.12601*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Adj-R2 0.0022 0.1012 0.0039 0.104 0.0027 0.0899 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 








Table 4-21   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Runup ‘CAR[-42, -2]’ on University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
(MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target CAR estimated over the runup period on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). The Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s 
stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before 
the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average 
sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are 
estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We 
limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered 
out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock 
price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest . Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same 
target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than 
$5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is 
completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and 
Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the 
target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and 
markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market 
cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value 
of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of 
stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target 
(Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before 
the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed 
successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, 
Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from 
CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.61139*** -0.48703*** -0.5734*** -0.47592*** -0.85017*** -0.50519** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0091) (<.0001) (0.0488) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy 0.14571*** 0.16723*** 0.13551*** 0.1608*** 0.20307*** 0.17798*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) 
Target Size  -0.00446  -0.00125  -0.01343** 
(p-value)  (0.1118)  (0.6947)  (0.0115) 
Target Turnover  -0.00054288  -0.00094484  0.00259** 
(p-value)  (0.3517)  (0.1584)  (0.0104) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.00818  -0.01182  0.00246 
(p-value)  (0.3211)  (0.2423)  (0.8623) 
Target B/M  0.06675***  0.08764***  0.03934** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0428) 
Relative Size  -0.23187***  -0.33438***  -0.01573 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.8426) 
Toehold Exist  -0.0314**  -0.03068  -0.03688 
(p-value)  (0.0422)  (0.1038)  (0.1597) 
Horizontal  0.00926  0.01342  -0.00428 
(p-value)  (0.2537)  (0.1689)  (0.7646) 
Tender Offer  0.00991  0.00271  0.00615 
(p-value)  (0.3502)  (0.8949)  (0.6233) 
Cash Bid  0.00724     
(p-value)  (0.3823)     
Hostile  0.00045383  0.01274  -0.02337 
(p-value)  (0.9823)  (0.6338)  (0.4428) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.01304  -0.02535  -0.00125 
(p-value)  (0.3127)  (0.1127)  (0.9513) 
Rumor  0.08973***  0.06602***  0.12305*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0005)  (<.0001) 
Complete  0.03345***  0.04418***  0.00561 
(p-value)  (0.0032)  (0.0012)  (0.7561) 
Adj-R2 0.0087 0.0462 0.0066 0.0509 0.0201 0.0607 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 





Table 4-22    Cross-sectional Regression of Target Runup ‘[(P-2 / P-42) - 1]’ on University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target Runup on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is 
estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected 
return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day 
to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated 
with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are 
available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment 
original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, 
Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ 
percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before 
the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 
months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from 
SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) 
– we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our 
sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price 
based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the 
announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the 
CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the 
stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the 
announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning 
of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the 
bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 
5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC 
code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-
value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.76829*** -0.4352*** -0.86579*** -0.42598** -0.7473*** -0.26458 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0049) (<.0001) (0.0209) (0.0009) (0.3488) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy 0.18682*** 0.19272*** 0.20649*** 0.18804*** 0.18645*** 0.1637*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0026) 
Target Size  -0.00615**  -0.00366  -0.01473*** 
(p-value)  (0.0294)  (0.2845)  (0.0074) 
Target Turnover  -0.00006256  -0.00040672  0.00219** 
(p-value)  (0.9096)  (0.507)  (0.0392) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.01615*  -0.01855*  -0.00542 
(p-value)  (0.0525)  (0.0705)  (0.7103) 
Target B/M  0.02574**  0.02256*  0.0306* 
(p-value)  (0.0215)  (0.0847)  (0.0983) 
Relative Size  -0.30423***  -0.40528***  -0.11158 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.2021) 
Toehold Exist  -0.05563***  -0.06945***  -0.04028 
(p-value)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.1186) 
Horizontal  -0.00278  -0.00233  -0.00838 
(p-value)  (0.7307)  (0.8092)  (0.5733) 
Tender Offer  -0.00298  -0.0066  -0.00574 
(p-value)  (0.7842)  (0.7445)  (0.6669) 
Cash Bid  0.00704     
(p-value)  (0.4005)     
Hostile  -0.00989  -0.00442  -0.02585 
(p-value)  (0.616)  (0.8706)  (0.3708) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.00472  -0.01417  -0.00203 
(p-value)  (0.715)  (0.3783)  (0.9241) 
Rumor  0.10122***  0.09119***  0.11669*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Complete  0.04326***  0.05051***  0.02518 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.1879) 
Adj-R2 0.0133 0.0514 0.0147 0.0519 0.0153 0.0549 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-23   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder CAR [-42,-2] on University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Bidder CAR estimated over the runup period on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). The Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s 
stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before 
the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average 
sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are 
estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We 
limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered 
out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock 
price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same 
target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than 
$5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is 
completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and 
Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the 
target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and 
markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market 
cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value 
of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of 
stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target 
(Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before 
the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed 
successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, 
Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from 
CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.04695 0.04314 0.12555 0.00396 -0.11324 -0.0765 
(p-value) (0.6215) (0.7376) (0.326) (0.9801) (0.4092) (0.7333) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy -0.01065 -0.0255 -0.02808 -0.03525 0.0252 0.02746 
(p-value) (0.615) (0.25) (0.3216) (0.2188) (0.4139) (0.4007) 
Bidder Size  -0.00194  -0.00321  0.00003116 
(p-value)  (0.3239)  (0.199)  (0.9921) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00030207  -0.00033371  0.00014271 
(p-value)  (0.3009)  (0.2611)  (0.8867) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.00998  0.0093  0.01441 
(p-value)  (0.1007)  (0.2142)  (0.1588) 
Bidder B/M  0.00627***  0.01356*  0.00284 
(p-value)  (0.0005)  (0.0575)  (0.1451) 
Target Turnover  6.44568E-07  -0.00002125  0.00004906 
(p-value)  (0.9991)  (0.9743)  (0.9411) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.0006002  -0.00618  0.01679* 
(p-value)  (0.9255)  (0.4526)  (0.0929) 
Target B/M  -0.00184  -0.01819  0.01225 
(p-value)  (0.7957)  (0.1021)  (0.1891) 
CAR [-42,-2] Target  0.18513***  0.22535***  0.09899*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0003) 
CAR [-1,+1] Target  0.05649***  0.09807***  -0.00379 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.847) 
Relative Size  0.11218**  0.206***  -0.02833 
(p-value)  (0.032)  (0.0012)  (0.7649) 
Toehold Exist  0.00723  0.01042  0.01642 
(p-value)  (0.5913)  (0.5532)  (0.4378) 
Horizontal  -0.00168  -0.00463  0.00374 
(p-value)  (0.8038)  (0.5683)  (0.7411) 
Tender Offer  -0.00569  -0.0087  0.00629 
(p-value)  (0.4843)  (0.6023)  (0.5358) 
Cash Bid  -0.00343     
(p-value)  (0.5691)     
Hostile  0.00398  0.02861  -0.02044 
(p-value)  (0.7862)  (0.1895)  (0.3363) 
Multiple Bidders  0.01805*  0.03453***  -0.0085 
(p-value)  (0.0637)  (0.0057)  (0.5435) 
Rumor  -0.02552***  -0.02018  -0.02515* 
(p-value)  (0.0098)  (0.1139)  (0.0763) 
Complete  0.0086  0.01489  -0.01035 
(p-value)  (0.3776)  (0.1902)  (0.5913) 
Adj-R2 -0.0002 0.0583 0.0001 0.0857 -0.0002 0.0169 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 









Table 4-24   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Markup ‘CAR[-1, +126]’ on University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target CAR estimated over the markup period [-1, +126] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). The 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of 
the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading 
days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted 
average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile 
cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from 
SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC 
and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the 
target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on 
the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is 
less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the 
deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and 
Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the 
target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and 
markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market 
cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value 
of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of 
stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target 
(Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before 
the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed 
successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, 
Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from 
CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.83807*** 0.51758* 0.57069** 0.40171 0.65452* 0.37082 
(p-value) (0.0003) (0.059) (0.0487) (0.1917) (0.0906) (0.4561) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy -0.14449*** -0.07977 -0.09317 -0.06267 -0.08565 -0.01823 
(p-value) (0.0048) (0.1117) (0.1439) (0.2732) (0.3192) (0.8411) 
Target Size  0.01382***  0.01318**  0.01074 
(p-value)  (0.0036)  (0.0112)  (0.2398) 
Target Turnover  -0.00157*  -0.0023**  0.00363** 
(p-value)  (0.0734)  (0.0251)  (0.045) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.018  0.01217  0.04075* 
(p-value)  (0.196)  (0.4676)  (0.092) 
Target B/M  0.18479***  0.21431***  0.14645*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0013) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  0.15393***  0.21719***  -0.08772 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.1867) 
Relative Size  -0.5539***  -0.57912***  -0.44258*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0015) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02158  -0.01607  -0.04218 
(p-value)  (0.455)  (0.6922)  (0.2831) 
Horizontal  0.01985  0.02638  0.00312 
(p-value)  (0.1485)  (0.1036)  (0.9054) 
Tender Offer  0.05468***  0.02047  0.07706*** 
(p-value)  (0.0069)  (0.6393)  (0.0002) 
Cash Bid  0.04473***     
(p-value)  (0.0022)     
Hostile  0.20139***  0.19226***  0.15014*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0038) 
Multiple Bidders  0.11986***  0.10353***  0.13976*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0006)  (0.0003) 
Rumor  -0.11189***  -0.10049***  -0.1029*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0015)  (0.0043) 
Complete  0.21002***  0.24459***  0.08108** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0305) 
Adj-R2 0.0026 0.1452 0.0007 0.1453 0.0003 0.1267 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 







Table 4-25   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Markup ‘[(Final Offer Price / P-1) - 1]’ on University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target Markup [(Final Offer Price / P-1) - 1] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). The Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s 
stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before 
the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average 
sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are 
estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We 
limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered 
out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock 
price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same 
target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than 
$5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is 
completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and 
Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the 
target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and 
markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market 
cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value 
of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of 
stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target 
(Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before 
the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed 
successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, 
Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from 
CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.62639** 1.11309*** 0.60385* 0.94224* 0.35442 1.22828*** 
(p-value) (0.0175) (0.0032) (0.0669) (0.0505) (0.4716) (0.0046) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy -0.06908 -0.01511 -0.06756 -0.00559 -0.00046991 -0.00783 
(p-value) (0.2386) (0.7952) (0.3528) (0.9384) (0.9966) (0.9309) 
Target Size  -0.01766  -0.01222  -0.03187* 
(p-value)  (0.1017)  (0.3088)  (0.0733) 
Target Turnover  0.00109  0.00070794  0.00305* 
(p-value)  (0.1784)  (0.4284)  (0.0541) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.05694**  0.04191  0.0943* 
(p-value)  (0.0293)  (0.118)  (0.0978) 
Target B/M  0.07814***  0.09407***  0.06511 
(p-value)  (0.0021)  (0.0003)  (0.1386) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  -0.23717***  -0.21667***  -0.35145*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.45351***  -0.51862***  -0.26764 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.2122) 
Toehold Exist  -0.07645***  -0.05375*  -0.09913** 
(p-value)  (0.0016)  (0.0982)  (0.0115) 
Horizontal  -0.00855  -0.0006852  -0.03435 
(p-value)  (0.6613)  (0.975)  (0.3865) 
Tender Offer  0.07251***  0.09691**  0.06138*** 
(p-value)  (0.0019)  (0.0258)  (0.0095) 
Cash Bid  -0.0077     
(p-value)  (0.5984)     
Hostile  0.11867***  0.09743*  0.12831** 
(p-value)  (0.0048)  (0.0619)  (0.0299) 
Multiple Bidders  0.04721  0.04983  0.03409 
(p-value)  (0.1593)  (0.286)  (0.4034) 
Rumor  -0.06401**  -0.04275  -0.08539*** 
(p-value)  (0.0284)  (0.309)  (0.0007) 
Complete  -0.02753  -0.03613  -0.00061655 
(p-value)  (0.3401)  (0.3361)  (0.9853) 
Adj-R2 0.0002 0.0566 0 0.0541 -0.0009 0.0427 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 








Table 4-26   Cross-sectional Regression of Target CAR [-1,+1] on University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized 
return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 
trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the 
weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The 
quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer 
price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid 
contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock 
price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed 
firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported 
by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For 
the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) 
by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought 
from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the 
announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – 
whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the 
deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on 
NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ 
SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 1.03808*** 1.27288*** 0.72084*** 1.20284*** 0.99692*** 1.33917*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0007) (0.0002) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy -0.18487*** -0.11906*** -0.12204*** -0.11478*** -0.15888** -0.10879 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0143) (0.1045) 
Target Size  0.0016  0.00312  -0.00606 
(p-value)  (0.5429)  (0.2897)  (0.2876) 
Target Turnover  -0.00034348  -0.0006947  0.00202 
(p-value)  (0.4427)  (0.1464)  (0.117) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00945  0.00376  0.0251 
(p-value)  (0.2567)  (0.69)  (0.1345) 
Target B/M  0.07134***  0.0792***  0.06263*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0094) 
CAR [-42,-2] Target  -0.16631***  -0.14421***  -0.25158*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.66355***  -0.71563***  -0.51255*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.04654***  -0.03783**  -0.05875** 
(p-value)  (0.0015)  (0.043)  (0.0194) 
Horizontal  0.00857  0.00728  0.0083 
(p-value)  (0.2825)  (0.378)  (0.6835) 
Tender Offer  0.05895***  0.05321**  0.06078*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0126)  (<.0001) 
Cash Bid  0.05089***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.06294***  0.0735***  0.03479 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.2231) 
Multiple Bidders  0.00305  -0.01055  0.02922 
(p-value)  (0.8064)  (0.4623)  (0.2433) 
Rumor  -0.06298***  -0.04216**  -0.08993*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0101)  (<.0001) 
Complete  0.03595***  0.03637***  0.03103 
(p-value)  (0.0002)  (0.0006)  (0.1532) 
Adj-R2 0.0128 0.1865 0.0064 0.1385 0.0073 0.1318 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 





Table 4-27   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
(MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). The Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the 
expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
(MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment 
index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated 
as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our 
sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top 
and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.22668 0.51758* -0.00271 0.40171 -0.19564 0.37082 
(p-value) (0.4113) (0.059) (0.9939) (0.1917) (0.6426) (0.4561) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy 0.00122 -0.07977 0.04234 -0.06267 0.11742 -0.01823 
(p-value) (0.9841) (0.1117) (0.5911) (0.2732) (0.211) (0.8411) 
Target Size  0.01382***  0.01318**  0.01074 
(p-value)  (0.0036)  (0.0112)  (0.2398) 
Target Turnover  -0.00157*  -0.0023**  0.00363** 
(p-value)  (0.0734)  (0.0251)  (0.045) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.018  0.01217  0.04075* 
(p-value)  (0.196)  (0.4676)  (0.092) 
Target B/M  0.18479***  0.21431***  0.14645*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0013) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  1.15393***  1.21719***  0.91228*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.5539***  -0.57912***  -0.44258*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0015) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02158  -0.01607  -0.04218 
(p-value)  (0.455)  (0.6922)  (0.2831) 
Horizontal  0.01985  0.02638  0.00312 
(p-value)  (0.1485)  (0.1036)  (0.9054) 
Tender Offer  0.05468***  0.02047  0.07706*** 
(p-value)  (0.0069)  (0.6393)  (0.0002) 
Cash Bid  0.04473***     
(p-value)  (0.0022)     
Hostile  0.20139***  0.19226***  0.15014*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0038) 
Multiple Bidders  0.11986***  0.10353***  0.13976*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0006)  (0.0003) 
Rumor  -0.11189***  -0.10049***  -0.1029*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0015)  (0.0043) 
Complete  0.21002***  0.24459***  0.08108** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0305) 
Adj-R2 -0.0003 0.4198 -0.0002 0.4449 0.0009 0.3308 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-28   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium ‘[(Final Offer Price / P-42) - 1]’ on University of Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index (MCSI) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium [(Final Offer Price / P-42) - 1] on Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). The Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s 
stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before 
the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average 
sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are 
estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We 
limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered 
out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock 
price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same 
target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than 
$5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is 
completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and 
Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the 
target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and 
markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market 
cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value 
of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of 
stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target 
(Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before 
the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed 
successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, 
Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from 
CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.30415 1.14702*** -0.38974 0.95259* -0.66516 1.48865*** 
(p-value) (0.3124) (0.0029) (0.2938) (0.0561) (0.2506) (0.0005) 
MCSI-Sentiment-Proxy 0.15645** 0.02753 0.16956** 0.03978 0.25028* -0.01825 
(p-value) (0.0193) (0.6444) (0.0382) (0.5945) (0.0554) (0.8402) 
Target Size  -0.02222**  -0.01589  -0.03646* 
(p-value)  (0.0471)  (0.1724)  (0.0813) 
Target Turnover  0.00158  0.00119  0.00266* 
(p-value)  (0.1302)  (0.319)  (0.0889) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.04631  0.02974  0.08839 
(p-value)  (0.1161)  (0.311)  (0.1806) 
Target B/M  0.03727  0.04117  0.04136 
(p-value)  (0.164)  (0.1335)  (0.4055) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  0.88449***  0.86346***  0.89563*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.54698***  -0.66501***  -0.31854 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.1869) 
Toehold Exist  -0.11479***  -0.11961***  -0.09667** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0009)  (0.0193) 
Horizontal  -0.01888  -0.01574  -0.03322 
(p-value)  (0.368)  (0.493)  (0.4631) 
Tender Offer  0.06014**  0.07187  0.05428** 
(p-value)  (0.0173)  (0.1021)  (0.0411) 
Cash Bid  -0.009     
(p-value)  (0.5549)     
Hostile  0.09439**  0.0744  0.10476** 
(p-value)  (0.0167)  (0.1692)  (0.0378) 
Multiple Bidders  0.06621*  0.07245  0.0302 
(p-value)  (0.0705)  (0.1605)  (0.4932) 
Rumor  -0.03994  -0.00177  -0.1031*** 
(p-value)  (0.209)  (0.9688)  (0.0004) 
Complete  0.00281  -0.00459  0.02776 
(p-value)  (0.9157)  (0.8928)  (0.4217) 
Adj-R2 0.0015 0.1874 0.0016 0.1967 0.0037 0.1474 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 







Table 4-29   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Target Runup ( CAR [-42,-2] ) and Runup Multiplied 
by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) Quartiles – Testing Markup Pricing 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Target Runup ‘CAR[-42, -2]’ and the Runup multiplied by the sentiment quartile 
dummies.  The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns 
spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal 
to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. 
The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer 
price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid 
contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock 
price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed 
firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported 
by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For 
the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) 
by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought 
from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the 
announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – 
whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the 
deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on 
NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ 
SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.1745*** 0.14964 0.13614*** 0.11657 0.27243*** 0.28598 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.1931) (<.0001) (0.4143) (<.0001) (0.1505) 
Target CAR [-42,-2] 1.56017*** 1.41994*** 1.94075*** 1.75339*** 0.95339*** 0.82724*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Q2 x Target CAR [-42,-2] -0.35315 -0.27213 -0.69282* -0.56145* 0.08474 0.15313 
(p-value) (0.1592) (0.2223) (0.0515) (0.0576) (0.7239) (0.4784) 
Q3 x Target CAR [-42,-2] -0.48238* -0.44884** -0.80967** -0.74426** -0.05915 0.01931 
(p-value) (0.0551) (0.0449) (0.0226) (0.0124) (0.808) (0.9283) 
Q4 x Target CAR [-42,-2] -0.326 -0.25618 -0.6338* -0.54345* 0.00165 0.10799 
(p-value) (0.1811) (0.2381) (0.0681) (0.0604) (0.9942) (0.6006) 
Target Size  0.01452***  0.01384***  0.01116 
(p-value)  (0.0018)  (0.0077)  (0.21) 
Target Turnover  -0.00149*  -0.00226**  0.00368** 
(p-value)  (0.0867)  (0.0254)  (0.041) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.01588  0.01197  0.04023* 
(p-value)  (0.253)  (0.475)  (0.0953) 
Target B/M  0.18611***  0.21509***  0.14846*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0013) 
Relative Size  -0.55708***  -0.58351***  -0.44305*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0016) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02176  -0.02403  -0.04168 
(p-value)  (0.4476)  (0.5498)  (0.2885) 
Horizontal  0.02053  0.0244  0.00241 
(p-value)  (0.1324)  (0.1255)  (0.9264) 
Tender Offer  0.05475***  0.02384  0.07724*** 
(p-value)  (0.0054)  (0.5646)  (0.0002) 
Cash Bid  0.04868***     
(p-value)  (0.0007)     
Hostile  0.19451***  0.17928***  0.14909*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0035) 
Multiple Bidders  0.12448***  0.10911***  0.1414*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Rumor  -0.11644***  -0.1054***  -0.10025*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0008)  (0.0058) 
Complete  0.20876***  0.23984***  0.08095** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0302) 
Adj-R2 0.3357 0.422 0.3796 0.4509 0.232 0.3304 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-30   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium (Final Offer Price / P-42 - 1) on Target Runup (P-2 / P-42 - 1) and Runup 
Multiplied by University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) Quartiles – Testing Markup Pricing 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Target Runup ‘CAR[-42, -2]’ and the Runup multiplied by the sentiment quartile 
dummies.  The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns 
spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) associated with the deal are brought from University of Michigan website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal 
to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. 
The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer 
price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid 
contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock 
price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed 
firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported 
by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For 
the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) 
by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought 
from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the 
announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – 
whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the 
deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on 
NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ 
SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.32429*** 1.07468*** 0.30514*** 0.91053*** 0.37242*** 1.24401*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Runup 1.13627*** 1.11547*** 1.17601*** 1.18534*** 1.03446*** 0.99975*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Q2 x Target Runup -0.01844 -0.03228 0.0039 -0.0221 -0.05409 -0.0837 
(p-value) (0.8638) (0.7467) (0.9779) (0.8688) (0.7383) (0.6165) 
Q3 x Target Runup -0.18049* -0.21948** -0.20445* -0.24508** -0.16188 -0.189 
(p-value) (0.0508) (0.013) (0.072) (0.0158) (0.2895) (0.2497) 
Q4 x Target Runup -0.10234 -0.10301 -0.13008 -0.1776* -0.03766 -0.05386 
(p-value) (0.2498) (0.2165) (0.2287) (0.0636) (0.8121) (0.708) 
Target Size  -0.02003*  -0.01269  -0.03526* 
(p-value)  (0.0657)  (0.2554)  (0.0965) 
Target Turnover  0.00116  0.00078754  0.00302** 
(p-value)  (0.1726)  (0.4081)  (0.0389) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.05454*  0.0381  0.09399 
(p-value)  (0.0599)  (0.183)  (0.1505) 
Target B/M  0.07039***  0.09403***  0.04645 
(p-value)  (0.0057)  (0.0002)  (0.3199) 
Relative Size  -0.44567***  -0.54462***  -0.22182 
(p-value)  (0.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.3764) 
Toehold Exist  -0.08712***  -0.07729**  -0.09262** 
(p-value)  (0.0002)  (0.0114)  (0.0249) 
Horizontal  -0.00834  -0.00255  -0.02962 
(p-value)  (0.6803)  (0.9062)  (0.5133) 
Tender Offer  0.07277***  0.08206*  0.06521** 
(p-value)  (0.0037)  (0.0562)  (0.0142) 
Cash Bid  -0.00925     
(p-value)  (0.5133)     
Hostile  0.10162***  0.08536  0.10564** 
(p-value)  (0.0078)  (0.1009)  (0.0293) 
Multiple Bidders  0.06274*  0.06837  0.03432 
(p-value)  (0.0808)  (0.1816)  (0.4045) 
Rumor  -0.06568**  -0.0429  -0.10492*** 
(p-value)  (0.0346)  (0.3339)  (0.0001) 
Complete  -0.01138  -0.01871  0.00956 
(p-value)  (0.6602)  (0.5734)  (0.7798) 
Adj-R2 0.1986 0.2395 0.2196 0.2656 0.1483 0.1646 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 









4.8 Appendix A 
 
 
Figure 4-6    Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) for our sample period 
Panel A shows the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) brought from professor Wurgler Website for our sample period. Panel B reports 
the sentiment quartiles that are associated with our sample. For every deal, we estimate a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available 
during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. We check where this sentiment measures ranks relative to the BWN 
values and associate it with a sentiment quartile. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. 
Panel A: The Sentiment Index Spanning our Sample 
 






































Figure 4-7   Target CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Target firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 10 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) that is associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from Wurgler Website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original 
index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) 
sentiment index level. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. We also required that the deal process a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid 
outliers. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each 
other. We also require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-
Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with 
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Figure 4-8   Target CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Target firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 126 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) that is associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from Professor Wurgler Website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment 
original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index 
levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) 
sentiment index level. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. We also required that the deal process a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid 
outliers. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each 
other. We also require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-
Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with 
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Figure 4-9   Bidder CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Bidder firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 10 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) that is associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from Wurgler Website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original 
index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) 
sentiment index level. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. We also required that the deal process a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid 
outliers. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each 
other. We also require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-
Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with 
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Figure 4-10   Bidder CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Bidder firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 126 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) that is associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from Wurgler Website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original 
index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) 
sentiment index level. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. We also required that the deal process a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid 
outliers. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each 
other. We also require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-
Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with 
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Table 4-31   Descriptive Statistics - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) – ALL 
The below table shows a general descriptive statistics (mean) for the main variables used in our tests. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns 
(AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the 
market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value 
weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal 
to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The 
quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from 
SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and 
filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target 
stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same 
target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. 
Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. 
We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. 
For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the 
announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR 
over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price 
by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The 
Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share 
Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC 
deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – 
whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s 
announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. 
Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. 
 All Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Target Size 19.4415 19.8275 19.7245 19.2295 19.1187 
Target Turnover 6.5291 7.4092 7.2171 6.3779 5.3162 
Target B/M 0.5794 0.6146 0.5655 0.5663 0.5861 
Acquirer Size 21.4060 21.7452 21.6823 21.1826 21.1396 
Acquirer Turnover 6.9172 7.3741 6.9439 6.6339 6.9198 
Acquirer B/M 0.5067 0.5541 0.4706 0.4989 0.5224 
      
Acquirer CAR [-42,-2] -0.0012 -0.0014 0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0031 
Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] -0.0140 -0.0077 -0.0122 -0.0162 -0.0177 
Acquirer CAR [+2,+126] -0.0844 -0.0573 -0.0835 -0.1061 -0.0772 
      
Target CAR [-42,-2] 0.0474 0.0249 0.0521 0.0456 0.0608 
Target CAR [-1,+1] 0.2023 0.2332 0.2145 0.1870 0.1860 
Target CAR [+2,+126] -0.0175 -0.0430 0.0043 -0.0309 -0.0058 
Target CAR [-1,+126] – Target Markup – CAR-based 0.1848 0.1902 0.2188 0.1561 0.1802 
Target CAR [-42,+126] – Target Premium – CAR-based 0.2322 0.2151 0.2708 0.2017 0.2410 
      
Target Runup [ (P-2/P-42) - 1] 0.0763 0.0711 0.0712 0.0718 0.0916 
Target Markup [ (Final Offer Price/P-2) - 1] 0.3141 0.3548 0.3134 0.3069 0.2944 
Premium [ (Final Offer Price/P-42) - 1] 0.4031 0.4370 0.3978 0.3872 0.4050 
      
Target Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.3565 0.3908 0.3695 0.3463 0.3304 
Acquirer Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.6507 0.6244 0.6285 0.6580 0.6853 
      
Toehold Exists 0.0413 0.0351 0.0382 0.0449 0.0446 
Horizontal Deal 0.2318 0.2763 0.2400 0.2073 0.2221 
Tender Offer 0.1579 0.1893 0.1376 0.1459 0.1730 
Cash Only Deal 0.3007 0.3725 0.3394 0.2755 0.2377 
Hostile Deal 0.0348 0.0275 0.0311 0.0406 0.0368 
First Bid in a Multibid Contest 0.0904 0.0626 0.0743 0.1123 0.1004 
Rumored Deal 0.0448 0.0702 0.0673 0.0268 0.0246 
Complete Deal 0.8618 0.8595 0.8685 0.8713 0.8438 
      
BWN 0.2955 -0.4518 -0.0676 0.3793 1.1370 
      






Table 4-32   Descriptive Statistics - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) – Non-
Cash-Only 
The below table shows a general descriptive statistics (mean) for the main variables used in our tests for the Non-Cash-Only (Stock and Mixed Deal) sample. The Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the 
expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement 
day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based 
on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every 
deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the 
announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 
2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required 
that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer 
premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million 
dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnormal Return from the beginning of the Runup 
period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms 
are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of 
exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days 
before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. 
For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by 
adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from 
Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 
days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was 
completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or 
not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. 
 All Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Target Size 19.5059 19.9107 19.8197 19.2653 19.2554 
Target Turnover 6.4603 7.1828 7.3021 6.1877 5.5493 
Target B/M 0.5849 0.6429 0.5755 0.5656 0.5827 
Acquirer Size 21.2293 21.3658 21.5236 21.0124 21.1301 
Acquirer Turnover 7.1493 7.3998 7.1702 6.6923 7.5397 
Acquirer B/M 0.4821 0.5713 0.4531 0.4666 0.4753 
      
Acquirer CAR [-42,-2] -0.0017 -0.0018 0.0050 -0.0020 -0.0078 
Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] -0.0236 -0.0173 -0.0232 -0.0262 -0.0247 
Acquirer CAR [+2,+126] -0.1074 -0.0806 -0.1004 -0.1325 -0.0995 
      
Target CAR [-42,-2] 0.0408 0.0182 0.0517 0.0360 0.0496 
Target CAR [-1,+1] 0.1677 0.1790 0.1820 0.1530 0.1653 
Target CAR [+2,+126] -0.0193 -0.0462 0.0084 -0.0382 -0.0066 
Target CAR [-1,+126] – Target Markup – CAR-based 0.1484 0.1328 0.1905 0.1147 0.1586 
Target CAR [-42,+126] – Target Premium – CAR-based 0.1892 0.1510 0.2422 0.1507 0.2082 
      
Target Runup [ (P-2/P-42) - 1] 0.0700 0.0625 0.0695 0.0646 0.0818 
Target Markup [ (Final Offer Price/P-2) - 1] 0.2977 0.3110 0.3037 0.2935 0.2890 
Premium [ (Final Offer Price/P-42) - 1] 0.3787 0.3804 0.3888 0.3633 0.3869 
      
Target Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.3701 0.4112 0.3997 0.3516 0.3397 
Acquirer Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.6229 0.5718 0.6003 0.6317 0.6647 
      
Toehold Exists 0.0343 0.0438 0.0334 0.0369 0.0264 
Horizontal Deal 0.2493 0.3187 0.2675 0.2169 0.2299 
Tender Offer 0.0459 0.0560 0.0471 0.0322 0.0556 
Cash Only Deal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hostile Deal 0.0247 0.0170 0.0167 0.0346 0.0249 
First Bid in a Multibid Contest 0.0853 0.0584 0.0699 0.1049 0.0922 
Rumored Deal 0.0440 0.0730 0.0699 0.0274 0.0220 
Complete Deal 0.8584 0.8516 0.8723 0.8594 0.8477 
      
BWN 0.3357 -0.4594 -0.0695 0.3877 1.1406 
      






Table 4-33   Descriptive Statistics - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) – Cash-
Only 
The below table shows a general descriptive statistics (mean) for the main variables used in our tests for the Cash-Only sample. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum 
of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is 
obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement 
day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
that is not orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that 
is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the 
announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals 
are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer 
price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price 
divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if 
bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 
is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the 
deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return 
data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock 
price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we 
estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days 
before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance 
sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the 
runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder 
attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% 
ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the 
deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. 
 All Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Target Size 19.2917 19.6872 19.5393 19.1352 18.6803 
Target Turnover 6.6891 7.7906 7.0517 6.8781 4.5687 
Target B/M 0.5667 0.5670 0.5462 0.5680 0.5968 
Acquirer Size 21.8169 22.3843 21.9914 21.6300 21.1699 
Acquirer Turnover 6.3776 7.3310 6.5034 6.4802 4.9322 
Acquirer B/M 0.5641 0.5251 0.5046 0.5839 0.6732 
      
Acquirer CAR [-42,-2] 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0082 0.0012 0.0120 
Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 0.0083 0.0086 0.0090 0.0099 0.0046 
Acquirer CAR [+2,+126] -0.0309 -0.0179 -0.0506 -0.0367 -0.0058 
      
Target CAR [-42,-2] 0.0627 0.0361 0.0527 0.0709 0.0968 
Target CAR [-1,+1] 0.2827 0.3244 0.2776 0.2765 0.2524 
Target CAR [+2,+126] -0.0132 -0.0376 -0.0037 -0.0115 -0.0030 
Target CAR [-1,+126] – Target Markup – CAR-based 0.2695 0.2868 0.2739 0.2650 0.2494 
Target CAR [-42,+126] – Target Premium – CAR-based 0.3322 0.3230 0.3266 0.3359 0.3462 
      
Target Runup [ (P-2/P-42) - 1] 0.0909 0.0854 0.0747 0.0907 0.1231 
Target Markup [ (Final Offer Price/P-2) - 1] 0.3523 0.4286 0.3323 0.3422 0.3119 
Premium [ (Final Offer Price/P-42) - 1] 0.4600 0.5321 0.4153 0.4502 0.4628 
      
Target Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.3250 0.3566 0.3107 0.3323 0.3005 
Acquirer Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.7154 0.7131 0.6834 0.7273 0.7512 
      
Toehold Exists 0.0575 0.0205 0.0473 0.0658 0.1033 
Horizontal Deal 0.1912 0.2049 0.1864 0.1818 0.1972 
Tender Offer 0.4183 0.4139 0.3136 0.4451 0.5493 
Cash Only Deal 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Hostile Deal 0.0584 0.0451 0.0592 0.0564 0.0751 
First Bid in a Multibid Contest 0.1023 0.0697 0.0828 0.1317 0.1268 
Rumored Deal 0.0467 0.0656 0.0621 0.0251 0.0329 
Complete Deal 0.8698 0.8730 0.8609 0.9028 0.8310 
      
BWN 0.2019 -0.4392 -0.0638 0.3574 1.1254 
      






Table 4-34   Bidder CAR during the Announcement Period – by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to 
Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the Bidder CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1, +1] sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as 
sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected 
return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the 
announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler 
Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a 
sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup per iod. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days 
before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and 
Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a 
reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the 
final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a 
multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target 
stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms 
with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. 
Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by 
the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and 
markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is 
obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 
42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the 
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the 
runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder 
attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% 
ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the 
deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile 
with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
-0.77%** -1.22%*** -1.62%*** -1.77%*** 1.01%** 
(-2.38) (-5.08) (-7.44) (-6.81) (2.45) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
-1.73%*** -2.32%*** -2.62%*** -2.47%*** 0.74% 
(-4.19) (-7.98) (-9.68) (-7.91) (1.43) 
Cash-Only Deals 
0.86%* 0.90%** 0.99%*** 0.46% 0.40% 







Table 4-35   Target Bargaining Power – by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table presents the deal estimated bargaining power over the different MCPI quartile. Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of 
Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are 
obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is 
calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is 
estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the 
market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index 
levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the 
sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom 
deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days 
before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 
6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. 
We have also used Target Cumulative Abnormal Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we 
termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into 
All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and 
markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final 
Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] 
respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares 
outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s 
equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we 
created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the 
deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are 
obtained from CRSP. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. 
Panel A: Target Bargaining Power is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-1,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
4.57%*** 4.34%*** 4.18%*** 4.47%*** 0.10% 
(14.78) (17.94) (20.26) (17.72) (0.25) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
5.21%*** 5.14%*** 4.62%*** 4.67%*** 0.54% 
(14.99) (17.45) (19.07) (16.63) (1.19) 
Cash-Only Deals 
3.49%*** 2.79%*** 3.02%*** 3.83%*** -0.34% 
(5.99) (6.78) (7.82) (6.83) (-0.42) 
Panel B: Target Bargaining Power is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-42,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
5.10%*** 5.38%*** 4.82%*** 5.72%*** -0.62% 
(10.55) (11.52) (10.96) (11.7) (-0.88) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
5.56%*** 5.65%*** 5.37%*** 5.96%*** -0.39% 
(9.66) (9.71) (10.38) (11.27) (-0.48) 
Cash-Only Deals 
4.32%*** 4.88%*** 3.37%*** 4.98%*** -0.66% 
(5.01) (6.22) (4.05) (4.26) (-0.46) 
Panel C: Target Bargaining Power is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-42,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
7.35%*** 10.82%*** 10.96%*** 9.48%*** -2.13% 
(7.58) (11.69) (12.96) (9.31) (-1.47) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
8.36%*** 12.54%*** 13.24%*** 10.24%*** -1.88% 
(6.48) (10.05) (12.96) (8.74) (-1.04) 
Cash-Only Deals 
5.66%*** 7.46%*** 4.97%*** 7.04%*** -1.38% 






Table 4-36   Synergy Related Univariate Tests – by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors 
(BWN) 
The below table presents the deal estimated synergy over the different MCPI quartile. Synergy is estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns 
(AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return 
of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days 
before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four 
sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor 
Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter 
spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: 
November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of 
Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to 
avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the 
first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose 
value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnormal Return from 
the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both 
target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based 
on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 
days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of 
the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French 
(1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought 
from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement 
to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was 
completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or 
not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 
represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Synergy is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-1,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
2.90%*** 2.42%*** 1.71%*** 1.66%*** 1.24%*** 
(8.37) (9.68) (7.68) (5.92) (2.82) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
1.98%*** 1.35%*** 0.68%*** 0.79%** 1.20%** 
(4.73) (4.35) (2.62) (2.54) (2.33) 
Cash-Only Deals 
4.45%*** 4.51%*** 4.41%*** 4.45%*** 0.00% 
(7.5) (11.32) (11.36) (7.47) (0) 
Panel B: Synergy is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-42,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
2.63%*** 2.99%*** 1.69%*** 1.54%*** 1.08% 
(4.58) (5.5) (3.3) (2.59) (1.27) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
1.64%** 2.12%*** 0.28% -0.01% 1.65% 
(2.24) (3.06) (0.45) (-0.01) (1.57) 
Cash-Only Deals 
4.29%*** 4.67%*** 5.42%*** 6.51%*** -2.22% 
(4.68) (5.46) (6.29) (5.66) (-1.53) 
Panel C: Synergy is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-42,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
-1.12% -2.21%* -6.06%*** -3.20%*** 2.08% 
(-0.94) (-1.9) (-5.79) (-2.59) (1.18) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
-3.39%** -4.53%*** -9.81%*** -5.78%*** 2.38% 
(-2.02) (-2.86) (-7.58) (-3.89) (1.03) 
Cash-Only Deals 
2.70%* 2.31% 3.82%** 5.05%** -2.35% 






Table 4-37   Target Runup - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the Target Runup sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the 
specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model 
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted 
index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized 
to Macro Factors (BWN) associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted 
average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs 
are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We 
limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out 
the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 
42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value 
is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever 
is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided 
our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price 
based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement 
date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and 
[-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of 
shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the 
firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we 
created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the 
deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are 
obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. 
The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Runup is estimated as the CAR of the target firm over [-42,-2] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
2.49%*** 5.21%*** 4.56%*** 6.08%*** -3.60%*** 
(3.74) (8.16) (7.57) (8.6) (-3.58) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
1.82%** 5.17%*** 3.60%*** 4.96%*** -3.14%*** 
(2.22) (6.63) (4.89) (6.08) (-2.56) 
Cash-Only Deals 
3.61%*** 5.27%*** 7.09%*** 9.68%*** -6.07%*** 
(3.2) (4.75) (7.05) (6.99) (-3.42) 
Panel B: Priced Based Target Runup - Target Runup is estimated as [ (P-2 / P-42) – 1] 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
7.11%*** 7.12%*** 7.18%*** 9.16%*** -2.05%** 
(10.61) (10.86) (11.06) (12.69) (-2.01) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
6.25%*** 6.95%*** 6.46%*** 8.18%*** -1.92% 
(7.91) (8.74) (7.98) (9.98) (-1.57) 
Cash-Only Deals 
8.54%*** 7.47%*** 9.07%*** 12.31%*** -3.77%* 





Table 4-38   Bidder CAR during the Runup Period - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro 
Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the Bidder CAR estimated over the runup period sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the 
Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is 
obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement 
day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
that is not orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that 
is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the 
announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals 
are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer 
price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price 
divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if 
bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 
is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the 
deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return 
data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock 
price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we 
estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days 
before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance 
sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the 
runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder 
attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% 
ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the 
deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile 
with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
-0.14% 0.05% -0.11% -0.31% 0.17% 
(-0.27) (0.11) (-0.24) (-0.56) (0.22) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
-0.18% 0.50% -0.20% -0.78% 0.59% 
(-0.27) (0.79) (-0.34) (-1.2) (0.6) 
Cash-Only Deals 
-0.06% -0.82% 0.12% 1.20% -1.26% 







Table 4-39   Target Markup - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the Target Markup sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the 
specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model 
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted 
index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized 
to Macro Factors (BWN) associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted 
average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs 
are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We 
limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out 
the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 
42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value 
is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever 
is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided 
our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price 
based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement 
date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and 
[-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of 
shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the 
firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to  the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we 
created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the 
deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are 
obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. 
The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Markup is estimated as the CAR of the target firm over [-1,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
19.02%*** 21.88%*** 15.61%*** 18.02%*** 1.00% 
(13.18) (20.07) (14.93) (15.9) (0.55) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
13.28%*** 19.05%*** 11.47%*** 15.86%*** -2.58% 
(7.64) (13.93) (9.36) (11.77) (-1.17) 
Cash-Only Deals 
28.68%*** 27.39%*** 26.50%*** 24.94%*** 3.74% 
(11.85) (15.54) (14.17) (12.82) (1.18) 
Panel B: Priced Based Markup - Target Markup is estimated as [ (Final Offer Price / P-2) – 1] 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
35.48%*** 31.34%*** 30.69%*** 29.44%*** 6.04%** 
(12.87) (30.96) (26.77) (33.14) (2.34) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
31.10%*** 30.37%*** 29.35%*** 28.90%*** 2.20% 
(9.48) (22.71) (19.87) (27.85) (0.77) 
Cash-Only Deals 
42.86%*** 33.23%*** 34.22%*** 31.19%*** 11.67%** 





Table 4-40    Target CAR during the Announcement Period - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to 
Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the Target CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1, +1] sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as 
sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected 
return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the 
announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler 
Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a 
sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup per iod. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days 
before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and 
Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a 
reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the 
final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a 
multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target 
stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms 
with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. 
Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by 
the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and 
markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is 
obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 
42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the 
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the 
runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder 
attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% 
ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the 
deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile 
with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
23.32%*** 21.45%*** 18.70%*** 18.60%*** 4.72%*** 
(25.34) (32.1) (31.07) (28.61) (4.31) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
17.90%*** 18.20%*** 15.30%*** 16.53%*** 1.38% 
(20.26) (24.45) (24.1) (23.03) (1.19) 
Cash-Only Deals 
32.44%*** 27.76%*** 27.65%*** 25.24%*** 7.20%*** 





Table 4-41   Premium - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the Premium sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the 
specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model 
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted 
index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized 
to Macro Factors (BWN) associated with the deal. BWN levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted 
average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs 
are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We 
limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out 
the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 
42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value 
is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever 
is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided 
our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price 
based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement 
date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and 
[-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of 
shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value o f the 
firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to  the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we 
created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the 
deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are 
obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. 
The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Premium is estimated as the CAR of the target firm over [-42,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
21.51%*** 27.08%*** 20.17%*** 24.10%*** -2.60% 
(12.77) (20.68) (15.95) (16.69) (-1.17) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
15.10%*** 24.22%*** 15.07%*** 20.82%*** -5.72%** 
(7.18) (14.27) (10.01) (12.14) (-2.08) 
Cash-Only Deals 
32.30%*** 32.66%*** 33.59%*** 34.62%*** -2.32% 
(12.07) (16.67) (15.61) (14.13) (-0.63) 
Panel B: Priced Based Premium - Target Markup is estimated as [ (Final Offer Price / P-42) – 1] 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
43.70%*** 39.78%*** 38.72%*** 40.50%*** 3.20% 
(14.87) (30.9) (30.03) (33.57) (1.11) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
38.04%*** 38.88%*** 36.33%*** 38.69%*** -0.65% 
(11.76) (22.37) (22.12) (27.72) (-0.21) 
Cash-Only Deals 
53.21%*** 41.53%*** 45.02%*** 46.28%*** 6.93% 






Table 4-42   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer 
The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we 
estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the 
announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 
2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required 
that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer 
premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million 
dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Size is the logarithm 
of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the 
ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the 
approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of 
preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 
166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed 
on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. The p-values are 
given underneath and are the MLE p-values. The *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 1 2 3 
Constant -0.7523*** 4.5584*** 5.8968*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.345*** -0.509*** -0.5209*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size  -0.0214 -0.0235 
(p-value)  (0.5385) (0.5369) 
Target Turnover  -0.00141 -0.0167** 
(p-value)  (0.8107) (0.0196) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.051 -0.0586 
(p-value)  (0.6255) (0.6097) 
Target B/M  -0.1113 0.1396 
(p-value)  (0.2891) (0.2583) 
Bidder Turnover  0.000061 -0.0137* 
(p-value)  (0.9911) (0.0718) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.2363** 0.1701 
(p-value)  (0.0201) (0.1289) 
Bidder B/M  0.124*** 0.146** 
(p-value)  (0.0079) (0.0134) 
Relative Size  -6.0369*** -6.4712*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  0.5223* 0.3793* 
(p-value)  (0.01) (0.0788) 
Horizontal  -0.2657* -0.2335** 
(p-value)  (0.0143) (0.0444) 
Tender Offer  2.7411*** 2.4707*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile  0.1093 0.2139 
(p-value)  (0.6572) (0.3941) 
Multiple Bidders  0.0538 -0.0742 
(p-value)  (0.725) (0.6424) 
Rumor  0.1845 0.1984 
(p-value)  (0.3851) (0.3752) 
Pseudo-R2 0.0094 0.2274 0.2810 
Industry Dummies No No Yes 






Table 4-43   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder CAR [-1,+1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to 
Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Bidder CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to macro factors (BWN). The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated 
as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is 
estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for 
the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For 
every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days 
before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 
till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid 
outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the 
first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal 
whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral 
Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. 
We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-
Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al 
(2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the 
logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in 
$Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is 
obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data 
we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether 
the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s 
announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal 
deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** 
indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.01226*** 0.11334*** -0.02205*** 0.17648*** 0.00861*** 0.08208 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0054) (<.0001) (0.001) (<.0001) (0.1925) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.00594*** -0.00562*** -0.00469* -0.00674** -0.00141 -0.00084153 
(p-value) (0.0068) (0.0098) (0.0863) (0.0147) (0.6365) (0.7736) 
Bidder Size  -0.00359***  -0.00454***  -0.00351** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0133) 
Bidder Turnover  0.00001356  0.00003604  0.00012412 
(p-value)  (0.8358)  (0.59)  (0.7589) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.00769**  0.01048***  0.00224 
(p-value)  (0.0142)  (0.0061)  (0.6735) 
Bidder B/M  0.0001651  0.00439**  -0.00043892 
(p-value)  (0.8567)  (0.0478)  (0.655) 
Target Turnover  -0.00054513***  -0.00065405***  0.00018183 
(p-value)  (0.0063)  (0.0047)  (0.6161) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.00018986  0.00254  -0.00287 
(p-value)  (0.9516)  (0.5105)  (0.5856) 
Target B/M  0.00268  -0.00613  0.01165** 
(p-value)  (0.4292)  (0.1901)  (0.0406) 
CAR [-42,-2] Target  0.0114  0.01499  -0.00548 
(p-value)  (0.1515)  (0.1249)  (0.5881) 
CAR [-1,+1] Target  0.02365***  0.04579***  -0.01738** 
(p-value)  (0.0004)  (<.0001)  (0.0196) 
Relative Size  -0.06614**  -0.13598***  0.01789 
(p-value)  (0.0159)  (<.0001)  (0.7039) 
Toehold Exist  0.00297  0.00475  0.00102 
(p-value)  (0.6756)  (0.6361)  (0.915) 
Horizontal  0.00094774  0.0007071  0.00155 
(p-value)  (0.7748)  (0.8606)  (0.7794) 
Tender Offer  0.0065  0.01319*  0.00348 
(p-value)  (0.1268)  (0.0929)  (0.5367) 
Cash Bid  0.02364***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  -0.00366  0.0089  -0.01698 
(p-value)  (0.5946)  (0.3004)  (0.1392) 
Multiple Bidders  0.00523  0.00766  -0.00128 
(p-value)  (0.3029)  (0.2504)  (0.8546) 
Rumor  0.018***  0.02521***  0.00202 
(p-value)  (0.0047)  (0.0036)  (0.8082) 
Complete  0.00752  0.00567  0.00991 
(p-value)  (0.1403)  (0.3207)  (0.3278) 
Adj-R2 0.0022 0.0827 0.0011 0.0753 -0.0007 0.1065 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-44   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Bargaining Power estimated over [-1, +1] interval on Baker and Wurgler 
Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of target bargaining power estimated over the interval [-1, +1] Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to macro factors (BWN). The Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar 
Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference 
between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market  model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily 
returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker 
and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated 
a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 
2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers 
and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the 
deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is 
estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of 
the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and 
acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the 
medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock 
price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market 
cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the 
Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of 
Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share 
– all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days 
before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is 
listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer 
size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.04353*** -0.27812*** 0.0492*** -0.23764*** 0.03168*** -0.3623*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy 0.00031408 0.00173 -0.00183 0.00081371 0.00197 0.00119 
(p-value) (0.8685) (0.3409) (0.4045) (0.7011) (0.5949) (0.7388) 
Target Size  0.00135  0.00422***  -0.00308 
(p-value)  (0.2044)  (0.0006)  (0.1382) 
Target Turnover  0.00053599***  0.00050015***  0.00057904 
(p-value)  (0.002)  (0.0046)  (0.2583) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00133  -0.00335  0.0089* 
(p-value)  (0.635)  (0.3181)  (0.0782) 
Target B/M  0.00869**  0.01737***  0.0009107 
(p-value)  (0.0222)  (<.0001)  (0.8496) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00006479  -0.00004498  -0.00005153 
(p-value)  (0.397)  (0.4828)  (0.8963) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  -0.00597*  -0.00932**  0.00415 
(p-value)  (0.0611)  (0.0117)  (0.4818) 
Bidder B/M  0.00014498  -0.00141  0.00111 
(p-value)  (0.8573)  (0.5045)  (0.3389) 
Relative Size  0.30101***  0.21055***  0.46991*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.01391**  -0.012  -0.02139** 
(p-value)  (0.022)  (0.15)  (0.0173) 
Horizontal  0.00459  0.00697**  0.00030286 
(p-value)  (0.1508)  (0.0482)  (0.9673) 
Tender Offer  0.00377  0.00099938  0.00634 
(p-value)  (0.3332)  (0.8973)  (0.1818) 
Cash Bid  -0.00971***     
(p-value)  (0.0022)     
Hostile  0.0285***  0.02574***  0.0208** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0048)  (0.0192) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.00464  -0.0061  0.00304 
(p-value)  (0.3031)  (0.2972)  (0.6361) 
Rumor  -0.02386***  -0.0271***  -0.01692** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0416) 
Complete  0.00453  0.00478  0.00248 
(p-value)  (0.2631)  (0.3137)  (0.7447) 
Adj-R2 -0.0003 0.1349 -0.0001 0.1043 -0.0007 0.2183 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-45   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Bargaining Power estimated over [-42, +1] interval on Baker and Wurgler 
Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of target bargaining power estimated over the interval [-42, +1] Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to macro factors (BWN). The Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar 
Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference 
between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily 
returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker 
and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated 
a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 
2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers 
and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the 
deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is 
estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of 
the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and 
acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the 
medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock 
price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market 
cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the 
Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of 
Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share 
– all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days 
before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is 
listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer 
size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.05161*** -0.26903*** 0.05535*** -0.09186 0.04355*** -0.56452*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1489) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy 0.00269 0.00455 0.00271 0.00552 -0.00055852 -0.00398 
(p-value) (0.446) (0.2074) (0.5057) (0.1827) (0.9381) (0.5808) 
Target Size  0.00192  0.00541**  -0.00437 
(p-value)  (0.3523)  (0.0254)  (0.252) 
Target Turnover  0.00034123  0.00024813  0.00131 
(p-value)  (0.5031)  (0.6701)  (0.1133) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.00047414  0.00229  -0.00788 
(p-value)  (0.9364)  (0.7486)  (0.4482) 
Target B/M  0.01003  0.02376**  0.00050651 
(p-value)  (0.1439)  (0.0144)  (0.9556) 
Bidder Turnover  0.0002518  0.00031691  -0.00026118 
(p-value)  (0.4353)  (0.3127)  (0.7774) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  -0.01869***  -0.02431***  -0.0017 
(p-value)  (0.0016)  (0.0003)  (0.8824) 
Bidder B/M  -0.00343**  -0.00894  0.00018257 
(p-value)  (0.0407)  (0.1244)  (0.9447) 
Relative Size  0.2796***  0.05368  0.70324*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.2687)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02964**  -0.02319  -0.05818*** 
(p-value)  (0.0245)  (0.1661)  (0.0075) 
Horizontal  0.00299  0.00896  -0.0093 
(p-value)  (0.6263)  (0.1941)  (0.4679) 
Tender Offer  0.00983  0.01082  0.00848 
(p-value)  (0.2214)  (0.4842)  (0.3783) 
Cash Bid  -0.0076     
(p-value)  (0.2262)     
Hostile  0.03571***  0.00598  0.03979** 
(p-value)  (0.0097)  (0.7623)  (0.0416) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.02569***  -0.04212***  0.00763 
(p-value)  (0.0089)  (0.0007)  (0.5965) 
Rumor  0.01002  0.00668  0.01049 
(p-value)  (0.2914)  (0.5613)  (0.5046) 
Complete  -0.00064304  -0.00498  0.00226 
(p-value)  (0.9373)  (0.5926)  (0.8891) 
Adj-R2 -0.0001 0.0465 -0.0002 0.0441 -0.0009 0.1278 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-46   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Bargaining Power estimated over [-42, +126] interval on Baker and Wurgler 
Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of target bargaining power estimated over the interval [-42, +126] Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to macro factors (BWN). The Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar 
Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference 
between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily 
returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker 
and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated 
a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 
2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers 
and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the 
deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is 
estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of 
the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and 
acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the 
medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock 
price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market 
cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the 
Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of 
Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share 
– all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days 
before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is 
listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer 
size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.09713*** 0.03516 0.11356*** 0.34405*** 0.06224*** -0.55176*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.7291) (<.0001) (0.004) (<.0001) (0.0008) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy 0.00722 0.00472 0.00424 0.00295 0.0023 0.00366 
(p-value) (0.2899) (0.5014) (0.603) (0.7222) (0.8591) (0.7895) 
Target Size  -0.0047  -0.0024  -0.00774 
(p-value)  (0.2079)  (0.5996)  (0.2094) 
Target Turnover  0.00123  0.0013  0.00118 
(p-value)  (0.174)  (0.2162)  (0.3508) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00552  0.00693  0.01276 
(p-value)  (0.6299)  (0.6312)  (0.4686) 
Target B/M  -0.01798  -0.01566  -0.00917 
(p-value)  (0.1778)  (0.4123)  (0.6166) 
Bidder Turnover  0.00125  0.0013  0.00217 
(p-value)  (0.2045)  (0.1647)  (0.1669) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  -0.04351***  -0.05483***  -0.00118 
(p-value)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.9508) 
Bidder B/M  -0.01637***  -0.03438**  -0.00672 
(p-value)  (0.0001)  (0.0269)  (0.1954) 
Relative Size  0.14823*  -0.17597*  0.74804*** 
(p-value)  (0.0943)  (0.093)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.00555  -0.01301  -0.01786 
(p-value)  (0.8116)  (0.6354)  (0.6652) 
Horizontal  0.00193  0.01415  -0.02623 
(p-value)  (0.8679)  (0.3088)  (0.1961) 
Tender Offer  -0.01505  -0.02798  -0.00549 
(p-value)  (0.2951)  (0.3478)  (0.7336) 
Cash Bid  -0.0458***     
(p-value)  (0.0001)     
Hostile  0.07728***  0.03169  0.08607** 
(p-value)  (0.004)  (0.3553)  (0.039) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.02632  -0.04069  -0.00238 
(p-value)  (0.1954)  (0.116)  (0.9294) 
Rumor  0.00127  -0.00342  0.00263 
(p-value)  (0.9437)  (0.8853)  (0.9128) 
Complete  -0.03319*  -0.04129*  -0.02469 
(p-value)  (0.0772)  (0.0682)  (0.4158) 
Adj-R2 0 0.0444 -0.0003 0.0537 -0.0009 0.0573 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 







Table 4-47   Cross-sectional Regression of Synergy estimated over [-1, +1] interval on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-
orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of synergy power estimated over the interval [-1, +1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to macro factors (BWN). Synergy is estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target 
and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by 
multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the 
expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the 
weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The 
quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer 
price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid 
contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock 
price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed 
firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported 
by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For 
the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) 
by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought 
from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the 
announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – 
whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the 
deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on 
NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ 
SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.02293*** -0.20086*** 0.01277*** -0.10858*** 0.04467*** -0.32396*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0047) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.00655*** -0.00455** -0.00569** -0.00611*** -0.00054717 -0.00036337 
(p-value) (0.0012) (0.0202) (0.0156) (0.0089) (0.8878) (0.9166) 
Target Size  -0.00471***  -0.00399***  -0.00835*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0027)  (<.0001) 
Target Turnover  -0.00037133*  -0.00063033**  0.00091801** 
(p-value)  (0.0891)  (0.0143)  (0.0353) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00407  0.00514  0.0054 
(p-value)  (0.1977)  (0.1959)  (0.2463) 
Target B/M  0.01291***  0.00913*  0.01673*** 
(p-value)  (0.0005)  (0.059)  (0.0084) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.000065  -0.00001766  0.00008389 
(p-value)  (0.288)  (0.755)  (0.825) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.00562*  0.00568  0.00777 
(p-value)  (0.0964)  (0.1483)  (0.1543) 
Bidder B/M  0.00021387  0.00513**  -0.00000313 
(p-value)  (0.8482)  (0.0323)  (0.9978) 
Relative Size  0.3286***  0.19073***  0.58133*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.00898  0.00115  -0.02323** 
(p-value)  (0.1745)  (0.895)  (0.022) 
Horizontal  0.00351  0.00337  0.00605 
(p-value)  (0.2993)  (0.3916)  (0.3466) 
Tender Offer  0.01185***  0.02626***  0.00117 
(p-value)  (0.0025)  (0.002)  (0.7838) 
Cash Bid  0.03261***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.02259***  0.04318***  -0.00006838 
(p-value)  (0.001)  (<.0001)  (0.9939) 
Multiple Bidders  0.00128  0.0025  -0.00081747 
(p-value)  (0.7887)  (0.6817)  (0.9015) 
Rumor  0.00058175  0.00747  -0.01194 
(p-value)  (0.9213)  (0.3524)  (0.106) 
Complete  0.01244***  0.00885*  0.0223*** 
(p-value)  (0.0035)  (0.0786)  (0.0012) 
Adj-R2 0.0024 0.1575 0.0018 0.0847 -0.0009 0.3555 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-48   Cross-sectional Regression of Synergy estimated over [-42, +1] interval on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of synergy power estimated over the interval [-42, +1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to macro factors (BWN). Synergy is estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target 
and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by 
multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the 
expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the 
weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The 
quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer 
price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid 
contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock 
price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed 
firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported 
by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For 
the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) 
by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought 
from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the 
announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – 
whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the 
deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on 
NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ 
SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.02437*** -0.23263*** 0.0128*** -0.16594** 0.04976*** -0.34105*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.026) (<.0001) (0.0003) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.00909** -0.00699* -0.01174** -0.01387*** 0.00873 0.01113 
(p-value) (0.025) (0.0842) (0.0154) (0.0043) (0.2417) (0.1305) 
Target Size  -0.00847***  -0.00709**  -0.0126*** 
(p-value)  (0.0005)  (0.0176)  (0.0008) 
Target Turnover  -0.00080783  -0.00134  0.00139* 
(p-value)  (0.2256)  (0.1097)  (0.0752) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00742  -0.00007447  0.02817*** 
(p-value)  (0.2892)  (0.9933)  (0.0078) 
Target B/M  0.03016***  0.02532**  0.03154** 
(p-value)  (0.0007)  (0.0314)  (0.0145) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00042988  -0.00037065  -0.0001078 
(p-value)  (0.1355)  (0.2317)  (0.9052) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.02***  0.01941**  0.02439** 
(p-value)  (0.0036)  (0.0195)  (0.0349) 
Bidder B/M  0.00221  0.01427**  0.00014458 
(p-value)  (0.2964)  (0.0108)  (0.947) 
Relative Size  0.4319***  0.27475***  0.70867*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.01521  -0.01056  -0.01847 
(p-value)  (0.2953)  (0.5861)  (0.3981) 
Horizontal  0.00696  0.00475  0.01581 
(p-value)  (0.343)  (0.5881)  (0.2191) 
Tender Offer  0.00884  0.0177  0.00165 
(p-value)  (0.3012)  (0.3478)  (0.8631) 
Cash Bid  0.04108***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.0389**  0.083***  -0.0057 
(p-value)  (0.0129)  (0.0002)  (0.7994) 
Multiple Bidders  0.008  0.01618  -0.0107 
(p-value)  (0.4588)  (0.2443)  (0.4505) 
Rumor  0.00605  0.01485  -0.00927 
(p-value)  (0.5985)  (0.3303)  (0.5757) 
Complete  0.03416***  0.03641***  0.03365** 
(p-value)  (0.0004)  (0.0018)  (0.0386) 
Adj-R2 0.0009 0.0757 0.0016 0.0572 0.0003 0.1426 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-49   Cross-sectional Regression of Synergy estimated over [-42, +126] interval on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of synergy power estimated over the interval [-42, +126] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to macro factors (BWN). Synergy is estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target 
and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by 
multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the 
expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the 
weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The 
quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer 
price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid 
contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock 
price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed 
firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported 
by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For 
the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) 
by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought 
from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the 
announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – 
whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the 
deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on 
NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ 
SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.02918*** -0.66229*** -0.0571*** -0.63191*** 0.0313*** -0.62254*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.0009) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.01838** -0.01203 -0.02023** -0.02151** 0.01084 0.01387 
(p-value) (0.0257) (0.1444) (0.0492) (0.0368) (0.3964) (0.2791) 
Target Size  0.00236  0.00529  -0.0066 
(p-value)  (0.6212)  (0.368)  (0.3323) 
Target Turnover  -0.00328***  -0.00466***  0.00327** 
(p-value)  (0.0029)  (0.0009)  (0.0128) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.0078  -0.0042  0.02582 
(p-value)  (0.5737)  (0.8166)  (0.1697) 
Target B/M  0.12218***  0.1429***  0.08614*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0001) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00117  -0.00106  -0.0016 
(p-value)  (0.2719)  (0.3136)  (0.3167) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.04864***  0.05608***  0.02864 
(p-value)  (0.0006)  (0.0016)  (0.1536) 
Bidder B/M  0.01849***  0.05111***  0.00826 
(p-value)  (0.0015)  (0.0065)  (0.1132) 
Relative Size  0.47695***  0.30339**  0.77641*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0129)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02066  0.0209  -0.09307** 
(p-value)  (0.5042)  (0.6127)  (0.0257) 
Horizontal  0.02482*  0.02596  0.02787 
(p-value)  (0.0959)  (0.1599)  (0.2031) 
Tender Offer  0.02788*  0.0418  0.01377 
(p-value)  (0.0647)  (0.1965)  (0.3929) 
Cash Bid  0.08388***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.10012***  0.13648***  0.07367 
(p-value)  (0.0021)  (0.0029)  (0.1428) 
Multiple Bidders  0.06349***  0.06538**  0.05019* 
(p-value)  (0.0065)  (0.025)  (0.0776) 
Rumor  -0.00966  -0.00573  -0.01539 
(p-value)  (0.6934)  (0.8679)  (0.5639) 
Complete  0.16755***  0.18007***  0.12803*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Adj-R2 0.0008 0.1013 0.0008 0.1046 -0.0003 0.088 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 








Table 4-50   . Cross-sectional Regression of Target Runup ‘CAR[-42, -2]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-
orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target CAR estimated over the runup period on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to 
macro factors (BWN). The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference 
between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily 
returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker 
and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated 
a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 
2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers 
and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the 
deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is 
estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of 
the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and 
acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the 
medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock 
price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market 
cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the 
Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of 
Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share 
– all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days 
before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is 
listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer 
size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.0444*** 0.29022*** 0.03917*** 0.27469*** 0.05657*** 0.32209*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0047) (<.0001) (0.0068) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy 0.00999* 0.0092* 0.00472 0.00162 0.03031*** 0.02516** 
(p-value) (0.0644) (0.0898) (0.4524) (0.7959) (0.0043) (0.0203) 
Target Size  -0.00594**  -0.00215  -0.01568*** 
(p-value)  (0.032)  (0.5014)  (0.0031) 
Target Turnover  -0.00063387  -0.00104  0.0023** 
(p-value)  (0.2729)  (0.1213)  (0.0217) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.00729  -0.01212  0.00508 
(p-value)  (0.3771)  (0.2334)  (0.7218) 
Target B/M  0.0594***  0.07637***  0.03856** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0402) 
Relative Size  -0.22949***  -0.34338***  -0.00668 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.9332) 
Toehold Exist  -0.03479**  -0.03574*  -0.04374* 
(p-value)  (0.0235)  (0.0523)  (0.097) 
Horizontal  0.00691  0.01116  -0.00665 
(p-value)  (0.3969)  (0.2537)  (0.6458) 
Tender Offer  0.01242  0.00018937  0.00982 
(p-value)  (0.2417)  (0.9927)  (0.4243) 
Cash Bid  0.0008834     
(p-value)  (0.915)     
Hostile  0.00418  0.01544  -0.01746 
(p-value)  (0.8367)  (0.5611)  (0.5629) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.01518  -0.02776*  -0.00311 
(p-value)  (0.2407)  (0.0831)  (0.8788) 
Rumor  0.08546***  0.05942***  0.12049*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0017)  (<.0001) 
Complete  0.03535***  0.04476***  0.00901 
(p-value)  (0.0018)  (0.001)  (0.6163) 
Adj-R2 0.0008 0.0361 -0.0002 0.0418 0.0083 0.0525 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-51   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Runup ‘[(P-2 / P-42) - 1]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-
orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target Runup on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to macro factors (BWN). The 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of 
the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading 
days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is 
equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the 
announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions 
deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a 
reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as 
the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall 
into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and 
whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period 
till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are 
public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of 
exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 
days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement 
respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days 
before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of 
the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and 
French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data 
are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before 
the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – 
whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the 
deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on 
NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ 
SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.07543*** 0.47081*** 0.06996*** 0.45783*** 0.08768*** 0.51106*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0001) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy 0.00297 0.00118 0.00025889 -0.00465 0.01578 0.00926 
(p-value) (0.5828) (0.8253) (0.9668) (0.4539) (0.1432) (0.4174) 
Target Size  -0.00825***  -0.00487  -0.01775*** 
(p-value)  (0.0036)  (0.1584)  (0.0015) 
Target Turnover  -0.00022562  -0.00055721  0.00185* 
(p-value)  (0.6775)  (0.3591)  (0.0779) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.0153*  -0.01913*  -0.00304 
(p-value)  (0.0665)  (0.0637)  (0.8356) 
Target B/M  0.01687  0.00926  0.02912 
(p-value)  (0.1191)  (0.4821)  (0.1051) 
Relative Size  -0.30323***  -0.41896***  -0.09947 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.2613) 
Toehold Exist  -0.05908***  -0.07579***  -0.04347* 
(p-value)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.091) 
Horizontal  -0.0056  -0.005  -0.01149 
(p-value)  (0.4906)  (0.6069)  (0.4434) 
Tender Offer  0.00063496  -0.00927  -0.00056967 
(p-value)  (0.9537)  (0.6524)  (0.9652) 
Cash Bid  -0.00202     
(p-value)  (0.8118)     
Hostile  -0.00583  -0.00111  -0.02186 
(p-value)  (0.7682)  (0.9676)  (0.4482) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.0067  -0.01668  -0.00256 
(p-value)  (0.6061)  (0.3038)  (0.9044) 
Rumor  0.09528***  0.0824***  0.11438*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0001)  (<.0001) 
Complete  0.04479***  0.05064***  0.02796 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.1444) 
Adj-R2 -0.0002 0.0379 -0.0004 0.0405 0.0014 0.0448 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-52   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder CAR [-42,-2] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to 
Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Bidder CAR estimated over the runup period on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized 
to macro factors (BWN). The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference 
between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily 
returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker 
and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated 
a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 
2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers 
and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the 
deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is 
estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of 
the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and 
acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the 
medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock 
price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market 
cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the 
Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of 
Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share 
– all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days 
before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is 
listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer 
size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.00075479 -0.07584 -0.00002651 -0.15504 -0.00172 0.04499 
(p-value) (0.7748) (0.3668) (0.9938) (0.1399) (0.662) (0.7424) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.00148 -0.003 -0.00502 -0.00611 0.00861 0.00892 
(p-value) (0.7072) (0.4534) (0.3032) (0.2086) (0.1743) (0.2057) 
Bidder Size  -0.00183  -0.0032  0.00008138 
(p-value)  (0.3572)  (0.2032)  (0.9787) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00029665  -0.0003262  0.0001028 
(p-value)  (0.3053)  (0.2684)  (0.9177) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.01004*  0.00955  0.01388 
(p-value)  (0.0996)  (0.2024)  (0.1752) 
Bidder B/M  0.00645***  0.01419*  0.0026 
(p-value)  (0.0004)  (0.0508)  (0.1918) 
Target Turnover  0.0000039  -0.00003998  0.00003595 
(p-value)  (0.9945)  (0.9519)  (0.9567) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00043725  -0.00637  0.01724* 
(p-value)  (0.9457)  (0.4387)  (0.0851) 
Target B/M  -0.00084105  -0.01605  0.01242 
(p-value)  (0.9054)  (0.1482)  (0.1827) 
CAR [-42,-2] Target  0.18389***  0.2236***  0.0989*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0003) 
CAR [-1,+1] Target  0.05758***  0.09963***  -0.00407 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.8347) 
Relative Size  0.1144**  0.20558***  -0.02783 
(p-value)  (0.0296)  (0.0015)  (0.762) 
Toehold Exist  0.0078  0.01101  0.01416 
(p-value)  (0.5607)  (0.5269)  (0.5011) 
Horizontal  -0.00132  -0.0041  0.00371 
(p-value)  (0.8438)  (0.6114)  (0.7428) 
Tender Offer  -0.00599  -0.00803  0.00617 
(p-value)  (0.4612)  (0.6321)  (0.5474) 
Cash Bid  -0.00284     
(p-value)  (0.6332)     
Hostile  0.00334  0.02812  -0.01905 
(p-value)  (0.8196)  (0.1978)  (0.3699) 
Multiple Bidders  0.01843*  0.03529***  -0.00912 
(p-value)  (0.0596)  (0.005)  (0.5152) 
Rumor  -0.0248**  -0.01938  -0.02567* 
(p-value)  (0.0121)  (0.1277)  (0.0724) 
Complete  0.00821  0.0143  -0.00967 
(p-value)  (0.3987)  (0.2078)  (0.6164) 
Adj-R2 -0.0002 0.058 0 0.0856 0.0007 0.0177 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 





Table 4-53   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Markup ‘CAR[-1, +126]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-
orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target CAR estimated over the markup period [-1, +126] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to macro factors (BWN). The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated 
as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is 
estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for 
the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For 
every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days 
before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 
till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid 
outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the 
first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal 
whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral 
Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. 
We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-
Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al 
(2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the 
logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in 
$Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is 
obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data 
we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether 
the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s 
announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal 
deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** 
indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.18919*** 0.15107 0.1502*** 0.11612 0.27159*** 0.27886 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.1957) (<.0001) (0.4205) (<.0001) (0.1625) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.01479* -0.00699 -0.0053 -0.00706 -0.01039 0.00512 
(p-value) (0.0939) (0.4002) (0.6158) (0.4793) (0.4952) (0.7396) 
Target Size  0.01439***  0.01337**  0.01145 
(p-value)  (0.0022)  (0.01)  (0.2014) 
Target Turnover  -0.00155*  -0.00231**  0.00371** 
(p-value)  (0.076)  (0.0236)  (0.04) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.01749  0.01201  0.04051* 
(p-value)  (0.2084)  (0.4731)  (0.0928) 
Target B/M  0.18848***  0.21886***  0.14706*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0013)* 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  0.14916***  0.2136***  -0.09045 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.1697) 
Relative Size  -0.55661***  -0.57994***  -0.4456*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0014) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02001  -0.01465  -0.04331 
(p-value)  (0.4875)  (0.718)  (0.2699) 
Horizontal  0.02098  0.02728*  0.00386 
(p-value)  (0.1261)  (0.0918)  (0.8827) 
Tender Offer  0.05374***  0.02173  0.07572*** 
(p-value)  (0.0078)  (0.6211)  (0.0003) 
Cash Bid  0.04728***     
(p-value)  (0.0011)     
Hostile  0.19958***  0.19142***  0.15027*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0035) 
Multiple Bidders  0.12095***  0.10466***  0.13929*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0006)  (0.0003) 
Rumor  -0.10973***  -0.09875***  -0.10233*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0018)  (0.0047) 
Complete  0.2091***  0.244***  0.08096** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0309) 
Adj-R2 0.0005 0.1446 -0.0003 0.145 -0.0005 0.1267 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-54   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Markup ‘[(Final Offer Price / P-1) - 1]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment 
Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target Markup [(Final Offer Price / P-1) - 1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to 
macro factors (BWN). The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference 
between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily 
returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker 
and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated 
a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 
2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers 
and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the 
deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is 
estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of 
the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and 
acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the 
medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock 
price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market 
cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the 
Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of 
Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share 
– all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days 
before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is 
listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer 
size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.31771*** 1.05472*** 0.29754*** 0.92155*** 0.35901*** 1.22294*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.01224 -0.01174 0.00034941 -0.00582 -0.03315* -0.03275 
(p-value) (0.215) (0.2734) (0.9762) (0.6279) (0.0679) (0.1606) 
Target Size  -0.01798*  -0.01233  -0.03382* 
(p-value)  (0.0989)  (0.3047)  (0.0839) 
Target Turnover  0.00103  0.00067251  0.00287* 
(p-value)  (0.2037)  (0.4495)  (0.0603) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.05667**  0.04171  0.0941 
(p-value)  (0.0292)  (0.1166)  (0.1002) 
Target B/M  0.07834***  0.09438***  0.06314 
(p-value)  (0.0024)  (0.0004)  (0.1581) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  -0.23709***  -0.2169***  -0.34425*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.45572***  -0.52117***  -0.25944 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.2417) 
Toehold Exist  -0.07562***  -0.05396*  -0.09145** 
(p-value)  (0.0016)  (0.0968)  (0.0141) 
Horizontal  -0.00846  -0.00062364  -0.03632 
(p-value)  (0.6625)  (0.9767)  (0.3767) 
Tender Offer  0.07313***  0.09724**  0.06523** 
(p-value)  (0.0021)  (0.0249)  (0.013) 
Cash Bid  -0.00914     
(p-value)  (0.5118)     
Hostile  0.11808***  0.09748*  0.12491** 
(p-value)  (0.0051)  (0.0616)  (0.0342) 
Multiple Bidders  0.04797  0.05018  0.03689 
(p-value)  (0.1567)  (0.289)  (0.3578) 
Rumor  -0.0648**  -0.04345  -0.08606*** 
(p-value)  (0.0267)  (0.3027)  (0.0006) 
Complete  -0.02846  -0.03662  -0.00163 
(p-value)  (0.3298)  (0.3372)  (0.9609) 
Adj-R2 0.0001 0.0568 -0.0004 0.0542 0.0013 0.0446 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-55   Cross-sectional Regression of Target CAR [-1,+1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to 
Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not 
orthogonalized to macro factors (BWN). The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated 
as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is 
estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for 
the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For 
every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available dur ing the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days 
before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 
till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid 
outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the 
first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal 
whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral 
Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. 
We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-
Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al 
(2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the 
logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in 
$Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is 
obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data 
we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether 
the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s 
announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal 
deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** 
indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.20675*** 0.72204*** 0.16812*** 0.67223*** 0.28759*** 0.83197*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.01506*** -0.00681 -0.00117 -0.00473 -0.02426** -0.01191 
(p-value) (0.0049) (0.1637) (0.8394) (0.3645) (0.0314) (0.3129) 
Target Size  0.0026  0.00366  -0.00455 
(p-value)  (0.3253)  (0.214)  (0.4205) 
Target Turnover  -0.00028546  -0.00066022  0.00223* 
(p-value)  (0.5308)  (0.1729)  (0.0829) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00876  0.00376  0.02354 
(p-value)  (0.2949)  (0.69)  (0.161) 
Target B/M  0.07701***  0.0877***  0.06352*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0096) 
CAR [-42,-2] Target  -0.17378***  -0.15093***  -0.25769*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.66702***  -0.71324***  -0.51903*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.04437***  -0.03469*  -0.05556** 
(p-value)  (0.0022)  (0.061)  (0.0281) 
Horizontal  0.0103  0.00896  0.00993 
(p-value)  (0.1984)  (0.2823)  (0.6216) 
Tender Offer  0.05728***  0.05516**  0.05817*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0101)  (<.0001) 
Cash Bid  0.05536***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.06031***  0.07177***  0.03142 
(p-value)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.2705) 
Multiple Bidders  0.00448  -0.00885  0.03005 
(p-value)  (0.7217)  (0.5415)  (0.2323) 
Rumor  -0.05933***  -0.03763**  -0.08764*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0212)  (<.0001) 
Complete  0.03484***  0.03596***  0.02909 
(p-value)  (0.0003)  (0.0007)  (0.1779) 
Adj-R2 0.0019 0.182 -0.0004 0.1333 0.0029 0.1293 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 





Table 4-56   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-
orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to macro factors 
(BWN). The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns 
spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and 
Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a 
sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 
days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers 
and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the 
deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is 
estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of 
the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and 
acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the 
medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock 
price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market 
cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the 
Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of 
Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share 
– all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days 
before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is 
listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer 
size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.23359*** 0.15107 0.18937*** 0.11612 0.32816*** 0.27886 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.1957) (<.0001) (0.4205) (<.0001) (0.1625) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.0048 -0.00699 -0.00057389 -0.00706 0.01993 0.00512 
(p-value) (0.6697) (0.4002) (0.9658) (0.4793) (0.3209) (0.7396) 
Target Size  0.01439***  0.01337**  0.01145 
(p-value)  (0.0022)  (0.01)  (0.2014) 
Target Turnover  -0.00155*  -0.00231**  0.00371** 
(p-value)  (0.076)  (0.0236)  (0.04) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.01749  0.01201  0.04051* 
(p-value)  (0.2084)  (0.4731)  (0.0928) 
Target B/M  0.18848***  0.21886***  0.14706*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0013) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  1.14916***  1.2136***  0.90955*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.55661***  -0.57994***  -0.4456*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0014) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02001  -0.01465  -0.04331 
(p-value)  (0.4875)  (0.718)  (0.2699) 
Horizontal  0.02098  0.02728*  0.00386 
(p-value)  (0.1261)  (0.0918)  (0.8827) 
Tender Offer  0.05374***  0.02173  0.07572*** 
(p-value)  (0.0078)  (0.6211)  (0.0003) 
Cash Bid  0.04728***     
(p-value)  (0.0011)     
Hostile  0.19958***  0.19142***  0.15027*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0035) 
Multiple Bidders  0.12095***  0.10466***  0.13929*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0006)  (0.0003) 
Rumor  -0.10973***  -0.09875***  -0.10233*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0018)  (0.0047) 
Complete  0.2091***  0.244***  0.08096** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0309) 
Adj-R2 -0.0002 0.4194 -0.0004 0.4447 0.0001 0.3309 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-57   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium ‘[(Final Offer Price / P-42) - 1]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium [(Final Offer Price / P-42) - 1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to 
macro factors (BWN). The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference 
between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily 
returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker 
and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated 
a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 
2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers 
and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the 
deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is 
estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of 
the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and 
acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the 
medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock 
price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market 
cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the 
Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of 
Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share 
– all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days 
before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is 
listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer 
size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.40557*** 1.29798*** 0.37858*** 1.15061*** 0.46224*** 1.45282*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BWN-Sentiment-Proxy -0.0082 -0.02065* 0.00040535 -0.01366 -0.01132 -0.05241* 
(p-value) (0.4901) (0.0773) (0.9766) (0.2938) (0.6193) (0.0516) 
Target Size  -0.02335**  -0.01643  -0.03946* 
(p-value)  (0.039)  (0.1563)  (0.0857) 
Target Turnover  0.00143  0.00107  0.00239 
(p-value)  (0.1691)  (0.3643)  (0.1199) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.0461  0.0292  0.08799 
(p-value)  (0.1154)  (0.3155)  (0.1843) 
Target B/M  0.03491  0.03792  0.03829 
(p-value)  (0.2015)  (0.1647)  (0.4513) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  0.88831***  0.86605***  0.90669*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.54979***  -0.67311***  -0.30593 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.2198) 
Toehold Exist  -0.11415***  -0.12168***  -0.08437** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0007)  (0.0282) 
Horizontal  -0.01953  -0.01638  -0.03623 
(p-value)  (0.3484)  (0.4662)  (0.4402) 
Tender Offer  0.06221**  0.07184  0.06023** 
(p-value)  (0.0154)  (0.1002)  (0.0411) 
Cash Bid  -0.01413     
(p-value)  (0.3298)     
Hostile  0.09446**  0.07538  0.09921** 
(p-value)  (0.0171)  (0.1644)  (0.0469) 
Multiple Bidders  0.06705*  0.07258  0.03466 
(p-value)  (0.0695)  (0.1649)  (0.4194) 
Rumor  -0.04335  -0.00585  -0.10403*** 
(p-value)  (0.1731)  (0.8979)  (0.0003) 
Complete  0.00145  -0.00572  0.02605 
(p-value)  (0.9569)  (0.8688)  (0.4484) 
Adj-R2 -0.0002 0.188 -0.0004 0.1969 -0.0007 0.151 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 







Table 4-58   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Target Runup (CAR [-42,-2] ) and Runup Multiplied 
by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) Quartiles – Testing Markup Pricing 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Target Runup ‘CAR[-42, -2]’ and the Runup multiplied by the sentiment quartile 
dummies.  The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns 
spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and 
Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a 
sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup per iod. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 
days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers 
and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the 
deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is 
estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid 
contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 
Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of 
the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and 
acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the 
medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock 
price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market 
cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the 
Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of 
Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share 
– all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days 
before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is 
listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer 
size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.17394*** 0.14079 0.13518*** 0.11593 0.27103*** 0.26327 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.2233) (<.0001) (0.421) (<.0001) (0.1785) 
Target CAR [-42,-2] 1.35882*** 1.25917*** 1.53888*** 1.38847*** 1.02605*** 0.9772*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Q2 x Target CAR [-42,-2] -0.16651 -0.11782 -0.16023 -0.08311 -0.2118 -0.19208 
(p-value) (0.4197) (0.5177) (0.5796) (0.7314) (0.3581) (0.3457) 
Q3 x Target CAR [-42,-2] -0.18871 -0.18361 -0.35587 -0.31458 0.0152 -0.02041 
(p-value) (0.3545) (0.312) (0.2124) (0.1895) (0.9475) (0.9211) 
Q3 x Target CAR [-42,-2] -0.07377 -0.06633 -0.18878 -0.14768 -0.00514 0.02474 
(p-value) (0.717) (0.7152) (0.5105) (0.5408) (0.9806) (0.8931) 
Target Size  0.01473***  0.0139***  0.01133 
(p-value)  (0.0015)  (0.0071)  (0.1995) 
Target Turnover  -0.0015*  -0.0023**  0.00378** 
(p-value)  (0.0889)  (0.0245)  (0.0388) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.01683  0.01078  0.03857 
(p-value)  (0.228)  (0.5215)  (0.1064) 
Target B/M  0.18798***  0.21901***  0.14531*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0012) 
Relative Size  -0.55271***  -0.58167***  -0.43073*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.002) 
Toehold Exist  -0.01986  -0.01198  -0.04563 
(p-value)  (0.495)  (0.7703)  (0.2403) 
Horizontal  0.02126  0.02745*  0.00269 
(p-value)  (0.121)  (0.0869)  (0.9187) 
Tender Offer  0.05475***  0.02509  0.076*** 
(p-value)  (0.0049)  (0.5438)  (0.0003) 
Cash Bid  0.04821***     
(p-value)  (0.0007)     
Hostile  0.19892***  0.19032***  0.15114*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0033) 
Multiple Bidders  0.12143***  0.1049***  0.13864*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Rumor  -0.11107***  -0.10304***  -0.10102*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0011)  (0.0059) 
Complete  0.20996***  0.24316***  0.08209** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.029) 
Adj-R2 0.3333 0.4198 0.374 0.4469 0.2344 0.3319 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-59   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium (Final Offer Price / P-42 - 1) on Target Runup (P-2 / P-42 - 1] ) and Runup 
Multiplied by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index non-orthogonalized to Macro Factors (BWN) Quartiles – Testing Markup 
Pricing 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium (Final Offer Price / P-42 - 1) on Target Runup (P-2 / P-42 - 1] ) and the Runup multiplied by the 
sentiment quartile dummies.  The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the 
difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated 
using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. 
The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is not orthogonalized to Macro variables (BWN) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we 
estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the 
announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till 
October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. 
We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. 
The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer 
within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is 
less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the 
beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that 
both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-
Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by 
dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 
days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the 
firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the 
ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the 
approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of 
preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval 
spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following 
dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor 
or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX 
whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of 
Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.32354*** 1.06824*** 0.30465*** 0.90868*** 0.37102*** 1.23693*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Runup 1.04943*** 1.00402*** 0.88057*** 0.84847*** 1.19841*** 1.13944*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Q2 x Target Runup 0.07639 0.10842 0.35542* 0.38274* -0.28634 -0.26766 
(p-value) (0.6251) (0.4801) (0.0678) (0.0529) (0.2438) (0.224) 
Q3 x Target Runup -0.06588 -0.04872 0.11929 0.11489 -0.30456 -0.32055 
(p-value) (0.6692) (0.7448) (0.5308) (0.5475) (0.2284) (0.2135) 
Q3 x Target Runup -0.02051 -0.01686 0.16829 0.15983 -0.23695 -0.23119 
(p-value) (0.894) (0.9114) (0.3771) (0.422) (0.3369) (0.3167) 
Target Size  -0.01951*  -0.0124  -0.03616 
(p-value)  (0.0739)  (0.2678)  (0.1014) 
Target Turnover  0.00117  0.00078984  0.00307** 
(p-value)  (0.1659)  (0.3957)  (0.0401) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.05594*  0.0404  0.09272 
(p-value)  (0.051)  (0.1572)  (0.1514) 
Target B/M  0.07296***  0.10162***  0.04608 
(p-value)  (0.0052)  (<.0001)  (0.3251) 
Relative Size  -0.45338***  -0.55511***  -0.2099 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.4082) 
Toehold Exist  -0.08477***  -0.07376**  -0.09433** 
(p-value)  (0.0002)  (0.0148)  (0.0218) 
Horizontal  -0.00713  -0.00071633  -0.03154 
(p-value)  (0.7264)  (0.9737)  (0.4956) 
Tender Offer  0.07229***  0.08057*  0.0667** 
(p-value)  (0.0046)  (0.0599)  (0.0178) 
Cash Bid  -0.0089     
(p-value)  (0.5181)     
Hostile  0.10345***  0.08977*  0.11003** 
(p-value)  (0.0062)  (0.081)  (0.0249) 
Multiple Bidders  0.06007*  0.06414  0.03307 
(p-value)  (0.0931)  (0.2096)  (0.4304) 
Rumor  -0.06682**  -0.04277  -0.1045*** 
(p-value)  (0.0321)  (0.3399)  (0.0003) 
Complete  -0.01268  -0.02076  0.01322 
(p-value)  (0.6272)  (0.5342)  (0.7112) 
Adj-R2 0.1986 0.2394 0.2213 0.2675 0.1502 0.1663 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 







4.9 Appendix B 
 
Figure 4-11   Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) for our sample period 
Panel A shows the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) brought from professor Wurgler Website for our sample period. Panel B reports the sentiment quartiles that are associated with 
our sample. For every deal, we estimate a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 
42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. We check where this sentiment measures ranks relative to the BWN values and associate it with a sentiment quartile. 
The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. 
Panel A: The Sentiment Index Spanning our Sample 
 










































Figure 4-12   Target CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Target firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 10 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index that is 
associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from Wurgler Website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 
1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This 
latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) sentiment index level. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We also required that the deal process a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid outliers. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a 
multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also require that both target and acquirer firms are 
public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as 
reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with a deal value greater than $10 Million and target share price 
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Figure 4-13   Target CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Target firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 126 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) that is 
associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from Professor Wurgler Website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: 
November 1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup 
period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) sentiment index level. Mergers and Acquisitions 
deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We also required that the deal process a 
reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid outliers. We removed any offer that is not the first 
offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also require that both target and acquirer 
firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of 
exchange as reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with a deal value greater than $10 Million and 
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Figure 4-14   Bidder CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Bidder firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 10 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) that is 
associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from Wurgler Website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 
1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This 
latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) sentiment index level. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We also required that the deal process a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avo id outliers. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a 
multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also require that both target and acquirer firms are 
public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as 
reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with a deal value greater than $10 Million and target share price 
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Figure 4-15   Bidder CAR as we progress in time through the runup period till after the announcement 
The below figure show the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the Bidder firms as we progress in time 42 days before the deal announcement till 126 days after the deal 
announcement. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter was estimated using daily date spanning 
253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. Once the CAR is estimated for 
every firm in our sample for a particular day, an equal weighted average is calculated. The CAR estimation period starts from day -42 (42 trading days before the announcement day). The 
process is repeated progressively as we advance in time. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) that is 
associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from Wurgler Website. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 
1981 till October 2015. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This 
latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. Q1 (Q4) is the quartile with lowest (highest) sentiment index level. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We also required that the deal process a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted as per their offer price in order to avoid outliers. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a 
multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also require that both target and acquirer firms are 
public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample in All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as 
reported by SDC. Similar approach is followed to estimate both target and bidder CAR. We limited our sample to those deal with a deal value greater than $10 Million and target share price 
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Table 4-60   Descriptive Statistics - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) – ALL 
The below table shows a general descriptive statistics of our data as well as the main variables used in our tests. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the 
Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is 
obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement 
day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
(BW) associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment 
index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per 
the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom 
deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days 
before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 
6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. 
We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we 
termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into 
All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and 
markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final 
Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] 
respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares 
outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s 
equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we 
created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the 
deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are 
obtained from CRSP. 
 All Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Target Size 19.4415 19.6222 19.7225 19.3610 19.1533 
Target Turnover 6.5291 7.4219 6.8001 6.5429 5.6809 
Target B/M 0.5794 0.6268 0.5665 0.5538 0.5872 
Acquirer Size 21.4060 21.6241 21.5591 21.3532 21.1797 
Acquirer Turnover 6.9172 7.1609 7.0331 6.5318 7.0617 
Acquirer B/M 0.5067 0.5481 0.4805 0.4945 0.5163 
      
Acquirer CAR [-42,-2] -0.0012 -0.0082 0.0093 -0.0037 -0.0034 
Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] -0.0140 -0.0102 -0.0095 -0.0166 -0.0179 
Acquirer CAR [+2,+126] -0.0844 -0.0593 -0.0901 -0.1073 -0.0713 
      
Target CAR [-42,-2] 0.0474 0.0379 0.0474 0.0441 0.0570 
Target CAR [-1,+1] 0.2023 0.2221 0.2138 0.1889 0.1930 
Target CAR [+2,+126] -0.0175 -0.0399 -0.0004 -0.0271 -0.0080 
Target CAR [-1,+126] – Target Markup – CAR-based 0.1848 0.1823 0.2134 0.1618 0.1850 
Target CAR [-42,+126] – Target Premium – CAR-based 0.2322 0.2202 0.2608 0.2059 0.2421 
      
Target Runup [ (P-2/P-42) - 1] 0.0763 0.0827 0.0708 0.0691 0.0848 
Target Markup [ (Final Offer Price/P-2) - 1] 0.3141 0.3569 0.3206 0.2959 0.2993 
Premium [ (Final Offer Price/P-42) - 1] 0.4031 0.4554 0.4048 0.3718 0.4006 
      
Target Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.3565 0.3735 0.3909 0.3453 0.3262 
Acquirer Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.6507 0.6250 0.6317 0.6639 0.6709 
      
Toehold Exists 0.0413 0.0298 0.0400 0.0460 0.0451 
Horizontal Deal 0.2318 0.2649 0.2462 0.2053 0.2253 
Tender Offer 0.1579 0.1994 0.1393 0.1372 0.1694 
Cash Only Deal 0.3007 0.3452 0.3207 0.2983 0.2556 
Hostile Deal 0.0348 0.0298 0.0292 0.0424 0.0353 
First Bid in a Multibid Contest 0.0904 0.0685 0.0702 0.1123 0.0999 
Rumored Deal 0.0448 0.0610 0.0745 0.0295 0.0235 
Complete Deal 0.8618 0.8378 0.8790 0.8738 0.8492 
      
BW 0.3764 -0.3295 0.0449 0.4109 1.1051 
      






Table 4-61   Descriptive Statistics - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) – Non-Cash-Only 
The below table shows a general descriptive statistics of our data as well as the main variables used in our tests for the Non-Cash-Only (Stock and Mixed Deal) sample. The Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock 
and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment 
quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment 
measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the 
announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisit ions deals 
are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer 
price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price 
divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if 
bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 
is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the 
deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return 
data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock 
price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we 
estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days 
before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance 
sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the 
runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder 
attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% 
ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the 
deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. 
 All Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Target Size 19.5059 19.7543 19.7892 19.3911 19.2425 
Target Turnover 6.4603 7.4695 6.7828 6.2694 5.8005 
Target B/M 0.5849 0.6393 0.5854 0.5498 0.5882 
Acquirer Size 21.2293 21.3425 21.4012 21.1418 21.1093 
Acquirer Turnover 7.1493 7.2593 7.0893 6.6702 7.6155 
Acquirer B/M 0.4821 0.5599 0.4738 0.4476 0.4785 
      
Acquirer CAR [-42,-2] -0.0017 -0.0073 0.0127 -0.0031 -0.0090 
Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] -0.0236 -0.0203 -0.0202 -0.0253 -0.0267 
Acquirer CAR [+2,+126] -0.1074 -0.0801 -0.1058 -0.1367 -0.0950 
      
Target CAR [-42,-2] 0.0408 0.0346 0.0407 0.0435 0.0416 
Target CAR [-1,+1] 0.1677 0.1737 0.1771 0.1553 0.1689 
Target CAR [+2,+126] -0.0193 -0.0374 -0.0024 -0.0301 -0.0120 
Target CAR [-1,+126] – Target Markup – CAR-based 0.1484 0.1364 0.1747 0.1252 0.1569 
Target CAR [-42,+126] – Target Premium – CAR-based 0.1892 0.1709 0.2154 0.1687 0.1985 
      
Target Runup [ (P-2/P-42) - 1] 0.0700 0.0752 0.0635 0.0700 0.0726 
Target Markup [ (Final Offer Price/P-2) - 1] 0.2977 0.3182 0.3094 0.2817 0.2920 
Premium [ (Final Offer Price/P-42) - 1] 0.3787 0.4062 0.3859 0.3589 0.3768 
      
Target Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.3701 0.3955 0.4229 0.3504 0.3316 
Acquirer Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.6229 0.5795 0.6184 0.6312 0.6434 
      
Toehold Exists 0.0343 0.0341 0.0382 0.0381 0.0276 
Horizontal Deal 0.2493 0.3023 0.2671 0.2218 0.2316 
Tender Offer 0.0459 0.0591 0.0413 0.0381 0.0500 
Cash Only Deal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hostile Deal 0.0247 0.0159 0.0191 0.0354 0.0237 
First Bid in a Multibid Contest 0.0853 0.0614 0.0684 0.1089 0.0895 
Rumored Deal 0.0440 0.0682 0.0700 0.0328 0.0197 
Complete Deal 0.8584 0.8318 0.8808 0.8688 0.8447 
      
BW 0.4054 -0.3260 0.0450 0.4161 1.1165 
      






Table 4-62   Descriptive Statistics - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) –  Cash-Only 
The below table shows a general descriptive statistics of our data as well as the main variables used in our tests for the Cash-Only sample. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is 
estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The 
expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before 
the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and 
Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the 
weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile 
cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. 
We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered 
out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock 
price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value 
is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnormal Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever 
is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided 
our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price 
based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement 
date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and 
[-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of 
shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the 
firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we 
created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the 
deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are 
obtained from CRSP. 
 All Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Target Size 19.2917 19.3716 19.5812 19.2899 18.8935 
Target Turnover 6.6891 7.3318 6.8367 7.1862 5.3326 
Target B/M 0.5667 0.6032 0.5266 0.5631 0.5843 
Acquirer Size 21.8169 22.1582 21.8935 21.8505 21.3847 
Acquirer Turnover 6.3776 6.9742 6.9141 6.2065 5.4492 
Acquirer B/M 0.5641 0.5259 0.4947 0.6046 0.6265 
      
Acquirer CAR [-42,-2] 0.0000 -0.0099 0.0021 -0.0051 0.0128 
Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 0.0083 0.0087 0.0133 0.0041 0.0076 
Acquirer CAR [+2,+126] -0.0309 -0.0198 -0.0569 -0.0382 -0.0022 
      
Target CAR [-42,-2] 0.0627 0.0442 0.0615 0.0455 0.1019 
Target CAR [-1,+1] 0.2827 0.3139 0.2916 0.2678 0.2633 
Target CAR [+2,+126] -0.0132 -0.0446 0.0040 -0.0200 0.0036 
Target CAR [-1,+126] – Target Markup – CAR-based 0.2695 0.2693 0.2956 0.2478 0.2669 
Target CAR [-42,+126] – Target Premium – CAR-based 0.3322 0.3135 0.3570 0.2933 0.3688 
      
Target Runup [ (P-2/P-42) - 1] 0.0909 0.0970 0.0862 0.0670 0.1203 
Target Markup [ (Final Offer Price/P-2) - 1] 0.3523 0.4301 0.3443 0.3292 0.3209 
Premium [ (Final Offer Price/P-42) - 1] 0.4600 0.5488 0.4448 0.4022 0.4699 
      
Target Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.3250 0.3319 0.3232 0.3333 0.3103 
Acquirer Listed on NYSE/AMEX 0.7154 0.7112 0.6599 0.7407 0.7510 
      
Toehold Exists 0.0575 0.0216 0.0438 0.0648 0.0958 
Horizontal Deal 0.1912 0.1940 0.2020 0.1667 0.2069 
Tender Offer 0.4183 0.4655 0.3468 0.3704 0.5172 
Cash Only Deal 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Hostile Deal 0.0584 0.0560 0.0505 0.0586 0.0690 
First Bid in a Multibid Contest 0.1023 0.0819 0.0741 0.1204 0.1303 
Rumored Deal 0.0467 0.0474 0.0842 0.0216 0.0345 
Complete Deal 0.8698 0.8491 0.8754 0.8858 0.8621 
      
BW 0.3090 -0.3360 0.0446 0.3986 1.0720 
      





Table 4-63   Bidder Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) during the Announcement Period - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment 
Index (BW) 
The below table shows the Bidder CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1, +1] sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as 
sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected 
return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the 
announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler 
Sentiment Index associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average 
sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are 
estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited 
our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top 
and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated 
by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought 
from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) 
– we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample 
into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup 
and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the 
Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] 
respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares 
outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s 
equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we 
created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the 
deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are 
obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. 
The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
-1.02%*** -0.95%*** -1.66%*** -1.79%*** 0.77%* 
(-3.23) (-3.68) (-7.53) (-7.39) (1.94) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
-2.03%*** -2.02%*** -2.53%*** -2.67%*** 0.64% 
(-5.38) (-6.5) (-8.96) (-9.05) (1.33) 
Cash-Only Deals 
0.87% 1.33%*** 0.41% 0.76%** 0.12% 





Table 4-64   Target Bargaining Power – by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table presents the deal estimated bargaining power over the different sentiment quartiles. Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the 
difference of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar 
CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  
The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). 
This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a 
proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal. BW levels are 
brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s 
runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the 
period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest 
and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer 
premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any 
offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out 
any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative 
Abnormal Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-
Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or 
Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al 
(2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock 
price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of 
the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the 
ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the 
approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of 
preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 
166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed 
on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Firms’ SIC codes 
are obtained from CRSP. 
Panel A: Target Bargaining Power is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-1,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
4.51%*** 4.36%*** 4.12%*** 4.53%*** -0.03% 
(14.82) (17.1) (19.24) (19.6) (-0.07) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
5.18%*** 5.05%*** 4.57%*** 4.81%*** 0.37% 
(15.13) (16.78) (17.58) (18.65) (0.87) 
Cash-Only Deals 
3.23%*** 2.89%*** 3.06%*** 3.74%*** -0.51% 
(5.5) (6.23) (8.28) (7.43) (-0.66) 
Panel B: Target Bargaining Power is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-42,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
5.77%*** 4.44%*** 5.17%*** 5.69%*** 0.08% 
(11.37) (9.25) (11.89) (12.07) (0.11) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
6.21%*** 4.62%*** 5.53%*** 6.21%*** 0.00% 
(10.47) (7.97) (10.43) (11.97) (0) 
Cash-Only Deals 
4.94%*** 4.03%*** 4.32%*** 4.19%*** 0.75% 
(5.23) (4.74) (5.73) (3.97) (0.52) 
Panel C: Target Bargaining Power is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-42,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
8.51%*** 9.71%*** 11.55%*** 9.33%*** -0.81% 
(8.09) (10.51) (13.46) (9.79) (-0.56) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
9.95%*** 10.99%*** 13.86%*** 10.46%*** -0.51% 
(7.21) (9.13) (12.79) (9.42) (-0.28) 
Cash-Only Deals 
5.80%*** 7.00%*** 6.13%*** 6.03%*** -0.23% 






Table 4-65   Synergy – by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table presents the deal estimated synergy over the different sentiment quartile. Synergy is estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns 
(AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return 
of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days 
before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four 
sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a 
sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days 
before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and 
Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a 
reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the 
final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a 
multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target 
stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnormal Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms 
with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. 
Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by 
the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and 
markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is 
obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 
42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the 
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the 
runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder 
attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% 
ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the 
deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile 
with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Synergy is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-1,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
2.42%*** 2.72%*** 1.70%*** 1.75%*** 0.68% 
(7.48) (9.66) (7.61) (6.79) (1.64) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
1.50%*** 1.56%*** 0.82%*** 0.72%** 0.77% 
(4.02) (4.52) (3.02) (2.52) (1.64) 
Cash-Only Deals 
4.18%*** 5.19%*** 3.75%*** 4.73%*** -0.55% 
(6.94) (11.34) (10.45) (9.08) (-0.69) 
Panel B: Synergy is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-42,+1] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
1.67%*** 3.98%*** 1.40%*** 1.68%*** -0.01% 
(2.86) (6.84) (2.85) (2.93) (-0.02) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
0.84% 2.80%*** 0.42% -0.20% 1.04% 
(1.15) (3.89) (0.68) (-0.3) (1) 
Cash-Only Deals 
3.24%*** 6.47%*** 3.70%*** 7.16%*** -3.93%*** 
(3.4) (6.7) (4.77) (6.94) (-2.78) 
Panel C: Synergy is estimated as the sum of Target and Acquirer CAR over [-42,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
-2.54%** -1.80% -6.03%*** -2.84%** 0.30% 
(-2.04) (-1.47) (-5.79) (-2.47) (0.17) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
-4.86%*** -4.43%*** -9.41%*** -5.87%*** 1.00% 
(-2.86) (-2.75) (-6.97) (-4.19) (0.45) 
Cash-Only Deals 
1.87% 3.78%** 1.91% 5.96%*** -4.10%* 





Table 4-66   Target Runup - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the Target Runup sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the 
specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model 
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted 
index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index associated with the deal. 
BW levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available 
during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index 
spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of 
Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted 
by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. 
We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We 
also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target 
Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-
Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed 
or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton 
et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the 
logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). 
B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following 
the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of 
preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 
166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the follow ing dummy variables: 
complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed 
on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 
represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Runup is estimated as the CAR of the target firm over [-42,-2] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
3.79%*** 4.74%*** 4.41%*** 5.70%*** -1.91%* 
(5.33) (7.07) (7.65) (8.41) (-1.88) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
3.46%*** 4.07%*** 4.35%*** 4.16%*** -0.70% 
(4.01) (5.06) (5.98) (5.23) (-0.57) 
Cash-Only Deals 
4.42%*** 6.15%*** 4.55%*** 10.19%*** -5.77%*** 
(3.52) (5.1) (5.04) (8.12) (-3.24) 
Panel B: Priced Based Runup - Runup is estimated as [ (P-2 / P-42) – 1] 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
8.27%*** 7.08%*** 6.91%*** 8.48%*** -0.21% 
(11.33) (10.53) (10.57) (12.6) (-0.2) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
7.52%*** 6.35%*** 7.00%*** 7.26%*** 0.26% 
(8.78) (7.96) (8.3) (9.35) (0.22) 
Cash-Only Deals 
9.70%*** 8.62%*** 6.70%*** 12.03%*** -2.33% 







Table 4-67   Bidder Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) during the Runup Period - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the Bidder CAR estimated over the runup period sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the 
Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is 
obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement 
day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
(BW) associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment 
index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per 
the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom 
deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days 
before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 
6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. 
We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we 
termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into 
All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and 
markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final 
Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] 
respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares 
outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s 
equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we 
created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the 
deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are 
obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. 
The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
-0.82% 0.93%* -0.37% -0.35% -0.48% 
(-1.52) (1.87) (-0.83) (-0.64) (-0.6) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
-0.73% 1.27%** -0.31% -0.90% 0.17% 
(-1.03) (1.99) (-0.55) (-1.4) (0.17) 
Cash-Only Deals 
-0.99% 0.21% -0.51% 1.28% -2.27%* 





Table 4-68   Target Markup - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the Target Markup sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the 
specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model 
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted 
index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index associated with the deal. 
BW levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available 
during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index 
spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of 
Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted 
by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. 
We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We 
also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target 
Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-
Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed 
or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton 
et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the 
logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). 
B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following 
the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of 
preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 
166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed 
on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 
represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Markup is estimated as the CAR of the target firm over [-1,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
18.23%*** 21.34%*** 16.18%*** 18.50%*** -0.28% 
(12.82) (18.48) (15.17) (17.39) (-0.16) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
13.64%*** 17.47%*** 12.52%*** 15.69%*** -2.06% 
(8.09) (12.52) (9.59) (12.38) (-0.98) 
Cash-Only Deals 
26.93%*** 29.56%*** 24.78%*** 26.69%*** 0.24% 
(10.75) (14.95) (14.25) (14.55) (0.08) 
Panel B: Priced Based Markup - Target Markup is estimated as [ (Final Offer Price / P-2) – 1] 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
35.69%*** 32.06%*** 29.59%*** 29.93%*** 5.75%** 
(13.23) (22.3) (34.14) (35.92) (2.38) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
31.82%*** 30.94%*** 28.17%*** 29.20%*** 2.63% 
(10.24) (15.77) (25.97) (29.85) (0.98) 
Cash-Only Deals 
43.01%*** 34.43%*** 32.92%*** 32.09%*** 10.93%** 







Table 4-69   Target Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) during the Announcement Period - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment 
Index (BW) 
The below table shows the Target CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1, +1] sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as 
sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected 
return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the 
announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler 
Sentiment Index associated with the deal. BW levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average 
sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are 
estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited 
our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top 
and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated 
by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought 
from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) 
– we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample 
into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup 
and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the 
Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] 
respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares 
outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s 
equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we 
created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the 
deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are 
obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. 
The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
22.21%*** 21.38%*** 18.89%*** 19.30%*** 2.91%*** 
(25.44) (29.63) (30.79) (31.07) (2.79) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
17.37%*** 17.71%*** 15.53%*** 16.89%*** 0.48% 
(20.95) (23.11) (22.99) (24.84) (0.44) 
Cash-Only Deals 
31.39%*** 29.16%*** 26.78%*** 26.33%*** 5.07%** 





Table 4-70   Premium - by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the Premium sorted across the four sentiment quartiles. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the 
specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model 
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted 
index was used as a proxy for the market. The deals within our sample are classified into four sentiment quartile based on the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index associated with the deal. 
BW levels are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available 
during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index 
spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of 
Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted 
by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. 
We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We 
also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target 
Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-
Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed 
or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton 
et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the 
logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). 
B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following 
the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of 
preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 
166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: 
complete – whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – 
whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed 
on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 
represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Premium is estimated as the CAR of the target firm over [-42,+126] period 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
22.02%*** 26.08%*** 20.59%*** 24.21%*** -2.19% 
(13.03) (18.76) (16.44) (17.69) (-1.01) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
17.09%*** 21.54%*** 16.87%*** 19.85%*** -2.76% 
(8.21) (12.43) (10.8) (12.13) (-1.03) 
Cash-Only Deals 
31.35%*** 35.70%*** 29.33%*** 36.88%*** -5.52% 
(11.2) (16.17) (15.07) (16.3) (-1.55) 
Panel B: Priced Based Premium - Target Markup is estimated as [ (Final Offer Price / P-42) – 1] 
All Deals 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 – Q4 
45.54%*** 40.48%*** 37.18%*** 40.06%*** 5.49%* 
(15.64) (25.25) (34.15) (35.96) (2.01) 
Non-Cash-Only Deals (Mixed and Stock-Only Deals) 
40.62%*** 38.59%*** 35.89%*** 37.68%*** 2.94% 
(12.93) (17.84) (25.43) (29.21) (1) 
Cash-Only Deals 
54.88%*** 44.48%*** 40.22%*** 46.99%*** 7.89% 









Table 4-71   Logistic Model Estimation of the Probability that the deal will be a cash-only offer versus a deal being a non-cash-
only offer 
The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment 
measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the 
announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: 
November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority 
Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ 
percentile when sorted by per their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 
42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on 
the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target 
stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by 
SDC. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the 
number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the 
announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders 
equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target 
(Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement 
to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete 
– whether the the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or 
not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and 
NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal 
deal. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Q1 – Q4 represents the mean difference between the quintile with lowest index level (Q1) and the quintile with 
highest index level (Q4). t-stat are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 1 2 3 
Constant -0.7476*** 4.3349*** 5.6552*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.2713*** -0.3726*** -0.3602*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Size  -0.00461 -0.00512 
(p-value)  (0.8936) (0.8918) 
Target Turnover  -0.00109 -0.0161** 
(p-value)  (0.8517) (0.0235) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.0556 -0.0627 
(p-value)  (0.5934) (0.584) 
Target B/M  -0.0981 0.1565 
(p-value)  (0.3504) (0.2045) 
Bidder Turnover  0.000033 -0.0133* 
(p-value)  (0.995) (0.0765) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.2118** 0.1497 
(p-value)  (0.036) (0.1794) 
Bidder B/M  0.1229*** 0.1461** 
(p-value)  (0.0081) (0.0131) 
Relative Size  -6.1343*** -6.5451*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  0.5124** 0.3708* 
(p-value)  (0.0113) (0.0846) 
Horizontal  -0.2588** -0.2284** 
(p-value)  (0.0167) (0.0483) 
Tender Offer  2.7125*** 2.4441*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Hostile  0.1089 0.2156 
(p-value)  (0.6563) (0.3873) 
Multiple Bidders  0.0334 -0.093 
(p-value)  (0.8267) (0.5595) 
Rumor  0.1815 0.2041 
(p-value)  (0.3917) (0.3598) 
Pseudo-R2 0.0054 0.2221 0.2758 
Industry Dummies No No Yes 





Table 4-72   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder CAR [-1,+1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Bidder CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of 
the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading 
days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
(BW) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index 
levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per 
the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample 
to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.01203*** 0.10883*** -0.02177*** 0.17289*** 0.0086*** 0.07923 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0075) (<.0001) (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.2096) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.00528** -0.00468** -0.00458 -0.00622** -0.0008616 0.00056592 
(p-value) (0.0212) (0.0372) (0.1077) (0.0302) (0.786) (0.8515) 
Bidder Size  -0.00347***  -0.00444***  -0.00344** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0152) 
Bidder Turnover  0.00001206  0.00003441  0.00013288 
(p-value)  (0.8528)  (0.6043)  (0.7425) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.0075**  0.01023***  0.00215 
(p-value)  (0.0168)  (0.0074)  (0.6867) 
Bidder B/M  0.00013845  0.00437**  -0.00046828 
(p-value)  (0.8805)  (0.0481)  (0.6372) 
Target Turnover  -0.00053718***  -0.00064909***  0.0001855 
(p-value)  (0.0071)  (0.005)  (0.6089) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.00019017  0.00256  -0.00284 
(p-value)  (0.9515)  (0.5074)  (0.5907) 
Target B/M  0.00272  -0.00615  0.01173** 
(p-value)  (0.4239)  (0.1889)  (0.04) 
CAR [-42,-2] Target  0.01124  0.0149  -0.0058 
(p-value)  (0.1573)  (0.1272)  (0.5662) 
CAR [-1,+1] Target  0.02377***  0.04606***  -0.01728** 
(p-value)  (0.0004)  (<.0001)  (0.0201) 
Relative Size  -0.06379**  -0.13393***  0.01917 
(p-value)  (0.02)  (<.0001)  (0.6851) 
Toehold Exist  0.0029  0.00482  0.00068608 
(p-value)  (0.6832)  (0.6311)  (0.9427) 
Horizontal  0.00099211  0.00077705  0.00161 
(p-value)  (0.7647)  (0.8472)  (0.7702) 
Tender Offer  0.0062  0.01297*  0.00333 
(p-value)  (0.1444)  (0.0976)  (0.5508) 
Cash Bid  0.02409***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  -0.00361  0.00881  -0.01682 
(p-value)  (0.6008)  (0.3051)  (0.1425) 
Multiple Bidders  0.00513  0.00756  -0.00137 
(p-value)  (0.3122)  (0.2567)  (0.8442) 
Rumor  0.018***  0.02527***  0.00209 
(p-value)  (0.0047)  (0.0035)  (0.8018) 
Complete  0.00773  0.00592  0.00994 
(p-value)  (0.13)  (0.3016)  (0.3258) 
Adj-R2 0.0015 0.0819 0.0009 0.0747 -0.0008 0.1065 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 




Table 4-73   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Bargaining Power estimated over [-1, +1] interval on Baker and Wurgler 
Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of target bargaining power estimated over the interval [-1, +1] Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The 
Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of 
Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are 
estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock 
and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the 
sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.04379*** -0.27723*** 0.04932*** -0.2373*** 0.03208*** -0.36084*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.00043431 0.00114 -0.00183 0.0005373 -1.8072E-07 -0.00024157 
(p-value) (0.8311) (0.5541) (0.4343) (0.8091) (1) (0.9499) 
Target Size  0.0013  0.0042***  -0.00318 
(p-value)  (0.22)  (0.0006)  (0.1248) 
Target Turnover  0.00053195***  0.00049823***  0.00057562 
(p-value)  (0.0022)  (0.0048)  (0.2606) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00132  -0.00337  0.00888* 
(p-value)  (0.6379)  (0.3158)  (0.079) 
Target B/M  0.00867**  0.01736***  0.00082916 
(p-value)  (0.0224)  (<.0001)  (0.8626) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00006423  -0.00004463  -0.00006043 
(p-value)  (0.4)  (0.4859)  (0.8789) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  -0.00589*  -0.00927**  0.00426 
(p-value)  (0.0645)  (0.0119)  (0.4721) 
Bidder B/M  0.00015341  -0.00141  0.00114 
(p-value)  (0.8493)  (0.5044)  (0.3268) 
Relative Size  0.30109***  0.2105***  0.47054*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.01387**  -0.01202  -0.02107** 
(p-value)  (0.0224)  (0.1495)  (0.0192) 
Horizontal  0.00458  0.00697**  0.00023812 
(p-value)  (0.1517)  (0.0483)  (0.9742) 
Tender Offer  0.00387  0.00103  0.00651 
(p-value)  (0.3202)  (0.8945)  (0.1685) 
Cash Bid  -0.00989***     
(p-value)  (0.0017)     
Hostile  0.02848***  0.02575***  0.02062** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0048)  (0.0205) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.0046  -0.00608  0.00314 
(p-value)  (0.3075)  (0.2987)  (0.6252) 
Rumor  -0.02389***  -0.02714***  -0.01692** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0419) 
Complete  0.00445  0.00474  0.00244 
(p-value)  (0.2712)  (0.3176)  (0.7488) 
Adj-R2 -0.0003 0.1348 -0.0001 0.1042 -0.0009 0.2182 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-74   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Bargaining Power estimated over [-42, +1] interval on Baker and Wurgler 
Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of target bargaining power estimated over the interval [-42, +1] Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The 
Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of 
Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are 
estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock 
and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the 
sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.05181*** -0.26701*** 0.05522*** -0.09018 0.04456*** -0.56381*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1562) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy 0.00158 0.00335 0.00257 0.00445 -0.00363 -0.00626 
(p-value) (0.6751) (0.3723) (0.5528) (0.3) (0.6347) (0.4121) 
Target Size  0.0018  0.00531**  -0.00438 
(p-value)  (0.3818)  (0.0278)  (0.2504) 
Target Turnover  0.00033259  0.00024022  0.00132 
(p-value)  (0.5134)  (0.6797)  (0.1117) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.00048825  0.00223  -0.00801 
(p-value)  (0.9345)  (0.7544)  (0.4406) 
Target B/M  0.00998  0.02374**  0.00038825 
(p-value)  (0.1455)  (0.0144)  (0.966) 
Bidder Turnover  0.00025307  0.0003186  -0.0002765 
(p-value)  (0.4323)  (0.3095)  (0.7651) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  -0.01851***  -0.02406***  -0.00156 
(p-value)  (0.0017)  (0.0004)  (0.8923) 
Bidder B/M  -0.0034**  -0.00893  0.00020323 
(p-value)  (0.042)  (0.1244)  (0.9384) 
Relative Size  0.27987***  0.05364  0.70352*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.2694)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02957**  -0.02329  -0.05774*** 
(p-value)  (0.0248)  (0.1646)  (0.0079) 
Horizontal  0.00297  0.00892  -0.00938 
(p-value)  (0.6295)  (0.1963)  (0.4627) 
Tender Offer  0.01008  0.01099  0.0084 
(p-value)  (0.2099)  (0.4775)  (0.381) 
Cash Bid  -0.00803     
(p-value)  (0.1983)     
Hostile  0.03565***  0.00604  0.03959** 
(p-value)  (0.0099)  (0.7603)  (0.0427) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.0256***  -0.04201***  0.00773 
(p-value)  (0.0092)  (0.0007)  (0.5919) 
Rumor  0.00998  0.00654  0.01018 
(p-value)  (0.2936)  (0.5695)  (0.5171) 
Complete  -0.0008338  -0.00522  0.00235 
(p-value)  (0.9187)  (0.5749)  (0.8851) 
Adj-R2 -0.0002 0.0463 -0.0003 0.0439 -0.0007 0.1281 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-75   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Bargaining Power estimated over [-42, +126] interval on Baker and Wurgler 
Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of target bargaining power estimated over the interval [-42, +126] Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The 
Bargaining power is estimated following Ahern et. Al (2013) as the ratio of the difference of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of 
Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are 
estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock 
and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the 
sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.09789*** 0.03863 0.11449*** 0.3472*** 0.06278*** -0.54911*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.7032) (<.0001) (0.0037) (<.0001) (0.0008) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy 0.00364 0.00187 0.00122 -0.00061984 -0.00024978 0.00158 
(p-value) (0.6171) (0.7968) (0.8873) (0.9418) (0.9857) (0.9137) 
Target Size  -0.00487  -0.0025  -0.00794 
(p-value)  (0.1891)  (0.5828)  (0.1946) 
Target Turnover  0.00121  0.00128  0.00117 
(p-value)  (0.1801)  (0.2244)  (0.3546) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00543  0.00671  0.01276 
(p-value)  (0.6351)  (0.6419)  (0.4687) 
Target B/M  -0.01811  -0.01573  -0.00929 
(p-value)  (0.1747)  (0.41)  (0.6115) 
Bidder Turnover  0.00126  0.00131  0.00216 
(p-value)  (0.2034)  (0.1636)  (0.1706) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  -0.0432***  -0.05447***  -0.00102 
(p-value)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.9577) 
Bidder B/M  -0.01635***  -0.0344**  -0.00667 
(p-value)  (0.0001)  (0.0267)  (0.1983) 
Relative Size  0.14827*  -0.17719*  0.7492*** 
(p-value)  (0.0943)  (0.0911)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.0054  -0.01323  -0.01737 
(p-value)  (0.8164)  (0.63)  (0.6732) 
Horizontal  0.00192  0.01418  -0.02633 
(p-value)  (0.8689)  (0.3077)  (0.1941) 
Tender Offer  -0.01475  -0.02786  -0.00513 
(p-value)  (0.3034)  (0.3493)  (0.748) 
Cash Bid  -0.04645***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.07718***  0.03175  0.08579** 
(p-value)  (0.0041)  (0.3543)  (0.0395) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.02617  -0.04054  -0.00222 
(p-value)  (0.1977)  (0.117)  (0.9343) 
Rumor  0.00104  -0.00399  0.00274 
(p-value)  (0.9543)  (0.8664)  (0.9093) 
Complete  -0.03346  -0.04159*  -0.0248 
(p-value)  (0.0749)  (0.0661)  (0.4151) 
Adj-R2 -0.0002 0.0443 -0.0004 0.0537 -0.0009 0.0572 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 







Table 4-76   Cross-sectional Regression of Synergy estimated over [-1, +1] interval on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of synergy power estimated over the interval [-1, +1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). Synergy is 
estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the 
announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market 
cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the 
market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP 
Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For 
every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days 
before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 
till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid 
outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the 
first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal 
whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral 
Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. 
We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-
Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al 
(2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the 
logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in 
$Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is 
obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data 
we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether 
the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s 
announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal 
deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** 
indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.02324*** -0.20271*** 0.01297*** -0.11035*** 0.04499*** -0.32439*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0041) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.00597*** -0.00356* -0.00521** -0.00505** -0.0014 0.00005582 
(p-value) (0.005) (0.0797) (0.0329) (0.0355) (0.7343) (0.9879) 
Target Size  -0.0046***  -0.00388****  -0.00832*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0035)  (<.0001) 
Target Turnover  -0.00036376*  -0.00062235**  0.00091904** 
(p-value)  (0.0952)  (0.0154)  (0.0348) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00408  0.00519  0.00541 
(p-value)  (0.1973)  (0.1917)  (0.2459) 
Target B/M  0.01296***  0.00915*  0.01676*** 
(p-value)  (0.0005)  (0.0591)  (0.0083) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00006616  -0.00001943  0.00008649 
(p-value)  (0.2812)  (0.7319)  (0.8198) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.00545  0.00541  0.00774 
(p-value)  (0.1068)  (0.1675)  (0.157) 
Bidder B/M  0.00019226  0.00512**  -0.00001157 
(p-value)  (0.8645)  (0.0329)  (0.992) 
Relative Size  0.32831***  0.19072***  0.58114*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.00904  0.00126  -0.02333** 
(p-value)  (0.1719)  (0.8859)  (0.0213) 
Horizontal  0.00354  0.00342  0.00607 
(p-value)  (0.2957)  (0.3854)  (0.3441) 
Tender Offer  0.0116***  0.02607***  0.00112 
(p-value)  (0.003)  (0.0021)  (0.7914) 
Cash Bid  0.03302***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.02264***  0.04311***  -0.00001677 
(p-value)  (0.001)  (<.0001)  (0.9985) 
Multiple Bidders  0.0012  0.00239  -0.00084688 
(p-value)  (0.8026)  (0.695)  (0.8979) 
Rumor  0.00058795  0.0076  -0.01194 
(p-value)  (0.9205)  (0.3441)  (0.1062) 
Complete  0.01262***  0.00911*  0.02232*** 
(p-value)  (0.0031)  (0.0701)  (0.0012) 
Adj-R2 0.0018 0.1569 0.0013 0.0838 -0.0008 0.3555 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-77   Cross-sectional Regression of Synergy estimated over [-42, +1] interval on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
(BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of synergy power estimated over the interval [-42, +1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). Synergy is 
estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the 
announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market 
cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the 
market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP 
Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For 
every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days 
before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 
till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid 
outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the 
first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal 
whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral 
Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. 
We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-
Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al 
(2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the 
logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in 
$Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is 
obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data 
we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether 
the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s 
announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal 
deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** 
indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.02501*** -0.23517*** 0.01358*** -0.16916** 0.04931*** -0.33855*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0232) (<.0001) (0.0004) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.00882** -0.00581 -0.01165** -0.01251** 0.00717 0.01184 
(p-value) (0.0409) (0.1679) (0.0237) (0.0131) (0.3647) (0.1244) 
Target Size  -0.0083***  -0.00686**  -0.01285*** 
(p-value)  (0.0007)  (0.0213)  (0.0006) 
Target Turnover  -0.00079809  -0.00133  0.00137* 
(p-value)  (0.2303)  (0.1119)  (0.0795) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00741  -0.00002315  0.02837*** 
(p-value)  (0.2896)  (0.9979)  (0.0073) 
Target B/M  0.0302***  0.02532**  0.03156** 
(p-value)  (0.0007)  (0.0315)  (0.0143) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00043146  -0.00037374  -0.00010108 
(p-value)  (0.1331)  (0.2262)  (0.9111) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.01976***  0.01888**  0.02439** 
(p-value)  (0.0039)  (0.0226)  (0.0349) 
Bidder B/M  0.00218  0.01423**  0.00017999 
(p-value)  (0.3043)  (0.0107)  (0.9339) 
Relative Size  0.4314***  0.2743***  0.70981*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.01528  -0.01039  -0.01848 
(p-value)  (0.2927)  (0.5922)  (0.3982) 
Horizontal  0.00701  0.00488  0.01581 
(p-value)  (0.3397)  (0.5781)  (0.219) 
Tender Offer  0.00847  0.01729  0.00226 
(p-value)  (0.3211)  (0.3586)  (0.8124) 
Cash Bid  0.04166***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.03897**  0.08285***  -0.00576 
(p-value)  (0.0127)  (0.0002)  (0.7969) 
Multiple Bidders  0.00788  0.01596  -0.01063 
(p-value)  (0.4655)  (0.2506)  (0.4533) 
Rumor  0.00602  0.01498  -0.00864 
(p-value)  (0.6011)  (0.3266)  (0.6015) 
Complete  0.03442***  0.03694***  0.03337** 
(p-value)  (0.0004)  (0.0015)  (0.0407) 
Adj-R2 0.0007 0.0755 0.0014 0.0565 -0.0002 0.1427 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-78   Cross-sectional Regression of Synergy estimated over [-42, +126] interval on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
(BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of synergy power estimated over the interval [-42, +126] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). Synergy is 
estimated as the ratio of the sum of Target and Acquirer Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) divided by the sum of Target and Acquirer market cap obtained 42 days before the 
announcement. The Dollar CARs are obtained as the sum of the dollar Abnormal Returns (AR). The dollar AR are estimated by multiplying the daily AR by the lagged daily market 
cap for the corresponding firm.  The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the 
market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP 
Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For 
every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days 
before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 
till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid 
outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the 
first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal 
whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral 
Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. 
We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-
Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al 
(2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target 
stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the 
logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in 
$Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is 
obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and 
subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio 
calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data 
we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether 
the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s 
announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal 
deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** 
indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.02916*** -0.66818*** 0.11449*** 0.3472*** 0.03136*** -0.61747*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.001) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.01447* -0.00821 0.00122 -0.00061984 0.00691 0.01226 
(p-value) (0.0984) (0.3343) (0.8873) (0.9418) (0.6116) (0.3604) 
Target Size  0.0027  -0.0025  -0.00703 
(p-value)  (0.5695)  (0.5828)  (0.2973) 
Target Turnover  -0.00325***  0.00128  0.00325** 
(p-value)  (0.0031)  (0.2244)  (0.0138) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00787  0.00671  0.026 
(p-value)  (0.5704)  (0.6419)  (0.1668) 
Target B/M  0.12234***  -0.01573  0.08602*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.41)  (0.0001) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00118  0.00131  -0.0016 
(p-value)  (0.2698)  (0.1636)  (0.3155) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.0481***  -0.05447***  0.02882 
(p-value)  (0.0007)  (0.0002)  (0.1511) 
Bidder B/M  0.01843***  -0.0344**  0.00834 
(p-value)  (0.0015)  (0.0267)  (0.109) 
Relative Size  0.47635***  -0.17719*  0.77867*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0911)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02087  -0.01323  -0.09256** 
(p-value)  (0.4997)  (0.63)  (0.0263) 
Horizontal  0.02489*  0.01418  0.02777 
(p-value)  (0.0952)  (0.3077)  (0.2051) 
Tender Offer  0.02721*  -0.02786  0.0147 
(p-value)  (0.0707)  (0.3493)  (0.3598) 
Cash Bid  0.08511***  0.03175   
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.3543)   
Hostile  0.10028***  -0.04054  0.07331 
(p-value)  (0.0021)  (0.117)  (0.1449) 
Multiple Bidders  0.06322***  -0.00399  0.05043* 
(p-value)  (0.0067)  (0.8664)  (0.0765) 
Rumor  -0.00949  -0.04159*  -0.01471 
(p-value)  (0.699)  (0.0661)  (0.5821) 
Complete  0.16808***  0.09834**  0.12767*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0396)  (<.0001) 
Adj-R2 0.0004 0.1011 -0.0004 0.0537 -0.0007 0.0878 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 








Table 4-79   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Runup ‘CAR[-42, -2]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target CAR estimated over the runup period on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s 
stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before 
the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the 
sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnormal Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.0442*** 0.2934*** 0.03959*** 0.27646*** 0.05414*** 0.32799*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0044) (<.0001) (0.0057) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy 0.00836 0.0079 0.00288 -0.00034694 0.02768** 0.02637** 
(p-value) (0.1464) (0.1658) (0.6691) (0.9582) (0.0126) (0.0174) 
Target Size  -0.00613**  -0.00219  -0.01625*** 
(p-value)  (0.0261)  (0.4918)  (0.0019) 
Target Turnover  -0.00064645  -0.00105  0.00226** 
(p-value)  (0.2633)  (0.1168)  (0.0238) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.00721  -0.0122  0.00553 
(p-value)  (0.3822)  (0.2305)  (0.6981) 
Target B/M  0.05936***  0.07633***  0.03859** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0394) 
Relative Size  -0.22924***  -0.34434***  -0.00392 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.9607) 
Toehold Exist  -0.03469**  -0.03586*  -0.04371* 
(p-value)  (0.0239)  (0.0515)  (0.0973) 
Horizontal  0.00681  0.01116  -0.00665 
(p-value)  (0.4039)  (0.254)  (0.6458) 
Tender Offer  0.0129  0.00026285  0.0112 
(p-value)  (0.2245)  (0.9899)  (0.3648) 
Cash Bid  0.00016048     
(p-value)  (0.9845)     
Hostile  0.00411  0.01548  -0.01769 
(p-value)  (0.8397)  (0.5601)  (0.5583) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.01501  -0.02767*  -0.0029 
(p-value)  (0.246)  (0.0842)  (0.887) 
Rumor  0.08552***  0.0591***  0.12187*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0018)  (<.0001) 
Complete  0.03503***  0.0446***  0.00837 
(p-value)  (0.002)  (0.0011)  (0.6421) 
Adj-R2 0.0004 0.0358 -0.0003 0.0417 0.0061 0.0527 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-80   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Runup ‘[(P-2 / P-42) - 1]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target Runup on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is 
estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected 
return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day 
to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal are 
brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the 
deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index 
spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of 
Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when 
sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the 
announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 
months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from 
SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnormal Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) 
– we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our 
sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price 
based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the 
announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the 
CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the 
stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the 
announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the 
average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning 
of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the 
bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 
5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC 
code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-
value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.0763*** 0.4735*** 0.07108*** 0.45928*** 0.08744*** 0.51481*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy 0.00002803 -0.00163 -0.00254 -0.00757 0.01112 0.0077 
(p-value) (0.9961) (0.7734) (0.7011) (0.2468) (0.3338) (0.5196) 
Target Size  -0.00833***  -0.00484  -0.01805*** 
(p-value)  (0.003)  (0.1596)  (0.0011) 
Target Turnover  -0.00024204  -0.00057441  0.00182* 
(p-value)  (0.6552)  (0.344)  (0.0812) 
Target NYSE/Amex  -0.01537*  -0.01931  -0.00291 
(p-value)  (0.0651)  (0.0612)  (0.8423) 
Target B/M  0.01675  0.00918  0.02903 
(p-value)  (0.1216)  (0.4862)  (0.1057) 
Relative Size  -0.30385***  -0.42057***  -0.09815 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.2669) 
Toehold Exist  -0.05895***  -0.07594***  -0.04304* 
(p-value)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0942) 
Horizontal  -0.00561  -0.0049  -0.01162 
(p-value)  (0.4896)  (0.6142)  (0.4378) 
Tender Offer  0.00077249  -0.00938  0.00008264 
(p-value)  (0.9437)  (0.6484)  (0.995) 
Cash Bid  -0.00244     
(p-value)  (0.7742)     
Hostile  -0.00588  -0.00112  -0.02213 
(p-value)  (0.766)  (0.9671)  (0.443) 
Multiple Bidders  -0.00658  -0.01665  -0.00233 
(p-value)  (0.6129)  (0.3048)  (0.9128) 
Rumor  0.09493***  0.08188***  0.11478*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0001)  (<.0001) 
Complete  0.04464***  0.05064***  0.02772 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.1477) 
Adj-R2 -0.0003 0.0379 -0.0003 0.0408 0.0001 0.0445 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 







Table 4-81   Cross-sectional Regression of Bidder CAR [-42,-2] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Bidder CAR estimated over the runup period on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s 
stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before 
the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the 
sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -0.00066368 -0.07863 0.00042755 -0.1584 -0.00287 0.04938 
(p-value) (0.8152) (0.3491) (0.9075) (0.1311) (0.4962) (0.7194) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.0014 -0.00221 -0.00528 -0.00553 0.00935 0.01005 
(p-value) (0.7383) (0.5955) (0.312) (0.2775) (0.1593) (0.1695) 
Bidder Size  -0.00176  -0.00311  -0.00006764 
(p-value)  (0.3749)  (0.215)  (0.9823) 
Bidder Turnover  -0.00029763  -0.00032777  0.00011032 
(p-value)  (0.3031)  (0.2653)  (0.9118) 
Bidder NYSE/Amex  0.00991  0.00932  0.01384 
(p-value)  (0.1031)  (0.2122)  (0.1759) 
Bidder B/M  0.00643***  0.01417*  0.00262 
(p-value)  (0.0004)  (0.0508)  (0.1885) 
Target Turnover  0.00000972  -0.00003475  0.00002093 
(p-value)  (0.9863)  (0.9581)  (0.9748) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.00045011  -0.00635  0.0174* 
(p-value)  (0.9442)  (0.4405)  (0.0822) 
Target B/M  -0.00081116  -0.01606  0.01246 
(p-value)  (0.9087)  (0.1477)  (0.1814) 
CAR [-42,-2] Target  0.18379***  0.22352***  0.09876*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0004) 
CAR [-1,+1] Target  0.05766***  0.09988***  -0.00372 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.8486) 
Relative Size  0.11587**  0.20752***  -0.03043 
(p-value)  (0.0277)  (0.0013)  (0.7416) 
Toehold Exist  0.00775  0.01109  0.01406 
(p-value)  (0.5632)  (0.5242)  (0.5041) 
Horizontal  -0.0013  -0.00404  0.00373 
(p-value)  (0.8463)  (0.6167)  (0.7418) 
Tender Offer  -0.00616  -0.00823  0.00661 
(p-value)  (0.4482)  (0.6238)  (0.5158) 
Cash Bid  -0.00257     
(p-value)  (0.6654)     
Hostile  0.00338  0.02805  -0.01907 
(p-value)  (0.8177)  (0.1995)  (0.3688) 
Multiple Bidders  0.01836*  0.03519***  -0.00911 
(p-value)  (0.0604)  (0.0052)  (0.5159) 
Rumor  -0.02475**  -0.0193  -0.02509* 
(p-value)  (0.0123)  (0.1292)  (0.0792) 
Complete  0.00833  0.01453  -0.0099 
(p-value)  (0.3917)  (0.201)  (0.6082) 
Adj-R2 -0.0002 0.058 0 0.0855 0.0008 0.018 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 





Table 4-82   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Markup ‘CAR[-1, +126]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target CAR estimated over markup period [-1, +126] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of 
the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading 
days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
(BW) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index 
levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per 
the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample 
to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.18843*** 0.1465 0.14773*** 0.11078 0.2744*** 0.28294 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.2086) (<.0001) (0.4417) (<.0001) (0.155) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.00959 -0.00337 0.00169 -0.00155 -0.01589 0.0013 
(p-value) (0.3088) (0.6956) (0.8794) (0.8798) (0.3411) (0.9362) 
Target Size  0.01459***  0.01352***  0.01118 
(p-value)  (0.0018)  (0.0089)  (0.2095) 
Target Turnover  -0.00152*  -0.00227**  0.00369** 
(p-value)  (0.0805)  (0.0258)  (0.041) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.01751  0.01219  0.04052* 
(p-value)  (0.2077)  (0.4663)  (0.0926) 
Target B/M  0.18864***  0.21896***  0.14681*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0013) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  0.14875***  0.21347***  -0.08953 
(p-value)  (0.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.1738) 
Relative Size  -0.55625***  -0.57737***  -0.44441*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0015) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02021  -0.01428  -0.0424 
(p-value)  (0.4832)  (0.7247)  (0.2804) 
Horizontal  0.02105  0.02732*  0.0036 
(p-value)  (0.1249)  (0.0915)  (0.8902) 
Tender Offer  0.05331***  0.02145  0.07628*** 
(p-value)  (0.0081)  (0.6247)  (0.0003) 
Cash Bid  0.04815***     
(p-value)  (0.0009)     
Hostile  0.19968***  0.19127***  0.14988*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0037) 
Multiple Bidders  0.12072***  0.10438***  0.13963*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0006)  (0.0003) 
Rumor  -0.10939***  -0.09785***  -0.10236*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0019)  (0.0047) 
Complete  0.20947***  0.24451***  0.08082** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0312) 
Adj-R2 0 0.1444 -0.0004 0.1448 -0.0001 0.1267 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 







Table 4-83   Cross-sectional Regression of Target Markup ‘[(Final Offer Price / P-1) - 1]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment 
Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target Markup [(Final Offer Price / P-1) - 1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s 
stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before 
the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the 
sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.32051*** 1.05531*** 0.2992*** 0.92302*** 0.36532*** 1.21719*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.01705 -0.01547 -0.0038 -0.00897 -0.04209** -0.03723 
(p-value) (0.1126) (0.1554) (0.7662) (0.4595) (0.0327) (0.1172) 
Target Size  -0.01786*  -0.01228  -0.03318* 
(p-value)  (0.0967)  (0.3019)  (0.0826) 
Target Turnover  0.00102  0.00065411  0.00291* 
(p-value)  (0.2116)  (0.4641)  (0.0563) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.0564**  0.04151  0.09346 
(p-value)  (0.0293)  (0.1173)  (0.1007) 
Target B/M  0.07816***  0.0943***  0.06291 
(p-value)  (0.0025)  (0.0004)  (0.1593) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  -0.23704***  -0.21703***  -0.3432*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.45736***  -0.52297***  -0.26258 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.2323) 
Toehold Exist  -0.0755***  -0.05412*  -0.09084** 
(p-value)  (0.0017)  (0.0958)  (0.0153) 
Horizontal  -0.00833  -0.000501  -0.0365 
(p-value)  (0.6662)  (0.9813)  (0.3735) 
Tender Offer  0.07266***  0.0971**  0.06363** 
(p-value)  (0.0021)  (0.0252)  (0.0123) 
Cash Bid  -0.00888     
(p-value)  (0.5207)     
Hostile  0.11806***  0.09746*  0.12497** 
(p-value)  (0.0051)  (0.0619)  (0.0343) 
Multiple Bidders  0.04797  0.0502  0.03682 
(p-value)  (0.1562)  (0.2879)  (0.3597) 
Rumor  -0.06559**  -0.044  -0.08813*** 
(p-value)  (0.0253)  (0.2982)  (0.0004) 
Complete  -0.02827  -0.03659  -0.00081491 
(p-value)  (0.3302)  (0.3343)  (0.9806) 
Adj-R2 0.0003 0.057 -0.0004 0.0543 0.0024 0.0451 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-84   Cross-sectional Regression of Target CAR [-1,+1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Target CAR estimated over the announcement period [-1,+1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of 
the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading 
days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
(BW) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index 
levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per 
the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample 
to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.20694*** 0.71969*** 0.16663*** 0.66922*** 0.29198*** 0.83211*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.01234** -0.00579 0.00272 -0.00179 -0.03006** -0.01671 
(p-value) (0.0319) (0.2611) (0.6551) (0.7402) (0.0157) (0.1845) 
Target Size  0.00274  0.00375  -0.00445 
(p-value)  (0.2986)  (0.2022)  (0.4285) 
Target Turnover  -0.00027593  -0.0006402  0.00223* 
(p-value)  (0.5441)  (0.1854)  (0.0818) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.0087  0.00385  0.02324 
(p-value)  (0.2978)  (0.6831)  (0.1655) 
Target B/M  0.07705***  0.08775***  0.06324*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0096) 
CAR [-42,-2] Target  -0.17399***  -0.15101***  -0.25656*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.66724***  -0.7119***  -0.51968*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Toehold Exist  -0.04445***  -0.03449*  -0.05464** 
(p-value)  (0.0022)  (0.0629)  (0.0309) 
Horizontal  0.01038  0.009  0.00967 
(p-value)  (0.1953)  (0.2804)  (0.6304) 
Tender Offer  0.05693***  0.05498**  0.05781*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0104)  (<.0001) 
Cash Bid  0.0559***     
(p-value)  (<.0001)     
Hostile  0.06037***  0.07168***  0.03117 
(p-value)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.2753) 
Multiple Bidders  0.00435  -0.00902  0.03026 
(p-value)  (0.7293)  (0.5343)  (0.2288) 
Rumor  -0.05935***  -0.03716**  -0.08864*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0229)  (<.0001) 
Complete  0.03509***  0.03626***  0.02938 
(p-value)  (0.0003)  (0.0006)  (0.1731) 
Adj-R2 0.001 0.1818 -0.0003 0.1331 0.0044 0.13 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 





Table 4-85   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the 
expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the 
announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the 
sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.23264*** 0.1465 0.18732*** 0.11078 0.32854*** 0.28294 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.2086) (<.0001) (0.4417) (<.0001) (0.155) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.00123 -0.00337 0.00457 -0.00155 0.0118 0.0013 
(p-value) (0.9186) (0.6956) (0.7487) (0.8798) (0.5844) (0.9362) 
Target Size  0.01459***  0.01352***  0.01118 
(p-value)  (0.0018)  (0.0089)  (0.2095) 
Target Turnover  -0.00152*  -0.00227**  0.00369** 
(p-value)  (0.0805)  (0.0258)  (0.041) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.01751  0.01219  0.04052* 
(p-value)  (0.2077)  (0.4663)  (0.0926) 
Target B/M  0.18864***  0.21896***  0.14681*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0013) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  1.14875***  1.21347***  0.91047*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.55625***  -0.57737***  -0.44441*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0015) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02021  -0.01428  -0.0424 
(p-value)  (0.4832)  (0.7247)  (0.2804) 
Horizontal  0.02105  0.02732*  0.0036 
(p-value)  (0.1249)  (0.0915)  (0.8902) 
Tender Offer  0.05331***  0.02145  0.07628*** 
(p-value)  (0.0081)  (0.6247)  (0.0003) 
Cash Bid  0.04815***     
(p-value)  (0.0009)     
Hostile  0.19968***  0.19127***  0.14988*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0037) 
Multiple Bidders  0.12072***  0.10438***  0.13963*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0006)  (0.0003) 
Rumor  -0.10939***  -0.09785***  -0.10236*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0019)  (0.0047) 
Complete  0.20947***  0.24451***  0.08082** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0312) 
Adj-R2 -0.0003 0.4193 -0.0003 0.4446 -0.0006 0.3308 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 













Table 4-86   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium ‘[(Final Offer Price / P-42) - 1]’ on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index 
(BW) 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium [(Final Offer Price / P-42) - 1] on Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW). The Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the realized return of the firm’s 
stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before 
the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) 
associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted average sentiment index levels 
that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the 
sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to 
Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and 
bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the target stock price 42 
trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on the same target are 
separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal 
value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the deal is completed 
(whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Base d-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and Compustat data on 
both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and Return data is brought 
from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the target stock price 42 days 
before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and markup we estimated 
them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by 
multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 
days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of stockholders equity to 
the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is 
estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before the announcement 
(before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed successfully or not, 
Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the 
bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the 
same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.40946*** 1.29828*** 0.38166*** 1.15173*** 0.46811*** 1.44433*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
BW-Sentiment-Proxy -0.01677 -0.02632** -0.00725 -0.01798 -0.02641 -0.06058** 
(p-value) (0.196) (0.0272) (0.6294) (0.1698) (0.2922) (0.0281) 
Target Size  -0.02313**  -0.0163  -0.03848* 
(p-value)  (0.0383)  (0.1557)  (0.0863) 
Target Turnover  0.00141  0.00105  0.00245 
(p-value)  (0.1756)  (0.3757)  (0.1095) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.04566  0.02886  0.08694 
(p-value)  (0.1176)  (0.3199)  (0.187) 
Target B/M  0.03463  0.0378  0.03786 
(p-value)  (0.2052)  (0.1664)  (0.4553) 
Target CAR [-42,-2]  0.88833***  0.86576***  0.9086*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Relative Size  -0.55248***  -0.67579***  -0.3108 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.2083) 
Toehold Exist  -0.11398***  -0.12187***  -0.08316** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0007)  (0.0315) 
Horizontal  -0.01931  -0.01613  -0.03658 
(p-value)  (0.3523)  (0.4717)  (0.4348) 
Tender Offer  0.06137**  0.07147  0.05773** 
(p-value)  (0.0161)  (0.1019)  (0.0424) 
Cash Bid  -0.01357     
(p-value)  (0.3448)     
Hostile  0.09446**  0.07528  0.09921** 
(p-value)  (0.0169)  (0.1651)  (0.0462) 
Multiple Bidders  0.06702*  0.07252  0.03463 
(p-value)  (0.0691)  (0.1643)  (0.4201) 
Rumor  -0.04462  -0.00663  -0.10742*** 
(p-value)  (0.1615)  (0.8846)  (0.0002) 
Complete  0.00182  -0.0055  0.02736 
(p-value)  (0.9455)  (0.8728)  (0.4273) 
Adj-R2 0.0002 0.1884 -0.0003 0.1971 0 0.152 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 







Table 4-87   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Target  Runup (CAR [-42,-2]) and Runup Multiplied 
by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) Quartiles – Testing Markup Pricing 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium ‘CAR[-42, +126]’ on Target Runup ‘CAR[-42, -2]’ and the Runup multiplied by the sentiment quartile 
dummies.  The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated using daily returns 
spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. The Baker and 
Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to the weighted 
average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. The quartile 
cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are downloaded from 
SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final offer price on SDC 
and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer price divided by the 
target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid contest if bids on 
the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock price on day -42 is 
less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day or 126 days after the 
deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed firms with CRSP and 
Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported by SDC. Price and 
Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the announcement day by the 
target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For the CAR based runup and 
markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the announcement day. The firm market 
cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s equity divided by the Market Value 
of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) by adding the book value of 
stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought from Compustat. Target 
(Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the announcement to 42 days before 
the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – whether the deal was completed 
successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the deal was a tender offer or not, 
Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target 
and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ SIC codes are obtained from 
CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.17391*** 0.13695 0.13561*** 0.10337 0.27158*** 0.28044 
(p-value) (<.0001) (0.2382) (<.0001) (0.4757) (<.0001) (0.1561) 
Target CAR [-42,-2] 1.31964*** 1.23116*** 1.48696*** 1.3608** 0.99323*** 0.94451*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Q2 x Target CAR [-42,-2] -0.11754 -0.07826 -0.14593 -0.07758 -0.11577 -0.10668 
(p-value) (0.5044) (0.6152) (0.5341) (0.6943) (0.5903) (0.575) 
Q3 x Target CAR [-42,-2] -0.19333 -0.19121 -0.31059 -0.3122 -0.06028 -0.05993 
(p-value) (0.2685) (0.2255) (0.1828) (0.1197) (0.7732) (0.7462) 
Q3 x Target CAR [-42,-2] -0.02155 -0.0372 -0.13272 -0.11639 0.04294 0.04113 
(p-value) (0.8992) (0.8075) (0.5632) (0.5496) (0.8208) (0.8082) 
Target Size  0.01498***  0.01417***  0.01091 
(p-value)  (0.0013)  (0.0062)  (0.2167) 
Target Turnover  -0.00155*  -0.00238**  0.00375** 
(p-value)  (0.0819)  (0.0231)  (0.0392) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.01707  0.01065  0.04108* 
(p-value)  (0.2206)  (0.5262)  (0.0865) 
Target B/M  0.18869***  0.21935***  0.14618*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0012) 
Relative Size  -0.55377***  -0.58158***  -0.43371*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.002) 
Toehold Exist  -0.02001  -0.01269  -0.04464 
(p-value)  (0.4915)  (0.7567)  (0.2554) 
Horizontal  0.02149  0.0284*  0.00269 
(p-value)  (0.1171)  (0.078)  (0.9183) 
Tender Offer  0.05351***  0.02329  0.07544*** 
(p-value)  (0.0068)  (0.5731)  (0.0003) 
Cash Bid  0.04819***     
(p-value)  (0.0008)     
Hostile  0.19836***  0.19062***  0.14981*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0037) 
Multiple Bidders  0.12158***  0.10631***  0.13988*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
Rumor  -0.11022***  -0.10112***  -0.10027*** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (0.0014)  (0.0064) 
Complete  0.21023***  0.24504***  0.08167** 
(p-value)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0298) 
Adj-R2 0.3336 0.4201 0.3735 0.4469 0.2326 0.3305 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 






Table 4-88   Cross-sectional Regression of Premium (Final Offer Price / P-42 - 1) on Target Runup (P-2 / P-42 - 1] ) and Runup 
Multiplied by Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) Quartiles – Testing Markup Pricing 
The below table shows the results of the cross-sectional regressions of Premium (Final Offer Price / P-42 - 1)  on Target Runup (P-2 / P-42 - 1] )  and the Runup multiplied by the 
sentiment quartile dummies.  The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is estimated as sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR) over the specified period. The AR is calculated as the 
difference between the realized return of the firm’s stock and the expected return. The expected return is obtained using the market model (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑚,𝑡  ). This latter is estimated 
using daily returns spanning 253 trading days before the announcement day to 43 days before the announcement day. CRSP Value weighted index was used as a proxy for the market. 
The Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index (BW) associated with the deal are brought from professor Wurgler Website. For every deal, we estimated a sentiment measure that is equal to 
the weighted average sentiment index levels that are available during the deal’s runup period. This latter spans 42 days before the announcement to 2 days before the announcement. 
The quartile cutoffs are estimated as per the sentiment original index spanning the period of our analysis: November 1981 till October 2015. Mergers and Acquisitions deals are 
downloaded from SDC. We limited our sample to Mergers, Acquisitions of Majority Interest and Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. We required that the deal have a reported final 
offer price on SDC and filtered out the top and bottom deals’ percentile when sorted by their offer premium in order to avoid outliers. The offer premium is estimated as the final offer 
price divided by the target stock price 42 trading days before the announcement day. We removed any offer that is not the first offer within a multibid contest. Deals fall into a multibid 
contest if bids on the same target are separated by less than 6 months from each other. We also filtered out any deal whose value is less than $10 Million dollar and whose target stock 
price on day -42 is less than $5. Deal value is brought from SDC. We have also used Target Cumulative Abnomral Return from the beginning of the Runup period till completion day 
or 126 days after the deal is completed (whichever is shorter) – we termed this variable as CAR-Based-Premium. We require that both target and acquirer firms are public US listed 
firms with CRSP and Compustat data on both. We divided our sample into All, Non-Cash-Only (Mixed or Stock-Only) and Cash-Only based on the medium of exchange as reported 
by SDC. Price and Return data is brought from CRSP. For price based runup and markup, we followed Betton et al (2008) by dividing the target stock price 2 days before the 
announcement day by the target stock price 42 days before the announcement date and the Final Offer Price by the target stock price 2 days before the announcement respectively. For 
the CAR based runup and markup we estimated them as the CAR over [-42, -2] and [-1, +126] respectively. Size is the logarithm of the firm market cap 42 days before the 
announcement day. The firm market cap is obtained by multiplying the stock price by the number of shares outstanding (in $Millions). B/M is the ratio of the Book Value of the Firm`s 
equity divided by the Market Value of the Firm 42 days before the announcement. The Book value of the firm’s equity is obtained following the approach of Fama and French (1993) 
by adding the book value of stockholders equity to the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit and subtracting the book value of preferred share – all data are brought 
from Compustat. Target (Acquirer) Turnover is estimated as the average of the Volume to Share Outstanding Ratio calculated over the interval spanning 166 days before the 
announcement to 42 days before the announcement (before the beginning of the runup period).  Relying on SDC deals’ data we created the following dummy variables: complete – 
whether the deal was completed successfully or not, Hostile – whether the bidder attitude was hostile or not, Rumor – whether the deal followed a rumor or not, Tender – whether the 
deal was a tender offer or not, Toehold – whether the bidder had more than 5% ownership of the target at the deal’s announcement, and NYSE/AMEX whether the deal is listed on 
NYSE, AMEX or not. If the target and acquirer share the same four-digit SIC code, the deal is considered a Horizontal deal. Relative size is the ratio of Target to Acquirer size. Firms’ 
SIC codes are obtained from CRSP. Heteroscedasticity consistent white p-value are reported underneath. The *,**,*** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Deal-Type All Deals Non-Cash-Only Cash-Only 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.3231*** 1.05724*** 0.30425*** 0.90586*** 0.37184*** 1.22029*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Target Runup 1.13277*** 1.0823*** 1.06151*** 1.0245*** 1.19243*** 1.11368*** 
(p-value) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Q2 x Target Runup] -0.01476 0.01427 0.12089 0.15234 -0.22026 -0.19486 
(p-value) (0.9129) (0.9158) (0.4688) (0.3538) (0.3241) (0.3319) 
Q3 x Target Runup -0.18957 -0.14749 -0.06535 -0.06053 -0.47684** -0.43811* 
(p-value) (0.1501) (0.2395) (0.6855) (0.6988) (0.0303) (0.0615) 
Q3 x Target Runup -0.09812 -0.09624 -0.01886 -0.02329 -0.20882 -0.18088 
(p-value) (0.4483) (0.451) (0.9058) (0.8852) (0.3367) (0.3598) 
Target Size  -0.01946*  -0.01262  -0.03562* 
(p-value)  (0.0727)  (0.2588)  (0.0992) 
Target Turnover  0.00114  0.00080138  0.00309** 
(p-value)  (0.1782)  (0.3967)  (0.0351) 
Target NYSE/Amex  0.05536*  0.03924  0.09607 
(p-value)  (0.0552)  (0.1709)  (0.1449) 
Target B/M  0.07211***  0.09755***  0.04737 
(p-value)  (0.0051)  (0.0001)  (0.2994) 
Relative Size  -0.44927***  -0.54917***  -0.20168 
(p-value)  (0.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.4305) 
Toehold Exist  -0.08505***  -0.07319**  -0.09312** 
(p-value)  (0.0002)  (0.0155)  (0.022) 
Horizontal  -0.00756  -0.00113  -0.03404 
(p-value)  (0.7092)  (0.9582)  (0.4667) 
Tender Offer  0.07166***  0.0794*  0.06478** 
(p-value)  (0.0044)  (0.0635)  (0.0167) 
Cash Bid  -0.00941     
(p-value)  (0.4959)     
Hostile  0.1038***  0.09059*  0.10486** 
(p-value)  (0.0064)  (0.0794)  (0.0334) 
Multiple Bidders  0.06043*  0.06602  0.03239 
(p-value)  (0.0907)  (0.1923)  (0.4361) 
Rumor  -0.06757**  -0.04321  -0.10642*** 
(p-value)  (0.0285)  (0.3287)  (0.0001) 
Complete  -0.01114  -0.01799  0.01246 
(p-value)  (0.6693)  (0.5905)  (0.7255) 
Adj-R2 0.1991 0.2395 0.2197 0.2658 0.1524 0.1677 
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 










This thesis examines mergers and acquisitions from three different angles. In the first essay 
(Chapter Two) we estimate the average of the implied volatility (AIV) and the volatility of the 
implied volatility (VIV) for both targets and bidders. We use AIV and VIV as a proxy for risk 
and uncertainty about risk and show that these measures can in part, explain the choice of the 
medium of exchange, bidder firm investors’ reaction to a deal announcement as well the chances 
that the deal will be completed successfully.  Also, we analyze the behavior of the implied 
volatilities of target and acquirer firms and show that target implied volatility approaches the 
acquirers’ implied volatility for stock or mixed offers and drops to a much lower level for cash-
only offers. The results of this paper suggest future research on the ability of AIV and VIV to 
predict the future long-term performance of the newly merged firm. 
 In the second essay (Chapter Three), we show that the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is 
stronger in periods of higher market and acquisition activities. The idiosyncratic puzzle refers to 
the negative relationship between stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility and next month return (Ang et 
al., 2006). We hypothesize that a firm undergoing a merger and acquisition will go through 
structural uncertainty which will be captured by the idiosyncratic volatility since it is more firm-
specific than market-wide. Also, previous literature establishes a relationship between mergers 
and acquisitions clustering (merger waves) and stock overpricing (Shleifer and Vishney, 2003;  
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2003). This leads us to conclude that in periods of high merger 
and acquisition activities, the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle is stronger than in periods of low 
merger and acquisition activities boosted by the target and acquirer specific uncertainty and the 
accompanying market-wide overvaluations. Our findings confirm our hypothesis. The results of 
our tests vary across the different merger waves we have identified. It would be interesting for 
future research to investigate how the particularity of each merger wave affects the idiosyncratic 
volatility puzzle and whether the puzzle is stronger for a specific industry undergoing 
technological changes that are leading to increased levels of merger and acquisition activities. 
 In the third essay, we examine whether the different parties involved in a merger and 
acquisition deal behave differently in periods of high investors' sentiment versus periods of low 
investors’ sentiment. We show that periods of high sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Baker 
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and Wu, 2012) are associated with higher chances of stock or mixed offers, lower bidder 
announcement reactions and higher target bargaining power for stock or mixed offers but higher 
synergy for cash-only offers. Our results can be interpreted within the context of possible 
overpricing: in periods of higher market sentiment there is a higher chance that bidder firms’ 
stock is overpriced. Consequently, the bidder firm will try to build on this possible overvaluation 
and opt for a stock or mixed offer. When the bidder investors receive this overvaluation signal, 
they react accordingly, and we observe a more pronounced drop in the bidder stock return around 
the announcement for stock (mixed) offers occurring in high sentiment periods. Also, target 
firms know that they might be paid with an overvalued bidder stock and bargain more. Bidder 
firms themselves may also pay cash for an overvalued target stock. As such, they exert all their 
due diligence to make sure the deal is profitable. This results in higher synergy for cash-only 
offers in periods of higher market sentiment. 
 In a related setting, we also show that target runup is higher for periods of higher investor 
sentiment. The target runup is explained by the literature (Schwert, 1996; King, 2012) as the 
increase in the target stock price due to information about the deal being leaked to the market or 
possibly to the increase in the standalone target value. In both cases, the runup is the result of a 
positive signal about the target firms. We argue that optimistic investors will overreact to this 
positive news in periods of high market sentiment. Our findings support this argument: there a 
positive relationship between target runup and investor sentiment. What is surprising is that this 
higher target runup does not translate into a higher premium. It appears that bidder firms know 
that the higher runup during high sentiment periods is simply an overreaction and they do not 
take it into full consideration while pricing the deal. Our results highlight the importance of 
market aggregate sentiment on different aspects of mergers and acquisitions. 
